Opinion
2:23-cv-01688-RMG-MGB
04-24-2024
Prince Charles Mallory, Plaintiff, v. Dorchester County Detention Center; John Does 1-44, unidentified Dorchester County Detention Center officers; John Does 45-46, unidentified mental health examiners from the Medical University of South Carolina; Dorchester County Public Defender's Office; Juliana Stewart; Dorchester County Solicitor's Office; Kelly LaPlante; United Health Services; John Does 47-51, unidentified Dorchester County Detention Center nurses; Dr. Wimberly; Judge Vernida Gillard-Hill; and Judge Murphy, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Prince Charles Mallory (“Plaintiff”), a state pretrial detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) in relation to various conditions of confinement he purportedly experienced at the Dorchester County Detention Center (“DCDC”). (Dkt. No. 1.) Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review this case and submit findings and recommendations to the assigned United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that this action be summarily dismissed.
BACKGROUND
Upon reviewing the initial filings in this case, the undersigned entered an order notifying Plaintiff that his case was not in proper form, as he had failed to submit a completed set of proposed service documents for each of the named defendants as required under General Order, In Re: Procedures in Civil Actions Filed by Prisoner Pro Se Litigants, No. 3:07-mc-5014-JFA (D.S.C. Sept. 18, 2007). (Dkt. No. 6.) The order also informed Plaintiff that his Complaint was subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, the undersigned afforded him twenty-one days, plus three days for mail time, to file the necessary service documents, as well as an amended pleading that cured the deficiencies identified in his Complaint. (Id. at 14-15.) The undersigned emphasized that if Plaintiff did not follow these instructions within the time permitted by the order, his case would be summarily dismissed. (Id. at 15.)
Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff filed a completed set of proposed service documents with the Court. (Dkt. No. 10.) The undersigned then issued an order reminding Plaintiff that he still needed to submit an amended pleading if he wished to proceed with this action and giving him a brief extension to do so. (Dkt. No. 11 at 3.) Plaintiff later filed a motion for an extension of time, seeking an additional sixty days to comply with the undersigned's instructions on the basis that he had been transferred from DCDC to an inpatient treatment facility in Columbia, South Carolina and was unable to bring his records for this action with him. (Dkt. No. 17.) The undersigned granted Plaintiff's motion. (Dkt. No. 18.)
Notwithstanding the above, Plaintiff submitted a letter approximately one week later seeking to voluntarily dismiss this action pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Dkt. No. 21), and the Clerk of Court therefore closed this matter in accordance with Plaintiff's request. Plaintiff then sent a second letter stating that he “reconsidered and decided to proceed” with this action, and asked the Court to provide him with an extension to “bring [his] case to form.” (Dkt. No. 22.) Based on Plaintiff's second letter, the undersigned directed the Clerk of Court to reopen the instant case and restore it to the docket. (Dkt. No. 23.) However, because Plaintiff still had ample time to submit his amended pleading pursuant to the sixty-day extension previously provided (Dkt. No. 18), and the undersigned declined to further extend the deadline. (Id.) Unfortunately, Plaintiff never filed an amended pleading and the time to do so has expired. Accordingly, the instant action remains limited to the claims presented in the original Complaint. (Dkt. No. 1), which are summarized below.
The heart of Plaintiff's Complaint is an overarching conspiracy perpetrated against him by DCDC; forty-four unidentified DCDC officers (“John Does 1-44”); two unidentified mental health examiners (“John Does 45-46”) from the Medical University of South Carolina (“MUSC”); the Dorchester County Public Defender's Office; Plaintiff's public defender, Juliana Stewart (“Stewart”); the Dorchester County Solicitor's Office; Assistant Solicitor Kelly LaPlante (“LaPlante”); United Health Services; five unidentified nurses at DCDC (“John Does 47-51”); Dr. Wimberly; Judge Vernida Gillard-Hill; and Judge Murphy (collectively, “Defendants”). Specifically, the Complaint contends that Defendants systematically deprived Plaintiff of various constitutional rights to “induce symptoms of mental illness” that would ultimately result in his “indefinite” incarceration.(See Dkt. No. 1 at 14-20.) The Complaint alleges that Defendants conspired against Plaintiff in retaliation for “political, religious, and governmental petition speeches related to his social media activity, and prominence, political aspirations and opinions, publicized and private business ventures, and for past and pending civil litigations and complaints against partner agencies and persons.” (Id. at 14.)
Plaintiff was confined at DCDC on charges of using a vehicle without permission with intent to deprive; carjacking; and resisting arrest (Indictment Nos. 2022-GS-18-01226, -1227, -1228). Plaintiff apparently pleaded guilty to the carjacking charge on December 20, 2023, and a nolle prosequi was entered with respect to the two remaining offenses. See Dorchester County Public Index, https://www.sccourts.org/casesearch/ (last visited April 24, 2024); see also Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970) (explaining that a federal court may take judicial notice of the contents of its own records, as well as those records of other courts); Tisdale v. South Carolina Highway Patrol, No. 0:09-cv-1009-HFF-PJG, 2009 WL 1491409, at *1 n.1 (D.S.C. May 27, 2009), aff'd, 347 Fed.Appx. 965 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 2009) (noting that the court may also take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government web sites).
The Complaint takes a somewhat rambling, “kitchen sink” approach in presenting the purported constitutional violations committed by each group of Defendants. With respect to DCDC, the Complaint alleges that the facility “orchestrated a cruel and unusual environment by training staff, [and] intentionally organizing/arranging inmates to terrorize [Plaintiff].” (Id. at 16.) For example, the Complaint states that DCDC “used sounds, smells, HVAC manipulations, manipulations of lights, fire alarms, door slamming, and supply availability” to “induce mental or physical abuse” against Plaintiff; “denied and/or ignored [a] request for bible studies;” subjected Plaintiff to “unwarranted nude searches;” and “leaked” Plaintiff's “private patent and book ideas” to outside “agencies.” (Id.)
With respect to the forty-four unidentified DCDC officers, the Complaint alleges that they “organized themselves into a mob style gang” and participated “in daily and consistent verbal and citation issuing attacks” to “break” Plaintiff and “cause mental [in]stability” in “support” of a “fraudulent” incompetency diagnosis. (Id. at 14.) The officers allegedly shared “private information”-such as “government and medical data on [Plaintiff]”-with other inmates so that they could “participate, extend, and intensify [the] attacks.” (Id. at 15.) The Complaint further states that Plaintiff was “denied clean water and equal food portions” on more than one occasion; “wrongly given citations without means to contest allegations” on at least four occasions, with two citations resulting in “long term” isolation; and subjected to “sexual harassment” when officers “shared detailed descriptions of Plaintiff's private parts with other officers and inmates” and directed body cameras at Plaintiff while he showered. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that these “attacks” intensified when he attempted to report the alleged misconduct through DCDC's grievance system. (Id.)
With respect to the five unidentified nurses at DCDC, Plaintiff claims that they likewise “participated in the verbal trigger attacks in order to induce symptoms of mental illness.” (Id. at 19.) The Complaint asserts that these nurses also falsely diagnosed Plaintiff as mentally ill and continued “without reason” to insist that he take medication for the same. (Id.) The nurses apparently intensified their attacks and “refused to provide [Plaintiff] equal access to treatment” when “grievances were reported about their behavior.” (Id. at 19-20.)
Similarly, the Complaint states that Dr. Wimberly, “the detention center doctor on duty,” alluded to Plaintiff having a mental illness as part of a “mental and psychological attack.” (Id. at 20.) The Complaint suggests that Dr. Wimberly essentially dismissed Plaintiff's complaints of “a fractured wrist and spinal cord/upper back abnormalities and pain” as a figment of this purported mental illness. Dr. Wimberly also allegedly denied Plaintiff “access to proper testing[,] conducted [a] cruel and unusual examination, and refused to provide details of his accreditation.” (Id.) The Complaint further claims that Dr. Wimberly “wrote prescriptions and refused to provide formulation and side effects data,” which apparently resulted in Plaintiff later developing “swollen feet.” (Id.)
With respect to Plaintiff's public defender, the Complaint states that Defendant Stewart “participated in obstructing due process when she ignored [Plaintiff's] request for a speedy trial by jury . . . and later agreed to a mental competency hearing.” (Id. at 17.) The Complaint contends that Defendant Stewart “conspired with [the] Solicitor's Office and Judge Murphy, who signed [the] competency order, to prevent access to courts to ensure Plaintiff remained incarcerated . . . and [to] restrict[] him from further bail proceedings.” (Id.; see also id. at 18, asserting that Defendant LaPlante, the assistant solicitor presumably assigned to Plaintiff's criminal case, also conspired with Defendant Stewart to “frame Plaintiff as mentally ill.”)
The Complaint also states that the two unidentified MUSC “psychology professionals” participated in the conspiracy against Plaintiff by “fraudulently misdiagnos[ing] [him] as mentally incompetent” for purposes of his criminal proceedings. (Id. at 18.) The Complaint seems to suggest that these two Defendants used “surveillance data collected on [Plaintiff's] private life and property” to “abuse” Plaintiff and, once again, “induce mental and physical illness.” (Id.)
Finally, Judges Gillard-Hill and Murphy apparently denied Plaintiff access to the court proceedings involving his “competency” assessment and relied on the “misdiagnosis” to “promote indefinite incarceration.” (Id. at 20.) The Complaint further suggests that Judges Gillard-Hill and Murphy “used excessive bail” and denied Plaintiff a “PR bond” in part due to his alleged “mental disability.” (Id.)
As a result of Defendants' purported actions, the Complaint states that Plaintiff has suffered from “post traumatic stress, general anxiety disorder, other unidentified mental illnesses, worsening of chronic conditions, [and] undiagnosed heart, stomach, and chemical imbalance issues.” (Id. at 5.) In terms of relief, the Complaint seeks $20 million in damages. (Id.)
LEGAL STANDARD
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any prisoner complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also id. § 1915A(b). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte “at any time” under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute “is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits.” Id. at 326.
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This plausibility determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations,” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a Pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2). See Wellerv. Dep'tof Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P., for “all civil actions”). The Fourth Circuit has explained that “though Pro se litigants cannot, of course, be expected to frame legal issues with the clarity and precision ideally evident in the work of those trained in law, neither can district courts be required to conjure up and decide issues never fairly presented to them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1276 (4th Cir. 1985).
DISCUSSION
Despite receiving ample time from the Court, Plaintiff has failed to file an amended pleading that cures the deficiencies identified in his original Complaint. As a result, this action remains subject to summary dismissal for the reasons discussed below.
I. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims
A civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
A. Parties Not Amendable to Suit Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
1. DCDC, the Dorchester County Public Defender's Office, the Dorchester County Solicitor's Office, and United Health Services
It is well-established that “inanimate objects such as buildings, facilities, and grounds are not ‘persons' and do not act under color of state law.” Sumpter v. Georgetown Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 0:20-cv-1770-JMC-PJG, 2020 WL 3060395, at *2 (D.S.C. June 8, 2020). Accordingly, as the undersigned previously warned Plaintiff (Dkt. No. 6 at 5), Defendants DCDC, the Dorchester County Public Defender's Office, the Dorchester County Solicitor's Office, and United Health Services do not qualify as “persons” for purposes of § 1983, regardless of whether Plaintiff refers to the physical buildings or the staff and collection of officials they house. See e.g., id. at *2 (Detention Center); Gause v. City of Conway Police Dep't, No. 4:20-cv-3185-RBH, 2020 WL 6156532, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 21, 2020) (Solicitor's Office); Kilgo v. Scalzo, No. 6:22-cv-815-HMH-JDA, 2022 WL 1129801, at *3 (D.S.C. Mar. 28, 2022), adopted, 2022 WL 1128599 (D.S.C. Apr. 15, 2022) (Public Defender's Office). Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against these Defendants are therefore subject to summary dismissal.
2. Judges Gillard-Hill and Murphy
With respect to the individual defendants, Judges Gillard-Hill and Murphy are entitled to absolute judicial immunity for their judicial actions. See Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991); Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985). Indeed, while Plaintiff seems to suggest, albeit quite vaguely, that Judges Gillard-Hill and Murphy were somehow involved in and mishandled his criminal proceedings, judicial immunity is not pierced by allegations of corruption or bad faith, nor will a judicial officer “be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (internal citations omitted). Thus, even if their judicial acts were “flawed,” id. at 359, Plaintiff's claims against Judges Gillard-Hill and Murphy are barred by the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity and subject to summary dismissal.
Although the Court is unable to verify the identities of the judges assigned to Plaintiff's state court proceedings, the undersigned assumes Judges Gillard-Hill and Murphy are part of the State of South Carolina's unified judicial system for purposes of this Report and Recommendation. See S.C. Const. art. V, § 1.
3. Defendant LaPlante
Similarly, with respect to Defendant LaPlante, any involvement in Plaintiff's criminal proceedings as an assistant solicitor is protected by the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity. Prosecutors, when acting within the scope of their duties, are entitled to absolute immunity from personal liability under § 1983 for alleged civil rights violations committed in the course of “activities intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976); see also Savage v. Maryland, 896 F.3d 260, 268-69 (4th Cir. 2018). Accordingly, while Plaintiff's claims against Defendant LaPlante are relatively vague, they appear to stem from her role as an assistant solicitor and are therefore subject to summary dismissal under the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity. See, e.g., Hewins v. Gardner, No. 6:18-cv-1762-MGL-KFM, 2018 WL 4335058, at *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 10, 2018) (finding that defendant's actions in her capacity as assistant solicitor were protected by prosecutorial immunity); Littles v. Clements, No. 4:19-cv-2485-JMC-SVH, 2019 WL 9667781, at *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 18, 2019), adopted, 2020 WL 2306586 (D.S.C. May 8, 2020) (same).
4. Defendant Stewart
With respect to Defendant Stewart, a public defender does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983. See Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (explaining that a public defender generally “does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding”). To the contrary, a public defender “is the State's adversary,” id. at 323 n.13, and because this Complaint challenges Defendant Stewart's conduct in her capacity as Plaintiff's defense attorney, the pleading fails to allege the requisite state action for purposes of § 1983. See id. at 318 (finding no state action because “a lawyer representing a client is not, by virtue of being an officer of the court, a state actor ‘under color of state law' within the meaning of § 1983”); see also Bell v. Stirling, No. 1:22-cv-1319-TMC-MGB, 2022 WL 5236739, at *7 (D.S.C. Aug. 31, 2022), adopted, 2022 WL 4462951 (D.S.C. Sept. 26, 2022). Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against Defendant Stewart are thus subject to summary dismissal.
The undersigned notes that, in some instances, a private entity that jointly participates in constitutional wrongdoing with a state official may be said to have engaged in state action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980). Here, Plaintiff attempts to show this joint participation by suggesting that Defendant Stewart “conspired” with certain court officials “to ensure Plaintiff remained incarcerated....” (Dkt. No. 1 at 18.) For the reasons discussed in greater detail below, however, Plaintiff's conspiracy allegations fail to establish a plausible claim under § 1983.
B. Failure to State a Claim to Relief Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Turning to Plaintiff's claims against the remaining Defendants, it is important to recognize that a person acting under color of state law can be held liable under § 1983 only if he or she was personally involved in the deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017). To that end, “a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. As the undersigned previously explained (Dkt. No. 6 at 6-7), lumping numerous defendants together in “broad-brush allegations,” as Plaintiff has done with the John Doe Defendants here, does not provide a sufficient factual basis to establish how each official personally deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right. See Allen v. City of Graham, No. 1:20-cv-997, 2021 WL 2037983, at *1-5 (M.D. N.C. May 21, 2021); see also Spivey v. Breckon, No. 7:20-cv-400-MFU-JCH, 2022 WL 2317448, at *3 (W.D. Va. June 28, 2022) (finding insufficient factual allegations of personal involvement where pleading was “replete with allegations that fail[ed] to identify who committed the alleged wrongdoing”); Luna-Reyes v. RFI Constr., LLC, 57 F.Supp.3d 495, 503 (M.D. N.C. 2014) (requiring filing of more definite statement where “the complaint repeatedly ma[de] factual allegations generally directed at ‘Defendants,' without any distinction between them,” because “[s]uch a conclusory and shotgun approach to pleading fails to provide each [d]efendant the factual basis for the claim(s) against him or it and therefore deprives them and the court of the opportunity of determining whether there are sufficient facts to make a claim against each [d]efendant plausible” (emphasis omitted)). Without any differentiation between the numerous John Doe Defendants generally referenced in the Complaint, Plaintiff simply cannot establish the personal involvement required under § 1983.
Notwithstanding the above, even if Plaintiff had adequately distinguished some of the unidentified John Doe Defendants in the Complaint, the undersigned finds that the pleading still fails to state a plausible claim to relief under § 1983.
1. Civil Conspiracy
As suggested above, the Complaint presents a scattered series of purported constitutional violations against Defendants and lumps them together in a conclusory fashion as evidence of a mass conspiracy to render Plaintiff mentally ill and keep him perpetually incarcerated. Accordingly, the undersigned reiterates here that the crux of this Complaint appears to be a civil conspiracy claim, which requires the plaintiff to establish that: (1) the defendants acted jointly in concert; (2) some overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (3) the conspiracy resulted in the deprivation of a constitutional right. See Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg, W.Va., 81 F.3d 416, 421 (4th Cir. 1996). “Where the complaint makes only conclusory allegations of a conspiracy under § 1983 and fails to demonstrate any agreement or meeting of the minds among the defendants, the court may properly dismiss the complaint.” McNeill v. Jhonson, No. 3:18-cv-188-FDW, 2018 WL 3868809, at *6 (W.D. N.C. Aug. 14, 2018); see also Williams v. Cavedo, No. 3:13-cv-672-HEH, 2014 WL 852038, at *2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 4, 2014) (explaining that a plaintiff alleging civil conspiracy must “plead facts that would reasonably lead to the inference that [defendants] positively or tacitly came to a mutual understanding to try to accomplish a common and unlawful plan”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted), aff'd, No. 14-7002 (4th Cir. Sept. 26, 2014).
It is worth noting that the assumption underlying Plaintiff's conspiracy claim-that a mental illness or mental incompetency determination automatically deprives a detainee of his constitutional rights and/or results in indefinite incarceration-appears to be somewhat of a legal fallacy. The undersigned is not aware of any case law or authority that would support this theory. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (finding frivolous claims that lack an arguable basis either in law or in fact).
Beyond Plaintiff's mere speculation, there is nothing in the pleading to suggest that the purported constitutional violations he experienced at DCDC and in relation to his criminal proceedings reflect a concerted effort by Defendants. To find otherwise would deem plausible the idea that over forty officers and nurses at DCDC colluded with each other-and the state court judges assigned to Plaintiff's criminal case, the assistant solicitor prosecuting said case, Plaintiff's public defender, and two medical examiners from MUSC-to perpetrate a multifaceted “attack” against Plaintiff. “Courts have routinely dismissed Pro se complaints that allege such amorphous and vast conspiracies.” Smith v. Jehovah's Witnesses, No. 1:22-cv-123-LMB-TCB, 2022 WL 500601, at *2 (E.D. Va. Feb. 11, 2022), aff'd, No. 22-1158, 2022 WL 2915453 (4th Cir. July 25, 2022); see also Paul v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., No. 3:13-cv-1852-CMC-PJG, 2014 WL 5025815, at *10 (D.S.C. Oct. 8, 2014) (citing Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg, 81 F.3d 416, 422 (4th Cir.1996) (explaining that allegations of conspiracy must “amount to more than ‘rank speculation and conjecture,' especially when the actions are capable of innocent interpretation”)), aff'd, 599 Fed.Appx. 108 (4th Cir. 2015); McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting that examples of frivolous claims include those whose factual allegations are so “wholly fanciful” as to be simply “unbelievable”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff's unsubstantiated conspiracy claim is subject to summary dismissal.
2. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to bring separate causes of action based on the discrete conditions of confinement he experienced at DCDC, the protections against “cruel and unusual punishment” afforded convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment extend to detainees like Plaintiff through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977). While “the Eighth Amendment only protects post-conviction detainees from ‘cruel and unusual punishment,' the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause protects pretrial detainees from being punished at all.” See Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th 593, 606 (4th Cir. 2023) (referencing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-37 & n.16 (1979)). Thus, “any pretrial detention conditions that ‘amount to punishment' violate due process.” Id.; see also Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he pretrial detainee, who has yet to be adjudicated guilty of any crime, may not be subjected to any form of punishment.”) (emphasis in original).
Notwithstanding the above, “not every inconvenience encountered during pretrial detention amounts to ‘punishment' in the constitutional sense.” See Prigg v. Baltimore Cnty. Dep't of Corr., No. 1:23-cv-48-DLB, 2024 WL 1012885, at *6 (D. Md. Mar. 8, 2024) (citing Martin, 849 F.2d at 870); see also Fuller v. Spartanburg Cnty., No. 6:24-cv-451-TMC-KFM, 2024 WL 1188419, at *5 (D.S.C. Feb. 14, 2024) (referencing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) (noting that the Constitution “does not mandate comfortable prisons,” and only deprivations which “deny the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities are sufficiently grave” to provide the basis of a § 1983 claim)). Rather, the detainee must show that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to a serious risk of harm, meaning that he or she acted or failed to act “in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known.'” See Short, 87 F.4th at 607 (referencing the standard of “civil recklessness” prescribed in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994)).The detainee may satisfy this showing by alleging that the challenged action is not related to a legitimate non-punitive governmental purpose or is excessive in relation to that purpose. Short, 87 F.4th at 611 (citing Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 398 (2015)).
At the time the undersigned issued the initial order regarding the deficiencies in Plaintiff's Complaint (Dkt. No. 6), the Court did not have the benefit of the Fourth Circuit's holding in Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th 593 (4th Cir. 2023). Instead, the undersigned relied on the Fourth Circuit's previous approach to pretrial detainees' Fourteenth Amendment claims, applying the same two-prong test used for prisoners alleging cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Under the previous approach, a prisoner was required to prove two elements: (1) that objectively the deprivation of a basic human need was sufficiently serious, and (2) that subjectively the prison officials acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (referencing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297-98 (1991)). While a “showing of subjective intent can still help a pretrial detainee state a claim for action that amounts to punishment,” this showing is no longer required under Short. See Short, 87 F.4th at 609 (referencing Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 398). Nevertheless, it does not matter which of the two tests the Court applies here, as Plaintiff's allegations fall short of the objective standard required under both.
Here, the Complaint's cursory allegations regarding Defendants' “verbal attacks” against Plaintiff and his temporary lack of access to “clean water and equal food portions” (Dkt. No. 1 at 1415, 19-20) do not amount to a “serious risk of harm” as required to show an actionable violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights under § 1983. See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 332 F.R.D. 505, 520 (S.D. W.Va. 2019) (noting that “verbal abuse of inmates by correctional facility staff, without more, is not actionable under § 1983”); Kemp v. Johnson, No. 1:09-cv-3195-TLW-SVH, 2011 WL 7143469, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 17, 2011) (finding that deprivation of clean water for a limited period of time did not pose a substantial risk of serious harm), adopted, 2012 WL 359725 (D.S.C. Feb. 2, 2012), aff'd, 474 Fed.Appx. 990 (4th Cir. 2012). Any such claims are therefore subject to summary dismissal.
3. Due Process
With respect to Plaintiff's allegations regarding the issuance of disciplinary citations and subsequent “long term isolation” without due process (Dkt. No. 1 at 15), it is true that a detainee charged with a disciplinary violation implicating a liberty interest is entitled to certain procedural safeguards under the Fourteenth Amendment. Dilworth v. Adams, 841 F.3d 246, 251-53 (4th Cir. 2016). However, the allegations in the Complaint provide little to no insight regarding the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff's citations. For example, the Complaint does not clearly describe the relevant disciplinary proceedings that followed Plaintiff's citations or how they allegedly violated his rights. See Crittington v. McFadden, No. 3:21-cv-314-MR, 2021 WL 5452134, at *7 (W.D. N.C. Nov. 22, 2021) (dismissing claims regarding detention center's disciplinary proceedings where plaintiff merely stated that the proceeding was unfair and expressed his disagreement with its outcome). Accordingly, the Complaint's vague allegations regarding disciplinary citations fail to state an actionable constitutional violation.
4. Violation of Privacy
Turning to Plaintiff's allegations regarding his right to privacy, “[i]t is generally understood that prisoners surrender many rights of privacy upon their incarceration given the communal nature of prison life and the surveillance and security requirements.” Emilien v. Weeks, No. 0:21-cv-2330-RMG-PJG, 2022 WL 18635150, at *9 (D.S.C. Dec. 6, 2022). In evaluating the reasonableness or legitimacy of a potential privacy violation, the court “must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.” Wofish, 441 U.S. at 559; see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-28 (1984).
Here, Plaintiff's cursory claim that DCDC officers directed body cameras at him while showering (Dkt. No. 1 at 15) does not provide sufficient factual support to establish an unreasonable invasion of Plaintiff's privacy. Indeed, the Complaint does not note the frequency with which Plaintiff's showers were recorded and in what capacity; whether the officers monitoring the showers are members of the same sex; and what was done with the footage, if anything. See Wilson v. N.R.A.D.C., No. 7:19-cv-771, 2020 WL 497166, at *1 (W.D. Va. Jan. 30, 2020) (stating that there is generally no constitutional right against “limited exposure” of an inmate's genitals to officers of the same sex); see also Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[I]solated episodes of harassment and touching . . . are despicable. . . . But they do not involve a harm of federal constitutional proportions as defined by the Supreme Court.”) (referencing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 53334).
Similarly, Plaintiff's vague, somewhat incoherent allegations of Defendants sharing “sensitive private information related to specifics about [his] family, work, sexual, medical, and social history” to “intensify” the attacks against him (see, e.g., Dkt. No. 1 at 15, 18-20) also fall short of a privacy violation because Plaintiff does not identify any constitutionally protected information or specify the scope of the alleged disclosures. See, e.g., Van Higgins v. Miller, No. 1:12-cv-297-RJC, 2012 WL 4511524, at *2 (W.D. N.C. Oct. 1, 2012) (noting that “neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor the Fourth Circuit has ever recognized a constitutional right in the privacy of prisoners' medical records”); Gamble v. Simmons, No. 5:20-cv-3618-RMG, 2020 WL 7706621, at *2 (D.S.C. Dec. 29, 2020) (noting that “there is no fundamental right of privacy in personal medical information”). Once again, without more, Plaintiff's bare allegations do not state an actionable constitutional violation.
5. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Treatment
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governs claims of inadequate medical treatment brought by pretrial detainees like Plaintiff. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 535 n.16; Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 671 n.40. To demonstrate an actionable constitutional violation for inadequate medical treatment, a plaintiff must show:
(1) they had a medical condition or injury that posed a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly acted or failed to act to appropriately address the risk that the condition posed; (3) the defendant knew or should have known (a) that the detainee had the condition and (b) that the defendant's action or inaction posed an unjustifiably high risk of harm; and (4) as a result, the detainee was harmed.Short, 87 F.4th at 611. In the instant case, Plaintiff's medical claims largely seem to be premised on the contention that John Does 47-51 and Dr. Wimberly misdiagnosed him as mentally ill and possibly disregarded other medical complaints based on the same. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 19-20.) However, “[a] § 1983 claim is not stated by disagreements between an inmate and a physician over treatment, diagnosis, or other questions of medical judgment.” See David v. Ozmint, No. 9:10-cv-1976-RBH, 2011 WL 1375016, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 12, 2011) (referencing Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318, 319 (4th Cir.1975)); see also Dontell v. Safford, No. 9:22-cv-1641-BHH-MHC, 2024 WL 1529166, at *8 (D.S.C. Jan. 31, 2024), adopted, 2024 WL 1109159 (D.S.C. Mar. 14, 2024).
Moreover, with respect to Plaintiff's other miscellaneous medical complaints, the ambiguous nature of Plaintiff's allegations makes it difficult to discern a serious medical need, as the Complaint alleges only bare references to various unrelated injuries and does not clarify the severity or extent of the same. See Wright v. Lassiter, No. 1:18-cv-90-FDW, 2018 WL 4186418, at *11 (W.D. N.C. Aug. 30, 2018) (dismissing medical treatment claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) where prisoner's references to certain injuries were too conclusory and vague to demonstrate the existence of a serious medical need). In any event, Plaintiff does not even allege that he was denied treatment for any such injuries; rather, he suggests that he was dissatisfied with the treatments offered. Once again, such allegations do not demonstrate that Defendants' conduct went beyond an “ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986); see also Short, 87 F.4th at 611-12 (“[I]t is still not enough for the plaintiff to allege that the defendant negligently or accidentally failed to do right by the detainee.”) (internal citations omitted). Consequently, Plaintiff's allegations of inadequate medical treatment fall short of an actionable constitutional violation and are therefore subject to summary dismissal.
6. Retaliation
Finally, the Complaint contends that Defendants' alleged actions were done in retaliation for Plaintiff “expressing freedoms to speech, religion, press, and rights to petition government for redress. . . .” (Dkt. No. 1 at 14-15.) To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) his speech was protected; (2) the alleged retaliatory action adversely affected his protected speech; and (3) a causal relationship between the protected speech and the retaliation. Raub v. Campbell, 785 F.3d 876, 885 (4th Cir. 2015). “[F]or purposes of a First Amendment retaliation claim under § 1983, a plaintiff suffers adverse action if the defendant's allegedly retaliatory conduct would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from the exercise of First Amendment rights.” Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 500 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In the instant case, Plaintiff's ambiguous, somewhat incoherent references to expressions of “speech, religion, press,” and “social media and political activity” do not clearly allege protected speech for purposes of the First Amendment. However, to the extent Plaintiff is referencing the complaints he apparently submitted through DCDC's grievance system, inmates do possess a First Amendment right to be free from retaliation for filing a grievance. See Booker v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 545-46 (4th Cir. 2017). Unfortunately, because Plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint that better articulated the bases for his retaliation claims and more clearly identified the officers involved in such conduct, he has failed to allege an actionable First Amendment violation. II. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 Claims
Although the Complaint references 42 U.S.C. § 1985 as a cause of action, Plaintiff does not clearly articulate the basis for this claim. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.) The undersigned assumes, however, that Plaintiff is alluding to § 1985(3), which protects against conspiracies that deprive persons of “the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.” See Cockrum v. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., 365 F.Supp.3d 652, 661 (E.D. Va. 2019), dismissed, No. 191398, 2019 WL 5152518 (4th Cir. July 5, 2019). Notably, claims raised under § 1985(3) are limited to conspiracies predicated on “racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based invidiously discriminatory animus.” Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971). Thus, to state a claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege: (1) a conspiracy of two or more persons, (2) who are motivated by a specific class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus to (3) deprive the plaintiff of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to all, (4) and which results in injury to the plaintiff as (5) a consequence of an overt act committed by the defendants in connection with the conspiracy. Simmons v. Poe, 47 F.3d 1370, 1376-77 (4th Cir. 1995). As the undersigned previously warned Plaintiff (Dkt. No. 6 at 12-14), the Complaint fails to state a facially plausible claim to relief under § 1985(3) for several reasons.
A. Parties Not Amendable to Suit Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985
1. DCDC, the Dorchester County Public Defender's Office, the Dorchester County Solicitor's Office, and United Health Services
At the outset, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) prohibits conspiracies by “two or more persons” to violate another's civil rights. Just as Defendants DCDC, the Dorchester County Public Defender's Office, the Dorchester County Solicitor's Office, and United Health Services do not qualify as “persons” under § 1983, they likewise are not “persons” for purposes § 1985(3). See, e.g., Fernandez v. Beaufort Cnty. Sheriff's Off., No. 9:05-cv-1150-PMD, 2005 WL 8163340, at *3 n.3 (D.S.C. Aug. 15, 2005); Kerr v. McKay, No. 2:20-cv-190, 2020 WL 8484879, at *6 (S.D. W.Va. Aug. 17, 2020), adopted in part, 2020 WL 7706514 (S.D. W.Va. Dec. 29, 2020). Accordingly, these Defendants are not amenable to suit under § 1985(3) and any such claims must therefore be dismissed.
2. Judges Gillard-Hill and Murphy and Defendant LaPlante
Similarly, Judges Gillard-Hill and Murphy are still entitled to absolute judicial immunity with respect to any claims raised under § 1985(3). See, e.g., Wetherington v. Phillips, 380 F.Supp. 426, 428 (E.D. N.C. 1974), Off'd, 526 F.2d 591 (4th Cir. 1975); Daniels v. City of N. Charleston, No. 2:12-cv-319-DCN, 2012 WL 3877710, at *3 (D.S.C. Aug. 9, 2012), adopted, 2012 WL 3880078 (D.S.C. Sept. 6, 2012). The doctrine of prosecutorial immunity likewise extends to § 1985(3) claims, such that Defendant LaPlante is also protected from suit here. See, e.g., Cribb v. Pelham, 552 F.Supp. 1217, 1221 (D.S.C. 1982); Rhodes v. Smithers, 939 F.Supp. 1256, 1272 (S.D. W.Va. 1995), Off'd, 91 F.3d 132 (4th Cir. 1996).
B. Failure to State a Claim to Relief Under § 1985
With respect to the remaining Defendants, the law is well-settled that to establish a civil conspiracy pursuant to § 1985(3), the plaintiff must show an agreement or a “meeting of the minds” by the defendants to violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Simmons, 47 F.3d at 1377. Thus, for the same reasons Plaintiff's conspiracy claim falls short under § 1983, the Complaint also fails to allege facts sufficient to infer the joint action required to raise a conspiracy claim under § 1985(3). See, e.g., Gunn v. Cheeks, No. 7:18-cv-3427-HMH-KFM, 2019 WL 831122, at *2 (D.S.C. Jan. 22, 2019) (dismissing § 1985(3) claim during initial review where Pro se plaintiff “set forth only conclusory allegations,” because “conjecture and speculation are insufficient to demonstrate a conspiratorial agreement” or “mutual understanding” as required § 1985(3)), adopted, 2019 WL 804658 (D.S.C. Feb. 21, 2019); see also Simmons, 47 F.3d at 1377 (noting that the Fourth Circuit has “specifically rejected section 1985 claims whenever the purported conspiracy is alleged in a merely conclusory manner, in the absence of concrete supporting facts”).
Additionally, a civil conspiracy under § 1985(3) must be motivated by a “class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.” Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102. Here, Plaintiff does not raise any factual allegations that indicate a class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus. To the contrary, Plaintiff seems to suggest that much of Defendants' alleged actions were done in retaliation for his filing of grievances at DCDC and/or other vague “expressions” of speech. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 14-20.) Without the requisite showing of unlawful discriminatory animus, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff cannot raise a plausible claim for conspiracy pursuant to § 1985(3). See Brown v. City of Charleston, No. 2:11-cv-466-DCN, 2013 WL 4499138, at *8 (D.S.C. Aug. 20, 2013) (dismissing § 1985 claim because “[a]bsent from the amended complaint is any allegation that the purported conspirators were motivated by some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
III. 42 U.S.C. § 1986 Claims
Turning to 42 U.S.C. § 1986, this statute provides a cause of action against any party with knowledge of a conspiracy in violation of § 1985 who fails to take action to prevent the violation. Notably, a cause of action under § 1986 is dependent upon the existence of a claim under section 1985. Trerice v. Summons, 755 F.2d 1081, 1085 (4th Cir.1985). Consequently, failure on a § 1985 claim also means failure on the corresponding § 1986 claim. Kandare v. Gillies, No. 2:20-cv-318, 2021 WL 4932003, at *18 (E.D. Va. July 29, 2021), appeal dismissed, No. 21-2188, 2022 WL 1182066 (4th Cir. Jan. 10, 2022). As the undersigned previously explained (Dkt. No. 6 at 13-14), because Plaintiff's § 1985 conspiracy claim fails, so too does his § 1986 claim.
IV. Americans With Disabilities Act
Finally, the Complaint generally cites the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) as a basis for this action. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.) The ADA was enacted in 1990 “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities,” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1), and “to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” Id. § 12101(b)(2). Unfortunately, Plaintiff does not specify which section of the ADA he is referring to in connection with his claims. Moreover, any claim under the ADA fails without a threshold showing of disability. As the undersigned previously warned (Dkt. No. 6 at 14), Plaintiff does not allege that he is a person with a disability as defined by the statute or describe any sort of discrimination by Defendants based on the same. See Resper v. Corizon, No. 1:22-cv-378-SAG, 2022 WL 3544258, at *2 (D. Md. Aug. 16, 2022) (dismissing ADA claim where prisoner failed to allege that he was a person with a disability), aff'd sub nom. Resper v. YesCare Corp., No. 22-7021, 2023 WL 3055223 (4th Cir. Apr. 24, 2023). Accordingly, Plaintiff's bare, isolated reference to the ADA does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Garner v. Cohen, No. 2:16-cv-561-TLW-MGB, 2016 WL 9175627, at *4 (D.S.C. Sept. 1, 2016) (finding complaint's “vague references to [Pro se] Plaintiff's rights being violated, absent any specific facts or allegations against the Defendants, [were] wholly insufficient to state any sort of plausible claim”), adopted, 2017 WL 2645754 (D.S.C. June 20, 2017).
To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to claim that the purported denial of certain medical care violated his rights under the ADA, a prisoner generally may not state a claim under the ADA for a lack of medical treatment. See Resper v. Corizon, No. 1:22-cv-378-SAG, 2022 WL 3544258, at *2 (D. Md. Aug. 16, 2022), aff'd sub nom. Resper v. YesCare Corp., No. 22-7021, 2023 WL 3055223 (4th Cir. Apr. 24, 2023).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff's action is subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS that this action be DISMISSED without further leave to amend, as Plaintiff has already had an opportunity to do so. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 798 (4th Cir. 2022); see also Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724 F. App'x. 280, 281 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018). The Clerk of Court shall not forward this matter to the United States Marshal Service for service of process at this time.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).