Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. CV30092
RAYE, J.Neighboring landowners plaintiff Marilyn Lynch and defendant John Hertzig make a return appearance before us in a dispute over the boundary line between their properties. Lynch filed a claim to establish boundary and quiet title, arguing the disputed boundary line between the Lynch and Hertzig properties had changed since a prior trial in 1992. The trial court disagreed, finding the judgment entered in the prior action dispositive, since Lynch had introduced no new evidence on the matter. Lynch filed a new trial motion, which the court denied. Lynch appeals, arguing the decision in the 1992 trial was not res judicata as to the boundary between the properties. We shall affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Lynch filed a complaint to quiet title and establish boundary in November 2003. Lynch claimed a prior trial between the parties in 1992 (the 1992 trial) had determined only one boundary between the parcels. Lynch’s parcel is bounded by Hertzig’s land on two sides. In 1998 Hertzig filed a parcel map showing his property spanned 11.69 acres. Lynch claimed she owned 3.12 acres of the property claimed by Hertzig.
Hertzig answered Lynch’s complaint, arguing the 1992 trial had confirmed the boundary between the parcels. Hertzig also filed a declaration by Roger R. Pitto, a licensed land surveyor, stating Hertzig employed him in the early 1990s to locate the common boundary between the east side of Hertzig’s parcel and the west side of Lynch’s parcel. Pitto located the boundary, which was demarcated by an historical and existing fence line. The boundary was reflected on a map recorded by Hertzig as Parcel Map 9-180. In the 1992 trial the court adopted Pitto’s testimony regarding the boundary reflected in Parcel Map 9-180.
A court trial followed. The court took judicial notice of its file in the 1992 case. (Hertzig v. Lynch (Super. Ct. Calaveras County, 1992, No. 17269).)
The 1992 Trial
In May 1991 Hertzig filed a complaint for a preliminary and permanent injunction and damages against Lynch, stemming from her conduct on the common property boundary. Following a court trial, the court held “[t]hat the true boundary line between defendant Lynch’s property, Assessor’s Parcel No. 16-020-71, on its most westerly boundary which is contiguous to the real property of plaintiffs Hertzig, Assessor’s Parcel No. 16-020-08, is the present fence line between the Hertzig property and the Lynch property as found by plaintiffs’ witness, Licensed Surveyor Roger Pitto.”
Lynch appealed the judgment. We affirmed the judgment on appeal. (Hertzig v. Lynch (May 23, 1994, C015206) [nonpub. opn.] (Hertzig I).) Lynch contended the trial court erred in establishing a boundary line between the parties’ properties at the current fence line. We found that ample evidence supported the trial court’s determination.
We noted: “Plaintiffs’ surveyor testified he had searched the deeds and surveyed the boundaries of plaintiffs’ property. He found old fence posts and barbed wire markings embedded in trees that matched the metes and bounds descriptions. He discounted defendant’s claim of ownership of additional property as being premised in part on a misidentification of a road on an old map. The surveyor testifying for defendant stated he had not done enough work to form any opinion as to the location of the true boundary line. The trial court found defendant had not ‘proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the boundary line is in any other place than the present fence line’ between the two properties. Ample evidence supports this determination.” (Hertzig I, supra, C015206.)
We also noted the record before us made appellate review exceedingly difficult: “The parties introduced a number of maps and referred to them repeatedly without specifying for the record which map was being discussed.” (Hertzig I, supra, C015206.)
The Trial Court’s Decision and Aftermath
After taking judicial notice of the case file for the 1992 trial, the court heard testimony by Lynch and surveyor Pitto. No reporter’s transcript was prepared.
Ordinarily, “[i]n a judgment roll appeal based on a clerk’s transcript, every presumption is in favor of the validity of the judgment and all facts consistent with its validity will be presumed to have existed. The sufficiency of the evidence is not open to review. The trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are presumed to be supported by substantial evidence and are binding on the appellate court, unless reversible error appears on the record.” (Bond v. Pulsar Video Productions (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 918, 924.) As discussed, infra, the sparse record in the present case affirmatively establishes the necessary predicate for application of the principles of res judicata found dispositive by the trial court. We will therefore resolve this appeal on the merits.
The trial court found “no new evidence has been presented, that the time for introducing further evidence in the prior case between the parties has expired, and that the Judgment entered in Case No. 17269, which was affirmed on appeal, previously dealt with these issues and should stand.” The court entered judgment in favor of Hertzig.
Lynch filed a motion for a new trial. In her motion, Lynch argued the trial court’s decision “apparently was based upon judicial notice of the file and Judgment in Case No. 17269. However, the Judgment entered in that case determined the common boundary as it existed in 1992. Since 1992 the boundary changed. There appears to be no evidence establishing the same common boundary existed at the time this action was filed as existed in 1992. This suit was based upon the change since 1992, not the location of the boundary in 1992.”
At the hearing on the new trial motion, Lynch argued a comparison of the assessor’s parcel numbers in the 1992 trial and a map recorded in 1999 established that the common boundary between the parcels had changed after 1992.
The trial court denied the motion. Following entry of judgment, Lynch filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I
Lynch challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the trial court’s judgment and the court’s denial of her motion for a new trial.
In determining whether the judgment is supported by substantial evidence, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. We give the evidence the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolve all conflicts in favor of the judgment. We do not reweigh evidence. Our authority begins and ends with a determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, in support of the judgment. (McMahon v. Albany Unified School Dist. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1282.)
Although a trial court is accorded wide discretion in ruling on a motion for a new trial and we give the exercise of this discretion great deference on appeal, it is also our duty to review all rulings and proceedings involving the merits or affecting the judgment as substantially affecting the rights of a party, including an order denying a new trial. In our review of such an order, as distinguished from an order granting a new trial, we must review the entire record, including the evidence, so as to make an independent determination as to whether any error was prejudicial. (Piscitelli v. Friedenberg (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 953, 969.)
II
In challenging both the judgment and the court’s denial of her new trial motion, Lynch contends the court erred in finding the 1992 trial determined the boundary as it presently exists between her property and Hertzig’s property. Lynch argues the boundary changed subsequent to the 1992 trial.
At the outset, Lynch contends no documents identified the location of the fence or boundary between the parcels in the 1992 trial. Lynch asserts the map prepared by Pitto was not entered into evidence, and therefore, “[f]rom the record in the prior case, the location of the fence/boundary cannot be ascertained.”
Part and parcel of Lynch’s argument is her contention that at the time the trial court took notice of the 1992 trial file, “all exhibits had been ordered destroyed or returned to the parties and were no longer in the file.” Since “[n]ot a single document” in the file of the 1992 trial depicts the location of the fence or boundary, no substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the 1992 trial established the boundary and res judicata bars the present action.
We are not convinced by Lynch’s effort to cast doubt upon the basis for the 1992 trial court’s order fixing the boundary between the parcels. Regardless of the availability of exhibits, the minutes of the 1992 trial reveal Pitto was called as a witness and testified regarding several maps. In his declaration, Pitto states he located the boundary between the parcels based on the fence line and depicted it on a map. This map was subsequently recorded as Parcel Map 9-180 in the Official Records of Calaveras County. According to Pitto, when he testified in the 1992 trial, “the court adopted my testimony for establishing the common boundary between Hertzig’s easterly boundary and Plaintiff’s [sic] Lynch’s westerly boundary. That is the boundary shown on the above-referenced Parcel Map.”
Although no reporter’s transcript exists of the trial in the present action, the minutes reveal Pitto again testified and the parcel map recorded in book 9, page 180-B, Calaveras County Records was introduced as plaintiff’s exhibit No. 1. The trial court, after considering Pitto’s testimony and the parcel map, concluded the judgment entered in the 1992 case previously determined the boundary and should stand.
Lynch also argues the decision in the 1992 trial regarding the location of the boundary between the parcels is not res judicata. The doctrine of res judicata gives preclusive effect to former judgments on the merits and bars relitigation of the same cause of action in a subsequent suit between the parties. (Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669 v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 765, 772, fn. 6.) Res judicata requires three elements be met: (1) the identical issue was decided in the prior proceeding, (2) a final judgment on the merits, and (3) the party against whom the plea is asserted was a party in the prior adjudication. (Nathanson v. Hecker (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1162.)
According to Lynch, the judgment in the 1992 trial did not state the exact location of the boundary, and the “reference to assessor’s parcel numbers is the only means by which the boundary could be ascertained.” However, Lynch ignores the fence line, key to establishing the boundary in the 1992 trial. Lynch does not argue that the fence line has disappeared or suddenly shifted position.
Lynch argues the parcel map admitted into evidence at trial was not the same map presented by Pitto at the 1992 trial. According to Lynch, the map introduced at trial was recorded in 1998 and was signed by Pitto and Hertzig on December 4, 1998. Therefore “it is conclusive that the Parcel Map recorded in 1998 did not even exist in 1992.”
However, regardless of the notations on the map entered into evidence, Pitto testified, and the trial court found, that the boundary between the parties’ land was identical to the boundary Pitto testified to in the 1992 trial.
The record before us provides evidence sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion that the 1992 trial established the boundary between Lynch’s and Hertzig’s properties, rendering the boundary res judicata in the present case. Therefore, the evidence also supports the trial court’s denial of Lynch’s new trial motion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Hertzig shall recover costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)
We concur: SIMS , Acting P. J., ROBIE , J.