Opinion
A146856 A146099
12-20-2017
ANDREA MANGAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SIERRA PACIFIC MORTGAGE COMPANY, INC., ET AL., Defendants and Respondents. ANDREA MANGAN, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent; SIERRA PACIFIC MORTGAGE COMPANY, INC., ET AL., Real Parties In Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (San Francisco City & County Super. Ct. No. CGC10500318)
Plaintiff Andrea Mangan lost her San Francisco home in foreclosure, wrongfully she contends, and brought this suit against her lender and others initially in an effort to prevent her eviction from the property and then, afterwards, to regain possession of her home. She amended her complaint five times, ultimately dropping all of the originally named defendants and proceeding solely against the property's current owners and their lender. Those purchasers had no role in the allegedly wrongful foreclosure and acquired the home some years later, while this lawsuit was pending, from the bankruptcy estate of Mangan's foreclosing lender.
Mangan now appeals a judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend to her sixth amended complaint, which pled a single cause of action against these new defendants for wrongful foreclosure. We affirm the judgment. We also deny the petition for writ of mandate Mangan has filed asking us to set aside the trial court's order expunging her lis pendens.
BACKGROUND
San Francisco homeowner Andrea Mangan commenced this suit on June 1, 2010, against her lender, GMAC Mortgage LLC (GMAC), and other entities involved in the servicing of her loan and the foreclosure proceedings. She alleged that in July 2009, her bank's automatic payments of her mortgage "fell through" while she was traveling out of the country for three months due to a family emergency. Subsequently, in September 2009, a notice of default/election to sell was recorded against the property, and for the next several months she tried to communicate with the lender and its agents in order to pay the arrears and cure the default (her complaint alleging the details), sending in the payments they requested of her to reinstate her loan only to have the payments returned to her repeatedly, with no explanation, and have her many calls and emails go unanswered. Ultimately, in March 2010, her home was sold at a trustee's sale to her lender GMAC. Mangan alleged sixteen causes of action against the original defendants, including to quiet title to the property in her name, alleging that the foreclosure was "wrongful" and "void ab initio." She sought an injunction restraining them from evicting her or selling the property to a third party, damages and equitable remedies setting the trustee's sale aside.
Mangan's attorney recorded a lis pendens the same day, but neglected to record with it any proof of service (see Code Civ. Proc., §§ 405.22, 405.23).
Two years later, on May 14, 2012, GMAC and ETS Services, LLC filed for bankruptcy and, on June 4, notified the trial court that this lawsuit was subject to the automatic bankruptcy stay (see 11 U.S.C. § 362).
The following month, in July 2012, the bankruptcy court lifted the automatic stay to allow borrowers to pursue actions to unwind foreclosures.
Nearly three years later, in April 2015, Mangan filed a fifth amended complaint, asserting a single cause of action for wrongful foreclosure against a single defendant, Residential Credit Solutions, Inc. (RCS). She alleged that "[d]uring the GMAC bankruptcy, the ResCap Liquidating Trust (the 'Trust') became the successor in interest to GMAC," and that in February 2013, "the Trust transferred the Property to Ocwen Financial Corporation ('Ocwen'), and that "[a]t some point thereafter, Ocwen transferred the Property to RCS" which, she alleged, "still owns the Property, and took it with notice of this lawsuit."
Less than a month later, on April 30, 2015, she filed a sixth amended complaint, again asserting a single cause of action for wrongful foreclosure, this time against Sierra Pacific Mortgage Company, Inc., and Nathaniel and Annelise Matson. The Matsons, she alleged, had bought her home in February 2015, using funds provided by their lender, Sierra Pacific, to whom they conveyed a deed of trust. She also alleged that the defendants took title to the property with knowledge that their purchase "was subject to the results of [her] claim for wrongful foreclosure against GMAC," because she had recorded a notice of pendency of action in 2010. Thus, she alleged, "[t]here is . . . no reason in equity not to restore Mangan to ownership of the Property." She sought an order setting aside the non-judicial foreclosure and restoring ownership of the property to her.
After naming the Matsons and their lender as defendants, Mangan never served them with the lis pendens. Code of Civil Procedure section 405.22 requires service of the notice to be made "immediately and in the same manner upon each adverse party later joined in the action."
Subsequently, in May 2015, although there were no claims pending against GMAC and two other former defendants (the complaint having been amended), Mangan dismissed with prejudice her action against them.
The Matsons and Sierra Pacific then demurred to the wrongful foreclosure (sixth amended) complaint on multiple grounds. They demurred on the ground it failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for wrongful foreclosure (see Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e)), arguing that Mangan failed to allege these defendants were in any way involved in the foreclosure process, nor did she allege any illegal sale of the property or that she had tendered the full amount of the indebtedness secured by the GMAC deed of trust. They also argued her cause of action was barred by res judicata, because she had previously dismissed her claims against GMAC with prejudice and those claims were based on the same conduct as alleged in the sixth amended complaint, and that the claim was barred by a three-year statute of limitations. The defendants also demurred on the ground that Mangan had failed to include indispensable parties (see Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (d)), contending she was required to join the foreclosing lender and foreclosure trustee.
A hearing took place but is unreported. The court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal. The court also granted a motion by the defendants to expunge the lis pendens.
The record does not reflect the basis for the court's ruling. A "notice of ruling" that defense counsel filed states only that the court "sustained the general demurrers of defendants . . . without leave to amend."
This timely appeal from the judgment followed. Mangan also filed a petition for writ of mandate asking us to set aside the order expunging the lis pendens. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 405.39.) We ordered a response to the petition, stayed the trial court's August 7, 2015 order expunging the Notice of Pending Action, and ordered that the petition would be decided in connection with the appeal. We subsequently placed the appeal and writ proceeding on the same oral argument calendar.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Mangan challenges the demurrer ruling on multiple grounds, arguing she properly pled a claim for wrongful foreclosure against the current owners of her home, and rebutting various arguments made below as to why that claim is not viable. She also argues that, in any event, the trial court should have granted her leave to amend the complaint to add a claim for quiet title.
Those arguments concern her supposed failure to join indispensable parties, res judicata, the statute of limitations, defects in the notice of lis pendens, and whether she was required to allege that she tendered the full amount of her indebtedness to GMAC to cure the default.
Before turning to those issues we first address the threshold question of our subject matter jurisdiction, because defendants have questioned that in their respondents' brief.
I.
The Bankruptcy Court Does Not Have Exclusive Jurisdiction Over This Dispute.
Defendants assert the trial court lacked jurisdiction over this lawsuit (and thus imply that this court also lacks jurisdiction), because "[a]s a matter of law, the bankruptcy court, not the trial court, has jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim because plaintiff's dispute over the foreclosure and ownership of the Property is related to the bankruptcy." Regrettably, none of the parties have cited any case law on this issue. Nevertheless, we have a sua sponte obligation to satisfy ourselves of our own jurisdiction, and we disagree with defendants.
By statute, the only matters as to which the federal district courts sitting in bankruptcy have exclusive jurisdiction (apart from ancillary matters concerning a trustee's employment of professionals (see 11 U.S.C. § 327)) are the bankruptcy case itself, and the debtor's property. In that regard, 28 U.S.C. section 1334 states in relevant part that, "(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11," and that the district court in which a case under chapter 11 is commenced "shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . [¶] of all the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of the commencement of such case, and of property of the estate." (Italics added.) It further states, though, that "(b) . . . [t]he district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11." (Id., italics added.) So, the statute on its face defies defendants' argument that a matter "related to" a case under chapter 11 is within the federal courts' exclusive jurisdiction. And although the bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction over the debtor's property, we agree with Mangan that its order lifting the automatic stay to allow state court actions to proceed that seek to unwind completed foreclosures implicitly reflects that we have jurisdiction to decide this dispute. In these circumstances, we have little trouble concluding that the exercise of our jurisdiction does not interfere with the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. Otherwise the bankruptcy court's order lifting the automatic stay to permit state court actions such as this would be pointless.
Cases "arising under" title 11 are those that involve rights created by the Bankruptcy Code; matters "arising in" a bankruptcy case entail administrative matters that are unique to the bankruptcy process with no independent existence outside of bankruptcy but are not expressly rooted in the Bankruptcy Code; and "related to" matters involve rights that exist outside of bankruptcy. (See Fitzgerald, et al., Rutter Group Practice Guide: Bankruptcy, National Edition (The Rutter Group 2017) ¶¶ 1:96, 1:105, 1:107-1:108.)
Had the bankruptcy court not done so this would have been a closer question. (See Miller v. R.K.A. Management Corp. (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 460, 465-467 [holding, in case not involving relief from the automatic stay, that state court lacks jurisdiction to invalidate bankruptcy-court approved sale of debtor's real property]).
In short, we see no basis for an argument that the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over this dispute, nor have the defendants cited any authority to that effect. Therefore, we conclude this court does not lack subject matter jurisdiction, and will proceed to decide this appeal on its merits.
The sole authority defendants cite, In re Tleel (9th Cir. 1989) 876 F.2d 769, does not concern bankruptcy court jurisdiction. It affirmed a judgment for the bankruptcy trustee in an adversary action brought by a third party seeking to impose a constructive trust over the proceeds of sale of real property in which the debtor held legal title, holding that the third party's claimed equitable interest in the property had been avoided (i.e., extinguished) pursuant to the bankruptcy trustee's "strong arm" avoidance powers. (See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) [giving trustee the power, inter alia, to "avoid . . . any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable by . . . (3) a bona fide purchaser of real property . . . from the debtor"].)
II.
Standard of Review
The principles governing our review of the court's ruling are well settled. "As a demurrer tests the sufficiency of the complaint as a matter of law, it raises only an issue of law (Code Civ. Proc., § 589, subd. (a)), as to which our review is de novo. [Citation.] We assume the truth of all facts properly pled in the complaint and also accept as true all facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged." (Hilliard v. Harbour (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1006, 1010-1011.) We also consider matters that may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwin (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) First, therefore, we review the complaint de novo to decide whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory. (Hilliard, at p. 1011.) Second, if the demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, we must decide whether there is a reasonable possibility the complaint could be amended to state a cause of action, and if not there has been no abuse of discretion. (Blank, at p. 318.) " 'Leave to amend should be denied where the facts are not in dispute, and the nature of the plaintiff's claim is clear, but, under the substantive law, no liability exists.' " (Kilgore v. Younger (1982) 30 Cal.3d 770, 781.) The trial court's denial of leave to amend is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081.)
All of that said, we do not review the court's ruling in search of error. The task of identifying, and establishing, reversible error indisputably falls to the appellant. That is because " '[a] judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct . . . and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.' " (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 (Denham).) One aspect of an appellant's burden is to furnish, and appropriately discuss, pertinent legal authority. We are not required to address arguments that the appellant has not supported with pertinent legal authority. (See Kim v. Sumitomo Bank (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 974, 981-982; see also Hodjat v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1, 10 ["an appellant is required to not only cite to valid legal authority, but also explain how it applies in his case"].) Simply put, an appellate brief must contain a cogent legal argument, supported by appropriate authority. (See Hearn Pacific Corp. v. Second Generation Roofing, Inc. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 117, 150.) With these principles in mind, we now turn to the issues.
III.
Mangan Failed to State a Claim for Wrongful Foreclosure Against the Matsons and
Sierra Pacific.
Although the parties debate many issues concerning the viability of Mangan's wrongful foreclosure claim, we address only one. Mangan acknowledges, at page 11 of her opening brief, that one element she must allege is that "the defendant caused an illegal, fraudulent, or willfully oppressive sale of the property pursuant to a power of sale." (Italics added.) (See Chavez v. Indymac Mortgage Services (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1062.) As defendants argued below, however, Mangan has not alleged that defendants did this, and she cannot; defendants are subsequent buyers and lender, not participants in the allegedly wrongful foreclosure. Defendants are more cursory in their brief on appeal, but we understand them to make essentially the same argument now, contending Mangan "cites no authority for pursuing a derivative claim" against these defendants based on GMAC's conduct. Indeed, the first sentence of the opposition Mangan filed below to their demurrer acknowledges she is "seeking redress for former defendants GMAC Mortgage, LLC and Executive Trustee Services, LLC's (together, "GMAC") wrongful foreclosure on her home." (Italics added.) Mangan cites no authority that a claim for wrongful foreclosure may be asserted against non-participants to the foreclosure sale and we are aware of none. So she hasn't met her burden of demonstrating any error in the trial court's ruling that she failed to allege facts constituting a valid cause of action. (See Denham, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 564 [" 'error must be affirmatively shown' "]; see also, e.g., Sporn v. Home Depot USA, Inc. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1303 [disregarding argument that appellant "fail[ed] to support . . . with reasoned argument and citations to authority"].)
She cites Barroso v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1001, which recognized a wrongful foreclosure claim against the loan servicer that foreclosed on the plaintiff's home (see id. at pp. 1016-1018), and Bank of America, N.A. v. La Jolla Group II (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 706, which was an action to invalidate a trustee's sale brought against the buyers who participated in the sale.
IV.
The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Mangan Leave to Amend
Her Complaint to Allege a Claim for Quiet Title.
This brings us, then, to Mangan's contention the trial court should have granted her leave to amend her complaint to add a cause of action for quiet title. She argues she pled facts sufficient to state a cause of action for quiet title, the only defect being that her complaint was not verified which, she argues, "would have been an easy fix had the trial court granted leave to amend." We conclude there was no abuse of discretion, because Mangan hasn't met her burden to show she could allege facts sufficient to state a valid quiet title cause of action.
Given various assertions in the parties' briefing about the details of GMAC's bankruptcy proceedings, we requested supplemental briefing as to whether Mangan's alleged right to regain possession of the property was extinguished in the bankruptcy on any of various grounds. Having reviewed the parties' supplemental briefing, we elect not to decide that question. In addition, the parties' requests for judicial notice in connection with their supplemental briefing are denied.
Mangan contends that "at the time [the Matsons] made their purchase, the recorded lis pendens notified them as a matter of law of this litigation." The reason, she contends, is because "once recorded, the lis pendens constructively notifies all subsequent purchasers without need of further service." She relies on Code of Civil Procedure section 405.24, which states: "From the time of recording the notice of pendency of action, a purchaser, encumbrancer, or other transferee of the real property described in the notice shall be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the noticed action as it relates to the real property and only of its pendency against parties not fictitiously named. The rights and interest of the claimant in the property, as ultimately determined in the pending noticed action, shall relate back to the date of the recording of the notice." (Italics added.)
Implicit in this position is the well-established principle, which the parties evidently assume, that a bona fide purchaser for value who acquires an interest in real property without knowledge or notice of someone else's prior rights or interest in the property takes the property free and clear of those unknown interests, whereas one who acquires real property with actual or constructive notice of prior interests takes the property subject to those interests. (See In re Marriage of Cloney (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 429, 437.)
But defendants argue the lis pendens is void and ineffectual, for two separate reasons. They argue there was no proof of service attached to it when it was originally recorded, and also Mangan did not serve them when they became adverse parties in 2015. These facts are undisputed. Both are statutorily required, and as we discuss below the failure to do either renders the notice void and invalid.
Defendants make these arguments in opposition to Mangan's writ petition challenging the expungement order, and incorporate those arguments by reference into their respondents' brief. Although we don't condone that practice which is improper, and defendants would have done better to include all pertinent legal arguments in their appeal brief, we presume they did this in an effort to avoid unnecessary duplication and not, as Mangan suggests, to circumvent the word limitations of their appellate brief. Indeed, the respondents' brief runs to all of 4,491 words, which is considerably shorter than what the rules permit. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(c)(1) [14,000 words].)
We start with Code of Civil Procedure section 405.22, which states: "Except in actions subject to Section 405.6, the claimant shall, prior to recordation of the notice, cause a copy of the notice to be mailed, by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, to all known addresses of the parties to whom the real property claim is adverse and to all owners of record of the real property affected by the real property claim as shown by the latest county assessment roll. If there is no known address for service on an adverse party or owner, then as to that party or owner a declaration under penalty of perjury to that effect may be recorded instead of the proof of service required above, and the service on that party or owner shall not be required. Immediately following recordation, a copy of the notice shall also be filed with the court in which the action is pending. Service shall also be made immediately and in the same manner upon each adverse party later joined in the action." (Italics added.) Mangan's counsel acknowledged at oral argument that the lis pendens was not served on the original defendants but should have been, and he also conceded that service should have been made on these defendants when they were later joined in this action.
That provision governs eminent domain proceedings. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 405.6.)
In light of these concessions at oral argument, it is unnecessary to explain why we disagree with contrary arguments by Mangan in her appellate briefing.
Section 405.23 of the Code of Civil Procedure addresses the consequences of violating the service requirements of section 405.22. It states: "Any notice of pendency of action shall be void and invalid as to any adverse party or owner of record unless the requirements of Section 405.22 are met for that party or owner and a proof of service in the form and content specified in Section 1013a has been recorded with the notice of pendency of action." (Italics added.) So, at a minimum, under the plain terms of section 405.23, the notice is "void and invalid" as to the defendants ("any adverse party"), because the requirements of section 405.22 were not met for them, because they were never served with the lis pendens "immediately" after being joined as parties (as required by section 405.22) or, indeed, ever. But it also is void and invalid as to them because, at the outset, Mangan did not serve the lis pendens on the originally named parties and "all owners of record of the real property" (see § 405.22), and "a lis pendens that is void as to one owner is also void as to that owner's transferees." (Carr v. Rosien (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 845, 856-857 (Carr); see also Rey Sanchez Investments v. Superior Court (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 259, 263-264 [plaintiff's failure to comply with service requirements of section 405.22 with respect to owners originally named as defendants rendered lis pendens void as to subsequent purchasor].)
Mangan's principal answer to this problem, as far as we understand it (made at oral argument), is that even if the lis pendens could have been, and was, properly expunged due to service defects, it nonetheless imparted constructive notice of her claims under section 405.24, quoted ante. That position, however, rests on interpretations of the lis pendens provisions that she asserts in conclusory terms but fails to support with adequate argument or authority, and so Mangan has not met her burden of persuasion. The language of section 405.23 makes plain that the invalidity of a lis pendens depends on compliance with section 405.22. What is less obvious is how section 405.24, which provides for constructive notice upon recording a lis pendens, is to be understood in light of section 405.23. That is, does a lis pendens that is "void and invalid" as to a party under section 405.23 nonetheless operate to provide that party with constructive notice under section 405.24? Relying solely on the plain text of section 405.24, Mangan contends that it does. But there is contrary authority, holding that a void lis pendens does not provide constructive notice to subsequent purchasers. (Carr, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at pp. 857-858 [affirming judgment entered in favor of subsequent purchasers in action to quiet title].)
While the meaning of section 405.24 and its application to the undisputed facts here are issues of law, we are not inclined to reach out and decide them. The question of whether section 405.24 means a lis pendens that is "void and invalid" nevertheless suffices to establish constructive notice was not squarely raised by Mangan in the briefing, and defendants have not addressed it at all. Issues of statutory construction such as this one should not be decided without care. Sections 405.22, 405.23 and 405.24 are part of a broader statutory scheme created to establish a method for plaintiffs' asserting an interest in property to give constructive notice of pending litigation to all parties claiming an interest in the property. (Formula Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1455, 1461-1462; see §§ 405-405.61.) Courts interpreting these sections have read the provisions together, been mindful of "various competing policies behind [the] statutory scheme" and consulted its legislative history. (Manhattan Loft, LLC v. Mercury Liquors, Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1040, 1052-1053; see Formula Inc., at pp. 1461-1465.) Mangan has failed to acknowledge or address possible interpretations other than the one that would favor her, cited no case law or other authority, and omitted any discussion of the purpose or history of the lis pendens statutes.
In short, she has failed to meet her burden on appeal of demonstrating that she could allege a valid quiet title claim, because she has failed to demonstrate that the lis pendens validly imparted to defendants constructive notice of this litigation. Given the clear, mandatory language of section 405.23 concerning defects in service of a lis pendens ("shall be void and invalid"), Mangan's treatment of this issue on appeal is too cursory for us meaningfully to decide it, and we deem it forfeited.
Furthermore, the absence of a transcript of the demurrer hearing only further complicates matters, because we do not know what might have been discussed at the hearing (and/or even possibly conceded) concerning the viability of a quiet title claim. (See Snell v. Superior Court (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 44, 49 [" 'In the absence of a transcript the reviewing court will have no way of knowing in many cases what grounds were advanced, what arguments were made and what facts may have been admitted, mutually assumed or judicially noticed at the hearing. In such a case, no abuse of discretion can be found except on the basis of speculation' "]; see also, e.g., Gee v. American Realty & Construction, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1416 [in the absence of a hearing transcript, "so long as such possible grounds may exist for the trial court to have denied defendants' motion in the exercise of its discretion, defendants have not sustained their burden as appellants to demonstrate error"]. )
V.
The Order Expunging the Lis Pendens
Given that we are affirming the judgment of dismissal, it follows that there is no basis to order the lis pendens reinstated. There is no pending action, much less a basis to conclude Mangan established the probable validity of her claim. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 405.32.) In addition, Mangan's counsel conceded in oral argument that the expungement motion could be properly granted given her failure to serve the lis pendens on the defendants when they were named in this action. Accordingly, we deny Mangan's petition for writ of mandate.
VI.
Conclusion
The complexities of this case, as we have said in another context, " 'would bring tears to the eyes of a brass monkey.' " (Schellinger Brothers v. Cotter (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 984, 988.) In light of our disposition, however, it is unnecessary to address other issues the parties have raised, such as the question of indispensable parties (see, e.g., Miller v. R.K.A. Management Corp., supra, 99 Cal.App.3d at p. 467 [bankruptcy trustee held an indispensable party to action seeking to unwind bankruptcy-approved sale of real property and to quiet title in plaintiff's name, and affirming order sustaining demurrer without leave to amend]), the legal consequences of an order by the trial court sustaining a demurrer by GMAC without leave to amend to a claim for quiet title, the potential res judicata implications of Mangan's dismissal with prejudice of GMAC, statute of limitations issues, and the potential res judicata impact of the bankruptcy court's ruling rejecting Mangan's proof of claim against GMAC on the ground there was no liability for wrongful foreclosure.
This appeal also exemplifies the importance of some fundamental principles governing the duties of litigants before us and the role of a reviewing court. In raising a claim of trial court error, it is the appellant's burden not to take a position that is legally correct in some abstract sense but, as noted, to affirmatively demonstrate the appellant's position is correct—through reasoned argument, analysis and citation to appropriate legal authority (see Cinema West, LLC v. Baker (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 194, 218-219; Sporn v. Home Depot USA, Inc., supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 1303), because we, as a reviewing court, approach each case presuming no error occurred. (See Denham, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 564.) In addition, no matter how sympathetic we might be toward any party before us, we are not advocates but impartial decision makers. Thus, no matter the circumstances of a civil dispute, it is simply not the job of an appellate court to ferret out issues, or independently research and develop answers to difficult legal questions that the parties haven't adequately addressed. We sometimes conduct independent legal research, of course; and in this case, we did. But it is one thing to research on the margins of an issue the parties have suitably analyzed; it is quite another thing to start largely from scratch.
Appellate courts also strive to be right. We don't want to err any more than a trial court does. Our obligations to the parties demand this as does our institutional role as a reviewing court that decides questions of law. That is another reason appropriate legal briefing from the parties is so essential. So, when a case appears to raise complicated legal issues that haven't been adequately briefed, we sometimes request supplemental briefing with the hope the parties will assist the court to root through the chaff, and arrive at the legally correct result. Here, though, that approach has proved unhelpful.
In this case, we requested several rounds of supplemental briefing on a number of points, which generated a significant number of new arguments and potential issues. Suffice it to say, the supplemental briefing by and large raised more complexities and questions than it supplied answers.
Every appeal must come to an end. In fairness to other litigants whose appeals are waiting to be heard and decided, and cognizant of the institutional necessity of doing our job unconstrained by any appearance of favoring any party, we are refraining from requesting any further supplemental briefing. There are too many unanswered questions on this record and on the state of the present briefing, for us to devote further judicial resources to staunch the flow of tears from this particular brass monkey's eyes.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Mangan's petition for a writ of mandate is denied. Our decision on the petition for writ of mandate shall become final 30 days after its filing, and the stay of the trial court's August 7, 2015 order expunging the notice of pending action this court previously entered is hereby lifted, to become effective as of the date this decision becomes final.
/s/_________
STEWART, J. We concur. /s/_________
KLINE, P.J. /s/_________
RICHMAN, J.