Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-0010-15T2
12-15-2016
ADONIS MALDONADO, Appellant, v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
Adonis Maldonado, appellant pro se. Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Alex J. Zowin, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3. Before Judges Guadagno and Suter. On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Corrections. Adonis Maldonado, appellant pro se. Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Alex J. Zowin, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Appellant Adonis Maldonado appeals the June 3, 2015 decision by the Department of Corrections (Department) finding him guilty of two counts of prohibited acts under N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a). We affirm.
On May 7, 2015, a Corrections officer at the East Jersey State Prison, who was screening incoming mail for inmates at that facility, observed an envelope with a partly detached postage stamp, which was addressed to appellant and included his inmate number. Inspection of the envelope revealed two orange strips labeled "N2" that were secured to the back of the stamp. The strips were suspected to be prohibited substances. A second such envelope was found on May 8, 2015. Subsequent testing identified the strips to contain Suboxone, a controlled dangerous substance (CDS). Appellant's cell was searched and he was drug tested, all with negative results.
Appellant was charged with two counts of prohibited acts under N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a): "*.203, possession or introduction of any prohibited substances such as drugs, intoxicants or related paraphernalia not prescribed for the inmate by the medical or dental staff;" and "*.803, attempting to commit any [prohibited act] . . . or making plans to commit such acts [which is] . . . considered the same as a commission of the act itself."
At the administrative hearing on these charges, appellant denied any connection with, or knowledge of, the drugs, contending he was set up by his mother-in-law. His counsel substitute asserted it was not appellant's modus operandi to possess CDS. Appellant called no witnesses at the hearing and did not request cross-examination of any adverse witnesses.
The hearing officer found appellant guilty on both charges. She concluded based on a review of the statements, reports, the contraband, photographs and lab reports, that appellant received incoming mail addressed to him with his identification number and that drugs were hidden under the stamps. Appellant's sanctions included detention, administrative segregation, urine monitoring and loss of contact visits.
Appellant filed an administrative appeal. On June 3, 2015, the Department's Assistant Superintendent upheld the hearing officer's findings and sanctions. Appellant contends on appeal that the hearing officer's decision should be vacated based on a lack of evidence that appellant possessed or attempted to possess drugs. He contends that the hearing officer relied on a report from a staff member who lacked the requisite expertise. We affirm the Department's decision.
In this appeal from agency action, our review is limited. We ordinarily decline to reverse the decision of an administrative agency unless it is "arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or it is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole." In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 657 (1999) (quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 580 (1980)). A finding that an inmate committed a disciplinary offense only has to be "supported by substantial evidence," Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 530 (1975), which means, "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corrs., 414 N.J. Super. 186, 192 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 35 N.J. 358, 376 (1961) (citation omitted)); see N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.15(a). When such evidence exists, a court may not substitute its own judgment for the agency's even though the court may have reached a different result. See Henry, supra, 81 N.J. at 579-80.
We reject appellant's contention that the decision by the hearing officer violated due process. Appellant was advised in writing of the charges in advance of the hearing, and was provided the limited right to call witnesses and present documentary evidence, the limited ability to cross-examine adverse witnesses, the right to a written statement of the evidence and the assistance of counsel substitute. See N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9. Appellant declined to call or cross-examine any witnesses. He had the ability to review the adjudication report and non-confidential evidence.
There was substantial evidence in the record to support the agency's decision based on the reports and evidence submitted at the hearing. Appellant was found guilty of attempted possession of prohibited substances, not with their possession. The orange strips under the stamps tested positive for CDS. They were attached to separate envelopes addressed to appellant with his prisoner identification number. That he did not physically receive them has only to do with the fact they were intercepted; they were addressed specifically to appellant for his receipt.
For the first time on appeal, appellant contends the hearing officer improperly relied on the training and experience of the Corrections Officer who provided a report. "Generally, an appellate court will not consider issues . . . which were not raised below." State v. Galicia, 210 N.J. 364, 383 (2012). Even if we were to entertain the issue, we discern no error where the training and experience of the officers merely aided in their identification of what was confirmed to be a prohibited substance.
We conclude that appellant's further arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION