Opinion
Page __
__ Cal.App.2d __319 P.2d 46723 Cal. Comp. Cases 13MANCHESTER AVENUE COMPANY, Plaintiff and Appellant,v.H. W. STEWART, as Director of Employment, Defendant and Respondent.VIRGINIA COUNTRY CLUB, Plaintiff and Appellant,v.H. W. STEWART, as Director of Employment, Defendant and Respondent.Civ. 22447.California Court of Appeals, Second District, First DivisionDec. 30, 1957Rehearing Denied Jan. 24, 1958.
Hearing Granted Feb. 26, 1958.
Clock, Waestman & Clock, Long Beach, for appellants.
Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., Irving H. Perluss, Asst. Atty. Gen., Vincent P. Lafferty, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.
DRAPEAU, Justice pro tem.
Manchester Avenue Company owns and operates a golf course known as Inglewood Country Club.
Virginia Country Club also owns and operates a golf course named 'Virginia Country Club.'
In 1952 the Department of Employment of the State of California levied an assessment against both clubs, based upon the amount that caddies had been paid while caddying for players using the clubs.
The clubs paid the assessments under protest, $502.24 for Manchester, and $5,200.07 for Virginia. They filed claims for refunds with the department, which were denied. Then they appealed to the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board of the State of California. These appeals were also denied. Then they brought actions for relief in the Superior Court.
The cases were consolidated for trial. The trial judge found and concluded that the caddies were not independent contractors, but that they were employees of the two clubs. Judgment for the department followed, from which judgment the clubs appeal.
Grounds of appeal are:
1. That the caddies were independent contractors.
[319 P.2d 468] 2. That while the clubs had rules governing the conduct of caddies while on the club premises, these were for general police purposes, (Rest., Agency, § 220, at p. 489), and did not necessarily establish the fact that the caddies were employees.
3. That there is no evidence that supports any finding or conclusion of law that the clubs controlled the manner or means by which the caddies performed their services.
4. Compensation was never paid by the clubs; it was determined and paid at the discretion of the players.
5. That the unemployment act in effect during the time these tax claims were asserted to have been incurred made it very clear that the tax liability was imposed only upon the person paying the wages, and on no one else.
6. That in 1953 the legislature enacted section 651 of the Unemployment Insurance Code, exempting caddies from its provisions. In 1954 the State Senate adopted a resolution declaring it was the intention of that body that caddies paid by individual golf players should not be deemed to be employees under the law.
The periods of employment here in question were before the enactment of the 1953 amendment. However, that amendment has within itself the seeds of future litigation, for it provides: '§ 651. 'Employment' does not include services performed in caddying or carrying a golf player's clubs by an individual who is not in the employ of the gold club or association.' (Emphasis added.)
This brings us to the controlling question in this case: Under the facts here before us were the caddies independent contractors, or were they employees of the clubs?
Our Supreme Court had this question under consideration in two cases: Claremont Country Club v. Industrial Accident Commission, 1917, 174 Cal. 395, 163 P. 209, L.R.A.1918F, 177, and Empire Star Mines Co. v. California Employment Commission, 1946, 28 Cal.2d 33, 168 P.2d 686.
In the Claremont Country Club case it was held that a caddie who leaned against a handrail of a bridge that gave way, causing him to fall into a creek bottom and injure his elbow, was an employee of the golf club, and entitled to workmen's compensation. The facts and the arguments in that case are strikingly similar to those in the case at bar.
In the Empire Star Mines case our Supreme Court sets forth the rules to be used in distinguishing between independent contractors and employees. In that case it is said (28 Cal.2d at page 43, 168 P.2d at page 692): '[T]he most important factor is the right to control the manner and means of accomplishing the result desired.'
So appellant clubs argue here that the result desired is the carrying of gold clubs for a gold player, and keeping track of his golf balls in flight and at rest, and that the player controls the manner and means of the result desired. That the player has the right to exercise complete control over a caddie. He need not take a caddie furnished by the club, and he can discharge a caddie at any time for any reason, or for no reason at all.
Appellants also argue that, applying the factors set forth in the opinion in the Empire Star case to the facts in this case:
(a) A caddie is engaged in a distinct occupation.
(b) He is under the direction of the player.
(c) There is no particular skill required.
(d) The caddie supplies himself, 'he is the lad who carries the bags.'
(e) The length of time of the employment is for one round of golf.
(f) The caddies are paid by the job.
(g) The work is for the player, not the club.
(h) Neither the player nor the caddie believe that they are creating a relationship of employer and employee.
This argument and reasoning makes a strong appeal to this court, especially in view of the legislative action stated.
[319 P.2d 469] But we are of the opinion that under the doctrine of stare decisis we are bound by the decision of our Supreme Court in the Clarement Country Club case, supra, and for that reason the judgment will have to be affirmed.
The judgment is affirmed.
WHITE, P. J., and FOURT, J., concur.