Opinion
A22-1826
01-06-2025
Tokvan Ly, Respondent, v. Jodi Harpstead, Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services, Appellant.
James P. Conway, Kevin J. Wetherille, Jaspers, Moriarty & Wetherille, P.A., Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent) Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Brandon Boese, Scott H. Ikeda, Assistant Attorneys General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Scott County District Court File No. 70-CV-22-13781
James P. Conway, Kevin J. Wetherille, Jaspers, Moriarty & Wetherille, P.A., Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent)
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Brandon Boese, Scott H. Ikeda, Assistant Attorneys General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge; and Schmidt, Judge.
SYLLABUS
1. Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1(b) (2022), the Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services has a clear legal duty to admit covered patients to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours of a district court's issuance of an order of commitment.
2. A district court is without authority to compel the Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services to create and submit monthly reports of the commissioner's statewide compliance regarding all individuals covered by Minn. Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1(b) (2022).
3. The Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure apply to mandamus proceedings to the extent the rules do not conflict with Minn. Stat. §§ 586.01-.12 (2022).
4. Upon issuance of an alternative writ of mandamus, the defendant in a mandamus proceeding may elect to move to dismiss or answer the petition. If the defendant moves to dismiss and that motion is denied, the defendant may then answer in accordance with the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure to the extent those rules do not conflict with Minn. Stat. §§ 586.01-.12.
5. In evaluating a motion to dismiss in a mandamus proceeding, a court may properly consider whether the petition and alternative writ, taken together, state a claim for relief.
6. Minnesota's notice-pleading standard for civil actions applies to mandamus proceedings.
7. Minnesota law does not require that a petitioner seeking a writ of mandamus specifically plead the existence of adequate funding to state a claim for relief.
OPINION
FRISCH, CHIEF JUDGE
Respondent Tokvan Ly suffers from chronic and severe mental illness that led to his arrest and subsequent commitment to the care of appellant Jodi Harpstead, in her official capacity as the Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services. Although Ly qualified for prioritized admission to a state-operated treatment program, he remained in jail for weeks after the district court ordered his commitment. Ly petitioned the district court for a writ of mandamus to compel the commissioner to immediately admit him to a state-operated treatment program, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1(b) (2022) (priority-admission statute). The district court issued an alternative writ of mandamus, and the commissioner moved to dismiss the mandamus proceeding, arguing that she was neither required nor able to immediately admit Ly to such a program. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, did not allow the commissioner an opportunity to answer the mandamus petition, issued a peremptory writ of mandamus granting Ly's requested relief, and on its own initiative, ordered the commissioner to create and submit to the district court periodic reports of statewide compliance with the priority-admission statute in all cases to which it applies.
The commissioner seeks reversal of the district court's order granting a peremptory writ of mandamus, arguing that (1) she did not have a clear legal duty to admit Ly to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours of his commitment, (2) there was no specific allegation that the commissioner had adequate funding to accomplish the requested relief, (3) the district court's issuance of the peremptory writ was procedurally improper, and (4) the district court was without authority to impose a statewide reporting requirement upon the commissioner.
We conclude that the commissioner had a clear legal duty to admit Ly to treatment within 48 hours of the district court's issuance of the order of commitment, that she violated that duty, and that Ly was not required to allege the adequacy of funding with specificity to state a claim for mandamus relief. But because we also conclude that the district court erred by imposing a statewide compliance-reporting requirement upon the commissioner and committed procedural errors, including not allowing the commissioner to answer the mandamus petition after denying her motion to dismiss, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
On September 27, 2022, pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, the district court declared Ly incompetent to proceed to trial on three pending criminal charges due to mental illness. On October 21, following civil-commitment proceedings, the district court filed an order stating that Ly "poses a risk of harm due to a mental illness" and is "in need of commitment." The district court determined that Ly suffered from schizoaffective disorder and had "an extensive mental health history inclusive of multiple psychiatric hospitalizations, residential placements, and civil commitments." Given Ly's "high level of need" requiring "involuntary long-term care," the district court ordered him committed to the care of the commissioner. But Ly remained in jail, awaiting prioritized admission to one of the commissioner's treatment programs pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1(b). At the time, the priority-admission statute provided in relevant part that "the Commissioner shall prioritize patients being admitted from jail or a correctional institution," and that covered patients "must be admitted to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours." Minn. Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1(b).
On November 5, Ly petitioned the district court for writs of mandamus and habeas corpus. Ly alleged that he "remain[ed] incarcerated in Scott County Jail, following his commitment, in violation of the 48-hours statute" and that the commissioner had "failed to comply with a clear and unequivocal legal duty imposed by law." He further alleged that the jail had denied him "necessary care for his mental illness" and that his condition was deteriorating. As relevant here, Ly sought relief in the form of (1) a writ of mandamus to compel the commissioner to "immediately admit [Ly] to a state-operated treatment program," (2) damages pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 586.09 to compensate Ly "for the Commissioner's failure to provide adequate treatment" and for "unlawful deprivation of liberty," and (3) fines to be assessed against the commissioner for failing to perform statutorily mandated duties, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 586.10.
On November 9, the district court issued an alternative writ of mandamus ordering the commissioner to "immediately admit [Ly] to a treatment facility or a state-operated treatment program," and in the interim, provide Ly with proper treatment and care. In the alternative, the district court ordered the commissioner to
fil[e] either an answer to show cause why [Ly] has not been admitted to a treatment facility or a state-operated treatment program as required under [Minn. Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1 (2022)], and provided treatment as required by [Minn. Stat. § 253B.03, subd. 7 (2022)], or file a demurrer, at least 24 hours before the return hearing. If [the commissioner] answers rather than filing a demurrer, the Court will set a jury trial on contested facts at a time and date to be determined, provided that the parties may waive a jury trial.
The alternative writ did not recite any facts.
"The writ of mandamus is either alternative or peremptory." Minn. Stat. § 586.03. Among other things, an alternative writ "shall state concisely the facts showing the obligation of the defendant to perform the [legally prescribed] act" and the defendant's failure to do so, and command the defendant to either perform the required act "or show cause before the court . . . why the defendant has not done so." Id. A peremptory writ "may be allowed in the first instance" in which "the right to require the performance of the act is clear, and it is apparent that no valid excuse for nonperformance can be given." Minn. Stat. § 586.04.
On November 16, the commissioner filed a "Motion to Dismiss/Demurrer," seeking dismissal of the alternative writ and denial of the petition for writ of habeas corpus. The commissioner argued for dismissal of the alternative writ because (1) the district court failed to set forth the factual basis for the alternative writ as required by Minn. Stat. § 586.03, (2) Ly failed to specifically allege that a medically appropriate bed was available or that the commissioner had "adequate funding to provide the relief requested by the petition," and (3) the priority-admission statute did not impose a clear legal duty requiring the commissioner to admit Ly to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours of the district court's issuance of the commitment order. The commissioner expressly reserved "any and all defenses to the Petition and Alternative Writ of Mandamus." That same day, the court administrator scheduled a "review hearing" for November 30. In advance of the review hearing, Ly responded to the commissioner's filings.
At the review hearing, the district court directed the commissioner to argue her motions on the merits. The commissioner objected because no motion hearing date had been scheduled, the issues presented by the commissioner's submissions had not been fully briefed, and the commissioner had not received adequate notice that she would be required to argue on the merits at the review hearing. The district court nevertheless required the parties to proceed with merits arguments. After hearing argument from both parties, the district court took the motion to dismiss under advisement and gave the commissioner 48 hours to submit a reply brief.
On December 21, the district court issued an order captioned: "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Denying Demurrer, Ordering a Peremptory Writ of Mandamus and Judgment for the Petitioner." The district court issued the peremptory writ based on the facts alleged in Ly's petition and determined that there were no contested issues of fact as to the commissioner's liability because she had not shown cause or filed an answer. The district court found that Ly had been committed to the care of the commissioner on October 21, 2022, but remained in jail even though the commissioner operated programs that could provide treatment and had the power to "effect [Ly's] transfer out of Scott County jail" and admit him into such a program. The district court determined that the priority-admission statute unambiguously provides that the commissioner has a clear legal duty to transfer Ly to a state-operated treatment program "within 48 hours of [his] commitment" and failed to do so. It also rejected the commissioner's funding argument, determining that "the legislature ha[d] clearly appropriated funds" for the commissioner to provide the treatment and care ordered for Ly.
The district court ordered the commissioner to (1) "immediately admit [Ly] to a treatment facility or a state-operated treatment program" and provide him with the necessary care, and (2) provide the district court with "30-day reports concerning all cases . . . to which the 48-hour rule applies," along with supporting documentation "demonstrating the resources utilized with regard to these cases." The district court then set the case for a damages trial and scheduled a review hearing to assess the commissioner's compliance with the peremptory writ.
The district court also reserved decision on the petition for writ of habeas corpus and directed the parties to engage in alternative dispute resolution. That petition is not at issue in this appeal.
On December 23, Ly was admitted to a state-operated treatment program.
The commissioner asserted that Ly was not admitted to comply with the peremptory writ, but rather, because a bed had become available at a state-operated treatment center.
The commissioner filed an appeal from the order issuing the peremptory writ. A special-term panel of this court dismissed the appeal as premature, concluding that the district court's December 21 order was not an appealable order because it "did not conclusively terminate the matter or fully adjudicate [the mandamus] petition." We explained that the commissioner could seek review of the December 21 order in an appeal from a final judgment. The supreme court subsequently granted review.
The supreme court first determined that the case was not moot because, although Ly had been transferred to a treatment facility and subsequently discharged, the commissioner was still subject to the district court's monthly compliance reporting requirement and damages had not been resolved. Ly v. Harpstead, 7 N.W.3d 560, 568-69 (Minn. 2024). The supreme court next determined that, "[b]ecause the district court's order directing issuance of the peremptory writ reserves determination on the issue of damages, it is not final," and the proper appeal is from a final judgment. Id. at 574. The supreme court nevertheless concluded that it would exercise its inherent authority to suspend the final-judgment requirement because the case "raises potentially complex, unaddressed questions of procedural law in mandamus" and "implicates weighty separation of powers concerns." The supreme court remanded the matter to this court to consider the merits of the commissioner's appeal. Id. at 576-77.
ISSUES
I. Does the commissioner have a clear legal duty under Minn. Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1(b) (2022), to admit covered patients to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours of the district court's issuance of an order of commitment?
II. Did the district court have the authority to compel the commissioner to create and submit monthly reports of the commissioner's statewide compliance regarding all individuals covered by Minn. Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1(b) (2022)?
III. Did the district court otherwise err in issuing the peremptory writ of mandamus?
ANALYSIS
On remand from the supreme court, the commissioner argues that the priority-admission statute does not impose a clear legal duty upon the commissioner to admit Ly to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours of commitment or authorize a district court to compel the commissioner to submit monthly compliance reports, and that the district court otherwise erred in issuing the peremptory writ of mandamus. A district court's interpretation of statutes and procedural rules raises questions of law subject to de novo review. Heilman v. Courtney, 926 N.W.2d 387, 392 (Minn. 2019). And we review de novo a district court's issuance of a writ of mandamus based on a legal determination given "the record at the time that the writ issued." Spann v. Minneapolis City Council, 979 N.W.2d 66, 78 (Minn. 2022).
I. The commissioner has a clear legal duty to admit covered individuals to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours of the district court's issuance of an order of commitment pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1(b), and the commissioner violated that clear legal duty.
The commissioner argues that the district court erred in issuing the peremptory writ of mandamus because Minnesota law did not impose on her a clear legal duty to admit Ly to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours of the issuance of the order of commitment. A primary use of a writ of mandamus is "to compel the performance of an official duty clearly imposed by law." Mendota Golf, LLP v. City of Mendota Heights, 708 N.W.2d 162, 171 (Minn. 2006); see also Minn. Stat. § 586.01 ("The writ of mandamus may be issued . . . to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station."). The availability of mandamus relief here is therefore dependent upon whether Minnesota law imposes such a clear legal duty upon the commissioner.
We review de novo whether the priority-admission statute imposes a clear legal duty on the commissioner. See Minn. Voters All. v. County of Ramsey, 971 N.W.2d 269, 275 (Minn. 2022). The purpose of statutory interpretation "is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature." Roberts v. State, 945 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted). The first step in statutory interpretation is to determine "whether the language, on its face, is ambiguous." Id. (quotation omitted). A statute is ambiguous when the disputed language "is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation." Spann, 979 N.W.2d at 73 (quotation omitted). To determine whether a statute is ambiguous, we "read the statute as a whole and interpret each section in light of the surrounding sections." Id. (quotation omitted). "If the statute is unambiguous, our analysis ends, and we interpret the statute according to its plain meaning without resorting to the canons of statutory construction." Id. (quotation omitted).
The relevant statutory scheme related to priority admission provides in pertinent part:
(a) When a person is committed, the court shall issue a warrant or an order committing the patient to the custody of the head of the treatment facility, state-operated treatment program, or community-based treatment program. The warrant or order shall state that the patient meets the statutory criteria for civil commitment.
(b) The commissioner shall prioritize patients being admitted from jail or a correctional institution who are:
(1) ordered confined in a state-operated treatment program for an examination under Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, rules 20.01, subdivision 4, paragraph (a), and 20.02, subdivision 2;
(2) under civil commitment for competency treatment and continuing supervision under . . . rule 20.01, subdivision 7;
(3) found not guilty by reason of mental illness under . . . rule 20.02, subdivision 8, and under civil commitment or are ordered to be detained in a state-operated treatment program pending completion of the civil commitment proceedings; or
(4) committed under this chapter to the commissioner after dismissal of the patient's criminal charges.
Patients described in this paragraph must be admitted to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours. The commitment must be ordered by the court as provided in section 253B.09, subdivision 1, paragraph (d).Minn. Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1(a)-(b) (2022). The parties agree that the statute imposes a clear legal duty on the commissioner to admit covered individuals "to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours." Id., subd. 1(b). But the parties disagree as to the event triggering the beginning of the 48-hour period. The commissioner argues that she did not have a clear legal duty to admit covered patients within 48 hours of the district court's issuance of the order of commitment because the priority-admission statute "was ambiguous as to when the 48-hour period began to run." According to the commissioner, because the legislature did not appropriate sufficient funds to enable the admission of all qualifying individuals within 48 hours of the issuance of a district court's order of commitment, we must interpret the statute to mean that the 48-hour period commences when a medically appropriate bed becomes available. Ly argues that the statute is "clear" and susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation: "that the 48-hours begins to run on commitment," and that issuance of an order of commitment "is the triggering event." Ly also argues that we must read the priority-admission statute together with Minn. Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1(a), which provides that "[w]hen a person is committed, the court shall issue a warrant or an order committing the patient to the custody of the head" of a state-operated treatment program.
During the pendency of this appeal, the legislature amended the statute by adding that covered patients "must be admitted to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours" of a determination "that a medically appropriate bed is available." Minn. Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1(e) (Supp. 2023); 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 61, art. 4, § 7, at 2393. The amendment went into effect on May 25, 2023, and expires on June 30, 2025. 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 61, art. 4, § 7, at 2393, ch. 61, art. 9, § 12, at 2452; Minn. Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1(e) (Supp. 2023).
We conclude that Ly's reading of the statute as requiring the admission of covered individuals to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours of the district court's issuance of an order of commitment is grounded in the plain language of the statute. The commissioner must prioritize admission when the individual (1) is incarcerated in a jail or correctional institution, (2) qualifies under Minn. Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1(b)(1)-(4), and (3) is subject to an order of commitment as provided by Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 1(d) (2022). Minn. Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1(b). Stated differently, the legislature expressly tied the commissioner's legal duty to act to the district court's issuance of a commitment order. See id. (requiring issuance of the order of commitment to trigger the commissioner's legal duty to effectuate prioritized admission for a covered individual). Indeed, throughout the civil-commitment chapter, the legislature repeatedly connects the issuance of the order of commitment to the commissioner's obligations. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. §§ 253B.09, subd. 5 (providing that "[t]he initial commitment begins on the date that the court issues its order or warrant under section 253B.10, subdivision 1," and that for certain classes of individuals, "the initial commitment shall not exceed six months"), .12, subd. 1(b) (requiring "the head of the facility or program that has custody of the patient" to provide a treatment report "at least 60 days, but not more than 90 days, after the date of the order [of commitment]") (2022). We therefore conclude that the plain language of the priority-admission statute imposes a clear legal duty upon the commissioner to admit a covered individual to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours of the district court's issuance of an order of commitment.
Minnesota Statutes § 253B.09, subd. 1(d), provides that "[i]f a person is committed to a state-operated treatment program as a person who poses a risk of harm due to mental illness[,] . . . the court shall order the commitment to the commissioner."
The commissioner argues that the statute is ambiguous because it does not explicitly set forth the event triggering the 48-hour period, the legislature could not have intended to designate the order of commitment as the triggering event, and such a reading would lead to absurd results. But the commissioner's arguments that the statute is somehow flawed in its application do not demonstrate that the statutory language is ambiguous. Rather, we must determine whether an alternative interpretation grounded in the plain language of the statute is sufficiently reasonable to render the statute ambiguous. See Spann, 979 N.W.2d at 73.
The commissioner has not offered an alternative reasonable interpretation grounded in the plain language of the statute. The commissioner's position that the 48-hour period should commence when a medically appropriate bed becomes available may reflect practical realities given the commissioner's resources, but such a reading is not supported by the statutory language. The version of the priority-admission statute in effect at the time of Ly's commitment did not reference medically appropriate beds, much less indicate that the "availability" of such beds triggers the commissioner's duty to act within 48 hours. The statute likewise does not set forth any criteria for determining when an "appropriate" bed would "become available" or who would make such a determination. It is not reasonable to deduce from the plain language of the statute that the availability of a medically appropriate bed triggers the commissioner's duty to act within 48 hours. We therefore conclude that the statute is unambiguous in the absence of an alternative reasonable reading of the statutory language. Accordingly, we hold that pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1(b) (2022), the Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services has a clear legal duty to admit covered patients to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours of the district court's issuance of an order of commitment.
Having determined that the priority-admission statute imposed a clear legal duty upon the commissioner to admit Ly to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours of the district court's issuance of an order of commitment, we reject the commissioner's argument for reversal on this ground. And, as explained further below, we also conclude that the commissioner violated that legal duty by failing to admit Ly to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours of the district court's issuance of the order of commitment in his case. We next turn to the commissioner's remaining challenges to the district court's issuance of the peremptory writ.
II. The district court exceeded its authority and otherwise erred in ordering the commissioner to create and submit monthly compliance reports to the district court.
The commissioner challenges that portion of the peremptory writ commanding the commissioner to provide the district court "with 30-day reports concerning all cases in the State of Minnesota in which the 48-hour rule applies," including "updated capacity issues of all relevant treatment centers." The commissioner argues that the district court exceeded its authority to compel such action and that the commissioner "does not have any clearly established legal duty to write and submit these reports." Ly concedes that the priority-admission statute "does not itself include a reporting obligation."
Mandamus relief "is available only to compel a duty clearly required by law." N. States Power Co. v. Minn. Metro. Council, 684 N.W.2d 485, 491 (Minn. 2004). The parties agree that the priority-admission statute does not impose a reporting obligation on the commissioner or authorize the district court to order periodic reporting of the commissioner's statutory compliance. We also agree. A district court is without authority to order mandamus relief commanding the commissioner to perform an act that is not "an official duty clearly imposed by law." See Mendota Golf, LLP, 708 N.W.2d at 171. We therefore hold that a district court was without authority to compel the Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services to create and submit monthly reports of her statewide compliance regarding all individuals covered by Minn. Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1(b) (2022). Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the district court's order commanding the commissioner to submit monthly reports regarding all persons covered by the priority-admission statute.
III. The district court erred in issuing the peremptory writ of mandamus.
The commissioner raises several procedural and substantive challenges to the district court's issuance of the peremptory writ of mandamus. "Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is available only to compel a duty clearly required by law." N. States Power, 684 N.W.2d at 491 (citation omitted). To obtain a writ of mandamus, a petitioner must show: "(1) [that the defendant] failed to perform an official duty clearly imposed by law; (2) that, as a result, the petitioner suffered a public wrong specifically injurious to the petitioner; and (3) that there is no other adequate legal remedy." Id. (citations omitted). Additionally, "in order to effect a valid issuance" of the writ, a district court must follow proper mandamus procedure. State v. Anderson, 58 N.W.2d 257, 259 (Minn. 1953). The commissioner argues that the peremptory writ should be reversed because she did not violate a clear legal duty, the district court's issuance of the writ was procedurally improper, and there was no specific allegation that the commissioner had adequate funding to accomplish the requested relief. We address each challenge in turn.
A. The commissioner violated a clear legal duty.
We have already concluded that the priority-admission statute imposed a clear legal duty on the commissioner to admit Ly to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours of the district court's issuance of the order of commitment. Ly qualified for priority admission as an incarcerated individual who was "under civil commitment for competency treatment and continuing supervision." Minn. Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1(b)(2). The district court issued the order committing Ly to the care of the commissioner on October 21, 2022. But by the time the district court granted the peremptory writ of mandamus on December 21, 2022, Ly had not yet been admitted and remained in jail. The commissioner therefore violated a clear legal duty imposed by law by failing to admit Ly to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours of the district court issuing the October 21 order of commitment.
Although we conclude that the commissioner violated a clear legal duty, it appears from the record that the commissioner has interposed several defenses to liability and may identify additional defenses on remand. The merits of these defenses are not the subject of this appeal and may be further developed by the parties on remand.
B. The district court committed procedural errors requiring reversal of the peremptory writ.
The commissioner advances two independent bases for reversal of the peremptory writ resulting from the district court's procedural errors: (1) the district court erred by issuing the peremptory writ without allowing the commissioner to present evidence contesting the allegations against her, and (2) the district court erred by awarding Ly a peremptory writ before entering judgment.
1. The district court erred by denying the commissioner an opportunity to answer after denying the motion to dismiss.
The commissioner contends that "once an alternative writ is issued, the mandamus statute instructs that the case is to proceed, and the pleadings are construed, as an ordinary civil action," guided by the rules of civil procedure. The commissioner argues that the district court erred in issuing the peremptory writ after denying the motion to dismiss without allowing the commissioner to answer, as provided by Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.01. Ly argues that the commissioner was required to choose between moving to dismiss or answering the petition, claiming that there are "no instances in the history of Minnesota case law" where a defendant in a mandamus action was given an opportunity to answer after a district court denied their motion to dismiss.
As a threshold matter, we must determine whether, and how, the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure apply in mandamus proceedings. These rules "govern the procedure" in all civil matters "with the exceptions stated in Rule 81." Minn. R. Civ. P. 1. Rule 81.01(a) provides that the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure "do not govern pleadings, practice and procedure in the statutory and other proceedings listed in Appendix A insofar as they are inconsistent or in conflict with the rules." And Minn. R. Civ. P. App. A lists mandamus proceedings as a type of special proceeding that "will be excepted from [the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure] insofar as they are inconsistent or in conflict with the procedure and practice provided by these rules." (Emphasis added.) In other words, when there is a conflict between the procedural directives of the mandamus statute and the rules of civil procedure, the mandamus statute controls. But when the mandamus statute is silent on a procedural matter, we apply the rules of civil procedure. The express language of the mandamus statute supports this reading. See Minn. Stat. §§ 586.06 (providing that a mandamus defendant "may show cause by answer made in the same manner as an answer to a complaint in a civil action"), .08 (providing that pleadings and written allegations "shall be construed and amended, and the issues tried, and further proceedings had, in the same manner as in a civil action"). Accordingly, we hold that the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure apply to mandamus proceedings to the extent the rules do not conflict with Minn. Stat. §§ 586.01-.12.
Against the backdrop of this procedural framework, we must determine if Minn. Stat. §§ 586.01-.12 addresses whether a mandamus defendant may file an answer upon denial of their motion to dismiss and, if not, whether such procedure is authorized by the rules of civil procedure. The commissioner argues that the mandamus statute does not address this circumstance, that the rules of civil procedure control, and that those rules authorize the commissioner to answer after a motion to dismiss is denied. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.01. We agree and conclude that the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure apply under these circumstances for two reasons.
First, the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure do not conflict with the mandamus statute with respect to the procedural circumstances presented here. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 81.01(a); Minn. R. Civ. P. App. A. The mandamus statute provides that "[i]f no answer is made, a peremptory mandamus shall be allowed against the defendant." Minn. Stat. § 586.07. But that provision does not address the situation in this case, in which the commissioner moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in the first instance and then sought to file an answer upon denial of the motion. Nor is there any provision of the mandamus statute that is otherwise inconsistent with a defendant in a mandamus matter filing an answer after the district court denies that defendant's motion to dismiss the proceeding.
We note that while the mandamus statute provides a defendant with the option to file an answer, it does not explicitly provide that a defendant may move to dismiss or demur. We observe that the meaning of "demurrer" has shifted over time and has come to be understood as a legal challenge to the sufficiency of a complaint-the functional equivalent of the modern motion to dismiss. See Nostdal v. Watonwan County, 22 N.W.2d 461, 464 (Minn. 1946) (explaining that "[a] demurrer raises an issue of law only" and "[n]o fact question is involved"). And over a century ago, the supreme court approved the filing of a demurrer by defendants in a mandamus action to challenge the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff's claim. State v. Cook, 138 N.W. 432, 433 (Minn. 1912). Additionally, when Minnesota adopted the rules of civil procedure, "[t]he demurrer was replaced by the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim." Pederson v. Am. Lutheran Church, 404 N.W.2d 887, 889 (Minn.App. 1987), rev. denied (Minn. June 30, 1987). Thus, Minnesota caselaw permits a mandamus defendant to challenge the legal sufficiency of a mandamus claim by filing a motion to dismiss.
Second, Minn. Stat. § 586.08 provides that a writ, answer, or demurrer "shall be construed and amended, and the issues tried, and further proceedings had, in the same manner as in a civil action." This provision indicates that mandamus proceedings in the motion-to-dismiss posture are subject to the rules of civil procedure, which allow defendants an opportunity to answer following the denial of a motion to dismiss. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.01.
Ly relies on State v. Jack for the proposition that a defendant is "not entitled to answer as a matter of right" upon denial of a demurrer. 148 N.W. 306, 307 (Minn. 1914). Jack is inapposite for two reasons. First, in Jack, the supreme court never reached the merits of this question because the defendant did not apply for leave to file an answer, and consequently, the question was not before the court. Id. Second, Jack long predates implementation of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. Those rules, together with the mandamus statute, control our decision on this issue. We therefore hold that upon issuance of an alternative writ of mandamus, the defendant in a mandamus proceeding may elect to move to dismiss or answer the petition. If the defendant moves to dismiss and that motion is denied, the defendant may then file an answer in accordance with the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure to the extent those rules do not conflict with Minn. Stat. §§ 586.01-.12.
Here, the district court denied the commissioner's motion to dismiss and granted the peremptory writ in the same order. The district court therefore erred by granting mandamus relief at the same time it denied the motion to dismiss, without permitting the commissioner to file an answer in accordance with the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's order granting a peremptory writ of mandamus.
Despite the district court's order, the commissioner subsequently answered the alternative writ of mandamus 13 days after the district court denied the motion to dismiss and issued the peremptory writ.
We recognize the imperative nature of mandamus as an extraordinary remedy that issues under "conditions of necessity or exceptional circumstances, where there would otherwise be a failure of justice." State ex rel. Hathorn v. U.S. Express Co., 104 N.W. 556, 557 (Minn. 1905). Our rules afford district courts faced with situations in which the failure to perform a clear legal duty might perpetuate grievous harm to an individual or the public interest with the discretion to implement appropriate procedural tools to expedite mandamus proceedings and swiftly determine whether relief is warranted. See Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 115.07 (providing that a district court "may waive or modify the time limits" prescribed for civil motions "[i]f irreparable harm will result absent immediate action by the court, or if the interests of justice otherwise require"). We also note that, in requiring the commissioner to argue its motion to dismiss on the merits at a "review hearing" without notice and before the completion of briefing, the district court did not follow the provisions set forth in Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 115 with respect to dispositive motions. And the district court did not provide notice to the parties or make any findings under Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 115.07 to alter the prescribed time limits.
2. The district court erred by granting mandamus relief before entering judgment.
The commissioner also argues-and Ly concedes-that the district court erred by issuing a peremptory writ before the entry of judgment. The mandamus statute provides: "A plaintiff who is given judgment, shall recover the damage sustained, together with costs and disbursements, and a peremptory mandamus shall be awarded without delay." Minn. Stat. § 586.09. We recently interpreted this provision and concluded that "[a] plain reading of section 586.09" establishes that the successful plaintiff in a mandamus action "must first obtain a judgment" before they can claim mandamus relief in the form of a peremptory writ, damages, or costs and disbursements. 14 Cherrywood, LLC v. City of North Oaks, 993 N.W.2d 287, 292 (Minn.App. 2023), rev. granted (Minn. Sept. 19, 2023) and ord. granting rev. vacated (Minn. July 9, 2024). Here, although the district court's order issuing the peremptory writ included the word "judgment," the record does not reflect the entry of judgment. The district court therefore also erred by issuing the peremptory writ before the entry of judgment. But because we reverse the peremptory writ in its entirety to allow the commissioner the opportunity to answer, we conclude that this error is now moot.
C. Specific allegations as to the availability of adequate funding are not required to state a claim for mandamus relief.
The commissioner argues that, notwithstanding any statutory duty to admit Ly to a state-operated treatment program, the district court erred in issuing the peremptory writ because "the lack of evidence, or even allegation, that the Commissioner had funding to admit [Ly] to a [state-operated] treatment facility within forty-eight hours of his commitment" is fatal to Ly's claim for mandamus relief. The commissioner argues that a petition and alternative writ must specifically allege the existence of adequate funding to accomplish the requested relief and that because neither Ly's petition nor the face of the alternative writ contained specific allegations as to the existence of adequate funding, the district court was required to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We disagree.
As an initial matter, we recognize the ambiguity in our mandamus caselaw regarding what constitutes the operative pleading in a mandamus action. Compare Cook, 138 N.W. at 433 ("The petition and alternative writ in mandamus cases constitute, in legal effect, the complaint."), with Gunther v. Bullis, 217 N.W. 119, 119-20 (Minn. 1927) ("In mandamus, the petition and writ constitute the information on the part of the relator, the writ standing in place of a complaint in an ordinary civil action."), and State v. Youngquist, 227 N.W. 891, 892 (Minn. 1929) ("The writ, not the petition, constitutes the complaint."). This question has not been substantively addressed since the adoption of the modern rules of civil procedure. We observe that limiting the operative pleading in a mandamus proceeding to the alternative writ carries significant procedural risks and would deprive the party that initiated the mandamus proceeding from framing the basis or nature of its own claim for relief. For example, such a construction may allow a defendant to achieve dismissal based on a facially deficient alternative writ-such as the alternative writ here- even if the petition initiating the action included allegations sufficient to state a claim and fairly notify the defendant of the nature of the claim and requested relief. Dismissal of an action would not be appropriate when the initiating party is not the source of a deficiency and has no ability to correct that deficiency. We therefore hold that, in evaluating a motion to dismiss in a mandamus proceeding, a court may properly consider whether the petition and alternative writ, taken together, state a claim for relief.
We have already concluded that the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure apply to mandamus proceedings to the extent the rules do not conflict with Minn. Stat. §§ 586.01-.12. In a civil action, we traditionally assess whether a party has stated a claim for relief under a notice-pleading standard. See Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 604-05 (Minn. 2014) (reaffirming that "Minnesota is a notice-pleading state," where "short and general statements of fact in complaints" that "fairly notify the opposing party of the claim against it" are adequate to state a claim (quotation omitted)). We discern no principled basis for deviating from that standard in mandamus proceedings, especially given the express directive in the mandamus statute that pleadings and written allegations "shall be construed and amended . . . in the same manner as in a civil action." Minn. Stat. § 586.08. We therefore hold that Minnesota's notice-pleading standard applies to mandamus proceedings. Accordingly, we apply this standard to determine whether the petition and the alternative writ together state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Minnesota Rule of Civil of Procedure 8.01 sets forth the pleading requirements in Minnesota courts and "reflects a 'preference for non-technical, broad-brush pleadings.'" Demskie v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 7 N.W.3d 382, 387 (Minn. 2024) (quoting Walsh, 851 N.W.2d at 605). Accordingly, "the Minnesota pleading standard requires only information sufficient to fairly notify the opposing party of the claim against it, with a focus on the underlying incident rather than on the specific facts of the incident." Id. (quotations omitted).
The commissioner argues that a different pleading standard should apply, citing two cases in support of her position that specificity in pleading the adequacy of funding is required to state a claim for mandamus relief. First, the commissioner relies on Powell v. Carlos Township, in which the supreme court held that an alternative writ must demonstrate that there is adequate funding to accomplish the requested relief. 225 N.W. 296, 297 (Minn. 1929).
We conclude that Powell is inapposite because it predates the modern rules of civil procedure. The adoption of these rules was intended "to permit the pleading of events by way of a broad general statement which may express conclusions rather than, as was required under code pleading, by a statement of facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action." Walsh, 851 N.W.2d at 605. Under the rules, "[a] claim is sufficient against a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim if it is possible on any evidence which might be produced, consistent with the pleader's theory, to grant the relief demanded." Id. at 603. Put differently, "a claim should be dismissed only if it appears to a certainty that no facts, which could be introduced consistent with the pleading, exist which would support granting the relief demanded." Demskie, 7 N.W.3d at 388 (quotation omitted). The current rules also provide that in pleading the performance or occurrence of conditions precedent, such as the adequacy of funding, "it is sufficient to aver generally that all conditions precedent have been performed or have occurred." Minn. R. Civ. P. 9.03. The commissioner's interpretation of Powell therefore conflicts with Minnesota's modern pleading standard, which rejects the notion that specificity in pleading is required to state a claim for relief, and the rules of civil procedure, which set forth the pleading standard for conditions precedent. See Demskie, 7 N.W.3d at 388; Minn. R. Civ. P. 9.03. Moreover, we emphasize that the mandamus statute itself does not articulate a heightened pleading standard or otherwise include a pleading requirement regarding the adequacy of funding.
The commissioner also relies on State ex rel. Traeger v. Carleton, in which-after a trial on the merits-the supreme court affirmed the denial of mandamus relief because the defendant municipal corporation did not have adequate funds to accomplish the requested relief. 64 N.W.2d 776, 779 (Minn. 1954). We conclude that Traeger is inapposite. In Traeger, petitioners brought a mandamus action to compel the municipality to complete a proposed project after the municipality ran out of funds to complete construction. Id. at 777-78. After hearing evidence, the district court dismissed the action, finding that the municipality had "discretionary power" to use the funds as it saw fit. Id. The supreme court disagreed with the trial court's reasoning, but affirmed on different grounds, holding that "[b]efore [a writ of mandamus] is issued to compel a municipal corporation to act in a matter of this kind, it must appear from the writ that the municipality has the funds with which to proceed." Id. at 779.
Unlike this case, in Traeger, the district court held a trial on the merits where the evidence established a lack of adequate funding. Based on that evidence, the supreme court determined that lack of funds precluded mandamus relief. Traeger therefore stands for the proposition that the existence of adequate funding is necessary to prevail on a claim for mandamus relief; Traeger does not stand for the proposition that to state a claim for mandamus relief, a petitioner must specifically plead the existence of adequate funding. And the rule in Traeger does not extend to the issuance of an alternative writ because an alternative writ is not a judgment and therefore does not represent a grant of relief. See 14 Cherrywood, LLC, 993 N.W.2d at 293, 295 (concluding that an alternative writ-unlike a peremptory writ-is not a judgment). Rather, "[a]n alternative writ . . . functions essentially like a summons in a typical civil proceeding, allowing a defendant to respond to the mandamus petitioner's allegations." Id. at 293. We reject the commissioner's argument suggesting that specificity in pleading the existence of adequate funding is required to state a claim for mandamus relief. And we therefore hold that Minnesota law does not require that a petitioner seeking a writ of mandamus specifically plead the existence of adequate funding to state a claim for relief.
We emphasize that a district court must still take care to follow the procedural directives of the mandamus statute, including the requirement that an alternative writ "state concisely the facts showing the obligation of the defendant to perform the act, and the defendant's omission so to do." Minn. Stat. § 586.03. And we note that a defendant in a mandamus proceeding confronted with vague or defective pleadings may seek clarification using the tools provided by the rules of civil procedure, to the extent they do not conflict with the mandamus statute. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.05 (allowing a party to move "for a more definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading").
Ly's mandamus petition contained allegations sufficient to state a claim for mandamus relief. The petition set forth allegations that the commissioner had violated a clear legal duty by failing to admit Ly to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours of the district court's issuance of the order of commitment in violation of the priority-admission statute, and that because the commissioner failed to perform her legal duty, Ly suffered a public wrong injurious to him because he remained incarcerated without access to critical medical care. Ly also alleged in the petition that the commissioner operated treatment facilities that could provide the necessary care, and that the commissioner "can and must, create a treatment plan for Ly that involves him receiving treatment in a non-jail setting." (Emphasis added.) And Ly filed a memorandum of law in support of his petition, specifically alleging that he had no adequate legal remedy other than the requested mandamus relief. These allegations sufficiently notified the commissioner of the nature of the cause of action, the existence of any condition precedent, and the requested relief. We therefore conclude that Ly stated a claim for mandamus relief.
We note that several of the commissioner's arguments for reversal-including inadequate funding and lack of notice concerning Ly's commitment to the commissioner's care-are defenses that the commissioner may pursue in the normal course of mandamus proceedings. See Winnetka Partners Ltd. P'ship v. County of Hennepin, 538 N.W.2d 912, 915 (Minn. 1995) (explaining that mandamus relief "will be denied where it is obvious that it will prove to be futile, unavailing, and ineffective" (quotation omitted)).
DECISION
We hold that pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1(b) (2022), the Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services has a clear legal duty to admit covered patients to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours of a district court's issuance of an order of commitment. And the commissioner violated that clear legal duty by failing to admit Ly to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours of the district court's issuance of the order of commitment. We further hold that a district court is without authority to compel the Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services to create and submit monthly reports of the commissioner's statewide compliance regarding all individuals covered by Minn. Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1(b) (2022). The district court therefore erred in compelling the commissioner to deliver to the district court monthly compliance reports of the commissioner's statewide activities under the priority-admission statute.
We hold that, in evaluating a motion to dismiss in a mandamus proceeding, a court may properly consider whether the petition and alternative writ, taken together, state a claim for relief. We also hold that Minnesota's notice-pleading standard applies to mandamus proceedings and that Minnesota law does not require that a petitioner seeking a writ of mandamus specifically plead the existence of adequate funding to state a claim for relief. We therefore conclude that Ly stated a claim for mandamus relief, and that the commissioner was fairly notified of the nature of the claim and requested relief.
We hold that the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure apply to mandamus proceedings to the extent the rules do not conflict with Minn. Stat. §§ 586.01-.12. And we hold that, upon issuance of an alternative writ of mandamus, the defendant in a mandamus proceeding may elect to move to dismiss or answer the petition. If the defendant moves to dismiss and that motion is denied, the defendant may then answer in accordance with the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure to the extent those rules do not conflict with Minn. Stat. §§ 586.01-.12. We therefore conclude that the district court erred in issuing the peremptory writ of mandamus without affording the commissioner an opportunity to answer.
Accordingly, we reverse the peremptory writ and remand to the district court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
We note that since this appeal was taken, Ly was admitted for treatment and subsequently discharged. At oral argument before this court, the parties acknowledged that the scope of requested and available relief on remand is unclear. But because liability has not yet been determined and the issue of what relief is available is not before us on appeal, we express no opinion on these or other considerations that may arise before the district court on remand.
Reversed and remanded.