Opinion
A20-0076
03-30-2020
IN RE Jeffrey KROGSTAD, M.D., et al., Petitioners, Darrel Manselle, Respondent, v. Jeffrey Krogstad, M.D., et al., Petitioners.
Nathaniel A. Dahl, Meshbesher & Spence, Ltd., Waite Park, Minnesota (for respondent) Steven R. Schwegman, Kenneth H. Bayliss, Michelle M. Draewell, Quinlivan & Hughes, P.A., St. Cloud, Minnesota (for petitioners)
Nathaniel A. Dahl, Meshbesher & Spence, Ltd., Waite Park, Minnesota (for respondent)
Steven R. Schwegman, Kenneth H. Bayliss, Michelle M. Draewell, Quinlivan & Hughes, P.A., St. Cloud, Minnesota (for petitioners)
Considered and decided by Cleary, Chief Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Bryan, Judge.
SPECIAL TERM OPINION
CLEARY, Chief Judge
Darrel Manselle brought a tort action in Kandiyohi County, arising out of medical treatment provided at a clinic in Todd County (operated by Lakewood Health System) by Dr. Jeffrey Krogstad, a physician residing in Kandiyohi County. The two defendants demanded a change of venue to Todd County, and plaintiff Manselle made a timely motion to quash the demand. The district court denied the request for a change of venue. The defendants seek a writ of mandamus.
DECISION
A party who asserts that the district court has erroneously applied venue statutes may seek review by way of a petition for a writ of mandamus. Ebenezer Soc'y v. Minn. State Bd. of Health , 301 Minn. 188, 223 N.W.2d 385, 388 (1974). Mandamus is appropriate if uncontroverted facts in the record establish that a party is entitled to a change of venue. Castle v. Village of Baudette , 267 Minn. 140, 125 N.W.2d 416, 419 (1963). A petitioner challenging the district court’s interpretation of venue statutes bears the burden of establishing that the petitioner’s interpretation of the applicable statutes is correct. Ebenezer Soc'y , 223 N.W.2d at 388.
The sole issue presented is whether the district court correctly interpreted the phrase "several defendants" in Minn. Stat. § 542.10 to mean more than two defendants. Because resolution of the issue turns on statutory interpretation, the first step is to determine whether the language of the statute "is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation." Rodriguez v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 931 N.W.2d 632, 634 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). If the language is ambiguous, "we look to other interpretative tools to assist our inquiry into legislative intent." Id. ; see also Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2018) (requiring that laws be construed "to give effect to all ... provisions" and listing other factors to be considered in ascertaining legislative intent).
In the district court, the defendants made an alternative argument that venue should be changed for the convenience of witnesses, see Minn. Stat. § 542.11(4) (2018), but the petition for mandamus indicates that the district court’s rejection of that argument is not being challenged at this time.
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In the absence of a specific venue statute, civil actions "shall be tried in a county in which one or more of the defendants reside when the action is begun or in which the cause of action or some part thereof arose." Minn. Stat. § 542.09 (2018). There is a "preference for venue in the county of defendant’s residence," and a plaintiff seeking to retain venue where no defendant resides "must make a strong showing" that some part of the cause of action arose where the action was brought. Associated Producers, Inc. v. Warren Grain & Seed Co. , 308 Minn. 150, 241 N.W.2d 93, 95 (1976). The district court’s denial of the defendants’ request to change venue in this case is consistent with the preference for venue where a defendant resides, because it is undisputed that one of the defendants resided in Kandiyohi County when the action was brought.
"If the county designated in the complaint is not the county in which the cause of action or some part thereof arose and if there are several defendants residing in different counties, the trial shall be had in the county upon which a majority of them unite in demanding ...." Minn. Stat. § 542.10. To determine the legislature’s intended meaning of a word or phrase within a statute, a court will "often consider dictionary definitions." Shire v. Rosemount, Inc. , 875 N.W.2d 289, 292 (Minn. 2016) (examining meaning of "voluntary recreational program"). Courts must interpret the statute "so as to give effect to each word and phrase." Id. "When a word or phrase has a plain meaning, we presume that the plain meaning is consistent with legislative intent and engage in no further statutory construction." Id.
Defendants observe that "joint and several liability" can apply when there are only two defendants, and argue that "several defendants" should be interpreted to apply whenever there are separate or distinct defendants, without regard to number.
The parties and the district court have cited numerous dictionary definitions for "several," and virtually all of the cited dictionaries confirm that the word "several" can mean both "separate" and "more than two." The district court referred to an 1898 dictionary issued in the era when the term first appeared in the statute, which indicated that "several" can mean: "Separate; distinct .... [D]ifferent .... Consisting of a number more than two, but not very many." Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 744 (Springfield, Mass., G & C Merriam Co. 1898). Modern dictionaries confirm that "several" continues to have the same (multiple) meanings. "Being of a number more than two or three but not many .... Single; distinct ...." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1652 (3d ed. 1992); see also The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1754 (2d ed. 1987) (defining "several" as "being more than two but fewer than many in number .... [I]ndividual .... [S]eparate").
When legal phrases appear in statutes, courts may "look to legal dictionaries" to define their terms. Getz v. Peace , 934 N.W.2d 347, 354 (Minn. 2019). But the phrase "several defendants," like the phrase "voluntary recreational program" construed in Shire , 875 N.W.2d at 292, consists of an adjective modifying a noun, not a legal term of art. Nor has there been any showing here that "several defendants" is a legal term of art appearing in multiple statutes. Cf. id. (interpreting "pursuant to"). But legal dictionaries cited by the district court and the parties, as well as those surveyed by this court, recognize the same multiple meanings. See, e.g. , Black’s Law Dictionary 1583 (10th ed. 2014) (defining several as "more than one or two but not a lot .... [S]eparate; particular; distinct .... [D]ifferent").
Because "several" may mean separate or more than two, we conclude that the statutory language is ambiguous and subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, and we turn to other tools "to assist our inquiry into legislative intent." Rodriguez , 931 N.W.2d at 634. "Every law shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions." Minn. Stat. § 645.16. This principle is also sometimes referred to as the canon against surplusage, and it requires that each word be given a distinct and non-identical meaning. State v. Thonesavanh , 904 N.W.2d 432, 437 (Minn. 2017). Because "defendants" is already plural, interpreting "several defendants" to include two separate defendants would give no distinct meaning to the word "several." Only by interpreting it to mean more than two defendants does "several" have a distinct meaning from "defendants." The defendants have not explained how their preferred interpretation of "separate" defendants would give effect to each word.
The defendants cite no case interpreting section 542.10 in the way that they propose. Instead, they cite two cases originally brought in counties in which no defendant resided, and in both cases, the supreme court held that venue was properly changed to counties where at least one defendant allegedly resided. Dworsky v. Herbst , 254 Minn. 295, 95 N.W.2d 19, 20, 26-27 (1959) (holding that venue of action brought in Hennepin County, to recover unpaid rent for leased property located in Anoka County, was properly changed to Benton County, where one defendant was alleged to reside); Rust-Parker Grocery Co. v. Swanson , 243 Minn. 156, 66 N.W.2d 756, 756-57 (1954) (holding that venue was properly changed from St. Louis County to Cass County, where both defendants resided). Those cases do not support the defendants’ argument that the district court in this case erred in interpreting the statute to deny a request to change venue from the county in which a defendant did reside. In fact, even in a case involving a demand by a single defendant, the supreme court has specifically described the statutory right to demand a change of venue as applying only "[w]here there are more than two defendants, none of whom live in the county wherein the action is commenced." State ex rel. Johnson v. Mills , 187 Minn. 287, 245 N.W. 431, 431-32 (1932) (denying mandamus because only one of the three defendants joined in demand to change venue). This language is consistent with the district court’s interpretation of "several defendants" in section 542.10.
In the absence of any case squarely addressing whether only two defendants may qualify as "several defendants" uniting to demand a change of venue, the district court considered dictum in a mandamus decision by this court, Riddle v. Ringwelski , 451 N.W.2d 372 (Minn. App. 1990). That case involved claims arising from an automobile accident in Morrison County, brought against defendants who resided in Hennepin County and Ramsey County, and the action was initially brought in Ramsey County. Riddle , 451 N.W.2d at 373. As in this case, one of the two defendants resided in the county where the case was initially brought, and both defendants made a timely demand to change venue to the county where the claim arose. Id. This court questioned whether section 542.10 actually applied, noting "that ‘several’ is generally defined as a number more than two ... and the case was properly filed in the county of residence of one of two defendants," but the plaintiff’s petition for mandamus was denied because the plaintiff had failed to make a timely motion to quash the defendants’ demand. Id. (citation omitted).
The observation in Riddle about the apparent misinterpretation of the statutory reference to "several defendants" was not essential to the denial of mandamus because the plaintiff failed to properly challenge the demand to change venue and thus could not establish that the district court in Ramsey County was required to deny the request to change venue. But that dictum supports the district court’s interpretation of the same statutory language in this case and not the interpretation urged by the defendants in this case.
Petitioners seeking a writ of mandamus bear the burden of establishing that their interpretation of the applicable venue statute is correct. Ebenezer Soc'y , 223 N.W.2d at 388. We conclude that the defendants have not met their burden of establishing that two defendants qualify as "several defendants," within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 542.10. The interpretation urged by the defendants would be inconsistent with numerous dictionary definitions of "more than two" and would not give a distinct meaning to every word in the phrase chosen by the legislature. It would also be inconsistent with caselaw favoring venue where defendants reside, and would not give effect to legislative intent to allow plaintiffs to bring tort actions either where the claim arose or where any defendant resides. Accordingly, we conclude that defendants failed to establish that the district court’s interpretation that "several defendants" means more than two was incorrect, and we deny the petition for mandamus.