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In re M.R.

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FIVE
Jan 31, 2012
No. B232664 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2012)

Opinion

B232664

01-31-2012

In re M.R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. A.R., Defendant and Appellant.

Merrill Lee Toole, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Office of the County Counsel, Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Jacklyn K. Louie, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK84118)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles, Timothy R. Saito, Judge. Orders affirmed.

Merrill Lee Toole, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Office of the County Counsel, Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Jacklyn K. Louie, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

INTRODUCTION

The juvenile court found that defendant and appellant A.R.—mother's live-in boyfriend and the father of her two youngest children, Ma.R. (a female born 2010) and M.R. (a male born 2008)—had sexually abused mother's older daughter C.G. (a female born 2003); found that it had jurisdiction over C.G. and her two younger half-siblings, Ma.R. and M.R; and entered a disposition order removing custody of the three children from mother and removing custody of the two youngest children from A.R. On appeal, A.R. argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the findings that he sexually abused C.G. and that her two younger siblings were at risk of sexual abuse. He also appeals from the disposition order removing custody of Ma.R. and M.R. from their parents, again arguing that there was insufficient evidence that Ma.R. and M.R. would be at risk of sexual abuse in their parents' custody

We hold that there was sufficient evidence to support the findings at the jurisdiction/disposition hearing that A.R. sexually abused C.G. and that Ma.R. and M.R. were at risk of such abuse in their parents' custody. We therefore affirm the jurisdiction and dispostion orders.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Because A.R. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence introduced at the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the facts are taken from the reports and exhibits received into evidence at that hearing.

The Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 alleging, inter alia, that A.R., mother's live-in boyfriend and the father of Ma. R. and M.R., had sexually abused C.G. for the past two years. DCFS further alleged that mother had failed to protect C.G. from the abuse she knew was ongoing, and that the abuse by A.R. and mother's failure to protect C.G. from it endangered C.G., and placed her and her two half-siblings at risk of physical and emotional harm.

All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

The petition contained other allegations of abuse and neglect against A.R. and mother that were ultimately dismissed.

In the detention report, a children's social worker (CSW) reported that an undisclosed source from C.G.'s school had advised that C.G. did not want to be around A.R. because he touched her and "showed her things in the shower" when mother was not home. C.G. also told the source that A.R. showed her his body parts and had her touch them. According to the source, C.G. disclosed that the abuse had been "going on for awhile."

Based on the information from the undisclosed source, the CSW interviewed C.G. at her school. During the interview, C.G. stated that she did not like A.R. because he demanded that she work hard at school and at her homework. She also said that she was afraid of A.R. and did not want to go home if he was there. In addition, C.G. explained that A.R. had touched her in the bed she shared with mother, A.R., and her two younger half-siblings. But she could not calculate the number of times or specify when the last touching had occurred. According to C.G., it could have been as recent as three days prior to the interview. C.G. described the touching as A.R. "putting his hand on her vagina" and having her "touch his penis with her hand."

The CSW next interviewed mother at the hospital where C.G. had been taken for a physical exam. Mother stated that she did not believe C.G.'s allegations of sexual abuse by A.R., but admitted that C.G. had disclosed the alleged abuse to mother two years prior. Mother also told the CSW that C.G. had seen some sexually explicit Spanish channel soap operas and had twice awakened and saw mother and A.R. having sex. In addition, mother explained that because she herself had been a victim of sexual abuse, she took the allegations by C.G. seriously and confronted A.R., who denied having any sexual contact with C.G. or the other two children. Mother admitted, however, that even after C.G. told her of the sexual abuse, A.R. sometimes slept in the bed with the rest of the family.

At the detention hearing, the juvenile court found that DCFS had established a prima facie case for detaining the minors and showing that the minors were persons described by section 300, subdivisions (b), (d), and (j). The juvenile court further found that a substantial danger existed to the physical and emotional health of the minors and that there were no reasonable means to protect the minors without removal. In addition, the juvenile court found that DCFS had made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the minors from their home and that continued placement in the home was contrary to their welfare. Accordingly, the juvenile court detained the minors, vested custody of the minors with DCFS, and temporarily placed them with DCFS.

In the jurisdiction/disposition report, a CSW reported that when she interviewed C.G., the girl made the following statements concerning the allegations of sexual abuse: '"[A.R.] touches my part with his hands, he hurts my parts. He pulls my shorts down and he touches me on my part and my butt and he makes me touch his part too. He has a movie that I can't watch. It's a movie that a man takes out his thing (penis) and then the woman sucks his thing (penis). When he does that my mom is in the shower. But he doesn't do it anymore, now he wants me to like him. [¶] When we are watching cartoons he takes his thing (penis) out and he hugs me from the back and presses it against my butt. ([C.G.] demonstrated using two teddy bears, how she would be in a laying position sideways watching television and [A.R.] would lay sideways behind her.) Sometimes when I was wearing shorts he would pull my shorts down and put his thing (penis) on top right here on the line (on top of buttocks). He would put his part (penis) on top of my part and on top of my butt. [¶] [Mother] would be sleeping when he would make me touch him. He would make me do this but he doesn't make me do that anymore. Now he only wants me to like him. He would do it a lot, almost everyday but not anymore. ([C.G.] demonstrated a masturbation motion by making a ring with her finger and moving her hand in an up and down motion). [¶] I told [mother] that [A.R.] touched my part and he touched me on the back, he made me touch him and that when she is in the shower he would watch a movie. I told [mother] that when I was sleeping [A.R.] takes out his thing (penis) and when I'm laying down watching cartoons. [Mother] asked [A.R.] about [it] but he said what are you talking about and he just stayed quiet. He knew what he was doing to me. Then he asked [mother] for forgiveness for touching me and we stayed living with him. Then [mother] called one of my god moms to put a camera in the house. [¶] Now that he doesn't do it to me, I guess he is going to ask me for forgiveness.'"

The CSW next reported that when she interviewed mother about the allegations of sexual abuse of C.G., mother made the following statement: "'Look, [C.G.] likes to watch this show called Rosa de Guadalupe, it's a show where they do re-enactments of people who are drug addicts, molestation of children, kidnappings that sort of thing. I let her watch it to educate her and she won't be ignorant. [¶] She also told me that she saw us having sex. One time she woke up and she saw us having sex and she said you guys do it why can't I? She would go to the bedroom and we would catch her with her legs open and rubbing herself with a stuffed animal. I did scold her that time and I told her it wasn't right. [¶] Even before that when she was about three years old my mom saw her with a neighbor girl who was also three years old. They were both naked on the bed touching each other. That happened before my rape and before I was with my partner. [¶] When C.G. was about three years old we were living with my parents. C.G. and I shared a bedroom and someone broke into the house and raped me. C.G. woke up when she heard the noise and witnessed the rape. [¶] I'm not going to lie, she did come and tell me. "Mom I'm scared that [A.R.] will touch me and do like they do in the show. He's really strict with me and he makes me do my homework. I'm scared that he will touch me or show me his penis or have sex like in the soap operas." She never said he did touch her or that he showed her anything only that she said was afraid. The only time she saw anything is when she saw us having sex.'"

When the CSW interviewed A.R., he stated the following concerning the allegations of sexual abuse: "'No, that's not true. [C.G.] is my daughter and I wouldn't want someone to hurt my other daughter either. Well, she witnessed [mother] be raped so maybe that's why she is saying that. She's my daughter, I have never disrespect her and I am willing to fight for her. I never bathe or change her clothes or diapers, my wife was always the one to change the girls and I would only help with my son. [¶] [C.G.] has seen me in boxers because that's how I sleep and we all share the bedroom. Yes, it's true [C.R.] did see us having relations two times and that's why we were looking to move, but its [sic] hard because of the lack of work and our economic situation. [¶] [C.G.] told her mother that she is afraid that, well she knows I'm not her father and she likes to watch soap operas and that show Rosa de Guadalupe. They show stepfathers raping their stepdaughters and [C.G.] will tell her mother she is afraid that I will do the same to her. I would tell her and her mother that she should watch cartoons instead of the soap operas or that show. [¶] In addition, [C.G.] has that problem that she will touch herself with dolls. [Mother] will ask her why she does it and she says she doesn't know.'"

The CSW also summarized a police report of the investigation of the allegations of sexual abuse as follows: "'The child [C.G.] reported to police officers that [A.R.] had been touching her private area under her clothing with his hand. [C.G.] denied any penetration with [A.R.'s] penis, fingers, or any other objects. Further [C.G.] also stated that [A.R.] makes her touch his penis, skin to skin with no clothing. [C.G.] indicated she reported the abuse to her mother and her mother stated she would attempt to videotape [A.R.] in the act. When the mother eventually confronted [A.R.] they argued and he stopped the abuse and agreed to sleep on the floor . . . . [¶] When the mother was interviewed she stated that [C.G.] had made those allegations four years ago and she believes [C.G.] needs counseling due to her trauma and strange behavior. The mother stated [C.G.] witnessed the mother being raped when the child was two years old and is not sure how much the child remembers. Further, she stated she has caught the child rubbing her private area with dolls or her hands. In addition, she stated the child has an unusual interest in sexually themed shows such as soap operas. The mother went on to explain that [C.G.] has seen the mother and [AS.R.] having sexual relations on at least two occasions and thus [A.R.] now sleeps on the floor. The mother stated she does not believe [A.R.] is guilty of the accusations the child is making . . . .'"

In addition to the foregoing, DCFS submitted a report from the laboratory that analyzed the sexual assault kit prepared following the physical examination of C.G. The report concluded that no male DNA had been detected in the four samples contained in the kit.

At the combined hearing on jurisdiction and disposition, the juvenile court admitted the September 20, 2010, detention report with attachments, the October 22, 2010, jurisdiction/disposition report, the December 8, 2010, last minute information for the court, the January 11, 2010, interim review report, and the March 22, 2011, last minute information for the court. At the request of DCFS, the juvenile court struck all of the allegations from the petition, except those dealing with the alleged sexual abuse and the alleged risk of sexual abuse. After hearing arguments from counsel, the trial court sustained the allegations in paragraphs b-1, d-1, and j-1 relating to the sexual abuse of C.G. by A.R., mother's failure to protect C.G. from that abuse, and the risk of sexual abuse of Ma.R. and M.R. The juvenile court explained its ruling as follows: "The court has read and considered the evidence and testimony in this case, heard the arguments of counsel, as well as considered evidence that was submitted, P-1 through 8. [¶] . . . [¶] With regards to B-1, D-1, and J-1, the court is sustaining these counts. The court finds that there is more than sufficient evidence to support this allegation. The child [C.G.] gave an explicit, very detailed account of the abuse, one, that the child of her age would not be able to come up on her own. [¶] In addition, her statements are consistent with the statements that were reflected in the jurisdiction report, detention report, and the police report in this case. [¶] With regards to the mother's explanation of the child actually witnessing them having—parents having sex or a possible rape in the past, the court finds that as minor's counsel has pointed out, that even if she did observe that at such an early age, the court couldn't find a nexus to her observing any of those incidents to her statements that were recounted with regard to the sexual abuse that she indicated had occurred. [¶] Mother's explanation with regard to the child watching explicitly sexual TV shows is not persuasive to this court."

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Father's challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the juvenile court's jurisdictional and dispositional findings are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard of review. "On appeal, the 'substantial evidence' test is the appropriate standard of review for both the jurisdictional and dispositional findings. (In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1654 ; In re P.A. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1344 .) The term 'substantial evidence' means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it is evidence which is reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value. (See In re Jerry M. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 289, 298 .)" In re J.K. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1426,1433.) "'In making this determination, all conflicts [in the evidence and in reasonable inferences from the evidence] are to be resolved in favor of the prevailing party, and issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trier of fact. [Citation.] In dependency proceedings, a trial court's determination will not be disturbed unless it exceeds the bounds of reason. [Citation.]' (In re Ricardo L. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 552, 564 .)" (In re Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1393.) "When an appellate court reviews a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, we may look only at whether there is any evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which would support the trier of fact's conclusion. We must resolve all conflicts in favor of the court's determination, and indulge all legitimate inferences to uphold the court's order. Additionally, we may not substitute our deductions for those of the trier of fact. (In re Katrina C. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 540, 547 ; In re Cheryl H. (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 1098, 1132 .)" (In re John V. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1201,1212.)

B. Legal Principles

Father first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the jurisdictional findings as to the three minors. As to each child, the juvenile court found that they were children described by section 300, subdivisions (b), (d), and (j). Section 300, subdivisions (b), (d), and (j) provides in pertinent part: "Any child who comes within any of the following descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge that person to be a dependent child of the court: [¶] (b) The child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child, or the willful or negligent failure of the child's parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child from the conduct of the custodian with whom the child has been left, or by the willful or negligent failure of the parent or guardian to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or by the inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for the child due to the parent's or guardian's mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] (d) The child has been sexually abused, or there is a substantial risk that the child will be sexually abused, as defined in Section 11165.1 of the Penal Code, by his or her parent or guardian or a member of his or her household, or the parent or guardian has failed to adequately protect the child from sexual abuse when the parent or guardian knew or reasonably should have known that the child was in danger of sexual abuse. [¶] . . . [¶] (j) The child's sibling has been abused or neglected, as defined in subdivisions (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i), and there is a substantial risk that the child will be abused or neglected, as defined in those subdivisions. The court shall consider the circumstances surrounding the abuse or neglect of the sibling, the age and gender of each child, the nature of the abuse or neglect of the sibling, the mental condition of the parent or guardian, and any other factors the court considers probative in determining whether there is a substantial risk to the child."

1. Substantial Evidence of Sexual Abuse of C.G.

A.R. contends that there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's jurisdictional finding that he sexually abused C.G as alleged in paragraphs b-1 and d-1 of the petition. According to A.R., C.G. had been exhibiting "sexualized" behavior even before he moved in with mother and, other than the CSW's opinion, there was no corroborating evidence that he had sexually abused C.G.

A.R.'s assertion concerning C.G.'s preexisting sexualized behavior raises a credibility issue concerning the truthfulness of C.G.'s accounts of sexual abuse and suggests that her prior experiences, including watching an adult-themed soap opera, witnessing mother's rape, and personally observing A.R. and mother having sex, provided her with a basis upon which to fabricate the sexual abuse allegations. The juvenile court, however, rejected that assertion and found C.G. to be credible. Under the applicable standard of review discussed above, we cannot reweigh the evidence or make independent credibility determinations on appeal. We therefore reject A.R.'s credibility assertions based on C.G.'s preexisting sexualized behavior.

As to A.R.'s assertion that there was no corroborating evidence of sexual abuse, the juvenile court found that a child of C.G.'s age could not have given such detailed accounts of sexual abuse and that she gave consistent accounts of the abuse to the undisclosed source, the police, and the CSW. Those accounts supported the juvenile court's determination that C.G. was credible and constituted sufficient corroboration and foundation for the CSW's opinion that C.G. was sexually abused by A.R. We therefore conclude that sufficient evidence supported the findings of sexual abuse as alleged in paragraphs b-1 and d-1 of the petition.

2. Substantial Evidence of Risk of Abuse

Subdivisions (b) and (j) of section 300 required a finding of a substantial risk that Ma.R. and M.R. would be sexually abused by A.R. A.R. contends that the evidence that he sexually abused C.G., by itself, was insufficient to support a finding that her younger half-siblings were at risk of sexual abuse, citing, inter alia, In re Maria R. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 48 (Maria R.).

The issue of whether a parent's sexual abuse of one child can support a finding that the abused child's male or female sibling is at substantial risk of sexual abuse has been addressed in several cases, including, most recently, in Maria, R., supra, 185 Cal.App.4th 48. For example in In re Karen R. (2001) 95 Cal.App.4th 84 (Karen R.), a father raped his 11-year-old daughter on two occasions in the home. The court in that case held that the sexual abuse of the daughter was sufficient to establish that her younger male sibling was at risk of substantial sexual abuse. (Id. at pp. 89-91.) The court in Karen R. explained that "[a]lthough the danger of sexual abuse of a female sibling in such a situation may be greater than the danger of sexual abuse of a male sibling, the danger of sexual abuse to the male sibling is nonetheless still substantial." (Id. at p. 91.) According to the court in Karen R., "a father who has committed two incidents of forcible incestuous rape of his minor daughter reasonably can be said to be so sexually aberrant that both male and female siblings of the victim are at substantial risk of sexual abuse . . . if left in the home." (Id. at pp. 90-91.)

In In re P.A. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1339 (P.A.), a father who touched his nine-year-old daughter twice in her "private area" was found by the juvenile court to have sexually abused the girl. (Id. at p. 1343.) The juvenile court further found that the girl's five- and eight-year old brothers were at risk of sexual abuse by reason of the father's abuse of their sister. (Ibid.) On appeal, the father argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the jurisdictional findings as to his sons because there was no evidence the father had touched them inappropriately and they were unaware of his abuse of their older sister. (Id. at p. 1345.) The court in P.A. rejected that argument, reasoning that "we are convinced that where, as here, a child has been sexually abused, any younger sibling who is approaching the age at which the child was abused, may be found to be at risk of sexual abuse. As we intimated in Karen R. [, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th 84], aberrant sexual behavior by a parent places the victim's siblings who remain in the home at risk of aberrant sexual behavior." (P.A., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1347.)

In In re Andy G. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1405 (Andy G.), the court reached a conclusion similar to those discussed above. There, the juvenile court found true the allegations that the father had sexually abused his 12- and 14-year-old step daughters by fondling them, showing them pornographic movies, and masturbating in their presence. (Id. at pp. 1408-1410.) The juvenile court further found that the father's two and a half-year-old son was at risk of sexual abuse based on the father's abuse of the boy's two half-sisters. (Id. at pp. 1410-1411.) On appeal, the father argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that his son was at risk of sexual abuse because there was no evidence that the father had touched his son or any other juvenile male inappropriately. (Id. at p. 1411.) In rejecting that contention, the court in Andy G. agreed "with the proposition advanced in In re P.A. that 'aberrant sexual behavior by a parent places the victim's siblings who remain in the home at risk of aberrant sexual behavior.'" (In re P.A., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1347.) Here, the only significant difference from In re P.A. is the fact that [the son] was only two and one-half years old at the time of the court's orders, so he was not 'approaching the age at which [his sisters were] abused.' (Ibid.) . . . But other factors convince us that the evidence was sufficient to support the court's findings that [the son] was at substantial risk of sexual abuse." (Andy G., supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 1414.)

There are other cases, however, including Maria R., supra, 185 Cal.App.4th 48, that have concluded that a parent's sexual abuse of a female child is not, by itself, sufficient to show that a male sibling is at substantial risk of sexual abuse by that same parent. For example, in In re Rubisela E. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 177 (Rubisela E.), the court reversed a jurisdictional finding that the male children of the father were at risk of sexual abuse based on the father's sexual abuse of their sister. The court reasoned as follows: "We do not discount the real possibility that brothers of molested sisters can be molested [citation] or in other ways harmed by the fact of the molestation within the family. Brothers can be harmed by the knowledge that a parent has so abused the trust of their sister. They can even be harmed by the denial of the perpetrator, the spouse's acquiescence in the denial, or their parents' efforts to embrace them in a web of denial. . . . [¶] . . . But in the case at bench, while such a showing is possible, there has been no demonstration by the department that 'there is a substantial risk [to the brothers] that [they] will be abused or neglected, as defined in . . . [the applicable] subdivisions.' [Citation.] We must therefore reverse the jurisdictional order as to the brothers and remand for appropriate changes in the dispositional order." (Rubisela E., supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at pp. 198-199.)

And in Maria R., supra, 185 Cal.App.4th 48, the case upon which father relies, the court held that "[i]n the absence of evidence demonstrating that a perpetrator of sexual abuse of a female child is in fact likely to sexually abuse a male child, we are not persuaded that the rule of general applicability enunciated in P.A., and repeated by the Andy G. court, is grounded in fact. For this reason, we decline to adopt the reasoning of P.A. and Andy G. [¶] Since there is no evidence in the record that would tend to support a finding that [the father] has an interest in engaging in sexual activity with a male child, we cannot, despite the Agency's urging, conclude that [the father's] sexual abuse of his daughters—as aberrant as it is—establishes that [his son] is at substantial risk of sexual abuse within the meaning of [section 300,] subdivision (j), as defined in [section 300,] subdivision (d) and Penal Code section 11165.1." (MariaR., supra 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 68.)

Here, A.R. does not emphasize the difference in sex between the victim and the younger siblings, a distinction that would only apply to M.R. Rather, A.R. contends that abuse of an older child does not mean the two younger children would be at risk. He points out that M.R. is particularly unlikely to be abused because he is disabled and in a special needs foster home and Ma.R. is an infant.

There is sufficient evidence in this case showing that A.R. repeatedly fondled C.G.'s genitals, forced her to fondle his genitals, rubbed his penis on her vagina and buttocks, "showed her things in the shower," and made her watch pornography with him. Moreover, at least some of the abuse was ongoing, taking place almost daily for two years.

Based on the record, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support a reasonable inference that A.R.'s behavior towards C.G. was "so sexually aberrant that both male and female siblings of [C.G. were] at substantial risk of sexual abuse . . . if left in the home." (In re Karen R., supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at pp. 90-91.) The substantial evidence shows that "[s]iblings of sexually abused children are at substantial risk of harm and are entitled to protection by the juvenile courts." (In re P.A., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1347.) C.G. was molested at a young age. When a child has been sexually abused, "any younger sibling who is approaching the age at which the child was abused, may be found to be at risk of sexual abuse." (Ibid.) Although A.R.'s behavior was not as violent or invasive as the forcible rapes at issue in Karen R., it was more egregious than the two isolated incidents of inappropriate touching at issue in P.A., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th 1339 and was similar to a certain extent to the behavior of the father towards his two step daughters in Andy G., supra, 183 Cal.App.4th 1405. Given the evidence that A.R.'s conduct toward C.G. was not limited to a few isolated incidents, but rather was ongoing for a significant period of time, it was reasonable for the juvenile court to conclude that he was a child molester who posed a risk of abuse, not only to C.G., but also to her younger half-sister and half-brother as they age.

Notwithstanding some language in Maria R., supra, 185 Cal.App.4th 48, under the applicable standard of review, we must resolve all conflicts in favor of the juvenile court's order and indulge all reasonable inferences from the evidence. We cannot substitute our conclusions for those of the juvenile court. When the evidence of abuse in this case is reviewed within the limitations of those well-established principles, we conclude that the juvenile court's finding of a substantial risk of sexual abuse of Ma.R. and M.R. did not exceed the bounds of reason.

3. Substantial Evidence of Risk to Ma.R. and M.R. to Support Removal of Custody

A.R. further argues that because the evidence of risk of sexual abuse of Ma.R. and M.R. was insufficient, there was no factual basis for the disposition order removing custody of the children from A.R. or mother. But to the extent A.R. is claiming that the children should have been placed in his custody, he forfeited that argument by failing to raise it below. "[A] a reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court. (People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 589-590 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 638, 853 P.2d 1093].) (Footnote omitted.) The purpose of this rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected. (Saunders, at p. 590.) [^] Dependency matters are not exempt from this rule. (See, e.g., In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 502 [failure to obtain supervising agency's assessment of prospective guardian under § 366.22, subd. (b)]; In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1338-1339 [failure to request court to order bonding study]; In re Kevin S. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 882, 885-886 [failure to challenge setting of § 366.26 permanency planning hearing when court determined that no reasonable reunification efforts were made].)" (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293.) Here, A.R. did not object to the disposition order removing custody of Ma.R. and M.R. from him. Instead, he argued that the children should be placed with mother with whom he was not living at the time. He therefore forfeited any challenge to the removal order as it related to him.

To the extent that A.R. is arguing that the children should be returned to mother's custody and placed in her home, his argument is unavailing. As discussed, there was substantial evidence that A.R. engaged in ongoing sexual abuse of C.G. that posed a risk of similar abuse of Ma.R. and M.R. There was substantial evidence showing that mother had been made aware of the abuse two years prior and did nothing about it because she did not believe C.G. Although A.R. may have moved out of mother's home by the time of the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, that fact, standing alone, did not negate the substantial evidence of mother's failure to protect the children against sexual abuse, including her previous denial that any abuse had occurred, her decision to allow A.R. to sometimes sleep in the same bed with C.G. even after C.G. reported his abuse to mother, her admission that she allowed C.G. to watch adult-themed soap operas, and her admission that she engaged in sex with A.R. in C.G.'s presence. In light of this evidence, it was not unreasonable for the juvenile court to conclude that the risk of abuse to the children warranted removal of them from mother's custody.

DISPOSITION

The jurisdiction and disposition orders are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

MOSK, J. We concur:

ARMSTRONG, Acting P. J.

KRIEGLER, J.


Summaries of

In re M.R.

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FIVE
Jan 31, 2012
No. B232664 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2012)
Case details for

In re M.R.

Case Details

Full title:In re M.R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES…

Court:COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FIVE

Date published: Jan 31, 2012

Citations

No. B232664 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2012)