Opinion
Index No. 850137/2020 Motion Seq. No. 001
06-23-2023
LPP MORTGAGE LTD., Plaintiff, v. FLORENCE SIMEON, BOARD OF MANAGERS OF RIVERSIDE SOUTH PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., BOARD OF MANAGERS OF 200 RIVERSIDE BOULEVARD AT TRUMP PLACE, JOVIA FINANCIAL CREDIT UNION F/K/A NASSAU EDUCATORS FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, NEW YORK CITY ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL BOARD, NEW YORK CITY PARKING VIOLATIONS BUREAU, NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT ADJUDICATION BUREAU, JOHN DOE Defendant.
Unpublished Opinion
PRESENT: HON. FRANCIS A. KAHN, III PART JUSTICE
DECISION + ORDER ON MOTION
FRANCIS A. KAHN III JUDGE
The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 001) 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70 were read on this motion to/for JUDGMENT - SUMMARY.
Upon the foregoing documents, the motion and cross-motion are determined as follows:
The within action is to foreclose on a mortgage encumbering a parcel of residential real property located 200 Riverside Boulevard, Unit 14A, New York, New York. The consolidated mortgage, dated June 11, 2003, was given by Defendant Florence Simeon ("Simeon") to non-party Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Credit Corporation and secures a loan with an original principal amount of $821,972.61. The loan is memorialized by an adjustable-rate consolidated note of the same date. Also executed that date was a modification and extension agreement These documents consolidated two prior sets of notes and mortgages on the same property dated September 14, 2000, and January 4, 2002.
Plaintiff commenced this action and alleged that Simeon defaulted in repayment of the indebtedness on or about February 1, 2019. A conference pursuant to CPLR §3408 was initially scheduled for August 10, 2021. Simeon appeared at one of the conferences by counsel, but she failed to appear at the final two conferences. Simeon also failed to file an answer in accordance with a Court set deadline (NYSCEF Doc No 34). Simeon filed a late answer on July 20, 2022, which Plaintiff rejected (CPLR §3408[m]). In that answer, Simeon pled nineteen [19] affirmative defenses, including lack of standing, failure to provide a contractual pre-foreclosure notice and failure to comply with RPAPL §§1303, 1304 and 1306.
Now, Plaintiff moves for summary judgment against Defendant Simeon, notwithstanding her default, striking the answer and affirmative defenses, a default judgment against all non-appearing parties, and to appoint a Referee to compute. Defendant Simeon opposes the motion.
In moving for summary judgment, Plaintiff was required to establish prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law though proof of the mortgage, the note, and evidence of Defendants' default in repayment (see U.S. Bank, N.A. v James, 180 A.D.3d 594 [1st Dept 2020]; Bank of NY v Knowles, 151 A.D.3d 596 [1st Dept 2017]; Fortress Credit Corp. v Hudson Yards, LLC, 78 A.D.3d 577 [1st Dept 2010]). Proof supporting a prima facie case on a motion for summary judgment must be in admissible form (see CPLR §3212[b]; Tri-State Loan Acquisitions III, LLC v Litkowski, 172 A.D.3d 780 [1st Dept 2019]). Since Defendant pled in the answer lack of standing, failure to serve an RPAPL §1304 notice and lack of a contractual pre-foreclosure notice, Plaintiff was required to demonstrate, prima facie, its standing (see eg Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Tricario, 180 A.D.3d 848 [2nd Dept 2020]), its substantial compliance with the requisites under paragraph 22 of the mortgage (see eg Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v McKenzie, 186 A.D.3d 1582, 1584 [2d Dept 2020]) as well as its strict compliance with RPAPL §§1303, 1304 and 1306 (see U.S. Bank, NA v Nathan, 173 A.D.3d 1112 [2d Dept 2019]; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Bermudez, 175 A.D.3d 667, 669 [2d Dept 2019]).
In support of a motion for summary judgment on a cause of action for foreclosure, a plaintiff may rely on evidence from persons with personal knowledge of the facts, documents in admissible form and/or persons with knowledge derived from produced admissible records (see eg U.S. Bank N.A. v Moulton, 179 A.D.3d 734, 738 [2d Dept 2020]). No particular set of business records must be proffered, as long as the admissibility requirements of CPLR 4518[a] are fulfilled and the records evince the facts for which they are relied upon (see eg Citigroup v Kopelowitz, 147 A.D.3d 1014, 1015 [2d Dept 2017]).
Plaintiffs motion was supported with an affidavit from Juliana Thurab ("Thurab"), a Contract Management Coordinator of PHH Mortgage Corporation. ("PHH"), Plaintiffs servicer. Thurab's affidavit laid a proper foundation for the admission of the records of PHH into evidence under CPLR §4518 (see Bank of N.Y.Mellon v Gordon, 171 A.D.3d 197 [2d Dept 2019]). The records of other entities were also admissible since Thurab sufficiently established that those records were received from the makers and incorporated into the records PHH kept and that it routinely relied upon such documents in its business (see U.S. Bank N.A. v Kropp-Somoza, 191 A.D.3d 918 [2d Dept 2021]). Further, annexed to the motion were records referenced by Thurab (cf Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Kirschenbaum, 187 A.D.3d 569 [1st Dept 2020]) as well as a power of attorney, dated November 1, 2022, demonstrating the authority of PHH to act on behalf of Plaintiff (see Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Silverman, 178 A.D.3d 898, 901 [2d Dept 2019]).
Thurab's affidavit and the referenced documents sufficiently evidenced the note and mortgage. As to the Mortgagor's default, it "is established by (1) an admission made in response to a notice to admit, (2) an affidavit from a person having personal knowledge of the facts, or (3) other evidence in admissible form" (Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v McGann, 183 A.D.3d 700, 702 [2d Dept 2020]). Here, Thurab's review of the attached account records demonstrated that the Mortgagor defaulted in repayment under the note (see eg ING Real Estate Fin. (USA) LLC v Park Ave. Hotel Acquisition, LLC, 89 A.D.3d 506 [1st Dept 2011]).
As to standing in a foreclosure action, the note is the dispositive instrument (Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Taylor, 25 N.Y.3d 355, 361-362 [2015]). '"Either a written assignment of the underlying note or the physical delivery of the note prior to the commencement of the foreclosure action is sufficient to transfer the obligation, and the mortgage passes with the debt as an inseparable incident'" (U.S. Bank N.A. v Camivale, 138 A.D.3d 1220, 1221 [2d Dept 2016], quoting Onewest Bank, F.S.B. v Mazzone, 130 A.D.3d 1399, 1400 [2d Dept 2015]). However, "mere physical possession of a note at the commencement of a foreclosure action is insufficient to confer standing or to make a plaintiff the lawful holder of a negotiable instrument for the purposes of enforcing the note" (U.S. Bank N.A. v Moulton, 179 A.D.3d 734, 737 [2d Dept 2020]). "Holder status is established where the plaintiff possesses a note that, on its face or by allonge, contains an indorsement in blank or bears a special indorsement payable to the order of the plaintiff (Wells Fargo Bank, NA v Ostiguy, 127 A.D.3d 1375, 1376 [2d Dept 2015] [citations omitted]). The indorsement must be made either on the face of the note or on an allonge "so firmly affixed thereto as to become a part thereof (UCC §3-202 [2]). "The attachment of a properly endorsed note to the complaint may be sufficient to establish, prima facie, that the plaintiff is the holder of the note at the time of commencement" (Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Webster, 142 A.D.3d 636, 638 [2d Dept 2016]; cf. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Grennan, supra).
In this case, Plaintiff annexed a copy of the note to the complaint to which an allonge was attached. That document contained an endorsement executed by the original lender to Plaintiff. Thurab averred in her affidavit that the allonge was firmly affixed to the note when the action was filed. The proffered evidence was sufficient to demonstrate Plaintiffs standing (see Nationstar Mtge, LLC v Calomarde, 201 A.D.3d 940 [2d Dept 2022]).
Plaintiff was also required to proffer "sufficient evidence demonstrating the absence of material issues as to its strict compliance with RPAPL 1304" (Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Weisblum, 85 A.D.3d 95, 106 [2d Dept 2011]). As to the contractual pre-foreclosure notice, paragraph 22 of the mortgage, a ubiquitous provision in residential mortgages, provides that as a prior to acceleration of the note, the lender must send a notice containing the information specified in paragraph 22[b][l] - [6] in the manner described in paragraph 15 of the mortgage. That section provides that all notices must be in writing and "is considered given to [Mortgagor] when mailed by first class mail or when actually delivered to my notice address if sent by other means . . . The notice address is the address of the Property unless I give notice to Lender of a different address". Paragraph 8 of the note also states that required notices will be given by delivering it... at the Property Address above or at a different address if I give the Note Holder a notice of my different address". That section also provides that "any notice that must be given to [mortgagor] under this Note will be given by delivering it or by mailing it... to [mortgagor] at the Property Address above".
The Court of Appeals has "has long recognized a party can establish that a notice or other document was sent through evidence of actual mailing or-as relevant here-by proof of a sender's routine business practice with respect to the creation, addressing, and mailing of documents of that nature" (Cit Bank N.A. v Schijfman, 36 N.Y.3d 550, 556 [2020][internal citations omitted]). A satisfactory office practice giving rise to the presumption "must be geared so as to ensure the likelihood that [the] notice ... is always properly addressed and mailed" (Nassau Ins. Co. v Murray, 46 N.Y.2d 828, 830 [1978]) and can be demonstrated via an affiant who explains "among other things, how the notices and envelopes were generated, posted and sealed, as well as how the mail was transmitted to the postal service" (Cit Bank N.A. v Schiffman, supra). An affidavit from the person who performed the actual mailing is not necessary (see Bossuk v Steinberg, 58 N.Y.2d 916, 919 [1983]). Proof from a person with "personal knowledge of the practices utilized by the [sender] at the time of the alleged mailing" is sufficient (Preferred Mut. Ins. Co. v Donnelly, 22 N.Y.3d 1169, 1170 [2014]; see also Citibank, N.A. v Conti-Scheurer, 172 A.D.3d 17, 21 [2d Dept 2019][internal quotation marks omitted]). Fulfillment of this requirement can raise a presumption that the required notice was sent and received by the projected addressee (Cit Bank N.A. v Schiffman, supra).
The affidavit of Thurab demonstrated strict compliance with the notice requirements under RPAPL §1304 (see HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Bermudez, 175 A.D.3d 667 [2d Dept 2019]). Thumb's affidavit laid a proper foundation for the admission of PHH's records into evidence under CPLR §4518 (see Bank of N.Y.Mellon v Gordon, 171 A.D.3d 197 [2d Dept 2019]). Thurab also attested to personal knowledge of the mailing practices and procedures of PHH. Thurab attested that PHH generated the notices and performed the mailings. Thurab described PHH's standard office procedure, in detail, attached copies of the notices and USPS documents related to Defendant's loan (see Bank of Am., N.A. v Bloom, 202 A.D.3d 736 [2d Dept 2022]; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Butt, 199 A.D.3d 662 [2d Dept 2021]). Likewise, the proffered affidavit and documentation proved compliance with RPAPL §1306 and service of the contractual pre-foreclosure notices (see eg HSBC Bank NA v Bermudez, 175 A.D.3d 667 [2d Dept 2019]). Plaintiff also demonstrated, with the affidavit of the process server, compliance with RPAPL §1303 (see HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Ozcan, 154 A.D.3d 822 [2d Dept 2017]).
Accordingly, Plaintiff established prima facie that it sent both the statutory and contractual pre-foreclosure notices.
In opposition, Simeon's claim that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate entitlement to summary judgment, its standing or compliance with statutory and contractual notice requirements is without merit. In any event, since Simeon defaulted in appearing, all those defenses were either waived or precluded (see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Campbell, 196 A.D.3d 726, 727 [2d Dept 2021]; One W. Bank, FSB v Rosenberg, 189 A.D.3d 1600, 1602 [2d Dept 2020]; Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Hall, 185 A.D.3d 1006, 1011 [2d Dept 2020]; Flagstar Bank, FSB v Jambelli, 140 A.D.3d 829, 830 [2d Dept 2016]).
As to the branch of the motion to dismiss Defendants' affirmative defenses, CPLR §3211 [b] provides that "[a] party may move for judgment dismissing one or more defenses, on the ground that a defense is not stated or has no merit". For example, affirmative defenses that are without factual foundation, conclusory or duplicative cannot stand (see Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v Vorobyov, 188 A.D.3d 803, 805 [2d Dept 2020]; Emigrant Bank v Myers, 147 A.D.3d 1027, 1028 [2d Dept 2017]). When evaluating such a motion, a "defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable intendment of its pleading, which is to be liberally construed. If there is any doubt as to the availability of a defense, it should not be dismissed" (Federici v Metropolis Night Club, Inc., 48 A.D.3d 741, 743 [2d Dept 2008]).
As pled, all the affirmative defenses are entirely conclusory and unsupported by any facts in the answer. As such, these affirmative defenses are nothing more than unsubstantiated legal conclusions which are insufficiently pled as a matter of law (see Board of Mgrs. of Ruppert Yorkville Towers Condominium v Hayden, 169 A.D.3d 569 [1st Dept 2019]; see also Bosco Credit V Trust Series 2012-1 v. Johnson, 177 A.D.3d 561 [1st Dept 2020]; 170 W. Vil. Assoc, v. G & E Realty, Inc., 56 A.D.3d 372 [1st Dept 2008]; see also Becher v Feller, 64 A.D.3d 672 [2d Dept 2009]; Cohen Fashion Opt., Inc. v V & M Opt., Inc., 51 A.D.3d 619 [2d Dept 2008]). Further, to the extent that specific legal arguments were not proffered in support of any affirmative defense, those defenses were abandoned (see U.S. Bank N.A. v Gonzalez, 172 A.D.3d 1273, 1275 [2d Dept 2019]; Flagstar Bank v Bellafiore, 94 A.D.3d 1044 [2d Dept 2012]; Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, N.A v Perez, 41 A.D.3d 590 [2d Dept 2007]).
The branch of Plaintiff s motion for a default judgment against the non-appearing parties is granted (see CPLR §3215; SRMOFII2012-1 Trust v Telia, 139 A.D.3d 599, 600 [1st Dept 2016]).
The branch of Plaintiff s motion to amend the caption is granted (see generally CPLR §3025; JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Laszio, 169 A.D.3d 885, 887 [2d Dept 2019]).
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff is awarded summary judgment against the appearing parties and a default judgment against the non-appearing defendants; and it is further
ORDERED that that Matthew D. Hunter III, Esq., 108-18 Queens Blvd Forest Hills, NY 10016 (718) 309-1660 is hereby appointed Referee in accordance with RPAPL § 1321 to compute the amount due to Plaintiff and examine whether the tax parcel can be sold in parcels; and it is further
ORDERED that in the discretion of the Referee, a hearing may be held, and testimony taken; and it is further
ORDERED that by accepting this appointment the Referee certifies that he is in compliance with Part 36 of the Rules of the Chief Judge (22 NYCRR Part 36), including, but not limited to §36.2 (c) ("Disqualifications from appointment"), and §36.2 (d) ("Limitations on appointments based upon compensation"), and, if the Referee is disqualified from receiving an appointment pursuant to the provisions of that Rule, the Referee shall immediately notify the Appointing Judge; and it is further
ORDERED that, pursuant to CPLR 8003(a), and in the discretion of the court, a fee of $350 shall be paid to the Referee for the computation of the amount due and upon the filing of his report and the Referee shall not request or accept additional compensation for the computation unless it has been fixed by the court in accordance with CPLR 8003(b); and it is further
ORDERED that the Referee is prohibited from accepting or retaining any funds for himself or paying funds to himself without compliance with Part 36 of the Rules of the Chief Administrative Judge; and it is further
ORDERED that if the Referee holds a hearing or is required to perform other significant services in issuing the report, the Referee may seek additional compensation at the Referee's usual and customary hourly rate; and it is further
ORDERED that plaintiff shall forward all necessary documents to the Referee and to defendants who have appeared in this case within 30 days of the date of this order and shall promptly respond to every inquiry made by the referee (promptly means within two business days); and it is further
ORDERED that if defendant(s) have objections, they must submit them to the referee within 14 days of the mailing of plaintiff s submissions; and include these objections to the Court if opposing the motion for a judgment of foreclosure and sale; and it is further
ORDERED the failure by defendants to submit objections to the referee shall be deemed a waiver of objections before the Court on an application for a judgment of foreclosure and sale; and it is further
ORDERED that plaintiff must bring a motion for a judgment of foreclosure and sale within 30 days of receipt of the referee's report; and it is further
ORDERED that if plaintiff fails to meet these deadlines, then the Court may sua sponte vacate this order and direct plaintiff to move again for an order of reference and the Court may sua sponte toll interest depending on whether the delays are due to plaintiffs failure to move this litigation forward; and it further
ORDERED that counsel for plaintiff shall serve a copy of this order with notice of entry upon the County Clerk (60 Centre Street, Room 141B) and the General Clerk's Office (60 Centre Street, Room 119), who are directed to mark the court's records to reflect the parties being removed pursuant hereto; and it is further
ORDERED that such service upon the County Clerk and the Clerk of the General Clerk's Office shall be made in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Courthouse and County Clerk Procedures for Electronically Filed Cases (accessible at the "E-Filing" page on the court's website at the address (www.nycourts.gov/supctmanh)]; and it is further
All parties are to appear for a virtual conference via Microsoft Teams on October 19, 2023, at 10:20 a.m. If a motion for judgment of foreclosure and sale has been filed Plaintiff may contact the Part Clerk Tamika Wright (tswright@nycourt.gov) in writing to request that the conference be cancelled. If a motion has not been made, then a conference is required to explore the reasons for the delay.