Opinion
2:21-03785 JLS (ADS)
12-15-2022
DUANE M. MAGEE, Petitioner, v. RON BROOMFIELD, Warden, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
HONORABLE AUTUMN D. SPAETH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Josephine L. Staton, United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and General Order 05-07 of the United States District Court for the Central District of California. For the reasons discussed below, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be denied and the action dismissed.
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 14, 2021, Duane M. Magee (“Petitioner”), a prisoner in state custody proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”), challenging his conviction and sentence on four grounds. (Dkt. No. 1.) On June 16, 2021, Respondent filed an Answer to the Petition and a supporting memorandum (“Answer”). (Dkt. No. 12.) Petitioner filed a Traverse containing no arguments on July 12, 2021. (Dkt. No. 14.) Thus, the matter is ready for decision.
II. RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
After an independent review of the record, the Court adopts and restates here the factual background from the California Court of Appeal's opinion. (Dkt. No. 13-11, Lodgment 6 at 2-4.) The Court of Appeal set forth the factual background as follows:
All citations to electronically filed documents refer to the CM/ECF pagination.
[Petitioner] and Velda met while in treatment for alcohol and substance abuse. In early 2012, Velda's adult daughter, G.N., moved in with them in their house on Greystone Road in San Bernardino.
In the summer of 2012, [Petitioner] began having frequent seizures. [Petitioner] resumed drinking alcohol again around the same time. Velda told him he was drinking too much and threw away or poured out his alcohol. Velda told a neighbor that she wanted a restraining order against [Petitioner] and that her marriage with [Petitioner] was failing. She also informed her neighbor that she wanted a divorce because of [Petitioner's] drinking and that she had changed the locks because she was afraid of [Petitioner].
G.N. believed that Velda was doing “something” to cause [Petitioner's] seizures. G.N. told [Petitioner] she thought his seizures were caused by Velda poisoning him. G.N. also thought that Velda did not care about [Petitioner's] seizures or his health. G.N. believed Velda sought to recover on an insurance policy on [Petitioner] that she had recently increased. G.N. told [Petitioner] Velda “wanted him dead,” and that he should move out of the Greystone residence because G.N. feared for his life. She also told [Petitioner] she suspected that Velda was having an affair. Shortly afterward, in early August 2012, [Petitioner] moved in with his sister, A.M.
On the morning of September 1, 2012, [Petitioner] called G.N. and told her he was at the Greystone residence. A.M. could not get a hold of [Petitioner], so she called their sister, R.M., who lived closer to the house, to check on him. When R.M. arrived, [Petitioner] was drunk and emotional. R.M. stayed with him until the evening.
The next morning, G.N. spoke with [Petitioner]. He was angry, and told G.N. he wanted to hurt and kill Velda. He said multiple times during their conversation that he was going to kill Velda. [Petitioner] also said he had talked to friends who worked in the judicial system and law enforcement about what would happen to him if he killed Velda.
Around 4:30 p.m., the police were dispatched to the Greystone residence in response to a reported stabbing. [Petitioner] had called 911 and said: “I just killed my wife.” “I'm hoping she's dead.” “I killed her with a knife.” “I just killed her.” “She was cheatin' on me and I killed her.” “She's laying here on the floor bleedin' to death.” “I stabbed her all over.”
The responding officers took [Petitioner] to the hospital for treatment for the injuries he sustained while stabbing Velda. On the way there, [Petitioner] said to the officers, “Crime of passion .... Crime of [p]assion.” “[L]istening to her kids, cheating on me.” “I'm guilty all the way. She claimed my heart.” “I did not want to do nothing like that.” “Crime of passion. She's dead. Aww, dead.” While at the hospital, [Petitioner] told medical personnel that he had been injured when stabbing his wife.(Id.)
Defendant had access to the house because G.N. had made him a key after Velda changed the locks.
B. Procedural Background
A jury convicted Petitioner of second degree murder (Cal. Penal Code § 187(a)). (Dkt. No. 13-2, Clerk's Transcript (“CT”), vol. 2 at 73-74, 119.) The jury also found true Petitioner used a deadly and dangerous weapon, a knife, in the commission of the murder. (Id.) Petitioner was sentenced to fifteen years to life plus one year in prison. (Id. at 119.)
Petitioner appealed to the California Court of Appeal. (Dkt. No. 13-8, Lodgment 3.) The appellate court affirmed the judgment in a reasoned opinion on February 5, 2020. (Dkt. No. 13-11, Lodgment 6.) Petitioner then filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, which summarily denied the petition on May 13, 2020. (Dkt. Nos. 13-12 and 13-13, Lodgments 7 and 8.)
Petitioner filed the instant Petition in the United States District Court, Northern District of California on April 14, 2021. (Dkt. No. 1.) On May 5, 2021, the Petition was transferred to this Court. (Dkt. No. 7.)
III. PETITIONER'S GROUNDS FOR RELIEF
The Petition raises the following grounds for relief:
1. The trial court's denial of Petitioner's motion for a new trial violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights;
2. The trial court violated Petitioner's rights to confrontation and due process when it admitted the pathologist's hearsay testimony;
3. The trial court violated Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights when it excluded testimony concerning Petitioner's state of mind; and
4. California Penal Code § 2933.2 denies Petitioner the benefits of Proposition 57 in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.(Dkt. No. 1 at 5-6.)
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) governs this Petition. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23, 336 (1997) (holding that AEDPA applies to all federal habeas petitions filed after April 24, 1996). Under AEDPA, a court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner “with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” only if that adjudication:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. §2254(d). Overall, AEDPA presents “a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court.” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 19 (2013). AEDPA imposes a “‘difficult to meet' and ‘highly deferential' standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (internal citations omitted).
The petitioner bears the burden to show that the state court's decision “was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). In other words, “a state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness” of that ruling. Id. at 101 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). Federal habeas corpus review therefore serves as a “guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.” Id. at 102-03 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
In applying the foregoing AEDPA standards, federal courts look to the last reasoned state court decision and evaluate it based upon an independent review of the relevant portions of the state court record. Nasby v. McDaniel, 853 F.3d 1049, 1052-53 (9th Cir. 2017). “Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same ground.” Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991); Wilson v. Sellers,___U.S. __, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018) (holding “the federal court should ‘look through' the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale [and] presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning”).
Here, Petitioner's claims were denied on the merits by the California Court of Appeal in a reasoned opinion. (Dkt. No. 13-11, Lodgment 6.) The California Supreme Court then summarily dismissed Petitioner's petition for review. (Dkt. No. 13-13, Lodgment 8.) Therefore, the Court applies the AEDPA standard to the Court of Appeal's decision, as the last reasoned state court decision on the merits. See Ylst, 501 U.S at 804; Montiel v. Chappell, 43 F.4th 942, 958 (9th Cir. 2022).
V. DISCUSSION
A. Denial of Motion for a New Trial (Ground One)
In Ground One, Petitioner asserts the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5.) Petitioner contends the denial violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id.) Respondent argues federal law does not require a new trial upon the discovery of additional evidence and that Petitioner's claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review. (Dkt. No. 12 at 9-10.)
1. Federal Law
“In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991); Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010) (per curiam). “[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.” Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990). Thus, challenges to state-court determinations on state law questions, such as the denial of motions based on state law, are not cognizable on federal habeas review unless the decision was “arbitrary or so prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.” Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995); see Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72-73. Additionally, habeas relief is warranted only where the error had “'substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.'” Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57, 58, 61-62 (2008) (per curiam) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993)); see also Clark v. Brown, 450 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 2006) (as amended).
2. State Court Decision
The state appellate court summarized and analyzed Petitioner's claim as follows:
After the trial, Velda's friend D.S. provided the defense with new evidence that she had not previously mentioned to anyone. She recalled that she helped clean Velda's car after her death and, when doing so, she found two rotting burritos and two soda containers on the left rear passenger floor of the car. The food and beverages were “unopened and unconsumed.”
[Petitioner] moved for a new trial based on this newly discovered evidence. [Petitioner] testified at trial that he believed Velda was trying to kill him and had hired a “hit man,” and that he saw someone with Velda before he stabbed her. He argued the new evidence from D.S. provided additional support for his belief that the hit man was with Velda, which bolstered his argument that he acted in self-defense.
[“]The determination of a motion for a new trial rests so completely within the court's discretion that its action will not be disturbed unless a manifest and unmistakable abuse of discretion clearly appears.[”] (People v. Howard (2010) 51 Cal.4th 15, 42-43.) “A new trial motion based on newly discovered evidence is looked upon with disfavor.” (People v. Mehserle (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1151.) A new trial is not warranted when it is not “probable” that the newly discovered evidence would have produced a different result. (People v. Delgado (1993) 5 Cal.4th 312, 328.)
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying [Petitioner's] motion for a new trial. The evidence of [Petitioner's] guilt was overwhelming. Among other things, the jury heard the recording of [Petitioner's] 911 call and his statements to the police on the way to the
hospital where he unambiguously admitted to killing Velda by “stabb[ing] her all over” in a “crime of passion” because he thought she was cheating on him. The jury also heard evidence from G.N. that on the morning of Velda's death, [Petitioner] told her repeatedly that he was going to kill Velda and that he had consulted with people in the legal community and law enforcement about the consequences. Finally, the jury heard evidence that [Petitioner] told medical professionals at the hospital immediately after his arrest that he injured himself while stabbing Velda. In light of this evidence, it is not probable that [Petitioner's] trial would have had a different outcome had the jury heard D.S.'s testimony about finding unopened food and drinks in Velda's car after her death.(Dkt. No. 13-11, Lodgment 6 at 5-6.)
3. Analysis
As an initial matter, Petitioner's claim is deficient because it is vague, conclusory, and unsupported by facts. See James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Conclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.”). Petitioner asserts the trial court violated his due process rights when it denied his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, but the Petition is bereft of any facts to support his claim. Petitioner does not state when the motion was filed, what is the alleged newly discovered evidence, and the basis for the trial court's denial. Nevertheless, regardless of the defect, upon reviewing the lodgments and Answer, the Court finds the claim should be denied.
First, Ground One is not cognizable on federal habeas review. The state court held a hearing on Petitioner's motion for a new trial and denied it on state law grounds - the evidence was not newly discovered, should have been discovered, and would not have change the outcome if presented at trial. (Dkt. No. 13-6, 4 Reporter's Transcript (“RT”) at 155). Petitioner simply alleges, in conclusory fashion, that the denial violated his due process rights. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5.) But “a claim that a state court denied a petitioner's state-court motion for a new trial, without more, is not cognizable on federal habeas review.” Howard v. Soto, 2016 WL 1068357, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016); see, e.g., Renteria v. Montgomery, 2020 WL 1426639 at *14 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2020) (“The denial of a motion for a new trial generally does not state a cognizable claim for federal habeas relief.”); Hall v. Almagar, 2014 WL 438368, at *19 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2014) (“[F]ederal courts generally are bound by a state court's construction of state laws, including the denial of a motion for new trial under state law.”) (quoting Washington v. Horel, 2008 WL 4427221, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2008)). A petitioner may not “transform a state-law issue into a federal one merely by asserting a violation of due process.” Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996); see Darby v. Allison, 2015 WL 2088935, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2015) (petitioner's claim that his due process rights were violated by the denial of a new trial was not cognizable because it did not present a theory as to how it violated due process). Petitioner also argues a misapplication of state law - that the trial court made an erroneous factual finding error when it concluded the “newly discovered evidence” should have been discovered. (Dkt. No. 13-8, Lodgment 3 at 31-36.) An error of state law is not cognizable on habeas.
Second, to the extent Petitioner adequately alleges a due process violation, the appellate court's finding was not contrary to clearly established federal law. The Supreme Court has never held that there is a constitutional right to a new trial in the absence of error. See e.g., Yim v. Lizarraga, 2018 WL 3126511, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 26, 2018) (“There is no clearly established constitutional right to move for a new trial, or to have such a motion granted . . . Rather, the right to file a new trial motion is a state statutory right, not a constitutional one.”); Jordan v. Walker, 2010 WL 3743646, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2010) (noting the court is unaware of any Supreme Court authority “providing that a defendant has a constitutional right to a new trial in the absence of any error at trial”). When the United States Supreme Court has not clearly addressed an issue, “‘it cannot be said that the state court unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law.'” Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125-26 (2008) (quoting Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006)) (internal brackets omitted).
Thus, Petitioner may only be entitled to habeas relief if the state court's decision was so prejudicial that it rendered his proceedings fundamentally unfair. In other words, “[n]ewly discovered evidence is a ground for habeas relief only when it bears on the constitutionality of [a petitioner's] conviction and would probably produce an acquittal.” Spivey v. Rocha, 194 F.3d 971, 979 (9th Cir. 1999); see Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 897 (9th Cir. 1996) (“While a petitioner for federal habeas relief may not challenge the application of state [] rules, he is entitled to relief if the [state court's] decision created an absence of fundamental fairness that ‘fatally infected the trial.'”) (citation omitted); Gordon v. Duran, 895 F.2d 610, 615 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he mere existence of newly discovered evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground for federal habeas relief. More is needed. It must be shown that the newly discovered evidence would probably have resulted in the defendant's acquittal.”) (internal citations omitted). Here, the appellate court reasonably concluded the evidence of Petitioner's guilt was overwhelming and the outcome would have been the same had the evidence of the unopened food and bottles been introduced. Petitioner not only told Velda's daughter he intended to kill Velda and he had consulted people in the legal community and law enforcement about the consequences, he also admitted that he killed Velda to the 911 dispatcher, police, and a medical professional. (Dkt. No. 13-2, 2 CT at 143-45, 153, 156; Dkt. No. 13-3, 1 RT at 131, 133; Dkt. No. 13-4, 2 RT at 28, 31.) Accordingly, the trial court's denial was not fundamentally unfair as it was improbable that the admission of the “newly discovered evidence” would have resulted in Petitioner's acquittal.
In sum, Ground One is not cognizable and, even assuming it was cognizable, the Court of Appeal's denial was not contrary to clearly established federal law. Moreover, the trial court's denial did not implicate fundamental fairness as it was improbable that the basis of Petitioner's motion for a new trial would have resulted in an acquittal. Petitioner is therefore not entitled to relief on Ground One.
B. Right to Confrontation and Due Process (Ground Two)
In Ground Two, Petitioner asserts the trial court violated his right to confrontation and due process by erroneously admitting hearsay evidence. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5.) Specifically, Petitioner argues the trial court erred when it allowed a pathologist to testify as to the contents of an autopsy report written by another pathologist. (Id.) Respondent contends the Court of Appeal's harmless error determination was objectively reasonable. (Dkt. No. 12 at 10-11.)
1. Federal Law
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that in criminal cases the accused has the right to “be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI; Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678 (1986). This right applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
The Confrontation Clause applies to all out-of-court testimonial statements offered for the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., “testimonial hearsay.” See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004). “Testimony . . . is typically a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also id. (“An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.”). The Confrontation Clause applies not only to in-court testimony but also to out-of-court statements introduced at trial, regardless of the admissibility of the statements under state laws of evidence. Id. at 50-51.
Out-of-court statements by witnesses that are testimonial hearsay are barred under the Confrontation Clause unless (1) the witnesses are unavailable, and (2) the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. Id. at 59. Hearsay that is not testimonial, “while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006).
Finally, even if evidence has been admitted in violation of the Confrontation Clause, the error is subject to harmless error analysis under Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. Ocampo v. Vail, 649 F.3d 1098, 1114 (9th Cir. 2011). An error cannot lead to habeas relief “unless it results in ‘actual prejudice'” that had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637.
2. State Court Decision
The California Court of Appeal summarized Petitioner's Confrontation Clause and due process claim and the evidence from the record, as well as rejected the claim, as follows:
Dr. Dennis Rhee, who performed Velda's autopsy, retired before trial. The trial court therefore allowed Dr. Chanikarn Changsri to testify about the autopsy based on her review of Dr. Rhee's report and photographs of Velda's body. [Petitioner] contends this was prejudicial error because admitting Dr. Changsri's testimony violated his “constitutional rights to due process, a jury trial, and confrontation of witnesses.”
We disagree. There was no dispute about how Velda died-because [Petitioner] did not dispute that he killed her by stabbing her repeatedly. The only issue was whether [Petitioner] was justified in doing so. Dr. Changsri's testimony about how Velda died and the nature of her wounds
had no bearing on that issue. And, as outlined above, there was overwhelming evidence that [Petitioner] killed Velda because he thought she was cheating on him, not in self-defense. We therefore conclude that, even if the trial court erred in admitting Dr. Changsri's testimony, any resulting error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.)(Dkt. No. 13-11, Lodgment 6 at 6-7.)
3. Analysis
Here, the California Court of Appeal did not determine whether the trial court erred when it admitted the pathologist's testimony after finding it fell within the business records hearing exception. Instead, the appellate court concluded that even if the testimony was admitted in error, the error was harmless. This conclusion was neither contrary to clearly established federal law nor an unreasonable determination of the facts.
Evidence admitted in violation of the Confrontation Clause or Due Process Clause is subject to harmless error analysis. See Hardnett v. Marshall, 25 F.3d 875, 881 (9th Cir. 1994) (the admission of the inadmissible hearsay was harmless because it did not result in actual prejudice); Sasouvanh v. Sandor, 2013 WL 3864207, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 18, 2013) (“If evidence is wrongly admitted at trial, the claim is reviewed under a harmless error standard.”) Here, the Court of Appeal reasonably concluded that because there was no dispute how Velda died, any error was harmless. As discussed above, Petitioner admitted he stabbed Velda. (Dkt. No. 13-5, 3 RT 7, 42, 46.) Instead, the issue was whether Petitioner's actions were justified. Because Dr. Changsri only testified as to the type and extent of Velda's injuries, as well as the cause of death, any error was harmless. (Dkt. No. 13-4, RT, vol. 2 at 180-96.) Dr. Changsri's testimony did not touch upon justification and thus did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury's verdict. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Ground Two.
C. Right to Present Evidence and to a Defense (Ground Three)
In Ground Three, Petitioner argues the trial court deprived him of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights when it excluded testimony that “went directly to [his] state of mind at the time of the killing.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 5.) Respondent contends the claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review and the appellate court's denial was not contrary to clearly established federal law. (Dkt. No. 12 at 11-13.)
1. Federal Law
The exclusion or admission of evidence under state evidentiary rules generally does not present a federal question. Estelle, 502 U.S. 67-68 (state evidentiary ruling does not give rise to a cognizable federal habeas claim unless the ruling violated a petitioner's due process right to a fair trial); Rhoades v. Henry, 638 F.3d 1027, 1034 n.5 (9th Cir. 2011) (same). However, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants “‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.'” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (citation omitted). This includes the right to present relevant evidence in their own defense, including the right to offer the testimony of witnesses. See Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) (“Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.”) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Thus, the exclusion of certain types of critical evidence may violate a defendant's due process rights if it deprives the defendant of “a fair opportunity to defend against a state's accusations.” Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973).
But a defendant “does not have an unfettered right to present any evidence he or she wishes.” Lunbery v. Hornbeak, 605 F.3d 754, 762 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotations omitted). Rather, a criminal defendant must “‘comply with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence.'” United States v. Waters, 627 F.3d 345, 354 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). State rulemakers “‘have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal trials.'” Nevada v. Jackson, 569 U.S. 505, 509 (2013) (quoting Holmes, 574 U.S. at 324). Those rules must not “be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice.” Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302. Instead, on habeas review, the question is whether the application of those rules violates a party's “right to present a defense and receive a fair trial.” Lunbery, 605 F.3d at 761 n.1; see also Aguilar v. Cate, 585 Fed. App'x 450, 451 (9th Cir. 2014).
2. State Court Decision
In addressing Ground Three, the California Court of Appeal summarized Petitioner's argument, the background, and the relevant state law, and rejected the claim as follows:
[Petitioner] argues the trial court prejudicially erred when it excluded two pieces of evidence. First, [Petitioner] sought to have A.M. testify that G.N. had told her that she (G.N.) believed that Velda poisoned [Petitioner]. The trial court excluded the evidence as inadmissible hearsay. Second, the trial court allowed [Petitioner] to introduce evidence from C.E. that he had an affair with Velda during which she solicited him to kill [Petitioner]. However, the trial court would not allow C.E. to testify about the details of how Velda proposed that C.E. kill [Petitioner] and dispose of his body.
“Under Evidence Code section 352, the probative value of the proffered evidence must not be substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission would create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1195.) Because the decision to admit or exclude evidence under Evidence Code section 352 is committed to the trial court's discretion, we will not disturb a trial court's exercise of that discretion [“]except on a showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of
justice.[”] (Uspenskaya v. Meline (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 996, 1000-1001.) Reversal is not required unless it is reasonably probable the defendant would have received a more favorable outcome had the excluded evidence been admitted. (People v. Aranda (2012) 55 Cal.4th 342, 354.)
Even if the trial court erred in excluding G.N.'s testimony or limiting C.E.'s testimony, any resulting error was harmless. As the People correctly note, the “substance of [G.N.'s] statement” was already in evidence because she testified that “she told [A.M.] that Velda wanted [Petitioner] dead,” and A.M. testified that she had discussed [Petitioner's] concern that Velda was poisoning him with G.N. G.N.'s statement that the trial court excluded therefore would have been cumulative and likely would have had little, if any, effect on the jury. It is not reasonably probable that the jury would have rendered a different verdict had it heard from A.M. that G.N. told her that she (G.N.) believed Velda poisoned [Petitioner].
Nor is it reasonably probable that [Petitioner] would have received a better outcome had the trial court allowed C.E. to testify about how Velda allegedly proposed that he kill [Petitioner]. Given that the jury heard C.E.'s testimony that Velda solicited him to kill [Petitioner], it is not reasonably probable that the jury would have come to a different result if C.E. testified about the specifics of the plan that Velda suggested.
More to the point, given the overwhelming evidence of [Petitioner's] guilt, it is not reasonably probable that [Petitioner] would have received a more favorable outcome had G.N.'s statement been admitted or if C.E.'s testimony had not been limited. (People v. Aranda, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 354.) We therefore conclude the trial court did not prejudicially err in excluding this evidence.
Accordingly, we reject [Petitioner's] argument that the trial court's exclusion of this evidence amounted to a violation of his rights under the federal Constitution. “[T]he routine application of provisions of the state Evidence Code law does not implicate a defendant's constitutional rights.” (People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 957.) “[O]nly evidentiary error amounting to a complete preclusion of a defense violates a defendant's federal constitutional right to present a defense.” (People v. Bacon (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1082, 1104, fn. 4, italics added.) That did not occur here. The trial court's excluding G.N.'s hearsay statement and limiting C.E.'s testimony did not prevent [Petitioner] from putting on a defense. “Because the trial court merely rejected some evidence concerning” [Petitioner's] defense, the trial court did not violate [Petitioner's] federal constitutional rights. (People v. McNeal, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1203.)(Dkt. No. 13-11, Lodgment 6 at 7-9.)
3. Analysis
As an initial matter, as with Ground One, Ground Three is defective because it is vague and conclusory. Petitioner simply alleges his constitutional rights were violated by the exclusion of testimony that would reflect his state of mind at the time of the killing. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5.) But Petitioner fails to identify the witness whose testimony was excluded and the content of his or her testimony. Notwithstanding the defects, upon reviewing the lodgments and Answer, the Court finds the claim should be denied.
Assuming Petitioner is raising the same arguments presented in his state filings, Petitioner asserts two evidentiary errors. First, Petitioner asserts the trial court erred by excluding, on hearsay grounds, A.M's testimony that during a conversation with G.N., G.N. told her that Velda was poisoning Petitioner. (Dkt. No. 13-5, 3 RT at 116-19; Dkt. No. 13-8, Lodgment 3 at 53-55; Dkt. No. 13-12, Lodgment 7 at 28, 31-32.) Second, Petitioner contends the trial court erroneously precluded testimony from C.E. concerning the details of how Velda wanted C.E. to kill Petitioner. (Dkt. No. 13-8, Lodgment 3 at 156-57; Dkt. No. 13-12, Lodgment 7 at 29-30.) Petitioner contends both testimonies should have been admitted to demonstrate his state of mind and defend against the charges. (Dkt. No. 13-8 Lodgment 3 at 61-62; Dkt. No. 13-12, Lodgment 7 at 31-33.) Petitioner also argues that A.M's testimony concerning G.N's statements was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. (Dkt. No. 13-8, Lodgment 3 at 61; Dkt. No. 13-12, Lodgment 7 at 31-32.) Respondent contends the claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review and any error was harmless. (Dkt. No. 12 at 12-13.)
Petitioner's assertion that the trial court erroneously excluded A.M's and C.E's hearsay testimonies is not cognizable on federal habeas review. Although Petitioner labels these errors as violations of his constitutional rights to due process and to present a defense, as the Court of Appeal reasonably determined, the claim is simply a matter of state evidentiary law. See Langford, 110 F.3d at 1389. The trial court exercised its discretion to exclude evidence whose probative value was outweighed by the possibility of undue prejudice. (Dkt. No. 13-11, Lodgment 6 at 7-8.) Because the claim concerns questions of state evidence law, it is not cognizable on federal habeas review. See Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009) (claims dealing with the admission of evidence are issues of state law); Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991) (federal courts do not review questions of state evidence law).
Even assuming the trial court erred and Petitioner's claim implicated his right to present a defense and to due process, the appellate court reasonably concluded the error was harmless. The exclusion of A.M's and C.E.'s hearsay testimonies did not preclude Petitioner from presenting his defense of justification. Moreover, although A.M. was not permitted to testify as to G.N's statements, Petitioner had already introduced the statement at issue through his cross-examination of G.N. and the testimony of Detective William Robert Flesher. (Dkt. No. 13-3, 1 RT at 142; Dkt. No. 13-4, 2 RT at 82.) And while the trial court excluded C.E. from providing testimony as to the manner in which Velda wanted him to kill Petitioner, it permitted C.E. to testify that Velda told him she wanted him to kill Petitioner. (Dkt. No. 13-5, 3 RT at 156, 163.) Thus, given that G.N's statement to A.M. was admitted through her own testimony, C.E. testified that Velda told him she wanted him to kill Petitioner, and the overwhelming evidence of Petitioner's guilt, any error could not have had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Ground Three.
D. Custodial Credits/Equal Protection (Ground Four)
In Ground Four, Petitioner asserts Proposition 57 “provides incentives for most inmates to earn [good conduct] credit” and California Penal Code § 2933.2 (“Section 2933.2”) denies that opportunity to those convicted of murder in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. (Dkt. No. 1 at 6.) Respondent argues the appellate court reasonably determined Petitioner failed to establish an equal protection violation. (Dkt. No. 12 at 13-15.)
1. Analysis
The Court does not have jurisdiction over Ground Four. At “the heart of habeas corpus” is the “immediate release or a speedier release from [] confinement.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498 (1973). If success on a claim “would not necessarily lead to his immediate or earlier release from confinement,” then it does not fall within “'the core of habeas corpus.'” Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 935 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 535 n.13 (2011)). Instead, it must be brought as a § 1983 claim. Id.
Although Respondent did not raise a jurisdictional argument, a court must, sua sponte, dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3); see WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 1997) (although the parties did not raise the issue of jurisdiction, the court must raise it sua sponte) Calif. Diversified Promotions, Inc. v. Musick, 505 F.2d 278, 280 (9th Cir. 1974) (“It has long been held that a judge can dismiss sua sponte for lack of jurisdiction.”).
Here, Petitioner argues that the application of Section 2933.2 denies him the benefits of Proposition 57 and therefore violates his equal protection rights. Proposition 57, enacted in November 2016, added section 32 to Article I of the California Constitution (“Section 32”). People v. Dynes, 20 Cal.App. 5th 523, 526 (2018). Section 32 states, in relevant part, “The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation shall have authority to award credits earned for good behavior and approved rehabilitative or educational achievements.” Cal. Const., art. I, § 32(a)(2). But Section 2933.2 prohibits prisoners convicted of murder from accruing pre-sentence and worktime credits. Cal. Penal Code § 2933.2(a), (c); People v. Chism, 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1336 (2014). Even if Petitioner's argument is correct and he is due the right to be eligible for pre-sentence conduct credits, the language of Section 32 clearly indicates the award of conduct credits is discretionary. At best, Petitioner would be entitled only to consideration of pre-sentence conduct credits, not immediate or earlier release. Thus, Ground Four does not fall within the core of habeas corpus. See, e.g., Shakur v. Samuel, 2021 WL 3728880, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 28, 2021) (habeas corpus is not the vehicle for petitioner's claim that he was entitled to good time credits under Proposition 57 because success on the claim would not necessarily lead to earlier release); Alexander v. Gastelo, 2019 WL 1104616, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2019) (petitioner's Proposition 57 claims did not fall within the core of habeas corpus because success on the claims would not necessarily lead to immediate or earlier release); Travers v. People of the State of Calif., 2018 WL 707546, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2018) (claim falls outside the core of habeas because compliance with Proposition 57 would not necessarily lead to immediate or earlier release).
Although the Court has the discretion to convert a habeas petition to a civil rights claim, it declines to do so here. See Nettles, 830 F.2d at 935. Petitioner's remaining claims fall within the core of habeas corpus so can be addressed by this court. Further, “‘a habeas corpus action and a prisoner civil rights suit differ in a variety of respects - such as the proper defendant, filing fees, the means of collecting them, and restrictions on future filings - that may make recharacterization impossible or, if possible, disadvantageous to the prisoner compared to a dismissal without prejudice of his petition for habeas corpus.'” Id. at 935-36 (quoting Robinson v. Sherrod, 631 F.3d 839, 841 (7th Cir. 2011). Thus, Ground Four is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, but Petitioner has the discretion to raise the claim in a § 1983 civil rights complaint.
VI. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
For reasons stated above, the Court finds that Petitioner has not shown that “jurists of reason would find it debatable whether”: (1) “the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right”; and (2) “the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). As such, it is recommended that a certificate of appealability be denied.
VII. RECOMMENDATION
Therefore, it is recommended that the District Judge issue an Order, as follows: (1) accepting this Report and Recommendation; (2) denying the Petition and dismissing Grounds One through Three with prejudice and Ground Four without prejudice; (3) denying a Certificate of Appealability; and (4) directing that Judgment be entered accordingly.