Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-CV-02384
2021-06-15
Ruben LUCIANO-JIMENEZ, Petitioner, v. Clair DOLL, Warden, et al., Respondents.
Katelyn Huff, Gian-Grasso, Tomczak & Hufe, P.C., Richard H. Frankel, Federal Litigation and Appeals Clinic Drexel University Thomas R. Kline School of Law, Philadelphia, PA, for Petitioner. Joseph J. Terz, Joanne M. Sanderson, U.S. Attorney's Office, Harrisburg, PA, for Respondent Warden Clair Doll. Joanne M. Sanderson, U.S. Attorney's Office, Harrisburg, PA, for Respondents Simona Flores, Chad Wolf, Tony Pham.
Katelyn Huff, Gian-Grasso, Tomczak & Hufe, P.C., Richard H. Frankel, Federal Litigation and Appeals Clinic Drexel University Thomas R. Kline School of Law, Philadelphia, PA, for Petitioner.
Joseph J. Terz, Joanne M. Sanderson, U.S. Attorney's Office, Harrisburg, PA, for Respondent Warden Clair Doll.
Joanne M. Sanderson, U.S. Attorney's Office, Harrisburg, PA, for Respondents Simona Flores, Chad Wolf, Tony Pham.
ORDER
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK, United States Magistrate Judge
This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner's Motion to Enforce Order granting Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 19). On December 18, 2020, Ruben Luciano-Jimenez ("Petitioner") petitioned the Court for a writ of habeas corpus, asserting that the length of his detention without an individualized bond hearing was in violation of the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. (Doc. 1). On February 19, 2021, the parties filed a joint stipulation requesting the Court to enter an order granting the Petitioner a writ of habeas corpus to the extent that the Immigration Court be directed to provide him with an individualized bond hearing. (Doc. 9). The Court granted the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus on March 2, 2021. (Doc. 15). The Court ordered that an Immigration Judge afford Petitioner an individualized bond hearing within twenty-one days of the Order and that "[t]he [I]mmigration [J]udge must make an individualized inquiry into whether detention is necessary for the purposes of ensuring that the Petitioner attends removal proceedings and that his release will not pose a danger to the community." (Doc. 15, at 1-2) (citing German Santos v. Warden Pike County Corr. Facility , 965 F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2020) ; Chavez-Alvarez v. Warden York Cnty. Prison , 783 F.3d 469, 475, 477-78 (3d Cir. 2015) ).
In the instant motion, Petitioner submits that he did not receive an individualized bond hearing in accordance with the Court's Order. (Doc. 20). Petitioner asks the Court to conduct its own bond hearing to determine whether Petitioner is a danger to the community or a flight risk. (Doc. 20, at 1). Respondents aver that Petitioner must exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing a challenge to the Immigration Judge's decision and that the Immigration Judge's decision was in accordance with all Due Process requirements. (Doc. 21). I. DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, Santos v. Lowe , No. 1:18-CV-1553, 2020 WL 4530728 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2020) is squarely in line with the case at hand and calls for the allowance of this motion without appeal to the BIA. In that case, an individual who was detained while undergoing removal proceedings was granted a writ of habeas corpus with the order that he be afforded an individualized bond hearing. Santos , 2020 WL 4530728, at *1. The hearing was held and the petitioner was denied bond. Santos , 2020 WL 4530728, at *1-2. The petitioner subsequently filed a motion to enforce the Court's order, arguing that he did not receive an "individualized" hearing and that the court should hold its own bond hearing. Santos , 2020 WL 4530728, at *2. There, as here, the petitioner asserted that the bond hearing was not in accordance with the court's order that the hearing be individualized. Santos , 2020 WL 4530728, at *2.
The court refuted the government's argument that the petitioner was obligated to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to challenging the hearing in court, explaining that "district courts have continuing jurisdiction to address alleged noncompliance with writs of habeas corpus." Santos , 2020 WL 4530728, at *2 (citing Gibbs v. Frank , 500 F.3d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 2007)). Furthermore, the parties to this matter have agreed that Petitioner is due an adequate bond hearing. (Doc. 9). Thus, as in Santos , "any appeal to the BIA would ... result[ ] in extending Petitioner's unreasonably long incarceration." See Santos , 2020 WL 4530728, at *2 (quoting Leslie v. Holder , No. 3:11-CV-249, 2012 WL 3686782, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2012) ). As in Santos , Petitioner need not exhaust his administrative remedies prior to requesting enforcement of the Court's judgment. See Santos , 2020 WL 4530728, at *2.
Petitioner asserts that his bond hearing was not in accordance with the Court's Order directing that the hearing be individualized "for the purposes of ensuring that the Petitioner attends removal proceedings and that his release will not pose a danger to the community." (Doc. 20, at 8-9) (quoting Doc. 15, ¶ 3). The Immigration Judge relied solely on Petitioner's past criminal act without examining whether he presents a current danger to the community, according to Petitioner. (Doc. 20, at 10). By not considering subsequent events, the decision falls short of Due Process requirements. (Doc. 20, at 10-11). Respondents submit that the bond hearing followed all Due Process requirements because the Immigration Judge stated that he listened to all of the evidence and took it into consideration. (Doc. 21, at 9-10). Furthermore, the Immigration Judge correctly articulated the legal standards and made a decision that was rational rather than arbitrary. (Doc. 21, at 12-13). "The [I]mmigration [J]udge assessed the dangerousness to the community based on [Petitioner's] 2018 criminal conviction for a drug trafficking offense and 2016 arrest for drug related activities." (Doc. 21, at 9-10).
The Court's direction that the bond hearing be individualized is to comport with constitutional Due Process requirements. See Chi Thon Ngo v. I.N.S. , 192 F.3d 390, 398 (3d Cir. 1999). "Even an excludable alien is a ‘person’ for purposes of the Fifth Amendment and is thus entitled to substantive due process." Chi Thon Ngo , 192 F.3d at 396. An alien ordered excluded, deported, or removed, may be indefinitely detained in accordance with the United States Constitution as long as (1) there is a possibility of his eventual departure, (2) there are adequate and reasonable provisions for the grant of parole, and (3) detention is necessary to prevent a risk of flight or a threat to the community. Chi Thon Ngo , 192 F.3d at 397.
The third prong of the detention requirements allows for continued detention only if the detainee is currently a risk of flight or a threat to the community. Chi Thon Ngo , 192 F.3d at 398 ("The process due even to excludable aliens requires an opportunity for an evaluation of the individual's current threat to the community and his risk of flight."). "Due process is not satisfied [ ] by rubberstamp denials based on temporally distant offenses." Chi Thon Ngo , 192 F.3d at 398. When using criminal history to deny bond on the basis of threat to the community, "the recency and severity of the [past criminal] offenses must be considered." Singh v. Holder , 638 F.3d 1196, 1206 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added); Guerrero Sanchez v. Sabol , No. 1:15-CV-2423, 2017 WL 569176, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2017). The government bears the burden of proving risk of flight or danger to the community by clear and convincing evidence. German Santos v. Warden, Pike County Corr. Facility , 965 F.3d 203, 213-14 (3d Cir. 2020).
In Guerrero Sanchez , the petitioner had been convicted of conspiracy to traffic drugs. Guerrero Sanchez , 2017 WL 569176, at *3. This court stated, "To be sure, [p]etitioner committed a serious crime." Guerrero Sanchez , 2017 WL 569176, at *5. Still, a serious crime, alone, was not sufficient to justify denial of bond. Guerrero Sanchez , 2017 WL 569176, at *5. "Respondents, meanwhile, have attempted to carry their burden by relying almost exclusively on Petitioner's years-old drug conspiracy conviction and generalities regarding the violent nature of the drug trade. But such generalities, by their nature, are not ‘individualized’ considerations of Petitioner's danger to the community, as the law requires." Guerrero Sanchez , 2017 WL 569176, at *5. The "rubberstamp denial[ ] based on temporally distant offenses" did not satisfy petitioner's due process. Guerrero Sanchez , 2017 WL 569176, at *5. This court has held that criminal conduct which occurred four years prior is too "temporally distant" to be grounds for a determination that the detainee is a current threat to the community. See Lawson v. Gerlinski , 332 F. Supp. 2d 735, 738, 745-46 (M.D. Pa. 2004) (concluding that an offense was "temporally distant" when it occurred in 1999 and release was denied in December 2003).
Here, Petitioner was arrested for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin on December 20, 2016. (Doc. 1, ¶ 20). The bond hearing at issue occurred on March 25, 2021. (Doc. 18). Over four years accrued between the time of Petitioner's conduct leading to his conviction and when the bond hearing took place. Still, "[t]he [I]mmigration [J]udge assessed the dangerousness to the community based on" that conduct. (Doc. 21, at 9-10). The sole reason given by the Immigration Judge for denying Petitioner's release was the seriousness of this crime. Bond Hearing Audio Recording, at 27:29-29:42. This assessment clearly does not meet constitutional due process requirements. The recency of the criminal offenses must be considered, yet the Immigration Judge failed to discuss this. See Singh , 638 F.3d at 1206 ; Guerrero Sanchez , 2017 WL 569176, at *2. Even if Petitioner's crime was "very serious," it does not establish that he is a current danger to the community. See Guerrero Sanchez , 2017 WL 569176, at *5. Criminal activity occurring over four years ago cannot be the sole reason for a conclusion that Petitioner is a current danger to the community. See Chi Thon Ngo , 192 F.3d at 398 ; Lawson , 332 F. Supp. 2d at 738, 745-46. Relying solely on this four-year-old conduct, the Immigration Judge erroneously determined that Petitioner is a current danger to the community.
The Immigration Judge was not permitted to use Petitioner's 2016 drug arrest without discussing evidence of the underlying conduct. Chavez-Rivas v. Olsen , 207 F. Supp. 2d 326, 340 (D.N.J. 2002) ("[C]ontinued detention based on the fact that an alien had been arrested, without any proof that an alien in fact committed the underlying offense, would be no better than the ‘grudging and perfunctory’ review condemned in Ngo as inadequate to satisfy substantive due process.").
The Immigration Judge determined that Petitioner is likely not a flight risk. Audio Recording of Bond Hearing, at 24:53-25:15.
Petitioner's bond hearing did not meet the due process requirements of the United States Constitution. As such, Petitioner's motion is GRANTED and the Court shall conduct its own individualized bond determination. This bond hearing will be held on Thursday, July 1, 2021 at 10:00 A.M. in Courtroom #6 of the William J. Nealon Federal Building and United States Courthouse, 235 North Washington Avenue, Scranton, PA.