Opinion
No. 7:97-CV-170-R.
December 8, 2000.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On the 11th day of July, 2000, came on for hearing the above styled and numbered cause wherein pro se Plaintiff Joseph Williams and, through counsel, Defendants Carl Reynolds, Ben Brown, Earl Fox, Robert Eason, Ted Sanders, Jeffery Smith and Terry Torbert appeared before this Court. The parties announced ready for trial and a jury trial having been waived by all parties, the case was tried before the Court.
On April 19, 2000, Plaintiff Michael Mack was dismissed as a party to this action. Defendants Leslie Woods, Fredna Hamilton, Joe Noel and the State of Texas were dismissed as parties prior to trial. The Court notes that service of process was never perfected on Defendant Kelly Lutes.
Plaintiff Joseph Williams alleges that he was denied sanitary living conditions while confined as an inmate in the James V. Allred Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ), He claims that he was denied access to Jewish religious services and Jewish religious materials, and that Defendant Reynolds retaliated against him for filing grievances and for filing this lawsuit. Mr. Williams also claims that Defendants failed to protect him from assault by another inmate.
Defendants deny Plaintiffs' allegations. They contend that they did not deny Williams the right to practice his religion. Plaintiff Williams failed to properly initiate and conclude the Jewish conversion ceremony and Defendants argue that the prison system has a substantial interest in determining that an inmate's slated change in religious preference is a truly held belief rather than a veiled attempt to obtain a transfer to a different prison unit. Defendants deny that Plaintiff was confined in unsanitary conditions. They deny retaliating against Plaintiff and they deny that they failed to protect him front assault by another prisoner. Defendants also claim that they are entitled to a qualified immunity defense because they acted in good faith, did not violate any clearly established law, and their actions were objectively reasonable.
Sanitary Living Conditions
Plaintiff claims that the conditions or his confinement in the Allred Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice were unsanitary such that they violated his constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment, Defendants deny these allegations.
Inmates are protected from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 581 (5th Cir. 1995). To show an Eighth Amendment violation due to adverse conditions of confinement, an inmate must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, both elements of a two part lost consisting of objective and subjective components. Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998). The Plaintiff must first demonstrate that prison conditions were serious enough to have deprived him of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." Wilson v. Seller, 501 U.S. 294, 304, 111 S.Ct. 2321 (1991); Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 720 (5th Cir. 1999). Such necessities may include the basic elements of hygiene. Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1301 (5th Cir. 1974). This prong of the test is an objective one, and in applying it, we are guided by society's contemporary standards of decency (i.e. — whether, under the circumstances, the conditions of confinement about which the plaintiff complains were reasonable or not). If the first part of the test is satisfied, the inmate must then demonstrate the second prong which requires a showing that the responsible defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the adverse conditions of confinement. Harper, 174 F.3d at 720. This is a subjective standard which occurs only where a prison official knows of and disregards a substantial risk to an inmate's health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1979 (1994). Deliberate indifference thus requires that "the [offending] official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. at 1979).
At trial, Plaintiff testified that his cell was infested with insects and rats and that he was denied cleaning supplies including Bippy, a product issue at the Allred Unit which inmates use to clean their cells. Plaintiff's witness, William Murphy, testified with regard to rat and insect infestation and the denial of cleaning supplies in general, The evidence presented by Defendants, through testimony of Major Robert Eason and Sergeant Greg Hair, indicates that Plaintiff's cell was not infested with rats or insects and that he was not denied cleaning supplies. Major Eason testified that he personally inspected Plaintiff's cell and that there was no infestation and that the cell was clean. Eason conceded that he refused to allow Plaintiff to keep a backup supply of Bippy in his cell. However, he testified that Plaintiff was given a per use amount of cleaning supplies upon request and that Plaintiff was not denied the use of items with which to clean his cell. Sergeant Greg Hair, the compliance officer at the Allred Unit, testified that, at no time during Plaintiff's confinement, was the Allred Unit out of compliance with state or internal standards for sanitation. insect control or rodent control. His testimony revealed that the units were clean, the showers were clean and that there were periodic pest exterminations conducted to ensure insect and rodent control in the prison.
In situations such as this, the trier of fact is called upon to make credibility determinations upon which the outcome of a case will turn. Here, the Court, being the trier of facts makes the following determinations:
Upon hearing and considering the testimony of the parties and their respective witnesses, the Court credits the testimony proffered by Defendants and discredits that put forth by Plaintiff. The Court finds that Plaintiff's cell was not infested with insects or rodents, that Plaintiff was not denied cleaning supplies and, as such, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he suffered any unreasonable deprivation of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities. Therefore, Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim must fail.
Access to Religious Services and Materials
Plaintiff claims that he was denied access to Jewish religious services and Jewish religious materials by Defendants after he sought to change his religion from Baptist to Judaism. Defendants deny these allegations.
The Constitution requires that an inmate be given a reasonable opportunity "to exercise the religious freedom guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments." Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n. 2, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 1081 n. 2 (1972). An inmate retains his First Amendment right to the free exercise of his religion, subject to reasonable restrictions and limitations necessitated by penological goals. E.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261-62 (1987); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349-50, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 2405 (1987); Powell v. Estelle, 959 F.2d 22, 25-26 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1025, 113 S.Ct. 668 (1992). Prison officials have a duty to accommodate inmates' religious beliefs unless there is a legitimate penological interest which prevents such accommodation. See Eason v. Thaler, 14 F.3d 8, 10 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that Muslim inmates are entitled to port free diets upon request); Powell v. Estelle, 959 F.2d 22, 24 (5th Cir.) (holding that TDCJ's prohibition on long hair is rationally related to the legitimate state objectives of maintaining security, facilitating inmate identification and maintaining good hygiene), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1025, 113 S.Ct. 668 (1992).
If a prison regulation impinges on an inmate's first amendment rights, the regulation is valid only if it is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest, Turner, 482 U.S. at 87, 107 S.Ct. at 2260-61. If the court is reviewing action taken by prison officials rather than a regulation, the same standard is applicable to determine whether the prison official's act is constitutionally permissible. Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1248 (5th Cir. 1989). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has suggested that an "administrative foul-up" which deprived an inmate of the right to practice his religious beliefs would amount to no there than negligence and would not support a claim for violation of the First Amendment. See Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1327 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1996).
In July of 1996, Plaintiff expressed his desire to convert to Judaism and asked that he be allowed to attend Jewish religious ceremonies. He also requested that he be issued a free Jewish bible and other Jewish materials. Rabbi Ted Sanders wrote to Plaintiff informing him that in order to convert to Judaism, there is a conversion process which one must undergo prior to being confirmed into the Jewish faith. He was also in formed that Jewish religious services were only provided at a few TDCJ units in the Houston area. It is undisputed that Plaintiff failed to complete the conversion process. However, Plaintiff claims that he is a "Reform Jew" and, therefore, not required to complete the process prior to becoming Jewish.
Plaintiffs claim of entitlement to free Jewish religious materials is without merit. There is no legal or constitutional requirement that inmates he provided with religious materials at government expense. Frank v. Terrell, 858 F.2d 1090 (5th Cir, 1998). Plaintiff made no claim that he was prevented from obtaining religious materials through friends or at his own expense and the testimony at trial was undisputed that Plaintiff was permitted to receive religious materials from outside sources. Therefore, this claim fails to raise any constitutional infirmity. See id.
The testimony of Defendants' expert witnesses, Michael Countz and Richard Lopez, reflect that there are inmates of approxamately 157 different religions confined in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. There are approximately 800 Jewish inmates and 5 Rabbis currently available to provide ceremonies and other religious services for these inmates. However, because of the limited number of Jewish inmates and Rabbis in the TDCJ system, formal services for Jewish inmates are not provided on all TDCJ Units.
The testimony of Michael Countz revealed that, while every effort was made to accommodate inmates with truly held religious beliefs, there has been a marked increase in the number of Texas inmates seeking to convert to Judaism or to American Indian religions in an effort to obtain a transfer to another TDCJ unit. This testimony was undisputed by Plaiatiff. Therefore, it is clear that TDCJ officials have a rational basis for determining that inmates seeking to change religions that would effect a transfer have truly held beliefs underlying their assertions of a change in faith. Asking a potential Jewish convert to proceed through a conformation process or otherwise demonstrate his truly held beliefs is reasonably related to this legitimate penological interest. The Texas Department of Criminal Justice cannot possibly provide religious services for each of the 157 religions at every prison facility within the State of Texas. Nor can TDCJ be expected to transfer an inmate to a facility where his newly adopted religions ceremonies are provided immediately upon his declaration that he has changed religions. Such a practice would open a floodgate of inmates seeking transfer to other prison units simply by declaring a change of religion.
There was no evidence presented to this Court that Plaintiff was prevented from attending non-denominational services at the Allred Unit or that he was in any way prevented from practicing his religious beliefs during such services or in his cell. The Court notes that, since originally filing this lawsuit, Plaintiff has been transferred to a prison unit where Jewish religious services are provided. Under the circumstances of this case and in light of TDCJ's legitimate penological interest, the conduct of Defendants was not constitutionally infirm and Plaintiff's First Amendment rights were not violated.
Protecting Plaintiff From Assault by Other Inmates
Plaintiff claims that, while confined in the Allred Unit, he was sexually assaulted for 53 days by his cell mate. He claims that, despite his repeated cries for help and the filing of numerous grievances, Defendants failed to intervene to protect him.
To establish a civil rights claim against a prison official for failure-to-protect, a plaintiff "must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his need for protection." Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1977 (1994)). Therefore, the inmate must demonstrate that the responsible Defendants were (1) aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed, and (2) that the Defendants also drew the inference. Neals, 59 F.3d at 533 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. at 1979).
Plaintiff claims that he informed guards, including Major Robert Eason that he was being sexually assaulted by his cell mate. However, the testimony of Major Eason reflected that Plaintiff never made any written or oral complaints or sexual assault; only complaints of harassment by various cell males. Eason further testified that Plaintiff was moved to different cells on numerous occasions due to his complaints of being harassed by cell mates. Eason testified that Plaintiff had difficulty getting along with his cell mates and that he had recommended Plaintiff for psychological counseling services.
Here again, the Court must make a credibility determination. A review of the record reflects no evidence, other than Plaintiff's testimony, that Plaintiff ever complained of sexual assault or that Plaintiff was ever actually assaulted. There is no credible evidence to indicate that any Defendant was aware or ("acts that could lead him to believe that Plaintiff was in any danger of sexual assault by his assigned cell mate." After listening to and considering the relevant testimony, the Court discredits Plaintiff's testimony and credits the testimony of Major Eason. Therefore, Plaintiff's failure-to-protect claim is dismissed.
Retaliation by Defendant Reynolds
Plaintiff Williams claims that Defendant Reynolds unlawfully retaliated against him for filing grievances and ("or filing this lawsuit by ordering Kelly Lutes to confiscate and destroy Plaintiff's watch and Etonic tennis shoes. Plaintiff's Supplemental Complaint at p. 12-13.
Plaintiff's retaliation claims against the other Defendants were dismissed by the Court's order on cross-motions for summary judgment, entered March 21, 2000 at p. 6.
Prison officials may not retaliate against an inmate for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right. Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1165 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1084, 116 S.Ct. 800 (1996); Gibbs v. King, 779 P.2d 1040, 1046 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1117, 106 S.Ct. 1975 (1986). In order to prove retaliation an inmate must: (1) allege the violation of a specific constitutional right; and (2) establish that the incident would not have occurred but for a retaliatory motive. Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 313 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 995, 118 S.Ct. 559 (1997). Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166. This places a significant burden on the inmate. Mere conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim. Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166; Richardson v. McDonnell, 841 F.2d 120, 122-23 (5th Cir. 1988). The inmate must produce direct evidence of motivation or "allege a chronology of events from which retaliation may plausibly be imferred." Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166 (quoting Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d 1139, 1143 n. 6 (7th Cir. 1988)).
Inmates have a constitutional right to tile grievances related to problems with their confinement. They also maintain a constitutional right to seek redress though the filing of lawsuits. Therefore, the question before the Court is whether Plaintiff has established, through a preponderance of the evidence, that the alleged retaliatory incidents would not have occurred but for a retaliatory motive on the part of Defendant Reynolds. Other than Plaintiffs' conclusoty allegations of retaliation, there is nothing before this Court to support such a claim. Plaintitf has presented neither direct evidence of motivation nor a chronology of events from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred as to Defendant Reynolds. Williams' own subjective belief that he was retaliated against is insufficient to create liability on the part of Defendant Reynolds under the Civil Rights Act. The Court discredits Plaintiff's testimony with regard to this claim and the same is hereby dismissed.
Qualified Immunity
Defendants claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity from suit.
Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from suit when performing discretionary functions unless their conduct violated statutory or constitutional rights, clearly established at the time of the alleged incident, of which a reasonable person would have known. Gibson v. Rich, 44 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1995).
In assessing government officials' entitlement to a defense of qualified immunity, the court should first determine whether Plaintiff has stated a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. See Doe v. State of La., 2 F.3d 1412, 1416 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1164, 114 S.Ct. 1189 (1994); Duckett v. City of Cedar Park, Tex., 950 F.2d 272, 276-78 (5th Cir. 1992). If such a violation has been stated the court should then determine whether a reasonable official would understand that what he or she is doing violates that right. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039 (1987).
The Court finds that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. The merits of Plaintiff's claims have been addressed herein because his allegations were inextricably intertwined with a key issue necessary to resolve the question of qualified immunity-i.e. whether there was a violation of a constitutional. right. See Gibson v. Rich, 44 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from suit when performing discretionary functions unless their conduct violated statutory or constitutional rights, clearly established at the time of the alleged incident, of which a reasonable person would have known). It is clear from the facts of this case, as now resolved by trial, that Defendants' actions did not give rise to any issue of constitutional magnitude.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff shall take nothing and this case is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that costs are to be born by each party.
The Clerk shall transmit a copy of this order to Plaintiff and to Counsel for Defendants.