Opinion
CV184009750S
10-04-2019
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Hon. Courtney M. Chaplin
The petitioner, Douglas Martin, filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking relief for alleged due process violations in the form of overturning the decision of the Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) and restoration of Risk Reduction Earned Credit (RREC) time. The respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition on July 30, 2019, and a memorandum of law in support. The petitioner did not file an objection or reply. The court scheduled argument on the motion to dismiss for September 13, 2019. The respondent appeared and argued the motion. The petitioner did not appear.
In the motion to dismiss, the respondent argues that the petition is moot because the petitioner was released from custody on April 5, 2019. The respondent provided Exhibit A to the court, which consists of DOC RT60 form for the petitioner (inmate number 263774) which indicates that he was discharged on April 5, 2019, from Osborn Correctional Institute for "sentence time served."
"A motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the [non-moving party] cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court ..." Naier v. Beckenstein, 131 Conn.App. 638, 643, 27 A.3d 104, cert. denied, 303 Conn. 910, 32 A.3d 963 (2011). When adjudicating a motion to dismiss, "a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Citation omitted; quotation marks omitted.) Lawrence Brunoli, Inc. v. Branford, 247 Conn. 407, 410-11, 722 A.2d 271 (1999). "The motion to dismiss ... admits all facts which are well pleaded, invokes the existing record and must be decided upon that alone ... Where, however ... the motion is accompanied by supporting affidavits containing undisputed facts ... the court may look to their content for determination of the jurisdictional issue and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint." (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Barde v. Board of Trustees, 207 Conn. 59, 62, 539 A.2d 1000 (1988). "Because subject matter jurisdiction implicates the authority of the court, the issue, once raised, must be resolved before proceeding to the merits of the case ..." (Citation omitted.) State v. Fowler, 102 Conn.App. 154, 158, 926 A.2d 672, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 922, 933 A.2d 725 (2007).
"Mootness ... implicates subject matter jurisdiction, which imposes a duty on the [trial] court to dismiss a case if the court can no longer grant practical relief to the parties ... Mootness presents a circumstance wherein the issue before the court has been resolved or had lost its significance because of a change in the condition of affairs between the parties ... A case becomes moot when due to intervening circumstances a controversy between the parties no longer exists." (Citation omitted.) Paulino v. Commissioner of Correction, 155 Conn.App. 154, 160, 109 A.3d 516, 521 (2015). "To qualify under th[e] exception, an otherwise moot question must satisfy the following three requirements: First, the challenged action, or the effect of the challenged action, by its very nature, must be of a limited duration so that there is a strong likelihood that the substantial majority of cases raising a question about its validity will become moot before appellate litigation can be concluded. Second, there must be a reasonable likelihood that the question presented in the pending case will arise again in the future, and that it will affect either the same complaining party or a reasonably identifiable group for whom that party can be said to act as surrogate. Third, the question must have some public importance. Unless all three requirements are met, the appeal must be dismissed as moot." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original.) Gaines v. Commissioner of Correction, 181 Conn.App. 377, 383, 186 A.3d 784 (2018).
The petitioner has been released from custody because his sentence has expired. He is no longer subject to DOC regulations, rules or disciplinary proceedings. If the habeas court were to grant his petition, there is no practical relief that could be afforded him or that could have been afforded him after April 5, 2019. Since the petitioner’s release from custody, there has not been an actual case or controversy at issue. There is no indication that the petitioner’s claim is capable of repetition yet evading review. For that reason, the petitioner’s claim is moot and this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over his claim.
Accordingly, the respondent’s motion to dismiss is granted.