Opinion
Civil Action 3:24-CV-00105-CRS-RSE
12-20-2024
MARIKA G. PLAINTIFF v. MARTIN O'MALLEY, Commissioner of Social Security DEFENDANT
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Regina S. Edwards, Magistrate Judge
Claimant Marika G. appeals from the final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her application for disability insurance benefits. (DN 1). Claimant filed a fact and law summary and brief. (DN 10). The Commissioner responded in a fact and law summary. (DN 12). Claimant filed a reply brief. (DN 13). The District Judge referred the case to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for consideration and preparation of a report and recommendation, as authorized in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). (DN 7).
I. Findings of Fact
Marika G. (“Claimant”) applied for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act on July 27, 2017, alleging disability beginning on May 1, 2016. (Transcript, hereinafter, “Tr.” 227). She alleged disability based on “disc disorders” and “cer[v]icalgia.” (Tr. 244). Claimant's application was denied by the State Agency Disability Determination Service at both the initial and reconsideration levels. (Tr. 115-39).
At Claimant's request, Administrative Law Judge Michelle Alexander (“ALJ Alexander”) conducted a hearing in Nashville, Tennessee on June 20, 2019. (Tr. 57-99). On July 10, 2019, ALJ Alexander issued a decision finding that Claimant was not disabled. (Tr. 33-56). Applying the five-step sequential evaluation process promulgated by the Commissioner, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a), ALJ Alexander determined that, while Claimant had severe impairments of degenerative disc disease of the lumbar and cervical spine, fibromyalgia, chronic pain syndrome, tennis elbow syndrome, and anxiety, she still retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform a range of sedentary work with additional exertional, postural, environmental, and mental limitations. (Tr. 38-49). When she evaluated Claimant's RFC, ALJ Alexander discussed the state agency physician opinions, which opined that Claimant could engage in “light exertional work.” (Tr. 46). The ALJ found the consultants' opinions “not persuasive” because “the evidence received in the record as well as the testimony after the determination establish[ed] greater limitations.” (Id.).
ALJ Alexander also discussed the opinion of Claimant's treating physician, Dr. Vincent Fry, who diagnosed Claimant with cervical and lumbar spondylosis and anxiety. (Id.). Dr. Fry completed a Physical Capabilities Evaluation, which listed “objective signs” of Claimant's symptoms and evaluated Claimant's functional limitations. (Tr. 1259-60). ALJ Alexander found Dr. Fry's opinion only “somewhat persuasive,” stating that “some of his findings [we]re out of proportion to the medical record and [we]re based mainly on the claimant's subjective complaint.” (Tr. 46). Ultimately, ALJ Alexander found Claimant had not been under a disability from May 1, 2016 through the date of the decision, July 10, 2019. (Id.).
The Appeals Council denied Claimant's request for review on June 3, 2020. (Tr. 1-3). Claimant then appealed to this Court. (Tr. 1667, see Gavre v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:20-CV-00551-DJH-CHL (W.D. Ky. 2021)). On December 28, 2021, Magistrate Judge Colin H. Lindsay issued a report and recommendation which was later adopted by District Judge David J. Hale on March 14, 2022, vacating ALJ Alexander's decision because she “did not sufficiently articulate how she considered the supportability and consistency factors [in discerning the persuasiveness of Dr. Fry's medical opinion.]” (Tr. 1667-91). The court reasoned that ALJ Alexander's decision was not supported by substantial evidence because the single sentence addressing Dr. Fry's opinion “neither explain[ed] how Dr. Fry's opinion was unsupported by objective medical evidence nor identifie[d] which of Dr. Fry's findings was inconsistent with other evidence in the record.” (Tr. 1689). In April 2022, the Appeals Council issued an order remanding the case to an ALJ. (Tr. 1692-96).
Administrative Law Judge William Zuber (“ALJ Zuber”) held a new hearing on December 7, 2022. (Tr. 1559-99). On January 16, 2023, ALJ Zuber issued a decision in which he concluded that Claimant was not disabled. (Tr. 1700-21). This time, the ALJ gave more than a one-sentence evaluation of Dr. Fry's opinion and addressed other evidence in the record as being inconsistent, but only vaguely did so, without any citations. (Tr. 1712). Claimant appealed and, on April 19, 2023, the Appeals Council remanded the case back to the Administrative Law Judge. (Tr. 172229). Among other reasons for remanding the case, the Appeals Counsel stated that “[t]he hearing decision does not contain an adequate evaluation of the prior administrative medical findings in assessing the claimant's residual functional capacity (RFC).” (Tr. 1725). However, the Appeals Counsel did not identify the evaluation of Dr. Fry's opinion as an issue in the remand of ALJ Zuber's decision.
Administrative Law Judge Candace McDaniel (“ALJ McDaniel”) then held a new hearing on September 14, 2023. (Tr. 1600-1633). Claimant attended the hearing by telephone with her attorney. (Tr. 1603). An impartial vocational expert also participated in the hearing. (Id.). At the date last insured, Claimant was 51 years old. (Tr. 1607). She is a high school graduate with one year of college education and lives in a house with her husband. (Id.). During the hearing, Claimant testified to the following. She does not drive unless she “absolutely ha[s] to.” (Tr. 1608). Her past work includes secretarial work and work in human resources. (Tr. 1609-10). During the period at issue, Claimant experienced pain in several places across her body. She experienced frequent headaches which could only be treated by Tylenol because she had a bad reaction to Excedrin. (Tr. 1615-16, 1624). Prior to her alleged onset date, she underwent several neck surgeries, but the pain remained. (Tr. 1611-12). She also experienced pain in her lower back and right arm, and treatment efforts were not successful. (Tr. 1612). Similarly, she underwent several surgeries on her knee but was unable to resolve the pain. (Tr. 1616-17). After she injured her ankle, she wore a boot for at least six weeks. (Tr. 1623). She had fibromyalgia and had not found a solution to its associated pain. (Tr. 1618-19). Overall, though she attempted to resolve her pain, she experienced chronic pain through her date last insured. (Tr. 1619).
This hearing was held telephonically due to the Covid-19 pandemic with Claimant's consent. (Tr. 1603).
On December 22, 2023, ALJ McDaniel issued a decision concluding that Claimant was not disabled. (Tr. 1532-58). In applying the five-step sequential analysis from 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a), ALJ McDaniel made the following findings. First, Claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity from May 1, 2016, her alleged onset date, through December 31, 2021, her date last insured. (Tr. 1538). Second, through the date last insured, Claimant had the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease, degenerative joint disease, fibromyalgia, tennis elbow, chronic pain syndrome, headaches, depression, and adjustment disorder. (Id.). Third, through the date last insured, Claimant did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Id.). Fourth, through the date last insured, Claimant had the RFC to perform “light work” with the following exceptions:
ALJ McDaniel found Claimant last met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2021. (Tr. 1538).
[S]he could not climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and she could only occasionally climb ramps or stairs. She could frequently balance but only occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl. She could frequently reach overhead bilaterally and frequently handle and finger with the bilateral upper extremities. She had to avoid concentrated exposure to vibrations and extreme cold and all exposure to hazards such as unprotected heights or the operation of dangerous moving machinery. She could tolerate moderate noise levels up to a 3 as defined in the SCO. She could not work in direct sunlight.(Tr. 1540). Additionally, ALJ McDaniel found that Claimant could do the following:
She could understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions. She could maintain attention, concentration, persistence, and pace for 2 hours at a time over an 8-hour workday. She could interact frequently with supervisors, coworkers, and the general public. She could adapt to routine changes in a work setting.(Id.). When evaluating Claimant's RFC, ALJ McDaniel discussed the opinion of state-agency medical consultants, who opined that Claimant could “perform some range of light exertional work.” (Tr. 1544). ALJ McDaniel found their opinions “not consistent with the longitudinal record” because she found “a need for restrictions on use of the hands as well as postural limitations that are more restrictive.” (Tr. 1545).
Finally, through the date of last insured, ALJ McDaniel determined that Claimant was unable to perform any past relevant work, but could perform other work including cashier, fingerprint clerk, and marker, each of which had over 30,000 jobs nationally. (Tr. 1546-47).
Based on these findings, ALJ McDaniel concluded Claimant was not under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from May 1, 2016 to December 31, 2021. (T. 1547). Because Claimant did not appeal and the Appeals Council did not review ALJ McDaniel's decision on its own, the decision became final on February 21, 2024. (Tr. 1533). Since then, Claimant appealed to this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (DN 1).
II. Standard of Review
Administrative Law Judges make determinations as to social security disability by undertaking the five-step sequential evaluation process mandated by the regulations. Vance v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 260 Fed.Appx. 801, 803-4 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 1990)); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). Throughout this process, the claimant bears the overall burden of establishing they are disabled; however, the Commissioner bears the burden of establishing the claimant can perform other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Id. at 804 (quoting Wilson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 548 (6th Cir. 2004)).
When reviewing the Administrative Law Judge's decision to deny disability benefits, the Court may “not try the case de novo, nor resolve conflicts in the evidence, nor decide questions of credibility.” Cutlip v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Instead, the Court's review of the Administrative Law Judge's decision is limited to an inquiry as to whether the Administrative Law Judge's findings were supported by substantial evidence, 42 U.S.C. § 495(g); Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 353 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted), and whether the Administrative Law Judge employed the proper legal standards in reaching his conclusion. See Landsaw v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 803 F.2d 211, 213 (6th Cir. 1986). Substantial evidence exists “when a reasonable mind could support a decision as adequate to support the challenged conclusion, even if that evidence could support a decision the other way.” Cotton v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 692, 695 (6th Cir. 1993). The Supreme Court has clarified “whatever the meaning of ‘substantial' in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high[.]” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (citations omitted).
III. Analysis
Claimant challenges ALJ McDaniel's opinion, arguing the RFC determination is unsupported by substantial evidence because the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the opinion evidence of Vincent Fry, M.D., and failed to create a logical bridge between the evidence and the rejection of the opinion evidence, frustrating meaningful review. (DN 10 at PageID # 3374). The Court disagrees.
A claimant's RFC is defined as the “maximum degree to which the individual retains the capacity for sustained performance of the physical-mental requirements of jobs.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2 § 200.00(c). In other words, the RFC is the most a claimant can do despite their physical and mental limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). An ALJ bases their RFC determination on “all of the relevant medical and other evidence” in the case record. Id. (a)(3). This requires the ALJ to evaluate the persuasiveness of the medical opinions in the record and assess the claimant's subjective allegations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c, 404.1529(a).
In this case, the new regulations for evaluating medical opinion evidence apply because Claimant filed her applications after March 27, 2017. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c. The new regulations specify that an ALJ will not give any specific evidentiary weight to any medical opinion, even the opinions of a claimant's treating physician. Id. ALJs now evaluate the “persuasiveness” of medical opinions using five factors: (1) supportability; (2) consistency; (3) relationship to the claimant; (4) specialization; and (5) other factors. Id (c)(1)-(5). Of these factors, supportability and consistency are the most important. Id. (a), (b)(2). The regulations, accordingly, require ALJs to explain how they considered the supportability and consistency factors in their determination. Id (b)(2). Comparatively, ALJs “may, but are not required to, explain” their consideration of factors (3)-(5). Id.
In assessing a medical opinion's “supportability,” “[t]he more relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) . . . the more persuasive the medical opinions . . . will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1). And the “consistency” factor denotes the extent to which the medical opinion “is consistent with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim[.]” Id. (c)(2). To further illuminate this distinction, “supportability” relates to the objective medical evidence and supporting explanation provided by a medical source to bolster their own opinion; by contrast, “consistency” relates to the relationship of a medical source's opinion to other medical opinions and evidence of record. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1)-(2).
“Courts within the Sixth Circuit have found that these regulations . . . still require that the ALJ provide a coherent explanation of [her] reasoning.” Gavre, No. 3:20-cv-00551-DJH-CHL at *4 (citing Hardy v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 20-10918, 2021 WL 3702170, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 13, 2021) (quoting Lester v. Saul, No. 20-01364, 2020 WL 8093313, at *14 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 11, 2020)) (quotation marks omitted). Now, determinations and decisions must have a “minimum level of articulation” in its rationale that is sufficient for a reviewing adjudicator or court to understand. Id. (citations omitted).
Claimant believes that ALJ McDaniel did not explain how she considered the supportability and consistency factors for Dr. Fry's opinion and failed to set out a sufficient analysis of the evidence to allow an appellate court to trace the path of her reasoning to reach the conclusion that Dr. Fry's opinion is unpersuasive. (DN 10, at PageID #3377). The Commissioner, on the other hand, argues that ALJ McDaniel complied with the regulatory requirement to articulate how she considered the supportability and consistency factors when she found Dr. Fry's opinion unpersuasive. (DN 12).
ALJ McDaniel evaluated the opinion of Dr. Fry, who provided a medical source statement concerning Claimant's physical work-related limitations. (Tr. 1259-1260). This evaluation is very similar to ALJ Zuber's evaluation of Dr. Fry's opinion, which was not at issue upon remand. (Compare Tr. 1712 with Tr. 1545-46, see Tr. 1724-27). ALJ McDaniel noted Dr. Fry's assessment:
. . . opined the claimant could stand/walk or sit for less than two hours a day each, meaning work less than eight hours a day. It further found she could only lift less than five pounds frequently, though up to twenty pounds occasionally. The opinion limited her to occasional climbing and balancing and no stooping, crouching, kneeling, or crawling. It found she would be limited in her ability to reach, handle, push, and pull. Lastly, the provider believed the claimant would need two thirtyminute breaks at unpredictable intervals and would be expected to miss three times a month.(Tr. 1545). ALJ McDaniel found Dr. Fry's opinion unpersuasive because “the longitudinal record does not describe these signs and symptoms with the frequency and severity one would expect to support such a drastic set of limitations.” (Id.) ALJ McDaniel reasoned that Dr. Fry rendered his opinion in November 2017, yet his preceding examination of Claimant was “unremarkable” and his following annual well visit examinations were “essentially normal . . . outside of findings of tenderness to palpitation or with range of motion.” (Id. (citing Tr. 1204-58, 1437-79)). Further, ALJ McDaniel notes that, even though there was evidence for “sensation abnormalities in the ankles and toes” it is unclear why Claimant could only sit or stand/walk for less than two hours a day, as Claimant “did not have evidence for strength loss in the legs and her gait was generally normal outside of her acute knee pain.” (Id.). Additionally, ALJ McDaniel found no corroborating support in the record for Claimant's exertional and postural limitations, as “[t]reatment for [Claimant's] neck and back has been conservative since her alleged onset date and she often reported good response to treatment without side effects, so the exertional and postural limitations do not find corroborating support in the record.” (Id. 1545-46). Overall, ALJ McDaniel found:
these findings are not compatible with an individual as limited as described [by Dr. Fry] who would be unable to sustain a regular and continuing work activity. The undersigned has provided some limitations with handling/fingering due to complaints of numbness/tingling in the hands, but there are limited objective findings to support upper extremity limitations otherwise.”(Tr. 1546).
A. Supportability
The Court finds that ALJ McDaniel properly evaluated the evidence regarding the supportability factor. ALJ McDaniel determined that Dr. Fry's opinion was not supported by his own treatment notes from other examinations, explaining that she believed they demonstrated that Claimant had “unremarkable” and “essentially normal” physical examinations. (Tr. 1545).
Claimant argues that ALJ McDaniel's observation that Claimant's June 2017 visit with Dr. Fry was “unremarkable” was a mischaracterization because Dr. Fry's resulting referrals for an MRI and neurosurgeon “indicate Dr. Fry found [Claimant's] complaints of pain supported by his own examinations and treatment history.” (DN 10 at PageID # 3376-77). The Commissioner points out that this visit also included notes the Claimant reported feeling good overall and that Dr. Fry observed that she was not in distress, among other things. (DN 12 at Page ID # 3399 (citing Tr. 1204-06)). The Court cannot rely on post hoc arguments, however, and must instead focus on the reasons ALJ McDaniel gave for her decision regarding supportability of Dr. Fry's opinion. Terhune, No. CV 3:21-37-KKC, 2022 WL at *5. These reasons must “build an accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and the result.” Id. at *57 (citations omitted).
To substantiate her contention that Dr. Fry's medical source statement was not supported by his other examinations of Claimant, ALJ McDaniel cites to the June 2017 visit, which she thought was “unremarkable,” and other “essentially normal” well visits. (Tr. 1545 (citing Tr. 120458, 1437-79)). A reasonable mind could find, as ALJ McDaniel did, that well visits that are “unremarkable” and “essentially normal” do not support a finding that Claimant is “unable to sustain a regular and continuing work activity.” (Tr. 1545-46). Further elaboration is not required. While reasonable minds may differ, the Court cannot reweigh the evidence and substitute its own judgment for that of ALJ McDaniel. See Price v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 342 Fed. App'x 172, 174 (6th Cir. 2009). For this reason, Claimant's argument fails. See Cotton, 2 F.3d at 695 (Substantial evidence exists “when a reasonable mind could support a decision as adequate to support the challenged conclusion, even if that evidence could support a decision the other way.”); see also Terhune, No. CV 3:21-37-KKC, 2022 WL at *9.
Claimant notes that ALJ McDaniel did not discuss many of Dr. Fry's other treatment records and that Dr. Fry has treated Claimant “longer than most any other provider in the record.” (DN 10 at PageID # 3378). Nevertheless, ALJ McDaniel's decision regarding supportability prevails. ALJ McDaniel was not compelled to give more weight to an opinion from Dr. Fry due to being Claimant's treating physician. Even though she did not provide a comprehensive discussion of all of Dr. Fry's other treatment records, ALJ McDaniel explained how she considered the supportability factor of Dr. Fry's opinion. This explanation was coherent, as ALJ McDaniel expressed her concerns and bolstered them with references to at least two other examinations conducted by Dr. Fry. (Tr. 1545). That alone is sufficient. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c; Gavre, No. 3:20-cv-00551-DJH-CHL at *4 (citations omitted).
The Commissioner also attempts to make a “checkbox form” argument to diminish the value of Dr. Fry's medical source statement because, they argued, the format resulted in his opinion being “conclusory and devoid of any supporting explanation.” (DN 12 at PageID # 3400). However, because the format of Dr. Fry's opinion was not addressed by ALJ McDaniel, the Court will not consider it here. See Terhune, No. CV 3:21-37-KKC, 2022 WL at *5.
B. Consistency
The Court finds that, while ALJ McDaniel did not properly evaluate the evidence regarding the consistency factor, her explanation is sufficient to permit meaningful judicial review and enable the Claimant to understand why she was not persuaded by Dr. Fry's opinion. As Judge Hale stated in Claimant's previous case, even when an ALJ's summary of the record “detail[s] medical findings that contradict[] the treating providers' evaluations,” if “she did not refer to those findings when she rejected the treating providers' opinion,” the ALJ “did not comply with the § 404.1520c requirements because the ALJ did not adequately explain why the opinions of the claimant's treating providers were unpersuasive.” Gavre, No. 3:20-cv-00551-DJH-CHL, at *5 (citing Hardy v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 20-10918, 2021 WL 3702170, at *5-6 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 13, 2021)). While ALJ McDaniel identified which of Dr. Fry's findings were inconsistent with other evidence in the record, she did not specifically identify any such “other evidence in the record.”
After summarizing Dr. Fry's opinion and positing that his other examinations of Claimant do not contain the frequency and severity one would expect from Dr. Fry's set of limitations, ALJ McDaniel noted “[t]reatment for [Claimant's] neck and back has been conservative since her alleged onset date and she often reported good response to treatment without side effects, so the exertional and postural limitations do not find corroborating support in the record.” (Tr. 1545). ALJ McDaniel did not identify to which treatment and response she was referring or whether they were administered by a different provider. Without a clear picture of any other medical opinions and evidence of record inconsistent with Dr. Fry's opinion, the Court cannot construe ALJ McDaniel's findings to satisfy the consistency factor. Terhune, No. CV 3:21-37-KKC, 2022 WL at *5.
An ALJ's failure to properly apply the regulations may be considered harmless where “the goal of the regulation was otherwise met.” Lorraine R. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:20-cv-00396, 2022 WL 4232839, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 14, 2022); see also Hardy v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 20-10918, 2021 WL 3702170, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 13, 2021) (citing Wilson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 547 (6th Cir. 2004)). The articulation requirement from the regulations for weighing medical opinions serves several purposes, one of which is “maintaining public confidence in the basic fairness of the administration of the Social Security program to have disappointed claimants at least understand why the government has rejected [an] opinion[.]” Smalley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No, 20-1865, 2021 WL 4026783, at *4 (6th Cir. Sept. 3, 2021).
The question then is whether the goal of §404.1520c(b)(2) was met through ALJ McDaniel's evaluation of Dr. Fry's opinion. Or stated otherwise, the Court must decide whether ALJ McDaniel's explanation is sufficient to permit meaningful judicial review and enable the Claimant to understand why she was “not persuaded” by Dr. Fry's opinion. See Jenna B. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:21-cv-00176, 2022 WL 4395682, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 23, 2022). The Court finds it is.
ALJ McDaniel described “conservative” treatment that she believed did not provide corroborating support in the record for limitations set forth in Dr. Fry's opinion, but she did not cite to any specific treatments. (Tr. 1545-46). She did, however, use the same language when she summarized the record: ALJ McDaniel described Claimant's treatment as “conservative,” then identified specific examples of treatment listed in the record to support her description. (Tr. 154243 (citing Tr. 1344-1429, 1495-1523, 2263-2579, 2580-2906)). ALJ McDaniel noted Claimant often reported good response to treatment without side effects, including when Claimant “described good pain relief with medication,” “reported improvements in neck pain with massages and trigger point injections,” and “reported 50% pain relief with Norco and no side effects ....” (Id.) These treatments were conducted by medical professionals besides Dr. Fry. (Tr. 1344-1429, 1495-1523, 2263-2579, 2580-2906). Looking back at ALJ McDaniel's summary of the record, it is clear she was referencing this conservative treatment conducted by other medical professionals and Claimant's reports of positive response to treatment in her analysis of Dr. Fry's opinion. This summary permits meaningful judicial review and allows Claimant to understand why Dr. Fry's opinion was not consistent with the other evidence of record.
Accordingly, ALJ McDaniel's discussion of Dr. Fry's opinion evidence can be understood to touch upon both the consistency and supportability factors, as required by the regulations. For these reasons, the Court finds ALJ McDaniel properly weighed Dr. Fry's medical opinion with the record and complied with the spirit of the regulations. Any error in the evaluation of Dr. Fry's opinion was harmless.
IV. Recommendation
ALJ McDaniel's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and comports with the applicable regulations; accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS the Commissioner's decision be AFFIRMED.
NOTICE
Therefore, under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(B) and (C) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the Magistrate Judge files these findings and recommendations with the Court and a copy shall forthwith be electronically transmitted or mailed to all parties. Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy, any party may serve and file written objections to such findings and recommendations as provided by the Court. If a party has objections, such objections must be timely filed or further appeal is waived. Thomas v. Arn, 728 F.2d 813 (6th Cir.), aff'd, 474 U.S. 140 (1984).