Opinion
2015-09-2
In the Matter of Robert LYNN, etc., respondent, v. TOWN OF CLARKSTOWN, et al., appellants.
Amy Mele, Town Attorney, West Nyack, N.Y. (Richard A. Glickel of counsel), for appellants. Feerick Lynch MacCartney PLLC, South Nyack, N.Y. (Donald J. Feerick, Jr., of counsel), for respondent.
Amy Mele, Town Attorney, West Nyack, N.Y. (Richard A. Glickel of counsel), for appellants. Feerick Lynch MacCartney PLLC, South Nyack, N.Y. (Donald J. Feerick, Jr., of counsel), for respondent.
MARK C. DILLON, J.P., THOMAS A. DICKERSON, JEFFREY A. COHEN, and COLLEEN D. DUFFY, JJ.
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Chief of Police of the Town of Clarkstown Police Department dated August 14, 2012, which denied the petitioner's application for benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207–c, the Town of Clarkstown and the Police Commission of the Town of Clarkstown appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Loehr, J.), dated July 12, 2013, which granted the petition and, in effect, annulled the determination.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
On July 3, 2012, the petitioner, a police officer employed by the Town of Clarkstown, was on patrol duty and reported that he was injured when he fell while walking to his patrol vehicle. Thereafter, he was absent from work due to his injuries and applied for benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207–c. The Town's Chief of Police denied the petitioner's application on the ground that he was not injured in the performance of his duties. The petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding to review that determination and compel an award of benefits. The Supreme Court granted the petition and, in effect, annulled the determination.
A determination denying an application for General Municipal Law § 207–c benefits may be annulled only if it was arbitrary and capricious ( seeCPLR 7803[3]; Matter of Tancredi v. Town of Harrison/Vil. of Harrison Police Dept., 72 A.D.3d 832, 833, 898 N.Y.S.2d 631; Matter of Schmidt v. Putnam County Off. of Sheriff, 49 A.D.3d 761, 854 N.Y.S.2d 178). “An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts” ( Matter of Peckham v. Calogero, 12 N.Y.3d 424, 431, 883 N.Y.S.2d 751, 911 N.E.2d 813).
In order to be entitled to General Municipal Law § 207–c benefits, “a covered municipal employee need only prove a ‘direct causal relationship between job duties and the resulting illness or injury’ ” ( Matter of Theroux v. Reilly, 1 N.Y.3d 232, 243–244, 771 N.Y.S.2d 43, 803 N.E.2d 364, quoting Matter of White v. County of Cortland, 97 N.Y.2d 336, 340, 740 N.Y.S.2d 288, 766 N.E.2d 950; see Matter of Lowther v. County of Rockland, 122 A.D.3d 845, 846, 996 N.Y.S.2d 665). The word “duties” in General Municipal Law § 207–c “encompasses the full range of a covered employee's job duties” ( Matter of Theroux v. Reilly, 1 N.Y.3d at 244, 771 N.Y.S.2d 43, 803 N.E.2d 364). Here, the Supreme Court properly found that the petitioner was injured in the performance of his duties, and that the denial of section 207–c benefits was arbitrary and capricious (see Matter of Dobbertin v. Town of Chester, 292 A.D.2d 382, 384, 738 N.Y.S.2d 688; cf. Matter of DiMeglio v. Village of Briarcliff Manor, N.Y., 67 A.D.3d 908, 888 N.Y.S.2d 436). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the petition and, in effect, annulled the determination.