Opinion
03 Civ. 3325 (LAK)
October 10, 2003
ORDER
Plaintiff, a former New York City police officer, was terminated on May 9, 2000 after having been found guilty of serious departmental charges. He subsequently brought and lost two Article 78 proceedings in the state courts in which he challenged his termination on precisely the grounds now alleged in support of this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants move for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, arguing principally that the action is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and principles of former adjudication.
This Court only recently discussed the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and principles of former adjudication in the specific context of the preclusive effects of judgments in Article 78 proceedings in actions brought by New York City police officers to challenge termination and other adverse employment actions. Latino Officers Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 253 F. Supp.2d 771 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). No purpose would be served by repeating that discussion here, and the Court assumes familiarity with the decision. This matter therefore may be disposed of briefly.
1. The doctrine of claim preclusion does not apply here in light of plaintiff s claim for compensatory damages, which could not have been awarded in his Article 7 8 proceedings. Id. at 781-83.
2. The issues plaintiff seeks to raise here — whether his rights were violated by the advancement of the departmental trial date in response to the filing of his retirement papers and whether the department acted improperly in trying him in absentia where plaintiff, by his own admission, deliberately failed to appear at the trial and evaded service of process designed to compel his appearance — are precisely those raised and decided against him in the first Article 78 proceeding. This action is barred by issue preclusion unless plaintiff was not afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate the propriety of those actions in the Article 78 court. Id. at 783. There is no basis for such a conclusion.
Plaintiffs memorandum attempts also to suggest that plaintiff here claims that there was a discriminatory motive in the bringing of charges against him, an issue not raised in the Article 78 proceeding. See PI. Mem. 6-7. In fact, however, there is no such claim in the complaint. The closest it comes is an allegation that other employees of the police department, prior to the departmental trial and his termination, used the word "guinea" in referring to him. Cpt ¶¶ 3 3. But the complaint draws no connection between the alleged use of those epithets and the advancement of the trial date and plaintiffs termination.
Plaintiff does argue, in an unsworn memorandum, that he had no incentive to raise constitutional claims and that he was not present when the Article 78 proceeding was heard. PI. Mem. 4-5. The assertion that there was no incentive to raise a constitutional claim is utterly without merit. The fact that the First Department decided the Article 78 proceeding, which required no trial or other evidentiary proceeding, after a hearing — presumably an oral argument — at which plaintiff was not present is of no moment.
Accordingly, defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and on the ground of issue preclusion is granted. The case is closed.
SO ORDERED.