Opinion
A21-1061
04-04-2022
Peter Gerard Lonergan, Appellant, v. Nancy Johnston, Respondent.
Carlton County District Court File No. 09-CV-21-906
Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Smith, Tracy M., Judge.
ORDER OPINION
FRANCIS J. CONNOLLY JUDGE.
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. Appellant Peter Lonergan was convicted of second-degree criminal sexual conduct in 1985 for the sexual abuse of a relative's eight-year-old daughter, and first-degree criminal sexual conduct in 1992 for the sexual abuse of a relative's eight-year-old son. Lonergan was later indeterminately committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) as a sexually dangerous person (SDP). On April 23, 2021, Lonergan filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and injunctive relief. The district court denied the petition. Lonergan appeals.
2. Lonergan challenges the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. A writ of habeas corpus is a statutory remedy available "to obtain relief from imprisonment or restraint." Minn. Stat. § 589.01 (2020). "A writ of habeas corpus may also be used to raise claims involving fundamental constitutional rights and significant restraints on a defendant's liberty or to challenge the conditions of confinement." State ex rel. Guth v. Fabian, 716 N.W.2d 23, 26-27 (Minn.App. 2006), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 15, 2006). But a writ of habeas corpus is narrow in scope and "not available when there is some other regular legal procedure to remedy the alleged wrong." State ex rel. Young v. Schnell, 956 N.W.2d 652, 674 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted).
3. In considering a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, we defer to the district court's findings and will uphold them as long as they are reasonably supported by the evidence. Northwest v. LaFleur, 583 N.W.2d 589, 591 (Minn.App. 1998), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 17, 1998). Questions of law, however, are reviewed de novo. Id.
4. In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Lonergan sought immediate relief from confinement because he claimed he no longer has a sexual disorder. The district court determined that it had "previously held" in an order denying a prior petition filed by Lonergan for a writ of habeas corpus that Lonergan's "claims to be in remission entitling him to release from MSOP were not properly raised in a habeas corpus petition and the Appellate Court affirmed this Court's holding." The district court held that because "[a] party may not use habeas proceedings to obtain review of an issue previously raised," Lonergan's "writ of habeas corpus is an improper venue to decide this issue."
5. Lonergan argues that the district court erroneously denied his current habeas petition because it is not "successive" to his previous habeas petition. But in addition to rejecting Lonergan's argument because it was previously raised, the district court determined that a writ of habeas corpus is an improper vehicle to decide the issue raised by Lonergan because "the proper procedure to address [Lonergan's] release based on his current diagnosis is through the SRB and judicial panel." Lonergan is unable to establish that this conclusion is erroneous.
6. The legislature has specifically provided that an SDP patient may not petition a district court for release from commitment on the ground that "the patient is not in need of continued care and treatment." Minn. Stat. § 253B.17, subd. 1 (2020). The legislature instead has provided that an SDP patient may petition a three-member special review board (SRB), which is authorized to "hear and consider all petitions for a reduction in custody." Minn. Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 4c (2020). And the supreme court has held that when seeking a transfer or discharge, a patient committed as an SDP "must exclusively follow" the Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act's (MCTA) specific procedures for petitioning for a transfer or discharge. In re Civil Commitment of Lonergan, 811 N.W.2d 635, 642 (Minn. 2012).
7. Here, Lonergan has requested a discharge from his commitment and a decision on that request is currently awaiting a recommendation from the SRB. Once the SRB issues a decision, Lonergan will have the opportunity to request reconsideration by the Commitment Appeal Panel (CAP) if he disputes any SRB recommendation. See Minn. Stat. § 253D.28, subd. 1 (2020). And if Lonergan disagrees with the decision of the CAP, he can appeal to his court. See Minn. Stat. § 253B.19, subd. 5 (2020). In order to obtain a discharge from MSOP, this is the process that Lonergan must "exclusively" follow. See Lonergan, 811 N.W.2d at 642. Accordingly, even if Lonergan's current habeas petition is not successive to his previous habeas petition, the district court properly concluded that Lonergan's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is not the proper procedural vehicle to address his claim that he is not in need of treatment.
8. Lonergan's habeas petition also sought immediate release from MSOP due to the "slothfully apathetic administrative process" the commissioner takes to hold the required SRB hearing. But as stated above, when seeking a discharge, a patient committed as an SDP "must exclusively follow the [MCTA's] specific procedures for petitioning for a transfer or discharge." Id. Under the MCTA a person civilly committed as an SDP and seeking a reduction in custody must file a petition with the SRB authorized under section 253B.18, subdivision 4c. Minn. Stat. § 253D.27, subd. 2 (2020). After the committed person files a petition, the SRB holds a hearing on the petition and issues a report and recommendation. Id., subd. 3(a) (2020). The statute provides the following directive for the SRB hearing: "The [SRB] shall hold a hearing on each petition before issuing a recommendation and report . . . ." Id. Nowhere does the statute require that the hearing be held within six months of-or within any specific time of-the filing of the petition. See id. And Lonergan cites no authority indicating that the failure to hold an SRB hearing within a specific time entitles him to release from MSOP.
We note that as long as the action would not imply the invalidity of his commitment, Lonergan could seek injunctive relief for a faster process before the SRB and CAP in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018), challenging the constitutionality of the current process as applied to him. See Karsjens v. Piper, 845 F.3d 394, 409 (8th Cir. 2017).
9. Moreover, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the MCTA-which contains the statutory discharge process and the timing provisions in section 253D.28, subdivision 1(b)-is facially constitutional. Karsjens, 845 F.3d at 410. The Minnesota Supreme Court has also consistently upheld the constitutionality of the MCTA. See, e.g., In re Linehan, 594 N.W.2d 867, 876 (Minn. 1999); Call v. Gomez, 535 N.W.2d 312, 319 (Minn. 1995); In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 911 (Minn. 1994). For example, in Call, the supreme court held that a civilly committed person's due-process rights are protected by procedural safeguards including the ability to petition for transfer or discharge, periodic review, and the right to competent medical care and treatment. 535 N.W.2d at 318-19. "[W]hen the [Minnesota] [S]upeme [C]ourt has already construed a statue, this court is bound by that interpretation." State v. Rohan, 834 N.W.2d 223, 227 (Minn.App. 2013), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 15, 2013); State v. Curtis, 921 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 2018) (holding that court of appeals is bound by supreme court precedent). Under these circumstances, Lonergan cannot establish that the SRB process is unconstitutional. The district court, therefore, did not err by denying Lonergan's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's order is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.