Opinion
CIVIL 3:22-CV-811
04-09-2024
AMILAR-ZANAS LUIS, Plaintiff v. UNITED STATES, et al., Defendants.
Mariani, Judge.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Martin C. Carlson, United States Magistrate Judge
I. Background
On February 4, 2024, a number of related cases, including the instant case, were reassigned to the undersigned for pretrial management. By way of background, in May 2022, several dozen cases were initiated in this Court involving members of the MS-13 gang confined at the United States Penitentiary Lewisburg (USP Lewisburg) alleging that a January 2022 “national lock down” of MS-13 members led to their unlawful transfer to USP Lewisburg and unconstitutional confinement to a “Special Management Unit” (SMU) status. On May 23, 2022, the instant civil rights action was initiated pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1346, by the filing of a complaint in the related action, Bran v. United States, on behalf a purported class of prisoners. (Doc. 1). The complaint named as Defendants the United States, the Federal Bureau of Prisons, J. Meyers, the National Gang Unit Agency, and S.I.S. (collectively, “Defendants”). (Id.)
On June 8, 2022, the plaintiff, Amilar-Zanas Luis, elected to proceed with this civil rights action by filing a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 4). After being granted leave to amend, Luis filed an amended complaint on May 9, 2023. (Doc. 22). On November 17, 2023, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss and for summary judgment. (Doc. 29). The statement of facts (Doc. 33) and the brief in support of the motion for summary judgment (Doc. 34) were filed on November 20, 2023.
As the plaintiff had not responded to the defendants' motion within the time allotted by Local Rule 7.6, on January 24, 2024, the Court issued an order directing the plaintiff to file a brief in opposition to the motion for summary judgment by February 21, 2024, and admonishing him that failure to respond could result in dismissal of his claims under Local Rule 7.6. (Doc. 35).
The plaintiff has not responded to this order or the defendants' motion for summary judgment and the deadline for response has now long since passed. The plaintiff's failure to timely respond to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and his non-compliance with the rules of this court, now stymies any efforts to litigate his claims. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted, and this case be dismissed.
II. Discussion
A. Under The Rules of This Court the Defense Motion Should Be Deemed Unopposed and Granted .
Under the Local Rules of this Court the plaintiff should be deemed to concur in this motion to dismiss, since the plaintiff has failed to timely oppose the motion or otherwise litigate this case. This procedural default completely frustrates and impedes efforts to resolve this matter in a timely and fair fashion and, under the rules of this Court, warrants dismissal of the action. Local Rule 7.6 of the Rules of this Court imposes an affirmative duty on the plaintiff to respond to motions and provides that:
Any party opposing any motion, other than a motion for summary judgment, shall file a brief in opposition within fourteen (14) days after service of the movant's brief, or, if a brief in support of the motion is not required under these rules, within seven (7) days after service of the motion. Any party who fails to comply with this rule shall be deemed not to oppose such motion. Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the authority of the court to grant any motion before expiration of the prescribed period for filing a brief in opposition. A brief in opposition to a motion for summary judgment and LR 56.1 responsive statement, together with any transcripts, affidavits or other relevant documentation, shall be filed within twenty-one (21) days after service of the movant's brief.Local Rule 7.6 (emphasis added).
It is now well settled that “Local Rule 7.6 can be applied to grant a motion to dismiss without analysis of the complaint's sufficiency ‘if a party fails to comply with the [R]ule after a specific direction to comply from the court.'” Williams v. Lebanon Farms Disposal, Inc., No. 09-1704, 2010 WL 3703808, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2010) (quoting Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 30 (3d Cir. 1991)). In this case, the plaintiff has not complied with the local rules, or this Court's order, by filing a timely response to this motion. Therefore, these procedural defaults by the plaintiff compel the court to consider:
[A] basic truth: we must remain mindful of the fact that Athe Federal Rules are meant to be applied in such a way as to promote justice. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 1. Often that will mean that courts should strive to resolve cases on their merits whenever possible. However, justice also requires that the merits of a particular dispute be placed before the court in a timely fashion ....” McCurdy v. American Bd. of Plastic Surgery, 157 F.3d 191, 197 (3d Cir.1998).Lease v. Fishel, 712 F.Supp.2d 359, 371 (M.D. Pa. 2010).
With this basic truth in mind, we acknowledge a fundamental guiding tenet of our legal system. A failure on our part to enforce compliance with the rules, and impose the sanctions mandated by the rules when such rules are repeatedly breached, “would actually violate the dual mandate which guides this Court and motivates our system of justice: ‘that courts should strive to resolve cases on their merits whenever possible [but that] justice also requires that the merits of a particular dispute be placed before the court in a timely fashion.'” Id. Therefore, we are obliged to ensure that one party's refusal to comply with the rules does not lead to an unjustified prejudice to those parties who follow the rules.
These basic tenets of fairness apply here. In this case, the plaintiff has failed to comply with Local Rule 7.6 by filing a timely response to this motion. This failure now compels us to apply the sanction called for under Rule 7.6 and deem the motion to be unopposed.
B. Dismissal of this Case Is Warranted Under Rule 41.
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a court to dismiss a civil action for failure to prosecute, stating that: “If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). Decisions regarding dismissal of actions for failure to prosecute rest in the sound discretion of the Court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). That discretion, however, while broad is governed by certain factors, commonly referred to as Poulis factors. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted:
To determine whether the District Court abused its discretion [in dismissing a case for failure to prosecute], we evaluate its balancing of the following factors: (1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was
willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense. Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984).Emerson, 296 F.3d at 190.
In exercising this discretion, “there is no ‘magic formula' that we apply to determine whether a District Court has abused its discretion in dismissing for failure to prosecute.” Lopez v. Cousins, 435 Fed.Appx. 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 2008)). Therefore, “[i]n balancing the Poulis factors, [courts] do not [employ] a . . . ‘mechanical calculation' to determine whether a District Court abused its discretion in dismissing a plaintiff's case.” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263 (quoting Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992)). Consistent with this view, it is well settled that “‘no single Poulis factor is dispositive,' [and it is] clear that ‘not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint.'” Id. (quoting Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003); Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373). Moreover, recognizing the broad discretion conferred upon the district court in making judgments weighing these six factors, the Court of Appeals has frequently sustained such dismissal orders where there has been a pattern of dilatory conduct by a pro se litigant who is not amenable to any lesser sanction. See, e.g., Emerson, 296 F.3d 184; Tillio v. Mendelsohn, 256 Fed.Appx. 509 (3d Cir. 2007); Reshard v. Lankenau Hospital, 256 Fed.Appx. 506 (3d Cir. 2007); Azubuko v. Bell National Organization, 243 Fed.Appx. 728 (3d Cir. 2007).
In this case, a dispassionate assessment of the Poulis factors weighs heavily in favor of dismissing this action. At the outset, a consideration of the first Poulis factor, the extent of the party's personal responsibility, shows that the failure to prosecute is entirely attributable to the plaintiff, who has failed to abide by court orders or timely respond to the defendants' motion.
Similarly, the second Poulis factor- the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to abide by court orders-also calls for dismissal of this action. Indeed, this factor-the prejudice suffered by the party seeking sanctions-is entitled to great weight and careful consideration. As the Third Circuit has observed:
“Evidence of prejudice to an adversary would bear substantial weight in support of a dismissal or default judgment.” Adams v. Trustees of N.J. Brewery Employees' Pension Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 873-74 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Generally, prejudice includes “the irretrievable loss of evidence, the inevitable dimming of witnesses' memories, or the excessive and possibly irremediable burdens or costs imposed on the opposing party.” Id. at 874 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).... However, prejudice is not limited to “irremediable” or “irreparable” harm. Id.; see also Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003); Curtis T. Bedwell & Sons, Inc. v. Int'l Fidelity Ins. Co., 843 F.2d 683, 693-94 (3d Cir. 1988). It also includes “the burden imposed by impeding a party's ability to prepare effectively a full and complete trial strategy.” Ware, 322 F.3d at 222.Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 259-60.
In this case, the plaintiff's failure to litigate this claim, or to comply with court orders, now wholly frustrates and delays the resolution of this action. In such instances, the defendant is plainly prejudiced by the plaintiff's continuing inaction and dismissal of the case clearly rests in the discretion of the trial judge. Tillio, 256 Fed.Appx. 509 (failure to timely serve pleadings compels dismissal); Reshard, 256 Fed.Appx. 506 (failure to comply with discovery compels dismissal); Azubuko, 243 Fed.Appx. 728 (failure to file amended complaint prejudices defense and compels dismissal).
When one considers the third Poulis factor-the history of dilatoriness on the plaintiff's part-it becomes clear that dismissal of this action is now appropriate. In this regard, it is clear that “‘[e]xtensive or repeated delay or delinquency constitutes a history of dilatoriness, such as consistent non-response . . ., or consistent tardiness in complying with court orders.'” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 260-61 (quoting Adams, 29 F.3d at 874) (some citations omitted). Here, the plaintiff has failed to respond to the defendants' motion to dismiss his claims or comply with court orders and has failed to communicate with the Court. Thus, the plaintiff's conduct displays “[e]xtensive or repeated delay or delinquency [and conduct which] constitutes a history of dilatoriness, such as consistent non-response . . ., or consistent tardiness in complying with court orders.” Adams, 29 F.3d at 874.
The fourth Poulis factor-whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith-also cuts against the plaintiff in this case. In this setting, we must assess whether this conduct reflects mere inadvertence or willful conduct, in that it involved “strategic,” “intentional or self-serving behavior,” and not mere negligence. Adams, 29 F.3d at 875. At this juncture, when the plaintiff has failed to comply with instructions of the Court, we are compelled to conclude that the plaintiff's actions are not isolated, accidental, or inadvertent but instead reflect an ongoing disregard for this case and the Court's instructions.
While Poulis also enjoins us to consider a fifth factor, the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, cases construing Poulis agree that in a situation such as this case, where we are confronted by a pro se litigant who will not comply with the rules or court orders, lesser sanctions may not be an effective alternative. See, e.g., Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 262-63; Emerson, 296 F.3d at 191. This case presents such a situation where the plaintiff's status as a pro se litigant severely limits the ability of the court to utilize other lesser sanctions to ensure that this litigation progresses in an orderly fashion. In any event, by entering our prior orders and counseling the plaintiff on his obligations in this case, we have endeavored to use lesser sanctions, but to no avail. The plaintiff still ignores his responsibilities as a litigant. Since lesser sanctions have been tried, and have failed, only the sanction of dismissal remains available to the Court.
Finally, under Poulis, we are cautioned to consider one other factor, the meritoriousness of the plaintiff's claims. In our view, however, consideration of this factor cannot save this particular plaintiff's claims since the plaintiff is now wholly non-compliant with the court's instructions. The plaintiff cannot refuse to comply with court orders which are necessary to allow resolution of the merits of his claims, and then assert the untested merits of these claims as grounds for declining to dismiss the case. Furthermore, it is well settled that “‘no single Poulis factor is dispositive,' [and it is] clear that ‘not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint.'” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263 (quoting Ware, 322 F.3d at 222; Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373). Therefore, the untested merits of the non-compliant plaintiff's claims, standing alone, cannot prevent dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute.
In any event, we note that this Court has rejected virtually identical claims brought by other Lewisburg inmates on numerous occasions. See e.g., Parada v. United States, No. 3:22-CV-00806, 2024 WL 697092, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:22-CV-806, 2024 WL 692162 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2024); Benitez v. United States, No. 3:22-CV-00809, 2023 WL 7314397, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:22-CV- 0809, 2023 WL 7302135 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2023); Parada-Mendoza v. United States, No. 3:22-CV-00771, 2023 WL 5919300 (M.D. Pa. June 21, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 3:22-771, 2023 WL 5608401 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2023); Moz-Aguilar v. United States, No. 3:22-CV-00804, 2023 WL 4753767, at *2 (M.D. Pa. June 21, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:22-CV-804, 2023 WL 4748185 (M.D. Pa. July 25, 2023). Further, it appears this amended complaint fails as a matter of law on a number of scores, as Luis has failed to file any grievance relating to these claims, and thus, has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), his Bivens claims are barred by sovereign immunity, and he has not filed an administrative tort claim, depriving this Court of jurisdiction over his FTCA claims.
Therefore, all of the Poulis factors currently appear to favor dismissal of this complaint since the plaintiff has declined to litigate this case, comply with court orders, or communicate with the Court and many of his claims fail on their merits.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. 29), be GRANTED and this case be DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to prosecute.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.