Opinion
2 CA-JV 2021-0111
01-14-2022
Maria P.M., Appellant, v. Department of Child Safety, J.M.P., and K.M., Appellees.
Emily Danies, Tucson Counsel for Appellant Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General By James W. Rappaport, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County No. JD20200557 The Honorable Ken Sanders, Judge Pro Tempore
Emily Danies, Tucson Counsel for Appellant
Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General By James W. Rappaport, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
Vice Chief Judge Staring authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Eppich and Judge Brearcliffe concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
STARING, VICE CHIEF JUDGE:
¶1 Maria P.M. appeals from the juvenile court's order finding her twin daughters, J.M.P. and K.M. (born January 2020), dependent as to her. She argues there was insufficient evidence to support the court's findings. We disagree and, therefore, affirm.
¶2 J.M.P. and K.M. were born prematurely and spent the first three months of their lives in the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU). In September 2020, after their discharge to home, K.M. was diagnosed with a subdural hematoma consistent with non-accidental trauma, and the Department of Child Safety (DCS) removed Maria's four children from the home she shared with their father, her husband Richard.
¶3 Later that month, DCS filed a dependency petition as to all of Maria's children. After the children were removed, Maria moved out of the family home and filed for divorce, although that divorce was not final at the time of the six-day contested dependency hearing held from February to August 2021. The juvenile court found J.M.P. and K.M. dependent as to Maria on abuse and neglect grounds. It concluded, given Maria's testimony "that she was essentially the sole provider and caretaker" for J.M.P. and K.M. and given the fact that their "injuries occurred in her care," she had "failed to provide . . . proper supervision, which resulted in [their] non-accidental injuries." The court further noted Maria had denied responsibility for the injuries and was "extremely reluctant to even acknowledge" the children could have been injured in her care, instead making "spurious allegations" they had been injured while in the NICU. This appeal followed.
The juvenile court dismissed the dependency proceeding as to Maria's two older children.
¶4 On appeal, Maria asserts there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that the children were dependent. She asserts the court erred in finding that she was solely responsible for the children's care and that she had claimed the injuries occurred while the children were hospitalized after birth, and by disregarding the "child's attorney's argument" that Maria "had taken responsibility that something happened to the twins in the home [and had] remedied the situation."
Maria also appears to challenge the juvenile court's order denying her motion to return the children to her care made pursuant to Rule 59, Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. Even if that order can be appealed, see Brionna J. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 247 Ariz. 346, ¶¶ 1, 7, 10 (App. 2019), Maria did not do so, nor did she seek review by special action.
¶5 A child is dependent if the child's "home is unfit by reason of abuse [or] neglect." A.R.S. § 8-201(15)(a)(iii). We review the juvenile court's order adjudicating a child dependent for an abuse of discretion and will affirm the order unless no reasonable evidence supports the court's factual findings. Louis C. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 237 Ariz. 484, ¶ 12 (App. 2015). The petitioner must prove the allegations in a dependency petition by a preponderance of the evidence. A.R.S. § 8-844(C)(1); see also Willie G. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz. 231, ¶ 2 (App. 2005). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the order, Willie G., 211 Ariz. 231, ¶ 21, recognizing that the juvenile court "is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts," Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, ¶ 4 (App. 2004).
¶6 Maria's argument is largely a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See id. The record supports the juvenile court's factual finding that Maria was "essentially solely responsible" for the children. She testified that Richard was never alone with them and that he only occasionally "participate[d] with" her when she cared for them. Maria correctly notes on appeal that other caregivers were sometimes present but identifies no evidence that they were regularly alone with the children.
¶7 The evidence also supports the juvenile court's conclusion Maria had made wrongful accusations against medical staff who had treated J.M.P. and K.M. while they were in the NIC U.She denied knowing how the children had been injured, stating only that she did not believe they had been injured at home. When asked where she thought they had been injured, she stated: "I don't know. They were [in intensive care] for three months before going home." Although Maria's meaning is not entirely clear from just the transcript, the court was in the best position to evaluate her testimony. See id. Maria's comment could reasonably be interpreted to suggest medical staff were somehow to blame for her children's injuries. Thus, we find no fault in the court's finding that Maria had made "spurious" accusations against medical staff who had treated her children.
¶8 Nor was there any reason for the juvenile court to discuss in its ruling the argument made by the children's counsel that Maria "accepts the fact that she wasn't able to protect the children in her home" and "has been able to finally take some responsibility" and, thus, counsel did "not believe . . . that there is still a dependency as to [her] clients." Counsel's beliefs are not evidence, see State v. Pedroza-Perez, 240 Ariz. 114, ¶ 13 (2016), and Maria has cited no authority suggesting the juvenile court is required to expressly address in its ruling each argument raised by counsel, see Melissa W. v. Dept of Child Safety, 238 Ariz. 115, ¶ 9 (App. 2015) (argument waived when unsupported by citation to authority).
¶9 We affirm the juvenile court's order finding J.M.P. and K.M. dependent as to Maria.