Opinion
Civil Action 00-0459-CB-S
March 15, 2001
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, an Alabama prison inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action has been referred to the undersigned for appropriate action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.2(c)(4). It is recommended that Plaintiff's federal claims be dismissed without prejudice, prior to service of process, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and that Plaintiff's state law claims be dismissed without prejudice.
I. Screening of Prisoner Complaints .
Plaintiff filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against correctional officers at Fountain Correctional Facility ("Fountain"). At the time of filing, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (Doc. 2). The Court granted Plaintiff's motion and ordered Plaintiff to pay a partial filing fee of $55.00 (Doc. 3), but instead Plaintiff paid the full $150.00 filing fee (Doc. 4).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B), the Court is required to screen an action filed by a prisoner who seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This screening procedure requires to the Court to dismiss an action if the Court finds that it is frivolous or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). This screening procedure is to be applied to a prisoner action regardless of "any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2). Moreover, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A requires that prisoner complaints be screened in the same manner as under § 1915(e)(2)(B) where a governmental official has been sued regardless of whether the $150.00 filing fee has been paid. Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 579 (5th Cir.) (Section 1915A "applies to any suit by a prisoner against certain government officials or entities regardless of whether that prisoner is or is not proceeding IFP."), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1041, 119 S.Ct. 2405, 144 L.Ed.2d 803 (1999). Section 1915A provides: "The court shall review . . . a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. . . . On review, the court shall . . . dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint — is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) (b)(1) (2).
Because Plaintiff filed this action against governmental employees while he was a prisoner, the Court is required to screen his action under § 1915(e)(2) or § 1915A(b), or both. Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999) (dismissing an action under both § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)). Under these sections, a claim may be dismissed as "frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1831-32, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). A claim is frivolous as a matter of law where, inter alia, the defendants are immune from suit, id. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833, the claim seeks to enforce a right which clearly does not exist, id., or there is an affirmative defense that would defeat the claim, such as the statute of limitations, Clark v. Georgia Pardons Paroles Bd., 915 F.2d 636, 640 n. 2 (11th Cir. 1990). Judges are accorded "not only the authority to dismiss [as frivolous] a claim based on indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless." Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833. Moreover, a complaint may be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted "only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)).
The predecessor to these sections was 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (d). Even though Congress made many substantive changes to § 1915(d) when it enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b), the frivolity and failure to state a claim analysis contained in Neitzke v. Williams 490 U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989), was unaltered. See Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 866 n. 4 (6th Cir. 2000).
II. Complaint (Doc. 1) .
Plaintiff named as Defendants Officers Hetzel, Zigler, and Gandy. Plaintiff claims that on April 9, 2000, while he was at prisoner at Fountain, these Defendants placed him in an isolation cell because he was unable to urinate into a cup for a drug test. Plaintiff alleges that he has numerous physical disabilities, which include heart, urinary, and blood pressure problems, some of which are a result of a cancer operation, and that he advised Defendants of these disabilities. Plaintiff relates that Defendant Hetzel contacted the medical staff and was told that Plaintiff's disabilities may prevent him from giving a specimen. Plaintiff avers that even though he told Defendant Gandy that he would pay for a blood test, Defendant Gandy placed him in an isolation cell for the night. Plaintiff contends that "the Defendants" denied him food from Saturday at 2:30 p.m. until Sunday at 3:00 p.m. and his high blood pressure medicine on Sunday. Plaintiff maintains that he takes high blood pressure medicine daily and that he received his medicine on Saturday morning, but did not receive his next dose until Monday at 2:30 a.m. Plaintiff states that when he was able to urinate, the test showed that he was free of drugs.
Plaintiff claims that he is entitled to recover from these Defendants for being deprived food and medicine for over twenty-four hours because Defendants were aware that he needed these items and that they were deliberately indifferent to his needs. Plaintiff asserts that these acts caused him to "suffer severe emotional distress, because plaintiff did not know if the denial of food and medication would cause plaintiff to suffer other medical problems, along with his other current medical condition." (Doc. 1, attachment) For his mental anguish, Plaintiff seeks $250,000 in actual damages and $250,000 in punitive damages from each Defendant. Plaintiff also invokes this Court's pendent jurisdiction.
III. Discussion .
Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 ("PLRA") in an attempt to curb the flood of prisoner actions in federal court. Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 971 (11th Cir. 2000), pet. for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2000) (No. 00-484). Included in the PLRA is 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), which provides: "No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury."
Section 1997e(e) bars only a damages recovery for a mental or emotional injury where there is no connected physical injury. Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1287-88 (11th Cir.). overruled on other grounds by Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2000), pet. for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2000) (No. 00-484). This provision is only a limitation on a damages recovery for these type of claims. Harris, 190 F.3d at 1287-88 n. 8. Furthermore, a physical injury that is associated with a mental or emotional injury must be more than de minimis in order to avoid the application of § 1997e(e). Id. at 1286 ("We therefore join the Fifth Circuit in fusing the physical injury analysis under section 1997e(e) with the framework set out by the Supreme Court in Hudson for analyzing claims brought under the Eighth Amendment for cruel and unusual punishment, and hold that in order to satisfy section 1997e(e) the physical injury must be more than de minimis, but need not be significant."). Otherwise, the essential purpose and vitality of Congress' scheme would be sapped. Id. at 1287.
In the present action, Plaintiff has clearly pleaded that his claims are for mental anguish and emotional distress that he suffered as a result of Defendants' actions. No physical injury is alleged by Plaintiff to have occurred. Thus, Plaintiff's federal claims come plainly within the purview of § 1997e(e). Due to Plaintiff's failure to demonstrate that he has a physical injury connected to his claims for emotional suffering and mental anguish, his federal § 1983 claims are barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
Plaintiff has also invoked this Court's pendent jurisdiction, which is now identified as supplemental jurisdiction. Eubanks v. Gerwen, 40 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 1994). Because Plaintiff's federal claims are recommended for dismissal, the Court, in its discretion, declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(3); Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000); Eubanks, 40 F.3d at 1160-61. Plaintiff's state law claims are, therefore, due to be dismissed.
IV. Conclusion .
Based upon the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that Plaintiff's federal claims be dismissed without prejudice, prior to service of process, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, Harris, 216 F.3d at 979 (requiring that a dismissal under § 1997e(e) be without prejudice), and that Plaintiff's state law claims be dismissed without prejudice. Accordingly, this action is due to be dismissed without prejudice in its entirety.