Opinion
B230298
01-24-2012
In re Marriage of LAURA and TIMOTHY MATHEW PETER LYNN. LAURA JUDITH LYNN, Appellant, v. TIMOTHY MATHEW PETER LYNN, Respondent.
Laura Judith Lynn, in pro. per., for Petitioner and Appellant. No appearance for Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. PD016769)
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Elizabeth R. Feffer, Judge. Affirmed.
Laura Judith Lynn, in pro. per., for Petitioner and Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
This is an appeal from the trial court's grant of an order of protection pursuant to Family Code section 6200 et seq. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On October 27, 2010, Timothy Lynn filed a request for a domestic violence prevention order pursuant to Family Code section 6200 et seq (Judicial Council Form DV-100). He indicated that he and Laura Lynn had been married and had one child under 18 (Branden), and asked the court to order Laura to stay away from him (his home, his workplace, his car), his child's school, his parents (James and Helen Lynn) and his friends Meredith Zamboni, Edna Lazo and Davina Anderson. In addition, he marked boxes asking the court to order Laura not to "[h]arass, attack, strike, threaten, assault (sexually or otherwise), hit, follow, stalk, molest, destroy personal property, disturb the peace, keep under surveillance, or block movements" or "[c]ontact (either directly or indirectly), or telephone, or send messages or mail or e-mail" to him or anyone he had identified. He also requested the right to record communications made to him by Laura in violation of the court's orders.
He said the most recent abuse had occurred on October 26, 2010, and was witnessed by Anderson, Zamboni and Lazo. In response to a question about what Laura had said or done that made him afraid, Timothy said: "My ex-wife has displayed conduct that for a long time that [sic] appears to be strange[,] odd and disruptive. She has continued to stock [sic, stalk] me and contact any woman I date and make slanderous remarks about me. She also uses threats of litigation to my friends and relatives. She blames everyone that associates with me that they are some[]how responsible for her not being able to have primary custody of our children."
In describing the "[second] most recent abuse" which he said occurred on October 23, 2010, in the presence of Anderson, Zamboni and Lazo, he attached an e-mail dated October 23, 2010, with the subject "To one of Tim's 'Babettes': Dear Davina, Meredith Zamboni and Edna Lazo, [¶] My name is Laura Lynn. [¶] I will try to reach you by mail also, and then if need be, I will have papers served on you personally. Before naming you in the civil suit I filed against Tim's mother and some court personnel, I would like to get your version of your participation in the denial of my parental rights guar[a]nteed under the Constitution of the United States of America. [¶] Violations of criminal code have been reported to the FBI since 2007. My efforts supported the apprehension and incarceration of Crystel Lynn Strelioff for child abduction and the trial of Tim Lynn for child abuse and I am relentless in bringing justice to all who cooperated without repentance in the destruction of my children's childhoods. [¶] Thank you for a prompt reply. Laura Lynn (760) 966-6000[.]"
Timothy said he "ha[d] trouble with this type of wording[:] 'I am relentless in bringing justice to all who cooperated without repentance in the destruction of my children's childhoods.'" Describing "other recent abuse" in 2010 witnessed by his parents, Timothy stated, "For the last year Laura . . . has been posting on[]line slanderous remarks about my parents. She often describes a conspiracy of sorts that led to her being unable to gain custody of her child," and said "There has been a long history of abuse in this case. If this order is granted i[t] will become the 5th conduct order protecting people in this family from Laura . . . ."
The trial court denied the requested temporary restraining orders because the facts did not show reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse (Fam. Code, §§ 6320, 6320.5), did not describe in sufficient detail the most recent incidents of abuse, relief could not be granted to Timothy's three adult friends and his parents could seek relief in a separate proceeding; however, the court scheduled a noticed hearing on Timothy's request for November 18, 2010.
On November 18, 2010, both Timothy and Laura appeared (in pro per). Laura said she was only specially appearing to object to jurisdiction as the order of September 2, 1997 and all subsequent orders were invalid. The trial court observed that the issue Laura raised was not before the court, but the request for an order for protection was a "self-contained proceeding," and Laura had been present when the hearing was scheduled with her consent.
Asked for more specific information and examples of Laura's conduct, Timothy testified that she repeatedly contacted the Santa Clarita Sheriff's Department, accusing him of torturing his son and keeping him locked up and tied up in a dark room. Just since November 2, he said, officers had been to his house four times and called him more than a dozen times to investigate; he said one of the officers told him everyone who worked the counter at the station knew Laura and agreed she "does this just to abuse" him.
Timothy said Laura contacted his friends (including Lazo, Anderson and Zamboni) by phone and e-mail. They showed him copies of e-mails sent from her e-mail address and in which she identified herself as Laura Lynn, directing the recipients to web pages where she refers to Timothy and his family as criminals. He said she blamed people with whom he associated for her inability to gain custody of their children. He said it worried him that Laura "believes that somehow people that I have a personal relationship with are actively destroying her children," and "she says she is going to be relentless," which he understood to mean "she is going to do everything she can to us." He said she had destroyed his property in the past and believed she had something to do with his dog disappearing. He said she had a "warped view of religion" and "thinks she is somehow an advocate for God" and "empowered by God to carry out what she is doing."
At this point, the trial court told Laura her behavior—frequently interrupting, "making weird facial gestures," turning around to look at someone in the audience, mouthing words, signaling, smiling and laughing during testimony—was inappropriate and asked her to maintain decorum in the courtroom.
Timothy further testified Laura posted "slanderous remarks" around the neighborhood and contacted his neighbors, telling people he and his family were sexually and physically abusing her children. Within the last year, he said, her behavior had been strange, odd and disruptive. He said she had called his answering machine and started speaking but then began making noises. He said she was angry and started quoting the Bible and then started making "sounds which aren't any language really." When he went to pick up his children in San Diego, he said, she was patrolling her yard with a baseball bat, saying the people around her were trying to damage the building where she lived. He said she had been to Santa Clarita twice within the past two weeks although she lived in San Diego to make reports to police and to "spy" on him. He said she had not visited their son for the last year and a half and said there was no reason "she is always around my neighborhood and then she is making these reports about me." Their marriage had been over for 14 years, he said, but he could not understand why she "keeps involving herself with me."
Timothy testified Laura slandered his parents online by calling them pedophiles and criminals and said she believed his parents paid officials to keep her from having custody of their children and said the courts were part of the conspiracy. She considered herself a reporter and posted everything about the case on the Internet. In the past, as evidenced by a prior restraining order he said, she would not stop contacting his employer to have him investigated; he was a building official and she falsely accused him of taking money to approve projects. He said Laura is "obsessive." "She won't stop calling the sheriff out up to my house. She won't stop contacting friends of mine. She won't stop slandering me and my family. . . ."
Within the last year, he said Laura had stalked him around seven times, "spying on me or trying to figure out where I am or where I'm living or who I'm associating with." Although she lived two-and-a-half hours away, she would show up in his neighborhood or contact people he knew trying to gather information on his schedule and things like that. She would knock on neighbors' doors at dinnertime and start talking and "ramble on about things that people feel are personal matters." His neighbors did not know why she was at their door or why she was posting things in front of their houses. He believed she was "disturbed" and had "never settled down." He said Laura also had a history of fighting with the staff at their son's school. Three times within the last year, she had contacted the school and said the court's orders were no longer valid and she was coming to pick up their son, claiming she had custody of him. In voice mail messages on Timothy's phone, she also said all of the court's orders dating back to 1997 were invalid and she was contacting the FBI and law enforcement to have him arrested; she demanded he turn their son over to her. She also said they were still married and she wanted to move back into the family home which made no sense as they were divorced and all assets had been divided, but "she doesn't seem to accept this has happened."
Laura testified she had not made threatening comments; she had made comments regarding litigation. She said she had filed a lawsuit in federal court against Timothy's mother and minor's counsel, alleging a conspiracy to deprive her of custody. She had also notified court counsel she was naming the trial court (Hon. Elizabeth R. Feffer) as a defendant. She had also obtained the neighboring home addresses for Commissioner Alan Friedenthal (also a defendant in her federal action) who had previously presided over the family law case and minor's counsel. She said she is a journalist writing about "alleged corruption in the family law court." Laura testified she spent between 20 and 40 hours a week on her case. She said she had contacted the police because she was concerned for her son's safety as he "had been threatened that he would be chopped into pieces." She acknowledged leaving the voice mail messages to which Timothy testified and acknowledged she believes she and Timothy are still legally married. She acknowledged that she had sent the e-mails to Zamboni, Lazo and Anderson to which Timothy testified and said she intended to name them as defendants in her federal action. She said she used the word "relentlessly" because "if they think that I'm going to go away, it's just not true."
After hearing testimony, the trial court concluded the evidence supported the issuance of a restraining order, finding Laura had knowingly and willfully engaged in behavior harassing and stalking Timothy and disturbing his peace as evidenced by her postings in the neighborhood, going to the neighborhood, calling him 12 years after entry of a judgment of dissolution and leveling the accusations she had leveled in court. Laura was advised (for a period of five years): "You must not harass, attack, strike, threaten, assault, sexually or otherwise, hit, follow, stalk, molest, destroy personal property, disturb the peace, keep under surveillance, or block movements. You must not contact either directly or indirectly, telephone or send messages or mail or e-mail, except for brief and peaceful contact as required for court-ordered visitation of children unless a criminal protective order says otherwise." She was advised that her willful conduct of contacting Timothy's female friends constituted indirect contact with Timothy with the intent to harass and disturb his peace. She was ordered to stay at least 200 yards away from him, his home, his vehicle, school, job or workplace as well as her son's school.
Laura appeals.
DISCUSSION
According to her notice of appeal, Laura appeals from the trial court's November 18, 2010 order issuing a restraining order pursuant to Family Code section 6320. Because a trial court's decision is presumed to be correct, it is the appellant's burden on appeal to show that the court prejudicially erred. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140-1141; Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 631-632.)
Timothy's "failure to file a respondent's brief means that we 'decide the appeal on the record, the opening brief, and any oral argument by the appellant' (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.220(a)(2), formerly rule 17(a)), examining the record and reversing only if prejudicial error is shown." (Nakamura v. Parker (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 327, 334, citations omitted.)
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First, Laura says, the trial court had no jurisdiction in this matter. "[T]he trial court, the appellate court, or some level of the court system should recognize that 'no subsequent order in the proceedings' after September 2, 1997 was valid, in other words that not any order occurring or coming later or after the September 2, 1997 occurance [sic] in the process of this family law action is valid, and the court should make a written record that [she] could use to return her to the status before the void decision to take her children and any money she ever earns or inherits away from her."
Laura raised the same argument in a prior appeal (In re Marriage of Lynn (Apr. 20, 2011, B221555) [nonpub. opn.] review den. Jul. 13, 2011, S193512), but as we noted at that time, "Laura has not demonstrated a legal basis for her assertion that more than 13 years of court proceedings should be overturned due to an alleged lack of notice of an ex parte hearing in 1997." Moreover, she has failed to explain how this issue is encompassed within (or bears any relationship to) the order from which she appeals. (See also Nakamura v. Parker, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 335 ["the rights provided by the [Domestic Violence Prevention Act] to persons claiming to be abused are available independently"].)
As explained in Nakamura v. Parker, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th 327, the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq. [further undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code]) "defines domestic violence as 'abuse' perpetrated against enumerated individuals, including a former spouse or cohabitant. (§ 6211, subds. (a), (b).) Its purpose is to prevent the recurrence of acts of such abuse and to provide for a separation of those involved in order to resolve its underlying causes. (§ 6220.) To this end, the DVPA provides for the issuance of restraining or 'protective' orders, either ex parte or after hearing, that enjoin specific acts of abuse. The act defines 'abuse' as either: an intentional or reckless act that causes or attempts to cause bodily injury; an act of sexual assault; an act that places a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to himself or herself or to another; and an act that involves any behavior that has been or may be enjoined under section 6320. (§ 6203.) The behavior that may be enjoined under section 6320 includes 'molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, harassing, [and making] annoying telephone calls as described in Section 653m of the Penal Code.' (§ 6320.) A court may also enjoin 'disturbing the peace of [another] party, and, in the discretion of the court, on a showing of good cause, of other named family or household members.' (§ 6320.) A trial court is vested with discretion to issue a protective order under the DVPA simply on the basis of an affidavit showing past abuse. Specifically, it 'may' issue an order 'with or without notice, to restrain any person for the purpose of preventing a recurrence of domestic violence and ensuring a period of separation of the persons involved, if an affidavit . . . shows, to the satisfaction of the court, reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.' (§ 6300.)
"The foregoing provisions of the DVPA confer a discretion designed to be exercised liberally, at least more liberally than a trial court's discretion to restrain civil harassment generally. For example, the 'abuse' that may be enjoined under sections 6203 and 6320 is much broader than that which is defined as civil harassment. (Cf. Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6, subd. (b).) Moreover, an order after hearing may enjoin civil harassment only on proof by clear and convincing evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6, subd. (d).) This stringent standard of proof does not apply to an order after hearing restraining abuse under the DVPA. (See § 6340, subd. (a).)" (Nakamura v. Parker, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 334.)
We review the issuance of a domestic violence restraining order for an abuse of discretion. (Gonzalez v. Munoz (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 413, 420.) "'The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.' [Citation.]" (Ibid.)
According to Laura, "the majority of testimony from [Timothy] was hearsay," citing as examples Timothy's testimony Laura accused him of criminal conduct, such as beating his children, stealing and perjuring himself as well as his testimony regarding the content of voice mail messages she had left for him (messages she acknowledged). However, as the trial court explained, contrary to Laura's objections, testimony as to Laura's own statements was properly admitted. (Evid. Code, § 1220 (admission of a party).) Further, she says, she was denied due process when the trial court excluded her proposed witness from the courtroom during testimony and then denied her presentation of this witness pursuant to Evidence Code section 352, but fails to present any argument or authority to establish that the trial court's determination constituted prejudicial error. In addition, Laura says the trial court "grant[ed] a restraining order intended to deny [Laura] her right to litigate against anyone [Timothy] knows," and had "effectively tampered with a witness (Laura Lynn) in the Federal Case of Laura Lynn v. Alan Friedenthal, et al, CV 09-08717-PSG(VBK)." We disagree.
"A trial court is vested with discretion to issue a protective order under the DVPA simply on the basis of an affidavit showing past abuse," and conduct consisting of unwanted, harassing and annoying e-mails and telephone calls may constitute "abuse" under the DVPA. (§ 6320 [conduct that may be enjoined includes harassing, telephoning or disturbing the peace of another]; see also In re Marriage of Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1498 ["the plain meaning of the phrase 'disturbing the peace' in section 6320 may include, as abuse within the meaning of the DVPA, a former husband's alleged conduct in destroying the mental or emotional calm of his former wife by accessing, reading and publicly disclosing her confidential e-mails"]; Ritchie v. Konrad (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1299 [a trial court may impose a domestic violence restraining order based solely on nonviolent conduct, including the "restrained party placing annoying telephone calls or sending unwanted e-mails, letters, or the like"].) Laura admitted to a number of acts meeting the definition of "abuse" within the meaning of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act. It follows that she has failed to demonstrate prejudicial error in the trial court's order restraining such conduct.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. As Timothy did not participate in this appeal, he is not entitled to an award of costs.
WOODS , J.
We concur:
PERLUSS, P. J.
ZELON, J.