Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. H-18-2752
2020-03-20
Lori WASHINGTON, EX REL. J.W., Plaintiffs, v. KATY INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.
Martin Jay Cirkiel, Cirkiel Assoc., Round Rock, TX, Andrew Joseph Willey, Drew Willey Law, Houston, TX, for Plaintiffs. Christopher B. Gilbert, Thompson & Horton LLP, Houston, TX, for Defendant.
Martin Jay Cirkiel, Cirkiel Assoc., Round Rock, TX, Andrew Joseph Willey, Drew Willey Law, Houston, TX, for Plaintiffs.
Christopher B. Gilbert, Thompson & Horton LLP, Houston, TX, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION
Lee H. Rosenthal, Chief United States District Judge
A public-school officer in the Katy Independent School District's police department tased and handcuffed J.W., a 17-year-old special-education student. One year and four days later, J.W.'s mother, Lori Washington, requested a due-process hearing under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. The hearing officer determined that all of J.W.'s claims were barred by the Texas one-year statute of limitations and dismissed Ms. Washington's petition.
Ms. Washington appealed the hearing officer's order on J.W.'s behalf. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment, both sides replied, and Ms. Washington filed a surreply. (Docket Entry Nos. 10, 14, 18, 19, 20). Based on the briefs, the administrative record, and the applicable law, the court grants in part and denies in part the parties' motions. The case is remanded to the hearing officer to determine which claims are not barred by the one-year statute of limitations.
The reasons for these rulings are detailed below.
I. Background
The background comes from the allegations in the plaintiffs' amended petition, additional evidence submitted by the parties, and other documents in the administrative record. (Docket Entry Nos. 8, 9-1). J.W. attended Mayde Creek High School in the Katy Independent School District. (Docket Entry No. 8 at 142). He was diagnosed as intellectually disabled and emotionally disturbed, and qualified for special education. (Id. ). Although J.W. communicated well when calm, he was easily upset and became unable to communicate effectively when other students bullied him. (Id. ).
On November 30, 2016, a student in J.W.'s special-education classroom called J.W. "stupid," an "idiot," and "retarded." (Id. ). J.W. went to his "chill out room" to calm down, as specified in his Individualized Education Program. (Id. ). Another student was already in the room and began to bully J.W. (Id. ). J.W. left and tried to leave the school campus to calm down. (Id. at 142–43).
When J.W. tried to leave the campus, Katy ISD staff blocked J.W.'s exit. (Id. at 143). J.W. became increasingly anxious and could not communicate his fears or explain why he wanted to leave. (Id. ). A Katy ISD School Resource Officer, Officer Paley, and a school coach, tried to forcefully prevent J.W. from leaving. (Id. ). Officer Paley then allegedly shot J.W. with his taser gun six to eight times. (Id. ). J.W. urinated and defecated on himself. (Id. ). After J.W. was on the ground and lying on his stomach, Officer Paley said "Don't you move Goddamit," and another officer handcuffed J.W. (Id. ). J.W. screamed that he could not breathe and began to gag. (Id. at 144).
The school nurse assessed J.W., and the school contacted emergency medical services. (Id. ). After paramedics arrived, the school called J.W.'s mother, Lori Washington. (Id. ). Ms. Washington called an ambulance to take J.W. to the hospital. (Id. at 145). Afterwards, Ms. Washington kept J.W. home from school based on the advice of his medical providers, and because J.W. feared for his safety while at school. (Id. ).
After the incident, Ms. Washington asked for meetings with Katy ISD to discuss both the tasing and J.W.'s individualized education program. (Id. ). After repeated requests, Katy ISD scheduled a meeting on April 24, 2017, but cancelled it when Ms. Washington arrived with her attorney. (Id. ). Katy ISD convened another meeting on May 22, 2017, but told Ms. Washington that it was an inappropriate time to discuss the tasing incident. (Id. ). Ms. Washington requested another meeting to discuss the tasing, but Katy ISD never scheduled it. (Id. ). Ms. Washington also asked for meetings to discuss J.W.'s individualized education program and how it would address his anxiety, but Katy ISD allegedly never responded. (Id. at 145–46).
At the time of the November 30, 2016 incident, J.W. was 17 years old. (Docket Entry No. 10 at 8). On June 29, 2017, he turned 18. (Id. ). On December 4, 2017—one year and four days after Officer Paley tased J.W.—Ms. Washington filed a petition for a due-process hearing on J.W.'s behalf. (Docket Entry No. 8 at 221).
In her original petition, Ms. Washington alleged claims on J.W.'s behalf under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), the Americans with Disabilities Act, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. at 221–243). Katy ISD answered the petition, raised the affirmative defense that all of J.W.'s IDEA claims were barred by the Texas one-year statute of limitations, and argued that the non-IDEA claims should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. (Id. at 179–86). Ms. Washington then amended her petition to remove the non-IDEA claims and to argue various theories about why the statute of limitations did not apply. (Id. at 138–57). Katy ISD allegedly did not respond to the amended petition. (Docket Entry No. 10 at 11). The hearing officer set an evidentiary hearing on whether J.W.'s claims were barred by the statute of limitations. (Docket Entry No. 8 at 45–46).
The hearing officer ordered the parties to submit exhibit and witness lists, any stipulated facts, and their objections to the evidence, and stated that he expected to see the tasing-video footage and hear testimony from Officer Paley. (Id. at 9, 18, 39, 107). The parties submitted briefs arguing the statute of limitations issue, but neither party filed an exhibit list or produced evidence for the hearing. (Id. at 6). Katy ISD had tried to email evidence, which the plaintiffs had intended to rely on, but problems with the parties' emails prevented the hearing officer from receiving the evidence. (Id. at 6, 10; Docket Entry No. 10 at 13–14). The hearing officer proceeded with the hearing, allowing J.W.'s counsel to argue his tolling theories. The hearing officer then issued an order dismissing the petition, finding that the one-year statute of limitations barred all of J.W.'s claims. (Docket Entry No. 8 at 66–72).
Ms. Washington appealed the hearing officer's order, and the parties cross-moved for summary judgment based on the administrative record. (Docket Entry Nos. 10, 14). Both parties agreed to submit the additional evidence that Katy ISD had tried to offer at the evidentiary hearing. (Docket Entry Nos. 9, 9-1).
II. The Legal Standard
A. The Summary Judgment Standard for Reviewing an IDEA Appeal
A district court reviews the decision of a due-process hearing officer "virtually de novo. " Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Woody , 865 F.3d 303, 309 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael F. , 118 F.3d 245, 252 (5th Cir. 1997) ). The court "receives the records of the administrative proceedings and also takes additional evidence at the request of any party." Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. V.P. ex rel. Juan P. , 582 F.3d 576, 582–83 (5th Cir. 2009). "As a practical matter, the IDEA creates a presumption in favor of the education plan proposed by the school district, and places the burden of proof on the party challenging it." Renee J. v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist. , 333 F. Supp. 3d 674, 683 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (quotation omitted); see also White ex rel. White v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd. , 343 F.3d 373, 377 (5th Cir. 2003). In reaching this decision, "courts must be careful to avoid imposing their view of preferable educational methods upon the States." Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley , 458 U.S. 176, 207, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982).
A district court adopts a different standard when ruling on a summary judgment motion in an IDEA appeal. E.R. ex rel. E.R. v. Spring Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. , 909 F.3d 754, 762 (5th Cir. 2018) ; Seth B. ex rel. Donald B. v. Orleans Par. Sch. Bd. , 810 F.3d 961, 966–67 (5th Cir. 2016). In E.R. , the Fifth Circuit summarized the summary judgment standard for an IDEA appeal:
Under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C) ... a district court must (i) "receive the records of the administrative proceedings"; (ii) "hear additional evidence at the request of a party"; and (iii) base "its decision on the preponderance of the evidence" and "grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate." The district court is required to "accord ‘due weight’ to the hearing officer's findings," but it "must ultimately reach an independent decision based on the preponderance of the evidence." Thus "the district court's ‘review’ of a hearing officer's decision is ‘virtually de novo.’ " Accordingly, in IDEA proceedings, summary judgment "is not directed to discerning whether there are disputed issues of fact, but rather, whether the administrative record, together with any additional evidence, establishes that there has been compliance with IDEA's processes and that the child's educational needs have been appropriately addressed."
E.R. , 909 F.3d at 762 (citing Seth B. , 810 F.3d at 966–67 ); see also Renee J. , 333 F. Supp. 3d at 683. The standard of review is "more expansive than the usual de novo review for summary judgments, as prescribed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a)." E.R. , 909 F.3d at 762.
B. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
"The IDEA's purpose is to ensure that children with disabilities have access to ‘free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living.’ " C.G. ex rel. Keith G. v. Waller Indep. Sch. Dist. , 697 F. App'x 816, 818 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) ). A school must provide students eligible under the IDEA with "an individualized program of education" in the form of an Individualized Education Plan. Woody , 865 F.3d at 309. "The [Plan] must be ‘reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child's circumstances.’ " Id. (quoting Endrew F. ex rel Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1 , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 988, 999, 197 L.Ed.2d 335 (2017) ). "The IDEA does not require an [Individualized Education Plan] that maximizes the student's potential, nor does it require educational opportunities ‘substantially equal to the opportunities afforded children without disabilities.’ " Spring Branch , 2017 U.S. Dist. 110524 at *43 (quoting Endrew F. , 137 S. Ct. at 1001 ). "Instead, the [Individualized Education Plan] must be ‘likely to produce progress, not regression or trivial educational advancement.’ " Id. (quoting Michael F. , 118 F.3d at 248 ).
III. Analysis
A. The Limitations Period
The plaintiffs argue that the Texas one-year statute of limitations for IDEA claims does not apply to J.W. Parents who disagree with their child's Individualized Education Plan have the right to request an administrative due-process hearing. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f). Under the IDEA, a "parent or agency shall request an impartial due process hearing within 2 years of the date the parent or agency knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the complaint." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C). The IDEA gives states the ability to modify the two-year statute of limitations. Id. Texas law shortens the period to one year. 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 89.1151(c). Texas law also provides for the transfer of parental rights under the IDEA to the child on reaching the age of 18. 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 89.1049.
The plaintiffs offer three reasons why the Texas one-year limitations period does not apply to J.W. First, the statute's language does not explicitly apply to students; second, the limitations period was tolled while J.W. was a minor; and third, an IDEA exception to the statute of limitations applies. (Docket Entry No. 10 at 23–28).
The plaintiffs begin with the statutory language. The Texas statute provides that a "parent or public education agency may initiate a due process hearing," and that the "parent or public education agency must request a hearing within one year of the date the parent or public education agency knew or should have known about the alleged action that serves as the basis for the request." 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 89.1151(a), (c). The plaintiffs argue that nothing in the statute's language explicitly applies the one-year limit to a student who turns 18 and brings an IDEA claim on his own behalf. As a result, according to the plaintiffs, when J.W. turned 18, the one-year limit no longer applied to him. (Docket Entry No. 10 at 23). In support, the plaintiffs cite cases stating that courts may rely on a statute's plain language when interpreting its text. (Docket Entry No. 10 at 24). See Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs. , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 743, 753, 197 L.Ed.2d 46 (2017) ; Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy , 548 U.S. 291, 296, 126 S.Ct. 2455, 165 L.Ed.2d 526 (2006) ("In considering whether the IDEA provides clear notice, we begin with the text. We have ‘stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.’ ").
Neither the IDEA nor the Texas statutory language supports the plaintiffs' argument. The IDEA requires covered educational agencies to establish certain procedures, including "[a]n opportunity for any party to present a complaint" relating to the child's free appropriate public education, "which sets forth an alleged violation that occurred not more than 2 years before the date the parent or public agency knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the complaint." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6). The IDEA describes the procedures for requesting a due-process hearing:
A parent or agency shall request an impartial due process hearing within 2 years of the date the parent or agency knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the complaint, or, if the State has an explicit time limitation for requesting such a hearing under this subchapter, in such time as the State law allows.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C). The federal regulations implementing the IDEA also state that a "parent or a public agency may file a due process complaint on any of the matters ... (relating to the identification, evaluation or educational placement of a child with a disability, or the provision of [a free appropriate public education] to the child)." 34 C.F.R. § 300.507(a). These provisions refer to parents or public agencies filing due-process complaints. Similarly, the IDEA's two-year statute of limitations refers only to parents or public-education agencies filing a due-process hearing request.
The Texas statute does not differ in how it refers to parents or public-education agencies except to shorten the limit to one year. It provides that a "parent or public education agency may initiate a due process hearing" and that the "parent or public education agency must request a hearing within one year of the date the parent or public education agency knew or should have known about the alleged action that serves as the basis for the request." 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 89.1151(a), (c). As Katy ISD argues, a literal reading of the statutes would prevent a student—of any age—from filing a due-process complaint. (Docket Entry No. 14 at 12). This is not the case. The IDEA provides that a state "may provide that, when a child with a disability reaches the age of majority under State law ... all other rights accorded to parents under this subchapter transfer to the child." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(m)(1)(B). The Texas Education Code accordingly provides that "[a]ll other rights accorded to parents under [the IDEA] Section 1415 transfer" to the "student with a disability who is 18 years of age or older." Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 29.017 (West 2017).
The plaintiffs rely on the Texas statutory language that applies the one-year limit only to parents or public-education agencies. They ignore the fact that the same statute does not allow a student to file a complaint; an entirely different statute transfers a parent's rights under the IDEA to the student when he turns 18. As Katy ISD persuasively argues, "it only makes sense that the procedural rules associated with those rights—including the one-year statute of limitations—transfers as well." (Docket Entry No. 14 at 12). The "rights accorded to parents" under the IDEA that transfer to the 18-year-old student include the right to bring a due-process complaint within the period the state sets. Texas has defined that period as one year from the time the parent knew, or should have known, about the action that is alleged as the basis for the due-process complaint.
The only case the plaintiffs cite, other than those stating that courts should start with a statute's plain text, is Washington v. Glucksberg , 521 U.S. 702 (1997). The plaintiffs argue that Washington stands for "the truism that any law or rule attempting to restrict the fundamental right of a citizen to file a law suit, must be explicitly noted in the operative law, so as to satisfy important due process concerns." (Docket Entry No. 10 at 24). This case does not appear to stand for, or even address, the "truism" the plaintiffs propose. Even so, the Texas one-year statute of limitations applies to parents and public education agencies, and the Texas Education Code transfers the parents' rights under the IDEA to the 18-year-old student. The one-year limit applies to J.W.
The plaintiffs next argue a variety of tolling theories in an attempt to start the clock running anew from the time J.W. turned 18. Under the Texas statute, the one-year limitations period begins to run from "the date the parent or public education agency knew or should have known about the alleged action that serves as the basis for the request." 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 89.1151(c). The plaintiffs argue that as applied to J.W., he could not, and should not, have known about the action serving as the basis for the due-process hearing request until he turned 18. (Docket Entry No. 10 at 25). The plaintiffs clarify that they do not argue that J.W.'s claim was tolled during minority, but rather that J.W. lacked the legal capacity to know until he turned 18.
Somewhat contradictorily, the plaintiffs then argue that "[i]t is well settled that the accrual date of an incident or injury is tolled during the time a person is a minor," citing Clyce v. Butler , 876 F.3d 145 (5th Cir. 2017). (Docket Entry No. 10 at 26). But Clyce v. Butler does not apply here. In Clyce , the Fifth Circuit examined a tolling provision from the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure that tolls the statute of limitations on a minor's tort claim. 876 F.3d at 148. The court held that a judge-made exception for when a next friend pursues a minor's claims did not apply to the Texas rule. Id. at 148–49. The principle the plaintiffs take from Clyce is that the accrual date of an injury is tolled while a person is a minor, under Rule 44 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, even when a next friend pursues the claim.
As Katy ISD argues, the Fifth Circuit has rejected this argument for IDEA claims. In Reyes v. Manor Independent School District , 850 F.3d 251, 255 (5th Cir. 2017), the Fifth Circuit held that an IDEA claimant "cannot borrow a limitations provision from a different state statute when the legislature of Texas set up a specific limitations scheme for IDEA due process hearings." The court rejected an attempt to apply the Texas rule tolling claims while a person is under 18 years old or of "unsound mind," explaining that the IDEA "subjects any state limitations period to the two federal tolling provisions involving the school making misrepresentations or withholding information." Id. The court stated that "there is nothing in the IDEA that incorporates general state tolling provisions like [the Texas Civil Procedure rule]." Id.
To the extent the plaintiffs do not seek to toll the statute of limitations based on J.W.'s age, and instead argue that J.W. lacked the legal capacity to know of the injury until he turned 18, the plaintiffs have not provided any case law in support, nor has this court found any. The plaintiffs' argument is also undermined by the fact that J.W.'s mother—not J.W.—brought the due-process complaint on J.W.'s behalf after he turned 18. The clock started on "the date the parent or public education agency knew or should have known about the alleged action that serves as the basis for the request," as the statute provides.
The IDEA creates two exceptions to the statute of limitations that apply even when state law creates its own limitations period. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(B). Under the IDEA:
The timeline described in subparagraph (C) shall not apply to a parent if the parent was prevented from requesting the hearing due to—
(i) specific misrepresentations by the local educational agency that it had resolved the problem forming the basis of the complaint; or
(ii) the local educational agency's withholding of information from the parent that was required under this subchapter to be provided to the parent.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(D). The plaintiffs argue that Katy ISD never sent J.W. a copy of the IDEA's procedural safeguards as required when he turned 18, so his claim falls under the second exception. (Docket Entry No. 10 at 27).
For the exception to apply, Katy ISD must have caused J.W. to file late by withholding required information. The statute's two exceptions are introduced by language that states that the limitations period "shall not apply to a parent if the parent was prevented from requesting the hearing due to " either exception. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(D) (emphasis added). The phrase "due to" requires a plaintiff to show that the district's withholding caused her failure to file a request on time. See D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist. , 696 F.3d 233, 246–47 (3d Cir. 2012) ("The terms ‘prevented from’ and ‘due to’ denote a causation requirement. Thus, where the evidence shows, for example, that parents were already fully aware of their procedural options, they cannot excuse a late filing by pointing to the school's failure to formally notify them of those safeguards."); R.S. ex rel. Ruth B. v. Highland Park Indep. Sch. Dist. , No. 3:16-CV-2916-S, 2019 WL 1099753, at *17 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 2019) ("Establishing evidence of specific misrepresentations or withholding of information is insufficient to invoke the exceptions; a plaintiff must also show that the misrepresentations or withholding caused [his] failure to request a hearing or file a complaint on time.") (quoting D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist. , 696 F.3d at 246–47 ).
Had J.W. been the one to file an untimely due-process hearing request, he might have been able to show that Katy ISD's failure to notify him of the IDEA's procedural safeguards caused him to file late. But the record shows that Katy ISD sent J.W.'s mother a copy of the required procedural safeguards notice 13 times. (Docket Entry No. 9-1). Because J.W.'s mother brought the due-process hearing request on J.W.'s behalf, the court finds that Katy ISD's lack of notice to J.W. did not prevent him or his mother from filing on time. No exception to the Texas one-year statute of limitations applies.
B. The Accrual Date
J.W.'s mother filed the due-process hearing request on December 4, 2017. Claims accruing outside the one-year limit are barred. The hearing officer determined that all of J.W.'s claims accrued on November 30, 2016, the date that Officer Paley tased J.W., and concluded that all of J.W.'s IDEA claims were barred. (Docket Entry No. 8 at 71–72). The plaintiffs argue that the hearing officer erred in determining that all of J.W.'s claims accrued on November 30, 2016. They argue that the request asserts multiple, separate instances in which Katy ISD denied J.W. a free appropriate public education, and that some of those denials occurred within one year of December 4, 2017. (Docket Entry No. 10 at 26–27). Katy ISD argues that J.W.'s due-process hearing request alleges ongoing effects from a single violation, and that the hearing officer correctly determined that all of J.W.'s claims were time barred. (Docket Entry No. 14 at 23–25).
The plaintiffs first argue that the complaint does not assert a continuing violation. (Docket Entry No. 10 at 26). "The continuing violations doctrine permits a plaintiff to sue on a claim that would be time-barred if considered in isolation, but where subsequent violations act to prevent accrual or otherwise toll the limitations period." Schoeffler v. Kempthorne , 493 F. Supp. 2d 805, 817 (W.D. La. 2007) (citing Mayberry v. Conoco, Inc. , 31 F. App'x 159, *2 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam)). Because the IDEA and the regulations that implement it establish two specific exceptions, the IDEA is not subject to the continuing violations or equitable tolling doctrines. See Reyes , 850 F.3d at 255 ; Evan H. ex rel. Kosta H. v. Unionville-Chadds Ford Sch. Dist. , Civ. A. No. 07-4990, 2008 WL 4791634, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2008). The plaintiffs do not appear to argue that Katy ISD's alleged violations occurring after Officer Paley tased J.W. allow the court to hear those claims that would otherwise be time-barred.
Instead, the plaintiffs argue that the due-process complaint alleged multiple, separate instances when Katy ISD denied J.W. a free appropriate public education. (Docket Entry No. 10 at 26–27). The plaintiffs argue that while some might be time-barred, others are not. Katy ISD responds that the plaintiffs have alleged only continuing effects of an initial, time-barred violation. (Docket Entry No. 14 at 24). In support, Katy ISD cites cases that distinguish continuing repeated tortious acts from the continuing effects of a single tortious act. See Baldwin v. Extended Stay Am. Co. , 16-CV-604 RP, 2016 WL 4386098, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2016) ("Even if the effects of the violation do not manifest until later, the statute of limitations begins running when the violations are committed."); Walker v. Epps , 587 F. Supp. 2d 763, 772 (N.D. Miss. 2008) ("A ‘continuing tort’ is one inflicted over a period of time; it involves a wrongful conduct that is repeated until desisted, and each day creates a separate cause of action. A continuing tort sufficient to toll a statute of limitations is occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not by continual ill effects from an original violation.").
Katy ISD mischaracterizes the nature of an IDEA claim by describing the plaintiffs' allegations as simply the ongoing effects from Officer Paley tasing J.W. The IDEA establishes substantive requirements "to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs." R.P. ex rel. R.P. v. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. , 703 F.3d 801, 809 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) ). The IDEA also establishes procedural safeguards "designed to guarantee parents ... an opportunity for meaningful input into all decisions affecting their child's education.’ " Id. at 810 (quoting Buser v. Corpus Christi Indep. Sch. Dist. , 51 F.3d 490, 493 (5th Cir. 1995) ). "These procedures require that the parents of a child with a disability have the opportunity ‘to participate in meetings with respect to the identification, evaluation, and educational placement of the child, and the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.’ " Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1) ). "When a parent challenges the appropriateness of an [individualized education program], [courts] first determine whether the state has complied with the IDEA's procedural requirements." Id. at 809. But "procedural defects alone do not constitute a violation of the right to a [free appropriate public education] unless they result in the loss of an educational opportunity." A.A. ex rel. K.K. v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist. , No. 19-50007, 951 F.3d 678, 685 (5th Cir. Mar. 6, 2020) (quoting Adam J. ex rel. Robert J. v. Keller Indep. Sch. Dist. , 328 F.3d 804, 812 (5th Cir. 2003) ).
The plaintiffs' amended petition alleges multiple procedural violations that could each be construed as separately violating the IDEA, if they resulted in lost educational opportunity. Aside from the tasing and the events that lead to it, the plaintiffs allege that: (1) Ms. Washington was forced to keep J.W. home after he was tased "due to fear for his safety while at school"; (2) Ms. Washington repeatedly requested an individualized education program committee meeting but Katy ISD did not schedule one until April 24, 2017, which Katy ISD then cancelled; (3) at the rescheduled meeting on May 22, 2017, Katy ISD refused to discuss the tasing; (4) Katy ISD never scheduled a meeting to discuss the tasing; and (5) Katy ISD never responded to Ms. Washington's requests to speak to a counselor about how J.W.'s plan would address the anxiety he suffered at school from the tasing. (Docket Entry No. 8 at 142–49).
Although the plaintiffs' allegations all relate in some way to when Officer Paley tased J.W., some of the plaintiffs' allegations may state separate IDEA violations that occurred within the limitations period. For example, if Katy ISD's alleged failure to respond to the requests for meetings on J.W.'s education plan resulted in lost educational opportunities and violated the IDEA, that claim would have accrued on the date Ms. Washington knew, or should have known, that Katy ISD refused to meet. The date that Officer Paley tased J.W. could not serve as the accrual date for that claim because Ms. Washington did not and could not know at the time of the tasing that Katy ISD would refuse to discuss and revise J.W.'s individualized education program to account for his resulting anxiety.
The hearing officer determined that November 30, 2016, was the date Ms. Washington "should have known of the alleged hostile educational environment." (Docket Entry No. 8 at 71). While this is undoubtably true as to the plaintiffs' claim that Katy ISD denied J.W. a free appropriate public education by tasing him and creating a hostile educational environment, it ignores separate claims that accrued later.
The plaintiffs also argue that the hearing officer made several procedural errors in determining that the statute of limitations barred all of J.W.'s claims. The plaintiffs argue that the hearing officer applied an incorrect standard of review because neither side presented any evidence as to the issue; that the hearing officer issued an order on the motion to dismiss even though the district had not responded to the plaintiffs' amended petition; and that the hearing officer failed to consider that the district had not responded to all of the plaintiffs' tolling theories. (Docket Entry No. 10 at 19–23). Because this court concludes, based on a "virtually de novo " review of the administrative record and the applicable law, that the Texas one-year limitation period applies to J.W. and that no exception to the limit applies, but that the hearing officer incorrectly determined that all of the plaintiffs' claims were time-barred, these alleged procedural errors do not affect this court's analysis. On remand, the hearing officer should make a fact-specific determination as to which claims accrued within the one-year limit.
IV. Conclusion
The plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and Katy ISD's cross-motion for summary judgment are granted in part and denied in part. The Texas one-year statute of limitations for IDEA claims applies to J.W., and no exceptions to the one-year limit apply. The hearing officer incorrectly dismissed all of J.W.'s claims as time-barred. The case is remanded to the hearing officer to determine which of the plaintiffs' IDEA claims may proceed.