Opinion
2:21-cv-00364-HL
02-26-2024
SHAWN MARTIN; KAREN MARTIN, Plaintiffs, v. JOEL HANNU; BALJINDER SINGH, LUIS FELIPE GASTELUM VALENZUELA; JOHN DOE DRIVER 1; JOHN DOE DRIVER 2, Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
HALLMAN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiffs Shawn Martin (“Martin”) and Karen Martin are husband and wife and bring this diversity action against Defendants Baljinder Singh (“Singh”) and Luis Felipe Gastelum Valenzuela (“Valenzuela”), alleging negligence and negligence per se based on a multi-vehicle accident on Interstate 84 outside of Pendleton, Oregon. Singh and Valenzuela now move for summary judgment. ECF 46, 55. This Court heard oral argument on both motions on November 16, 2023. For the reasons set forth below, both motions should be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Plaintiff Joel Hannu was previously dismissed from this lawsuit. ECF 31. Further, at oral argument, Plaintiffs acknowledged that the John Doe defendants should be dismissed from this lawsuit. Tr. 5.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts, and all reasonable inferences, are recited in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Plaintiffs. Earl v. Nielsen Media Rsch., Inc., 658 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2011).
The accident occurred on February 4, 2019, on Interstate 84 westbound on Cabbage Hill. Compl. ¶4. The freeway was open and it was starting to snow, but the roads were clear. Zekala Dec. Ex. 9, Glerup Depo. 16:10-20, ECF 58-1. However, there was dense fog in the small area between the two freeway exits where the accident occurred, which became worse the further the parties traveled down the hill. Martin Depo. 76:05-76:15, 168:7-169:03, 170:19-171:5.
All parties have included excerpts of Martin's deposition. Williams Dec. Ex. 2, ECF 47; Cramer Dec. Ex. G, ECF 56-5; Zakala Dec., Ex 2.
Defendants Singh and Valenzuela were driving semi-trucks on the day of the accident. When Singh and Valenzuela neared the offramp for a viewpoint, they encountered a highway that was completely blocked by prior collisions. Valenzuela was in the right lane of travel, and Singh was to his left. Singh came upon a Black Ford Escape, and rear-ended that car, which propelled it forward and to the right. Singh's tractor-trailer continued forward and moved from the left to the right lane, crossing in front of Valenzuela's vehicle and forcing Valenzuela's vehicle onto the off-ramp. Williams Dec. Ex. 9, Isbister Report, ECF 47.
Plaintiffs have not introduced any accident reconstruction evidence or other evidence that would dispute Singh and Valenzuela's assertions concerning the timing and sequence of events that led to them stopping in the freeway. Accordingly, this Court accepts those assertions as undisputed for purposes of this motion.
Martin was driving a pickup owned by his employer and Dylan Smith was riding in the front passenger seat. Martin Depo. 55:2-4. Martin continued to drive and encountered increasingly foggy conditions. Martin Depo. 78. No more than ten seconds after Singh and Valenzuela had stopped, Martin encountered their tractor trailers. Tr. 42-43 (counsel's stipulation as to timing). Martin asserts that he was travelling at 25 m.p.h. Martin Depo. 77:22, 145:11. He was encountering “near-zero visibility” due to the fog when he first saw the rear of Valenzuela's tractor-trailer about 15 feet in front of him. Martin Depo. 52:8-9.
In their briefing, Defendants emphasize two facts regarding Martin's conduct prior to the collision: First, as Martin entered Interstate 84 westbound from the Old Emigrant Highway entrance ramp, he encountered Oregon Department of Transportation employee Ryan McLaughlin, who warned him of a stalled vehicle or accident in the left lane, about two miles ahead. Martin Depo. 66:5-9; Smith Depo. 17:19-27, 18:1-5. Second, Martin pulled out of the right lane to pass another vehicle and then got back into the right lane despite this warning. Smith Depo., 18:1-19. Neither of these facts is relevant to either Singh or Valenzuela's alleged negligence.
Valenzuela had not activated his rear flashers. Smith Depo. 79:5-14. Plaintiff applied his brakes but did not have enough time to stop and collided with Valenzuela's vehicle. Martin Depo. 170:13-171:24.
Plaintiffs allege that Martin sustained serious injuries in the accident. Compl. ¶12. Martin brings suit against Singh and Valenzuela for negligence and negligence per se. Id. ¶¶14-28. Plaintiff Karen Martin brings claims for loss of consortium. Id. ¶¶29-31.
LEGAL STANDARDS
I. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(A) (2019). THE MOVING PARTY BEARS THE INITIAL BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING THE absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To meet this burden, the party asserting that a fact cannot be genuinely disputed must support that assertion with admissible evidence. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(C).
If the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must go beyond the allegations in the complaint to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. A party cannot defeat a summary judgment motion by relying on the allegations set forth in the complaint, unsupported conjecture, or conclusory statements. Hernandez v. Spacelabs Med., Inc., 343 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2003). Summary judgment thus should be entered against “a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
The court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Bell v. Cameron Meadows Land Co., 669 F.2d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1982). All reasonable doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue of fact should be resolved against the moving party. Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 432 (9th Cir. 1976).
II. Negligence
To establish negligence under Oregon common law, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant's conduct “created a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of legally cognizable harm to the plaintiff and that the conduct in fact caused that kind of harm to the plaintiff.” Sloan ex rel. Estate of Sloan v. Providence Health Sys. Oregon, 364 Or. 635, 642 (2019); Stewart v. Jefferson Plywood Co., 255 Or 603, 609 (1970) (under Oregon law, an actor is negligent if he “ought reasonably to foresee that he will expose another to an unreasonable risk of harm”).
The concept of foreseeability “refers to the generalized risks of the type of incidents and injuries that occurred, rather than predictability of the actual sequence of events.” Fazzolari v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 303 Or. 1, 22 (1987). Oregon law does not require a plaintiff “to precisely forecast a specific harm to a particular person.” Piazza v. Kellim, 360 Or. 58, 80 (2016). “A dispute in a negligence action about whether an injury was foreseeable generally presents an issue of fact and, therefore, is not a likely candidate for summary judgment. There are some cases, however, in which no reasonable factfinder could find the risk of harm to be reasonably foreseeable.” Cunningham v. Happy Palace, Inc., 157 Or.App. 334, 337, 970 P.2d 669, 671 (1998).
The plaintiff in a negligence action “must also prove an actual causal link between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's harm-that is, the plaintiff must prove ‘cause in fact.'” Towe v. Sacagawea, Inc., 357 Or. 74, 86 (2015). As the Oregon Court of Appeals explained, this rule “prevents jurors from speculating about causation in cases where that determination requires expertise beyond the knowledge and expertise of an ordinary lay person.” Baughman, 200 Or.App. at 18 (citing Howerton v. Pfaff, 246 Or. 341, 347-48 (1967)).
III. Negligence Per Se
“[N]egligence per se claim is not a separate type of negligence claim with its own elements.” Moody v. Oregon Cmty. Credit Union, 371 Or. 772, 781 (2023). Rather, it
is a shorthand descriptor for a negligence claim in which the standard of care is expressed by a statute or rule. When a negligence claim otherwise exists, and a statute or rule defines the standard of care expected of a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances, a violation of that statute or rule establishes a presumption of negligence. Once a violation is proven, the burden shifts to the violator to prove that he or she acted reasonably under the circumstances. A statute that sets a standard of care addresses only one element of a negligence claim; other elements remain unaffected and must be established.Deckard v. Bunch, 358 Or. 754, 761 n.6 (2016) (simplified).
“[V]iolations of statutory safety rules by themselves provide the element of negligence with respect to those risks that the rules are meant to prevent, at least unless the violator shows that his conduct in fact did not violate the rule under the circumstance.” Shahtout By & Through Shahtout v. Emco Garbage Co., 298 Or. 598, 601, 695 P.2d 897, 899 (1985). When a party invokes a governmental rule to establish negligence, “the question is whether the rule, though it was not itself meant to create a civil claim, nevertheless so fixes the legal standard of conduct that there is no question of due care left for a factfinder to determine; in other words, that noncompliance with the rule is negligence as a matter of law.” Axen v. Am. Home Prod. Corp. ex rel. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 158 Or.App. 292, 307, opinion adhered to as modified on reconsideration sub nom. Axen v. Am. Home Prod. Corp., 160 Or.App. 19 (1999).
DISCUSSION
I. Negligence Per Se
Plaintiffs allege negligence per se based on Singh and Valenzuela's alleged failure to comply with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulation (“FMCSR”), 49 C.F.R. § 392.14, which pertains to discontinuing operation of a vehicle in hazardous conditions, and FMCSR, 49 C.F.R. § 392.22, which addresses activation of warning devices. Compl. ¶¶20-28.
In their complaint, Plaintiffs asserted negligence per se claims based on alleged violations of the California Commercial Drivers handbook and the Oregon Commercial Driver Manual. Compl. ¶22. In their briefing and at oral argument, Plaintiffs clarified that neither the handbook nor the Manual gave rise to separate claims for negligence per se. Resp. 23; Tr. 56.
Plaintiffs' first negligence per se claim is premised on Singh and Valenzuela's alleged failure to discontinue operation of their vehicles due to dangerous weather conditions, which they assert was a violation of the standards set forth in 49 C.F.R. § 392.14. Resp. 18. That regulation states in full:
Extreme caution in the operation of a commercial motor vehicle shall be exercised when hazardous conditions, such as those caused by snow, ice, sleet, fog, mist, rain, dust, or smoke, adversely affect visibility or traction. Speed shall be reduced when such conditions exist. If conditions become sufficiently dangerous, the operation of the commercial motor vehicle shall be discontinued and shall not be resumed until the commercial motor vehicle can be safely operated. Whenever compliance with the foregoing provisions of this rule increases hazard to passengers, the commercial motor vehicle may be operated to the nearest point at which the safety of passengers is assured.
49 C.F.R. § 392.14 (emphasis added). Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on this claim because this rule is not sufficiently specific to fix the standard of care. This Court agrees.
Although 49 C.F.R. § 392.14 requires the driver to discontinue operation of the vehicle, this requirement only comes into play when conditions “become sufficiently dangerous.” The term “sufficiently dangerous” does not “so fix[] the legal standard of conduct” such that there is nothing left for a jury to resolve. See Axen, 158 Or.App. at 307. To the contrary, the requirement would, at most, require the operator to exercise reasonable care in making determination as to whether conditions were sufficiently dangerous. See Kim v. Multnomah Cnty. ex rel. Multnomah Cnty. Cmty. Dep't of Cmty. Corr., 328 Or. 140, 153 (1998) (affirming trial court's grant of summary judgment on negligence per se claim where the statute would only require the defendant to exercise reasonable care). It does not provide “advance warning of the specific conduct that is prohibited.” Moody, 371 Or. at 799 (emphasis added). Thus, while the provisions of 49 C.F.R. § 392.14 are relevant to the negligence determination, see Shahtout, 298 Or. at 604, they do not so fix the legal standard of conduct such that there are no issues for the jury to resolve. Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' negligence per se claims under 49 C.F.R. § 392.14.
Valenzuela also asserts that he cannot be liable for any harm caused by his alleged failure to comply with 49 C.F.R. § 392.14 because he was in complete control of his vehicle at the time of the accident and 49 C.F.R. § 392.14 was not designed to protect against the harm of a person rear-ending a stopped vehicle on the roadway. See Moody, 371 Or. 772, 798-99 (the injury plaintiff suffered is of a type that the statute was enacted to prevent). This Court agrees that 49 C.F.R. § 392.14 was “designed to protect against the possibility that as conditions become hazardous the truck driver will be more prone to lose control of his vehicle and cause an accident.” Labbee v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 469 F.2d 169, 172 (8th Cir. 1972). It was not designed to protect against harm sustained when an individual rear-ends a vehicle that the driver was in complete control of. Thus, Valenzuela would be entitled to summary judgment on this alternative ground.
Plaintiffs' next negligence per se claim is premised on Singh and Valenzuela's alleged failure to activate their hazard lights, which they assert was a violation of the standards set forth in 49 C.F.R. § 392.22(a). Resp. 18. That regulation states in relevant part:
Whenever a commercial motor vehicle is stopped upon the traveled portion of a highway or the shoulder of a highway for any cause other than necessary traffic stops, the driver of the stopped commercial motor vehicle shall immediately activate the vehicular hazard warning signal flashers and continue the flashing until the driver places the warning devices required by paragraph (b) of this section.
49 C.F.R. § 392.22(a) (emphasis added). Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on this claim because the undisputed material facts demonstrate that this was a “necessary traffic stop.” This Court agrees.
49 C.F.R. § 392.22(a), by its terms, does not apply to “necessary traffic stops.” Here, there is no dispute that both Singh and Valenzuela were required to abruptly - and necessarily -stop due to accidents that occurred ahead of them. These were “necessary traffic stops” under any definition of the term. See Mack v. Wilkerson, 304 Ark. 114, 116 (1990) (regulation did not apply where defendant “had stopped due to the exigencies of traffic and that the stop was a necessary one.”); Aguilera v. Flanders, 2014 WL 2743189 (Ill. Ct. App. 2014) (“Because [defendant's] truck was stopped in traffic due to an accident (i.e., due to a “necessary traffic stop”), [defendant] was not required to activate his hazard lights under this federal regulation.”). Plaintiffs cannot establish that 49 C.F.R. § 392.22(a) applies where, as here, Defendants were forced to abruptly stop in the middle of a freeway. Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' negligence per se claims under 49 C.F.R. § 392.22.
Plaintiffs also alleged violations of 49 C.F.R. § 392.22(a) based on Defendants' failure to deploy reflective triangles, fuses, or liquid burning flares after they were stopped. Compl. ¶25. However, this provision does not apply to “necessary traffic stops” for the reasons set forth above and is therefore not applicable. See 49 C.F.R. § 392.22(a). Even if it were applicable, given counsel's stipulation that no more than ten seconds passed between the initial stop and the accident, see Tr. 42-43, no reasonable juror could conclude that either Singh or Valenzuela had an opportunity to exit their vehicles and place warning devices prior to the accident. Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment on all negligence per se claims based on 49 C.F.R. § 392.22(a).
II. Negligence
In their complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Singh and Valenzuela were negligent based on their failure to: (1) cease operating their vehicles due to weather conditions; (2) maintain a proper following distances, operate at a safe driving speeds, and maintain control of their vehicles; and (3) use required safety equipment, including but not limited to hazard lights. Compl. ¶17.
This claim is not expressly pleaded in paragraph 17 of the complaint. At oral argument, however, Plaintiffs clarified that they were alleging negligence based on Singh and Valenzuela's continued operation of their vehicles despite the hazardous conditions. Tr. 51-52.
A. Cease operation of vehicles due to weather.
Defendants argue that the undisputed material facts demonstrate that the weather conditions did not deteriorate until immediately prior to the accident, there is no evidence that they could have safely pulled over prior to the accident and, as such, no reasonable juror could conclude that they were negligence for continuing to drive. Valenzuela Mot. 16-17; Singh Mot. 19-20. This Court disagrees.
Martin testified that it was foggy when he got on the freeway but the visibility was not “near zero” until he went down the hill towards the stalled vehicles. Martin Depo. 76:8-15. Martin's passenger, Dylan Smith, testified that it was “foggy” when they got on the freeway, but “it wasn't like a whiteout by any means. So until we were maybe three-quarter of a mile, mile on the road that it really got like a blanket of fog.” Smith Depo. 13:23-14:12. Plaintiffs' expert, Lew Grill, opines that Defendants should “have pulled over once the conditions began to deteriorate and the accident with [Plaintiff] Martin could have been avoided. The stretch of highway where the accident occurred is a rural setting and there would have been amply [sic] space on the shoulder to pull over.” Zekala Dec. Ex. 7, Grill Report, ECF 58-1.
Based on this evidence, which the Court must view in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, a reasonable juror could conclude that both Singh and Valenzuela failed to exercise reasonable care by not pulling over onto the shoulder prior to the accident, once the fog reduced visibility to “near zero.” To be sure, the evidence at most suggests that Defendants had a very narrow window in which to pull over after visibility decreased. Whether they actually had an opportunity to do so, and whether the failure to do so created a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm, are questions for the jury. Summary judgment should be denied on this claim of negligence.
B. Maintain a proper following distance, operate at a safe driving speed, and maintain control of their vehicles.
Valenzuela asserts that he is entitled to summary judgment on all claims concerning the operation of his vehicle because the undisputed facts demonstrate that he was completely in control of his vehicle and was struck by other vehicles, including Singh's vehicle, that came into his lane of travel. Valenzuela Mot. 8-9. Therefore, there is no factual basis for these claims of negligence. This Court agrees. Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence regarding Valenzuela's operation of his vehicle prior to his stop. Thus, there is no evidence that Valenzuela was following too closely to any vehicle in front of him; that he was operating an unsafe driving speed; or that he failed to maintain control his vehicle at any point. Summary judgment should be granted to Valenzuela on these claims of negligence.
On the other hand, there is sufficient evidence that Singh's operation of his vehicle created a foreseeable risk of harm and caused the accident. Again, it was Singh who rear-ended a car in front of him, moved from the left lane to the right lane, and forced Valenzuela onto the off-ramp. At least one expert opined that the accident was precipitated in part by Singh's “failure to reduce [his] speed under the prevailing conditions where visibility was significantly reduced/impaired.” Williams Dec. Ex. 10 at 18, Report, ECF 47. Singh asserts that because Plaintiffs failed to introduce evidence from an accident reconstruction specialist, it is speculative that his negligence caused Martin's injuries because the vehicles would have been forced to stop regardless. Singh Reply 12. However, a reasonable juror could infer from the circumstantial evidence and common knowledge that Singh's alleged negligence caused the vehicles to stop in the location where Martin collided with them. See Magnuson v. Toth Corp., 221 Or.App. 262, 268 (2008) (“Circumstantial evidence, expert testimony, or common knowledge may provide a basis from which the causal sequence may be inferred.”) (quotations and citations omitted). Accordingly, summary judgment should be denied to Singh on these claims of negligence.
C. Use required safety equipment, including but not limited to hazard lights.Valenzuela acknowledges that there is a factual dispute as to whether his hazard lights were activated. Valenzuela Reply 7. But he asserts that expert testimony is required to determine whether his hazard lights being activated would have prevented Martin from colliding with his trailer. Id. This argument should be rejected because Plaintiffs' expert opined that Valenzuela “failed to operate [his] warning device in time to prevent the accident.” Zekala Dec. Ex. 7. Moreover, a reasonable juror could infer, without expert testimony, that there was a causal link between Valenzuela's alleged failure to activate his hazard lights and Martin's inability to see his trailer and apply his breaks sooner. Summary judgment should therefore be denied to Valenzuela on this ground.
As noted above, there is no factual basis to conclude that either Singh or Valenzuela had an opportunity to exit their vehicles and to deploy other warning devices prior to the collision. Accordingly, this Court only addresses Plaintiffs claim that Defendants should have activated their hazard lights.
Singh, on the other hand, asserts that he is entitled to summary judgment because there is no dispute of fact as to whether his hazard lights were activated. Singh testified that his hazard lights were activated at the time of the accident. Singh Depo. 73:20-21. No witness testified that Singh's hazard lights were off. Witness Sam Glerup was the only witness other than Singh who testified as to Singh's hazard lights and testified that he “could not tell” and “d[id] not know” if Singh's hazard lights were on. Zekala Dec. Ex. 9, Glerup Depo. 45:14-23. This testimony is insufficient to create a material fact as to whether Singh's hazard lights were on. Plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating that Singh was negligent by failing to activate his hazard lights. They cannot meet that burden if the only witnesses to that issue will either testify that the hazard lights were on or that they could not tell. Thus, Singh is entitled to summary judgment on this ground.
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons discussed above, Defendants Singh and Valenzuela's Motions for Summary Judgment, ECF 46, 55, should be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Genuine issues of material fact preclude entry of summary judgment on the following claims alleged in Paragraph 17 of Plaintiffs' complaint:
(a) Singh and Valenzuela failed to cease operation of their vehicles due to weather;
(b) Singh failed to maintain a proper following distance, operate at a safe driving speed, and maintain control of his vehicle; and
(c) Valenzuela failed immediately activate his hazard lights;
Summary judgment should be granted to Defendants on all other grounds, including Plaintiffs' allegations of negligence per se.
SCHEDULING ORDER
The Findings and Recommendation will be referred to a District Judge. Objections, if any, are due fourteen (14) days from service of the Findings and Recommendation. If no objections are filed, then the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement on that date.
A party's failure to timely file objections to any of these findings will be considered a waiver of that party's right to de novo consideration of the factual issues addressed herein and will constitute a waiver of the party's right to review of the findings of fact in any order or judgment entered by a district judge. These Findings and Recommendation are not immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of judgment.