Opinion
1:21-CV-01892
12-22-2021
DARRYL V. LYONS, Plaintiff, v. JOHN E. WETZEL, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SUSAN E. SCHWAB UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Introduction.
Plaintiff Daryll V. Lyons filed a motion for a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction seeking an order requiring that he be transferred from the State Correctional Institution at Rockview to a different correctional institution. Because Lyons has not met the exacting standard for showing that he is entitled to such relief, we recommend that the court deny his motion for a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction.
II. Background and Procedural History.
Lyons began this action by filing a complaint in the United States District Court of the Western District of Pennsylvania. On November 5, 2021, the case was transferred to this court. The complaint names one defendant: John E. Wetzel, the former Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections.
In the complaint, Lyons contends that he was assaulted at the State Correctional Institution at Rockview on July 3, 2021, in retaliation for calling the prison abuse hotline. Lyons contacted security staff about that assault, but he was not satisfied with their response. Lyons was allegedly assaulted again on September 6, 2021, the same day he was scheduled for a medical test to determine if he has colon cancer. According to Lyons, this assault was done with the hope that he would die from lack of medical attention. Lyons contends that although he does not have a history of hemorrhoids, blood leaks everyday from his anus. In the complaint, written in crayon, Lyons also complains about being denied access to unspecified legal materials.
Lyons requests in his complaint that the court issue an order that a severe penalty will follow any additional assaults. And he requests that counsel be appointed since he is being denied access to legal materials. He further requests that the court retain jurisdiction and issue any other relief the court deems necessary.
After the case was transferred to this court, Lyons was ordered to either pay the filing fee or file an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. On December 22, 2021, Lyons filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis, which we have granted by a separate order.
On December 22, 2021, Lyons also filed a document titled “TRO/Preliminary Injunction, ” which the Clerk of Court docketed as a motion for a TRO or Preliminary Injunction. Doc. 9. In this motion, Lyons contends that on November 21, 2021, he filed a Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”) complaint against two corrections officers, who made him perform a sex act to receive his food trays. According to Lyons, this was caught on camera. He contends that after his PREA complaint, he was retaliated against by being moved to a different cell and stripped of all amenities. More specifically, he asserts that he is being retaliated against by being denied his personal property and by being housed in a cell that does not have a mattress or a blanket and is only 37 degrees. Lyons also asserts that he has only two sheets of paper to make his pleading.
In his motion, Lyons also asserts that after his request to be separated from his abusers was denied, he went on a hunger strike. He asserts that he has missed 24 meals, and just today (which we take to mean December 9, 2021, which is the date on his motion) he was moved to the medical department. Lyons asserts that he is continuing his hunger strike because he wants to be separated from his abusers. He requests that the court enter an order directing the Department of Corrections to immediately transfer him to an institution with a “DTU Facility.” Id. at 2.
Given that Lyons is proceeding pro se and given the nature of the assertions that Lyons makes in his motion, we address the motion now without waiting to see whether Lyons files a brief in support. For the reasons discussed below, we recommend that the court deny the motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction.
III. Discussion.
Lyons seeks a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction requiring the Department of Corrections to transfer him to a different facility.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 governs temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions. Motions for temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions are judged against exacting legal standards. Preliminary injunctive relief “is not granted as a matter of right.” Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 443 (3d Cir. 1982). Rather, it “is an ‘extraordinary remedy.'” Doe by & through Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518, 526 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004)). A motion for such is properly granted only if such relief is the “only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm.” Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1989). “It has been well stated that upon an application for a preliminary injunction to doubt is to deny.” Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Braddock, 90 F.2d 924, 927 (3d Cir. 1937).
“When evaluating a motion for preliminary injunctive relief, a court considers four factors: (1) has the moving party established a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits (which need not be more likely than not); (2) is the movant more likely than not to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) does the balance of equities tip in its favor; and (4) is an injunction in the public interest?” Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140, 152 (3d Cir. 2019). “The first two factors are prerequisites for a movant to prevail.” Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 286 (3d Cir. 2018). “If these gateway factors are met, a court then considers the remaining two factors and determines in its sound discretion if all four factors, taken together, balance in favor of granting the requested preliminary relief.” Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2017).
As the first two factors necessary for a preliminary injunction “suggest, there must be a relationship between the injury claimed in the party's motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint.” Ball v. Famiglio, 396 Fed.Appx. 836, 837 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1251 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994)). Thus, it is inappropriate to grant a motion for a preliminary injunction when the relief requested in the motion is unrelated to the allegations in the complaint. Id. at 838; see also Moneyham v. Ebbert, 723 Fed.Appx. 89, 92 (3d Cir. 2018) (holding that the District Court correctly denied a “requested injunction because it involved allegations unrelated to the complaint”).
Further, the limitations on the power of courts to enter injunctions in a correctional context are further underscored by statute. Specifically, preliminary injunctive relief in a civil action with respect to prison conditions must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). Also, in considering a motion for preliminary injunctive relief, the court must give substantial weight to any adverse impact such relief may have on public safety or on the operation of the criminal justice system. Id.
Here, the nature of the preliminary injunctive relief that Lyons seeks- transfer to a different institution so that he can be separated from guards who sexually harassed him-does not appear to have any nexus to the claims Lyons raises in his complaint, which concern physical, but not-as far as we can tell- sexual, assaults. Lyons does not allege in his complaint the names of the guards that allegedly assaulted him. Thus, it is not clear whether the guards that were involved in the assaults outlined in the complaint and the guards involved in the most recent sexual incident are the same or related. In sum, Lyons has not shown how, if at all, the events he complains of in his complaint and the events underlying his motion for a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction are related. And although the exact nature of the relief that Lyons seeks in his complaint is not clear, he does not request a transfer to a different institution, which is what he requests in his motion. Because Lyons seeks preliminary injunctive relief that is unrelated to the claims he raises in his complaint, the court should deny his motion. Allah v. Martinez, No. 3:18-CV-1547, 2019 WL 1429275, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2019) (denying motion for injunctive relief because “it is unrelated to the claims asserted in this action and seeks relief against persons who are not parties to this action”).
Moreover, Lyons has not shown a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of the claims raised in his complaint, which is another reason the court should deny his motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. As noted above, the only defendant named in the complaint is defendant Wetzel, the former Secretary of the Department of Corrections. It is not clear from the complaint whether Lyons intended to name Wetzel in his official capacity, his individual capacity, or both his official and individual capacities. Whether the complaint seeks injunctive relief, damages, or both bears on this question. But the nature of the relief requested in the complaint is not clear. Lyons should be given leave to amend his complaint to clarify these issues.
If Wetzel was named in the complaint in his official capacity, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(d), the current Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections is automatically substituted for Wetzel. As noted above, however, it is not clear in what capacity Lyons sued Wetzel.
To the extent that Wetzel was named in his individual capacity, Lyons does not allege that Wetzel was personally involved in the events at issue in the complaint (a necessary requirement if he is being sued in his individual capacity). Moreover, the allegations in the complaint are conclusory and do not show deliberate indifference (a necessary requirement for an Eighth Amendment claim, which it appears is the type of claim that Lyons intended to plead). Thus, Lyons cannot show a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits.
IV. Recommendations.
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the court deny Lyons's motion (doc. 9) for a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction. It is further ordered that the court grant Lyons leave to file an amended complaint to clarify his claims, the relief he seeks, and the defendants he is suing. It is further recommended that the case be remanded to the undersigned for further proceedings.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.