Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an Order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Super. Ct. No. PC031109Y Barbara M. Scheper, Judge.
Law Offices of Richard Pech and Richard Pech, for Defendants and Appellants Ravinder S. Grewal and Narinder Singh Grewal.
Law Office of Kent M. Bridwell and Kent M. Bridwell for Plaintiff and Respondent Ai Ping Lu.
ZELON, J.
Ravinder S. Grewal and Narinder Singh Grewal appeal the trial court’s order awarding attorneys’ fees to Ai Ping Lu. They argue that the trial court abused its discretion in calculating the fee award, and raise numerous contentions of procedural errors. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This matter concerns a lease dispute. In Lu v. Grewal (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 841, we reversed the judgment in favor of the Grewals. After retrial of the matter, the court awarded Lu $138,124.73 in damages, and found that, as prevailing party, she was entitled to attorneys’ fees.
On March 28, 2007, Lu submitted a Memorandum of Costs seeking attorneys’ fees in the amount of $469,214.21 and costs of $20,317.40. Attached to Lu’s motion were the declarations of attorneys Bert L. Rogal (Rogal) and Timothy V. Milner (Milner) and detailed attorney time records.
On April 12, 2007, defendants filed an “Opposition to Motion to Fix Costs, or in the Alternative, A Motion to Strike the Entire Memorandum of Costs or, in the Alternative, a Motion to Tax Costs.” Defendants objected that plaintiff’s Memorandum of Costs did not state the amounts sought and instead referred to plaintiff’s motion; the total amount of costs claimed differed from the total of the itemized costs; and the billings lacked foundation due to Rogal’s lack of personal knowledge. Defendants objected to plaintiff’s declarations.
On April 26, 2007, defendants filed an objection to plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees, objecting that the fees were unreasonably high because the hourly rates ($450 for Rogal and $375 for Milner) were not justifiable, the amount of time spent was excessive, and the skill employed was not extraordinary.
At a hearing held May 9, 2007, the court requested further briefing. The court advised defendants their filings were subject to being stricken because defendants failed to pay filing fees and to obtain leave of court to file the opposition to plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees. The court requested plaintiff to supply more detailed information and for the prior attorneys on the matter to supply a declaration setting forth the foundation for their billing records. The court gave defendants’ counsel an opportunity to respond to plaintiff’s supplemental filings.
On May 24, 2007, plaintiff filed supplemental documentation seeking a total of $528,910.72 in fees and costs. The cost memorandum summary was itemized for each of the six attorneys working on the case (Kent Bridwell, Forgey & Hurrell, J. Steven Kennedy, Jeffrey Leo, Rogal, and Milner). Plaintiff also submitted declarations from each of the attorneys involved detailing the basis of their fees; each declaration was supported by time records.
Forgey & Hurrell (Darrell A. Forgey and Christopher Wend) and Jeffrey Leo represented plaintiff at the first trial. J. Steven Kennedy and Kent Bridwell represented her on appeal. At the retrial, she was represented by Rogal and Milner.
Defendants raised numerous procedural objections to plaintiff’s supplemental papers. Defendants contended that: Rogal’s declaration had not been filed in support of the motion originally served March 28, 2007, and there was no authority to permit the late filing of the motion; the court abused its discretion in permitting the filing; and the declaration lacked foundation. Defendants objected to the other four attorneys’ declarations on the same grounds.
Defendants also objected to the continuance of the hearing to obtain supplemental briefing, and argued that the total fees of $500,000 were out of proportion to the judgment of $138,124; they further objected that the memoranda were untimely, and that various cost items were unsupported or unrecoverable.
At the hearing, the court rejected defendants’ timeliness argument, but taxed portions of plaintiff’s attorneys’ costs as not recoverable or factually unsupported. On the merits of plaintiff’s fee motion, the court analyzed each attorney’s fee request and ruled as follows:
1. Jeffrey Leo.
Leo sought $320,250.00 in attorneys’ fees and $8,069.15 in costs, based on 854 hours at $375 an hour. The court noted that Leo represented plaintiff from September 2002 through November 2003, a period of 14 months. The court found Leo’s hourly rate reasonable. However, although Leo stated he was involved in discovery and pre-trial preparation, the court found that, aside from attaching his billing records, Leo did little to explain his demand for over $300,000 in fees on a breach of lease case. In particular, during trial preparation, Leo was assisted by two other attorneys; collectively, they spent 216 hours and $67,000 in the 23 days leading up to trial. However, the court found no explanation for the need for three attorneys, and could not determine whether their work was duplicative. Although the court found some of the issues in the case were unusual, it determined the amount of fees sought was excessive. Therefore, the court struck $52,387.50 in fees, leaving a balance of $267,862.50, which the court further reduced by half.
2. Forgey & Hurrell.
Forgey & Hurrell sought $53,250 in attorneys’ fees and $1,896.17 in costs, based upon 83.5 hours for Forgey at $375 an hour, and 97.5 hours for his associate Christopher Wend at $225 an hour. The court allowed Darrell Forgey’s fees in the amount of $55,146.17 as reasonable, but found that Wend spent a significant amount of time reviewing work done by plaintiff’s previous attorney, and disallowed Wend’s $21,937.50 fee request as duplicative.
3. J. Stephen Kennedy.
Kennedy sought $44,492.50 in fees and $1,277.67 in costs. The court found Kennedy’s hourly rate reasonable, and allowed fees for post-trial work in the amount of $44,492.50.
4. Kent Bridwell.
Bridwell sought $28,400 in fees and $696 in costs, based on 142 hours of attorney time at $200 per hour. Bridwell’s declaration did not contain complete time records. The court denied Kent Bridwell’s fee request as unsupported as to all but 28.9 hours and for failing to explain why two attorneys were needed for the appeal.
5. Bert Rogal.
Rogal sought $54,765.85 in fees and $715.85 in costs. Rogal sought $14,000 for the four-day trial, and $450 per hour for the remainder of his time. The court found Rogal’s hourly rate reasonable, and awarded Rogal fees of $46,215.15 after disallowing $8,500 as duplicative.
6. Timothy Milner.
Milner, Rogal’s co-counsel, sought $14,250 of attorneys’ fees based on an hourly rate of $375. Because Milner used a block billing method, the court could not determine if the billing was reasonable. The court disallowed the fees as duplicative.
The court also cut several of the attorneys’ requested costs in various particulars as being unsupported or unrecoverable. In total, the court awarded plaintiff a total of $259,120.81 in costs and overruled the majority of defendants’ evidentiary objections.
DISCUSSION
Defendants contends that the trial court erred in sua sponte continuing the hearing on plaintiffs’ motion for costs and fees, and in ordering the moving party to file new and additional declarations in support of such fees and costs. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b); Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.1700, subd. (b)(3) and 3.1702, subd. (d).) He also contends the fees are not reasonable, and that plaintiff “took advantage of her own fraud” by seeking $329,166 for fees and costs incurred to attorney Leo, while at the same time arguing those fees and costs had no value in response to Leo’s attorney’s lien. Defendants’ contentions are meritless.
1. The Trial Court Properly Continued the Hearing on the Motion and Solicited Supplemental Declarations.
California Rule of Court provides that a motion claiming attorneys’ fees pursuant to contract shall be made within the time for filing a notice of appeal under Rules 8.104 and 8.108. (Cal. Rule Ct. Rule 3.1702, subd. (b)(1).) The time may be extended by stipulation, but shall be made no later than 60 days after the expiration of the time for filing a notice of appeal, or if an appeal is filed, until the time within which a memorandum of costs must be filed on appeal pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.278, subdivision (c). (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1702, subd. (b)(2).)
Those rules provide that a notice of appeal shall be filed on or before the earliest of 60 days of the date of the clerk’s mailing of a notice of entry of judgment; within 60 days of service by a party of a notice of entry of judgment or a file-stamped copy of the judgment; or 180 days after entry of judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104, subd. (a).) The time may be extended by post-trial motions as set forth in Rule 8.108. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.108.)
A motion for costs must be served and filed within 15 days after the date of the clerk’s mailing of the notice of entry of judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700, subd. (a)(1).) A motion to strike or tax must be served and filed 15 days after service and filing of the cost memorandum. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700, subd. (b)(1).) The parties may stipulate to extend these time limits; in the absence of an agreement, the court may extend the time for serving a cost memorandum or a notice to strike or tax for a period not to exceed 30 days. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700, subd. (b)(3).)
Code of Civil Procedure section 1005, on which defendants rely, governs the filing of motions generally, and would not apply to plaintiff’s cost memorandum or attorneys’ fees request. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).)
Nothing in these rules prohibits the trial court from requesting additional briefing on the issue as it did here. (Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 967 [courts have fundamental inherent equity, supervisory, and administrative powers, as well as inherent power to control litigation before them].) “We have often recognized the ‘inherent powers of the court . . . to insure the orderly administration of justice.” (Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 266.) Although some of these powers are set out by statute, the inherent powers of the courts are derived from the California Constitution, art. VI, § 1, and are not confined by or dependent on statute. (Id. at p. 267.) “[C]ourts have inherent authority to control their own calendars and dockets, and to inquire into their own jurisdiction [citation].” (Ibid.)
Courts have the obligation to decide cases before them fairly and in accordance with the law. (Cal. Code Jud. Ethics, canon 3.) To do so, and to ensure their decisions are made on the merits, courts must retain the ability to manage proceedings, so that relevant and necessary evidence is presented on the record.
Here, the trial court exercised this authority when it determined that defendants had filed improper motions and that plaintiff’s evidence in support of her request for attorneys’ fees was inadequate. By continuing the matter and soliciting additional briefing, the court gave both parties an opportunity to correct the deficiencies. The trial court acted within its inherent powers. In any event, given the fact they were afforded the opportunity to file opposition to plaintiff’s supplemental fee request, defendants cannot demonstrate they suffered any prejudice from the court’s actions.
2. The Trial Court’s Fee Award Was Not An Abuse of Discretion.
Defendants contend that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees that were double the amount of the judgment. He points to the fact the attorneys sought over $500,000 for a case that resulted in a judgment of $138,124, while the two trials in this matter only consumed six court days.
We review the trial court’s fee award for abuse of discretion. “The trial court’s decision will only be disturbed when there is no substantial evidence to support the trial court’s findings or when there has been a miscarriage of justice.” (Frei v. Davey (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1506, 1512.) The trial court also has broad authority to determine what constitutes a reasonable amount of fees in a given case. (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) An “‘experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his [or her] court, and while his [or her] judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong’ -- meaning that it abused its discretion.” (Ibid.)
The trial court has broad discretion to determine the amount of a reasonable fee, and the award of such fees is governed by equitable principles. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler, supra, at pp. 1094-1095.) The first step involves determining the lodestar figure, a calculation based on the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the lawyer’s hourly rate. “The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.” (Id. at p. 1095.) After determining the lodestar amount, the court shall then “‘consider whether the total award so calculated under all of the circumstances of the case is more than a reasonable amount and, if so, shall reduce the section 1717 award so that it is a reasonable figure.’” (Id. at p. 1096, quoting Sternwest Corp. v. Ash (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 74, 77.) The factors to be considered include the nature and difficulty of the litigation, the amount involved, the skill required and employed to handle the case, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case. (PLMC Group. v. Drexler, supra, at p. 1096.) The “necessity for and the nature of the litigation” is also a factor to consider. (Kanner v. Globe Bottling Co. (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 559, 569.)
We have reviewed the trial court’s ruling and the basis for its decision. The record makes clear the court did not accept as either established or warranted the amount of hours allegedly expended on this matter by plaintiff’s attorneys, and carefully scrutinized all of the attorneys’ billing records to determine the appropriate amounts. The court eliminated amounts for duplicative work, eliminated amounts for inflated work hours, and struck ineligible cost items from the attorneys’ requests. With these items removed, the court concluded the reduced amount of $259,120.81 in attorney’s fees and costs was reasonable.
Defendants have failed to demonstrate any abuse of the court’s discretion in determining the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. (Frei v. Davey, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 1512.) On the contrary, the record indicates the court reduced the fees plaintiff requested by almost half based upon factors such as duplication, excessive hours expended, and lack of documentary support. Finally, we reject defendants’ argument that the award is large in proportion to the amount of damages because the award made here of fees to four attorneys (two did not receive any fees) for two trials and an appeal is not so large as to “shock[ ] the conscience.” (Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1134.)
3. The Propriety of Leo’s Attorney’s Lien Is Not Properly Before This Court.
Subsequent to the entry of judgment in this matter, attorney Leo filed a “Notice of Lien,” claiming a lien for fees upon plaintiff’s recovery from defendants. Plaintiff objected, contending that because Leo was hired on a contingency basis and lost the first trial, he had no valid claim for quantum meruit and his fees were of “no value.” Defendants contend that Lu is taking advantage of her own fraud (Civ. Code, § 3517) by submitting Leo’s declaration in support of her request for attorneys’ fees, but at the same time contending in response to his lien that those services were of no value.
We are unable to evaluate these contentions because the propriety of the attorney’s lien was not properly before the trial court, nor did the court rule on it. An attorney may obtain a lien upon the proceeds of a prospective judgment in favor of his or her client for legal services rendered. Such lien may be created by contract, express or implied; it is a “secret” lien which does not require the attorney to file a notice of lien for the lien to be valid. (Brown v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 320, 327.) However, the trial court has no jurisdiction to determine the validity of the lien because it has no subject matter jurisdiction over the attorney, who was not a party to the underlying action. (Id. at p. 328.) “Absent proper intervention . . . the fundamental rule is that the attorney is not a party to the client’s action and cannot appear on his or her own behalf to seek any relief in that action, including enforcement of a contractual lien against the proceeds of the judgment.” (Id. at p. 330.)
DISPOSITION
The order of the superior court is affirmed. Respondent is to recover her costs on appeal.
We concur: PERLUSS, P. J. JACKSON, J.