Opinion
24A-CR-387
11-25-2024
Ian J. Marietta, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
Attorney for Appellant Marielena Duerring South Bend, Indiana Attorneys for Appellee Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Caroline G. Templeton Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Elkhart Superior Court The Honorable Kristine A. Osterday, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 20D01-2304-F3-19
Attorney for Appellant Marielena Duerring South Bend, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General
Caroline G. Templeton Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
KENWORTHY, JUDGE
Case Summary
[¶1] Ian Marietta pleaded guilty to Level 3 felony rape and was sentenced to twelve years in the Indiana Department of Correction ("DOC") with three years suspended to probation. Marietta now appeals, raising one issue for our review: Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it did not sentence him under Indiana's alternative juvenile sentencing scheme? We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] In fall 2022, then sixteen-year-old Marietta raped his fourteen-year-old half-sister, H.D, by pulling down her pants and underwear and "penetrat[ing] her vagina with his penis" while she was sleeping. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 9. H.D. reported the incident a few months later. During a subsequent interview with police, Marietta admitted he "got these feelings and went on top of [H.D.]" and "stuck his penis in [H.D.'s] vagina." Id.
[¶3] The State charged Marietta as an adult with Level 3 felony rape for knowingly having sexual intercourse with H.D. when she was unaware the sexual intercourse was occurring. Marietta pleaded guilty to the charge without a plea agreement. Marietta requested to be sentenced prior to his 18th birthday. And prior to and at his sentencing hearing, Marietta requested the trial court sentence him under the alternative juvenile sentencing scheme, seeking to serve his sentence in a juvenile facility or on probation. The trial court explained it had not received the requisite information for such an alternative placement and ordered Marietta to serve twelve years in the DOC with three years suspended to probation.
Because the State alleged Marietta committed rape while he was between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years old, a juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over Marietta. See Ind. Code § 31-30-1-4(a)(4) (2022).
When sentenced on January 17, 2024, Marietta was three days shy of turning eighteen years old.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did not sentence Marietta under the alternative juvenile sentencing scheme.
[¶4] Marietta argues the trial court improperly denied his request for alternative juvenile sentencing under Indiana Code Section 31-30-4-2. We review a trial court's decision on whether to apply an alternative sentencing scheme for abuse of discretion. Harris v. State, 165 N.E.3d 91, 95-96 (Ind. 2021). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 269 (Ind. 2023).
[¶5] A trial court sentencing a child offender in adult court "essentially has two choices": (1) "sentence the child in accordance with adult sentencing statutes"; or (2) "elect to send the child to a juvenile facility instead of adult prison," so long as the child is eligible. James v. State, 178 N.E.3d 1236, 1240 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021), trans. denied; see also I.C. § 31-30-4-2(a)-(b) (2023). Alternative sentencing, however, is unavailable unless the DOC determines a space is available for the child offender. I.C. § 31-30-4-2(b) (explaining a trial court may elect to impose an alternative sentence only if the DOC "determines that there is space available for the offender in a juvenile facility of the division of youth services of the department").
[¶6] After pleading guilty, Marietta moved for the trial court to order the DOC to determine whether space was available for Marietta to be sentenced under the alternative juvenile sentencing scheme. That same day, the trial court granted Marietta's motion, ordering the DOC to make the requested determination. But at Marietta's sentencing hearing around a month later, the trial court explained it had not yet received information from the DOC "to advise whether or not they have the appropriate space for [alternative] placement." Tr. Vol. 2 at 35. Marietta did not request a continuance to permit the DOC more time to provide the necessary information. In this instance, the trial court was precluded from imposing alternative juvenile sentencing. See I.C. § 31-30-4-2(b).
Conclusion
[¶7] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did not sentence Marietta under the alternative juvenile sentencing scheme.
[¶8] Affirmed.
Felix, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.