Opinion
C.A. No. 09A-02-005 WLW.
Submitted: September 25, 2009.
Decided: December 1, 2009.
Upon an Appeal from the Decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. Affirmed.
Dawn Loeffler, pro se.
Elia D. Trowbridge, Esquire, Associate General Counsel, Dover Downs Hotel Casino, Dover, Delaware; attorney for the Appellee.
ORDER
Introduction
This is a pro se appeal by Dawn Loeffler ("Loeffler") from the February 15, 2009 decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board ("the Board" or "UIAB"). The Board affirmed a determination by the Appeals Referee ("the Referee") that Loeffler is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits due to her discharge for just cause, pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 3314(2).
Decision of the UIAB
Loeffler was employed by Dover Downs as a "slot ambassador" from January 29, 2007 until August 1, 2008. On July 28, 2008, Loeffler was approached by an elderly guest and the guest's daughter. An altercation ensued. The parties dispute the details surrounding this altercation. Loeffler contends that she did not pursue, push or injure any guest. Instead, Loeffler avers that she simply warned the customer not to engage in physical contact that would result in the customer's removal from the casino. Loeffler, claiming she was under duress, failed to raise these arguments upon termination. Dover Downs, following a short investigation, terminated Loeffler on August 1, 2008.
Dover Downs purported that Loeffler confronted the customer without calling a lead supervisor. Moreover, Dover Downs maintained that Loeffler pushed away the customer's raised arm. Dover Downs determined that these actions constituted inappropriate conduct and were in violation of the Employee Handbook.
On August 25, 2008, the Claims Deputy determined that Loeffler was eligible to receive unemployment benefits so long as she met the eligibility requirements of Section 3315. The Claims Deputy reasoned that Loeffler was not disqualified pursuant to Section 3314(2) because she was discharged without just cause.
See 19 Del. C. § 3315.
See 19 Del. C. § 3314(2).
A hearing was held before the Appeals Referee on November 5, 2008. On November 18, 2008, the Appeals Referee issued a decision reversing the Claims Deputy's determination. The Appeals Referee concluded that Loeffler was disqualified from receiving benefits because she was terminated for just cause. The Appeals Referee noted that Loeffler escalated the confrontation by pursuing the patron instead of following protocol and calling a supervisor. The Appeals Referee ultimately determined that Loeffler's actions constituted wanton misconduct. Loeffler appealed to the Board.
On January 21, 2009, a hearing was held before the UIAB. The Board issued a final decision affirming the Appeals Referee's determination on February 15, 2009. The Board framed the issue as "whether the Employer has shown just cause, namely willful and wanton conduct on the part of [Loeffler], for discharge from employment, pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 3314(2)." The Board described the facts of this case as follows:
Loeffler v. Dover Downs, UIAB Appeal Docket No. 40065231 (Feb. 15, 2009), aff'g Decision of Appeals Referee (Nov. 18, 2008).
[Loeffler] was terminated for a confrontation with a customer that occurred on the floor. The customer accused [Loeffler] of looking at her male partner, which [Loeffler] denied. Originally, [Loeffler] stated that she pursued the customer to talk to her without calling for a lead supervisor. The resulting confrontation was heated and at one point, [Loeffler] pushed down the customer's arm. According to her written statement dated July 31, 2008, [Loeffler] admitted to pushing her arm and telling the customer to "go ahead and hit me."
In the wake of an adverse ruling below, [Loeffler] now contends that she did not pursue, push or injure the customer. She also testifies that she called a lead supervisor. The only excuse [Loeffler] offers for the disparity of the two versions is that she was under duress when she wrote the first statement.
Id.
The Board did not find Loeffler's duress excuse credible.
The Board concluded that this confrontation violated Dover Downs's written policies. Loeffler received an employee handbook and signed an acknowledgment on January 29, 2007. Consequently, the Board determined that Loeffler was aware of the handbook's requirements. The Board concluded that Loeffler knowingly violated multiple portions of Dover Downs's policies. Consequently, the Board determined that Dover Downs met its burden to show that Loeffler was discharged for just cause. Loeffler filed an appeal with this Court on February 17, 2009.
Standard of Review
This Court's review of a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board is limited to a determination of whether there is sufficient substantial evidence in the record to support the Board's findings, and that such findings are free from legal error. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The Board's findings are conclusive and will be affirmed if supported by "competent evidence having probative value." An appellate court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make its own factual findings.
Employment Ins. Appeals Bd. of the Dep't of Labor v. Duncan, 337 A.2d 308, 309 (Del. 1975); Longobardi v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 287 A.2d 690, 692 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971), aff'd, 293 A.2d 295 (Del. 1972).
Oceanport Indus. v. Wilmington Stevedores, 636 A.2d 892, 899 (Del. 1994); Battista v. Chrysler Corp., 517 A.2d 295, 297 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986).
Geegan v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 76 A.2d 116, 117 (Del. Super. Ct. 1950).
Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A.2d 64, 66 (Del. 1965).
Discussion
Section 3314 of Title 19 of the Delaware Code provides, in pertinent part, that an individual shall be disqualified for benefits, "[f]or the week in which the individual was discharged from the individual's work for just cause in connection with the individual's work. . . ." "Just cause" refers to a "wilful [sic] or wanton act in violation of either the employer's interest, or of the employee's duties, or of the employee's expected standard of conduct."An employee must be aware of a company policy for that policy to form a basis for the employee's discharge. Consequently, when determining whether there was "just cause," a court should consider: (1) whether a company rule or policy existed and what conduct was prohibited, and (2) whether the employee was aware of the policy and, if so, how the employee became aware. An employee may be said to have been aware of an existing company rule or policy where there is evidence of a written policy, such as an Employee Handbook.
McCoy v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 1996 WL 111126, at *3 (Del. Super.) (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
As noted above, the only issue before this Court is whether the Board's findings are supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error. Again, the Board's findings are conclusive and will be affirmed if supported by "competent evidence having probative value." An appellate court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make its own factual findings.
Geegan v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 76 A.2d 116, 117 (Del. Super. Ct. 1950).
Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A.2d 64, 66 (Del. 1965).
Loeffler received Dover Downs's Employee Handbook on January 29, 2007. This handbook set forth guidelines for employees to follow while working for Dover Downs. The Board determined that Loeffler violated multiple portions of Dover Downs's policies, including failing to call a lead supervisor, pursuing a customer and making physical contact with a customer. This Court finds that the Board's decision is supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error.
Conclusion
The decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board is affirmed. IT IS SO ORDERED.