Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. VC052872. Yvonne T. Sanchez, Judge.
Joseph E. Marsico, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Roberts, Raspe & Blanton and Jenner C. Tseng for Defendants and Respondents.
DOI TODD, J.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants and respondents Dolores Pfile and Robert Pfile on a complaint filed by plaintiff and appellant Joseph E. Marsico alleging breach of contract, constructive trust, declaratory relief, quiet title, and specific performance. Appellant contends that the trial court (1) denied him due process by granting respondents’ summary judgment motion on a ground they did not raise; (2) erroneously sustained respondents’ objections to the evidence in his declarations; and (3) erred when it found no triable issue of fact as to his breach of contract claim. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1985, appellant began renting a house located on Bright Avenue in Whittier. In 1999, the owner of the property threatened to evict appellant. While that eviction was pending, respondents purchased the property from the owner for $125,000. Respondents made a down payment of $12,500 and financed the balance with a $100,000 note secured by a first deed of trust and a $12,500 note secured by a second deed of trust.
Appellant and his family continued to live at the property. During this time, respondents received numerous letters and notices from the City of Whittier Police Department informing them that the property was not being maintained in accordance with the Whittier Municipal Code. Specifically, the City stated that there was an accumulation of household items, vehicle parts and other junk strewn around the property. Respondents directed appellant to take the necessary action to bring the property into compliance with the Code. Appellant failed to do so, and the City began issuing fines to both respondents and appellant in May 2007. Finally, on November 1, 2007, a letter was sent to both respondents and appellant by a Whittier deputy city prosecutor asking respondents and appellant to participate in a meeting in the prosecutor’s office to address potential criminal prosecutions against both respondents and appellant for the Code violations. Respondents filed an unlawful detainer action against appellant, and an eviction order was issued on April 9, 2008. Appellant was forcibly removed from the property.
Appellant filed a first amended complaint on May 14, 2009, alleging causes of action for breach of a real property sales contract, constructive trust, declaratory relief, quiet title, and specific performance. Appellant alleged that he and respondents had been close personal friends for more than 40 years. When appellant was threatened with eviction in 1999, respondents intervened and purchased the property to prevent appellant from being evicted. At that time, respondents “advised [appellant] that at any time [appellant] wished to purchase the property from [respondents] at the price paid for the property by [respondents] that [respondents] would sell and transfer the property to [appellant].” Appellant further alleged that in 2004, he exercised his option to purchase the property from respondents and paid them $20,000 for their equitable interest in the property, but respondents failed to transfer the title to him. Respondents answered, denying the allegations and asserting a number of affirmative defenses.
During discovery, respondents deposed appellant. Appellant initially testified that respondents told appellant that he could purchase the house for $125,000 at any time, as long as appellant made the house payments. Later in the deposition, appellant testified that he became the legal owner of the house immediately after respondents’ purchase in 1999 and title would be transferred to him when he paid the balance of the loan on the property. It was undisputed that the agreement was not memorialized in writing in any form.
In October 2009, respondents moved for summary judgment. They asserted that the alleged oral agreement was unenforceable as a matter of law because the agreement (1) violated the statute of frauds; (2) was not sufficiently certain to make the precise obligations of the parties clearly ascertainable; and (3) lacked consideration. In support of their motion, respondents submitted the declarations of both respondents, discovery responses, and excerpts of appellant’s deposition.
In opposition to respondents’ summary judgment motion, appellant stated that the terms of the oral agreement were as follows: respondents would transfer title to appellant when appellant reimbursed respondents for all of the out-of-pocket expenses they had incurred in the purchase of the property and appellant assumed the loans on the property. Appellant argued that the statute of frauds did not apply because he had partially and even fully performed the terms of the alleged agreement. In support of his opposition, appellant offered his own declaration and those of his former life partner, Carol Miller, and his friend, Gregory Baker. In reply, respondents denied that appellant had performed the terms of any such agreement and filed 51 objections to the evidence offered by appellant in his declarations.
At the hearing on the summary judgment motion, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of respondents. It ruled that appellant could not prove his performance under the alleged agreement sufficient to trigger respondents’ obligation to transfer title to the property to appellant. In that same order, the court sustained all of respondents’ evidentiary objections. Appellant made a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.
Judgment was entered on March 19, 2010, and this appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends that the trial court denied him due process by granting respondents’ summary judgment motion on a ground they did not raise. As part of his challenge, appellant also argues that the trial court erroneously sustained respondents’ objections to the evidence in his declarations. Finally, appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because there were triable issues of material fact. We find no merit to any of appellant’s contentions.
I. Due Process
The trial court found that appellant had set forth two versions of the terms of the alleged oral agreement. In one version, appellant had to pay respondents $125,000, which was the amount respondents paid for the property. In another version, appellant was the legal owner of the property at the time respondents purchased the property in 1999 and had to pay the principal balance of the loan. The court ruled that under either version, appellant could not prove his performance under the agreement sufficient to trigger respondents’ obligation to transfer title to the property to appellant.
The record plainly demonstrates that both parties were well aware of, and presented evidence and argument, on the issue which formed the basis for the trial court’s ruling. Respondents specifically raised and briefed the issue in their summary judgment motion. In fact, they had an entire section entitled, “Even If Defendants Did Agree To Sell Plaintiff the Property, Plaintiff Did Not Fully Perform the Very Terms of the Alleged Agreement That He Purportedly Entered Into With Defendants.” Respondents’ separate statement of undisputed facts, Nos. 6 and 8 in particular, provides that appellant did not pay respondents the price paid for the property and that the only payments appellant made consisted of monthly house payments and reimbursements for fees levied by the City. In response, appellant argued in his opposition to respondents’ motion that he had fully performed the terms of the agreement: “[Appellant’s] diligent performance of the terms of the parties’ agreement for nearly a year and payments to [respondents] towards reimbursement to [respondents] of all expenses he incurred and made known to [appellant] by [respondents] is more than substantial part performance, it is full performance.” Moreover, the court faxed a tentative ruling to the parties on the day before the summary judgment hearing, which it then adopted as the actual order. Appellant acknowledged that he had received the tentative ruling but did not object or request leave to provide additional briefing. We find no failure of due process here.
Appellant did not appear at the hearing on the summary judgment motion. He called the court to inform them that he would be 30 minutes late. The court placed the matter on second call. The court called the case a second time, which was an hour and 45 minutes after appellant’s telephone call, and appellant still had not appeared. At that time, the court adopted its tentative order.
II. Evidentiary Rulings
As an initial matter, appellant argues that respondents’ evidentiary objections to the evidence in the declarations in support of his opposition to respondents’ summary judgment motion should be deemed waived on appeal. At the end of its order granting summary judgment, the trial court ruled that “[respondents’] evidentiary objections numbered 1-51 are sustained.” Appellant contends that this “blanket ‘one-liner’ statement” was deficient in its brevity and in its timing.
Relying on Sambrano v. City of San Diego (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 225 and a string of related appellate cases, appellant argues that respondents’ objections should be deemed waived and that we should consider all of the evidence submitted by appellant as having been admitted into evidence. Appellant’s reliance on Sambrano and the related cases is misplaced. That line of cases stands for the rule that when a trial judge fails to rule on evidentiary objections properly presented on summary judgment, the objections are treated on appeal as though they were overruled and deemed waived. In each of those cases, the trial court explicitly declined to rule on the evidentiary objections. In Sambrano, there was one evidentiary objection and the trial court declined to rule on the objection, instead stating that it relied only upon evidence that was “competent and admissible.” (Id. at p. 232.) Here, as appellant concedes, the trial court expressly ruled on the objections. Thus, the above cases are inapposite. Further, the California Supreme Court has more recently held that properly presented evidentiary objections at a summary judgment hearing are not deemed waived on appeal even if the trial court failed to expressly rule on the objections. (Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 522–527.)
Swat-Fame, Inc. v. Goldstein (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 613, 623; Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 670, fn. 1; City of Long Beach v. Farmers & Merchants Bank (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 780, 783.
As for timing, respondents raised their evidentiary objections as a part of their reply brief in response to appellant’s opposition to respondents’ summary judgment motion. Appellant appears to contend that because of the placement of the trial court’s ruling on the objections, specifically, at the very end of the order granting summary judgment, the trial court failed to rule on the objections before it ruled on the motion. We simply find no merit to this argument. Respondents’ evidentiary objections are not deemed waived on appeal.
Appellant further argues that many of the trial court’s rulings on respondents’ objections were erroneous and should be reviewed de novo. We disagree. Though we independently review the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, “[w]e review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings on summary judgment for abuse of discretion. [Citations.] As the [party] challenging the court’s decision, it is [appellant’s] burden to establish such an abuse, which we will find only if the trial court’s order exceeds the bounds of reason. [Citation.] ‘Where a trial court has discretionary power to decide an issue, an appellate court is not authorized to substitute its judgment of the correct result for the decision of the trial court.’ [Citation.] We will only interfere with the lower court’s judgment if appellant can show that under the evidence offered, ‘“no judge could reasonably have made the order that he did.”’ [Citation.]” (DiCola v. White Brothers Performance Products, Inc. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 666, 679–680.)
In order to demonstrate an abuse of discretion, an appellant must affirmatively challenge the trial court’s evidentiary rulings on appeal by providing some analysis and citation to authority. (Roe v. McDonald’s Corp. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1114.) Here, appellant’s arguments are devoid of authority or reasoned legal analysis. Instead, they consist of bare assertions and conclusory statements. Because appellant’s arguments are wholly inadequate, we do not need to address them. (Wright v. City of Los Angeles (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 683, 689 [“Generally, asserted grounds for appeal that are unsupported by any citation to authority and that merely complain of error without presenting a coherent legal argument are deemed abandoned and unworthy of discussion”]; Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784–785 [When a party raises a point but “fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived”].) The trial court’s evidentiary rulings stand.
A representative example is appellant’s response to respondents’ objections Nos. 25, 26, and 27, which were based on relevancy/hearsay/speculation/improper opinion. Appellant states “[t]he information is of firsthand knowledge, not speculative and relevant in laying a foundation for respondents’ purchase of the property at a significantly reduced price going to appellant’s claim of unjust enrichment, enrichment received for appellant’s conduct and promises given him by Urich. No opinion is discernable.”
III. Summary Judgment Was Properly Granted
“Following a grant of summary judgment, we review the record de novo for the existence of triable issues, and consider the evidence submitted in connection with the motion, with the exception of evidence to which objections were made and sustained. (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 334.)” (Wall Street Network, Ltd. v. New York Times Co. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1176.)
A defendant seeking summary judgment need not “conclusively negate an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853 (Aguilar).) Rather, the moving defendant bears the burden of persuasion that “[o]ne or more of the elements of the cause of action” in question “cannot be separately established, ” or that “defendant establishes an affirmative defense” thereto. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (o)(1) & (2).) The moving party bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; satisfaction of that burden causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production to “make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Aguilar, supra, at p. 850.) There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, “the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Ibid.) We affirm summary judgment where it is shown that no triable issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Here, appellant’s primary cause of action is that of breach of contract. To prevail on a breach of contract claim, a plaintiff must prove (1) the existence of a contract; (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance; (3) defendant’s breach; and (4) resulting damage. (Armstrong Petroleum Corp. v. Tri-Valley Oil & Gas Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1391, fn. 6.) Appellant contends that he had an oral agreement with respondents whereby respondents would transfer title of the property to him upon the performance of certain conditions. Respondents deny there was any such agreement. Even if such an agreement did exist, appellant’s breach of contract claim would still fail because he cannot prove the second element of his claim, namely, his performance.
Appellant’s articulation as to the terms of the alleged oral agreement is a bit muddled. In his first amended complaint, appellant alleges that at the time respondents purchased the property in 1999, they “advised [appellant] that at any time [appellant] wished to purchase the property from [respondents] at the price paid for the property by [respondents] that [respondents] would sell and transfer the property to [appellant].” At one point in his deposition, appellant confirmed that these were the terms of the agreement. Later in his deposition, appellant testified that he became the owner of the property immediately after respondents purchased the property in 1999 and that title would be transferred when appellant paid the balance of the loan on the property. In his opposition to respondents’ summary judgment motion, appellant stated that title would be transferred to him when he reimbursed respondents for all of the out-of-pocket expenditures they had incurred regarding the property and assumed the loan on the property.
It is undisputed that respondents purchased the property for $125,000 and financed the purchase price of the property with a $100,000 note and first trust deed and a $12,500 note and second deed of trust. It is also undisputed that the loan balance on the property was in excess of $96,000 between August 12, 2002, and February 10, 2003, and at the end of 2007, the remaining balance was $87,064.74.
In his deposition, appellant admitted that at no point in time did he pay respondents the entire purchase price of the property: “Q: Yes. Did you, at any time, pay [respondents] the price that [they] paid for the property? A: The price that [they] paid for the property? No. No, I never paid [them]-you mean the whole price? Q: Yes. A: Of course not.” This admission eviscerates appellant’s first version of the terms of the agreement. As to appellant’s second version of the terms of the agreement, appellant concedes that the loan balance on the property was at least $87,064.74. By appellant’s own admissions, he did not pay such an amount to respondents. In his first amended complaint, appellant alleges that in 2004, he exercised the option to purchase the property and paid respondents $20,000. Later, in his opposition to respondents’ summary judgment motion, appellant alleges that he paid respondents $10,000 in 2002, his life partner paid $10,000 in 2002, he paid $10,000 in 2006, and he paid $10,000 again the following year, for a total amount of $40,000. In either case, the amount was insufficient to satisfy the remaining principal balance on the loan. As to appellant’s third version of the terms of the agreement, even assuming that $40,000 was sufficient as full reimbursement for all of respondents’ out-of-pocket expenditures, appellant never assumed the loans on the property. The loans remained in respondents’ names.
Thus, under any of appellant’s versions of the terms of the alleged agreement, he cannot prove his performance sufficient to trigger respondents’ obligation to transfer title to the property to appellant. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that appellant failed to raise a triable issue of material fact regarding his performance under his breach of contract claim, and thus appellant’s breach of contract claim, as well as his four other claims which are dependent on that claim, fail as a matter of law.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to their costs on appeal.
We concur: BOREN, P. J., ASHMANN-GERST, J.