Opinion
December 7, 1987
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Morrison, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
In her second cause of action, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that (1) she and the defendants had entered into an oral contract in February 1985 pursuant to which the plaintiff would serve as Executive Director of the Nassau County Association for the Help of Retarded Children, Inc. (hereinafter AHRC) for at least five years, and (2) the defendants wrongfully terminated her employment as Executive Director in May 1985. Since the second cause of action alleged an oral contract of five years' duration, it was barred by the Statute of Frauds (see, Cunnison v Richardson Greenshields Sec., 107 A.D.2d 50, 52). Nor does the alleged oral provision of the contract that the plaintiff could only be discharged for a flagrant neglect in the performance of her duties mandate a different result. This language contemplates the termination of the contract by the defendant AHRC within one year only upon a breach of the agreement by the plaintiff, and therefore it does not take the agreement outside the Statute of Frauds (see, D N Boening v Kirsch Beverages, 63 N.Y.2d 449, 456, n). Accordingly, based on the record before it at that time, the Supreme Court, by its order dated February 26, 1986, properly dismissed the plaintiff's second cause of action.
In her third cause of action, which sounds in fraud, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that she was fraudulently induced to enter into a contract for employment as the defendant AHRC's Executive Director by reason of the following false representations: "26. In or about February 1985 defendants represented to plaintiff: a) that [defendant] Kaplan was about to retire from the position of Executive Director of AHRC; b) that AHRC was committed to employing plaintiff as successor Executive Director for at least 5 years and c) that AHRC had a legal obligation to comply with its representations." In essence, the plaintiff's third cause of action merely restates her cause of action to recover damages for breach of contract. It has been held that no cause of action for fraud arises "when the only fraud charged relates to a breach of contract" (Miller v Volk Huxley, 44 A.D.2d 810; Gould v Community Health Plan, 99 A.D.2d 479; cf., Deerfield Communications Corp. v Chesebrough-Ponds, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 954, 956). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly dismissed the plaintiff's third cause of action.
We have examined the plaintiff's remaining contentions concerning the fourth, fifth and sixth causes of action, and find them to be without merit (see, CPLR 3016 [a]; Buffolino v Long Is. Sav. Bank, 126 A.D.2d 508, 510; Klein v Jamor Purveyors, Inc., 108 A.D.2d 344, 348; Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293). Mangano, J.P., Thompson, Lawrence and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.