Opinion
No. C3-96-637.
Filed October 15, 1996.
Appeal from the District Court, Hennepin County, File No. 95-010197.
Jonathan D. Gallop, (for respondent Livingston)
Russell S. Ponessa, David H. Wright, (for appellant Metropolitan Council)
Considered and decided by Schumacher, Presiding Judge, Norton, Judge, and Harten, Judge.
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994)
Unpublished Opinion
Appellant Metropolitan Council (formerly the Metropolitan Transit Commission) appeals from a summary judgment in favor of respondent Marie Norine Livingston. The judgment entitles Livingston to uninsured motorist benefits in the amount of $25,000 from the Metropolitan Council, in addition to the workers' compensation benefits that she has already received from the Council. Based on the supreme court's recent decision in Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Casper, 549 N.W.2d 914 (Minn. 1996), we affirm.
Facts
The Metropolitan Council employed Livingston as a bus driver. In August 1990, while acting in the scope and course of her employment, Livingston was injured in a two-vehicle accident. The Metropolitan Council paid and continues to pay Livingston workers' compensation benefits.
The Metropolitan Council was then self-insured for uninsured motorist coverage in the amount of $25,000 per person. Livingston claimed uninsured motorist benefits from the Metropolitan Council, which denied her claim, citing the exclusivity provision of the workers' compensation statutes. The district court granted summary judgment for Livingston. The Metropolitan Council appeals.
Decision
The exclusivity provision of the workers' compensation statutes provides:
The liability of an employer prescribed by this chapter [the workers' compensation statutes] is exclusive and in the place of any other liability to such employee * * * or other person entitled to recover damages on account of such injury or death.
Minn. Stat. ___.031 (1994). Whether Livingston's claim for uninsured motorist benefits is barred by this provision is a question of law; therefore, we are not bound by the district court's decision. See Karst v. F.C. Hayer Co., 447 N.W.2d 180, 181 (Minn. 1989); Rayford v. Metropolitan Transit Comm'n, 379 N.W.2d 161, 164 (Minn.App. 1985), review denied (Minn. Feb. 14, 1986).
In Brunmeier v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 296 Minn. 328, 208 N.W.2d 860 (1973), the supreme court allowed an employee to recover under his own uninsured motorist policy in addition to receiving workers' compensation benefits. In Janzen v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 278 N.W.2d 67 (Minn. 1979) the supreme court, relying on Brunmeier, held that an employee was entitled to uninsured motorist benefits in addition to workers' compensation benefits because the employee's right to receive uninsured motorist benefits was contractual. Id. at 69-70. In Fryer v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 365 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. 1985), the supreme court explained that if an employee's uninsured motorist benefits could be reduced by a workers' compensation award, the burden of loss from an auto accident would be shifted from the auto insurance system to the workers' compensation program, which would be "inconsistent with the legislative coordination of the various reparation payments." Id. at 255. See also Rayford, 379 N.W.2d at 164-65 (relying on Fryer and concluding that workers' compensation benefits should not have been deducted from wage loss award); Murphy v. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 368 N.W.2d 753, 758 (Minn.App. 1985) (affirming refusal to reduce uninsured motorist liability by amount of workers' compensation benefits, citing Fryer), review granted on other grounds (Minn. July 26, 1985), affirmed in part and remanded in part 388 N.W.2d 732 (Minn. 1986); Wills v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 364 N.W.2d 504, 506 (Minn.App. 1985) (applying Brunmeier, despite fact that employee would receive a double recovery).
Recently, in Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Casper, 549 N.W.2d 914 (Minn. 1996), the supreme court reaffirmed its decisions in Fryer and Brunmeier. There, as in the instant case, the employer's auto insurer was also its workers' compensation insurer. The supreme court concluded:
It must be remembered, however, that regardless of the identity of the workers' compensation insurer, any reimbursement of workers' compensation benefits is a function of the Workers' Compensation Act, not the provisions of the underinsured motorist coverage.
Id. at 918 n. 2.
The supreme court rejected the argument that the legislature's enactment of the collateral source statute eroded the Fryer and Brunmeier decisions:
The collateral source statute, enacted in 1986, provides, in relevant part, that an award in a civil action to compensate a plaintiff for damages must be reduced by payments made to the plaintiff pursuant to the workers' compensation act. Minn. Stat. ___.36 (1994). "The primary purpose behind the statute is to prevent windfalls by plaintiffs at the expense of defendants." Rogers v. Ponti-Peterson Post #1720 Veterans of Foreign Wars, 495 N.W.2d 897, 902 (Minn.App. 1993) (citing Imlay v. City of Lake Crystal, 453 N.W.2d 326, 334 (Minn. 1990); Buck v. Schneider, 413 N.W.2d 569 (Minn.App. 1987)).
[T]he collateral source statute was not intended to shift the burden of loss for an auto accident from the auto injury reparations system to the workers' compensation system. For that reason we are also of the opinion that the rationale of Fryer and Brunmeier was not impaired by the adoption of the collateral source statute and still flourishes today.
Id.
In light of Casper, we affirm the district court's decision that Livingston may receive both uninsured motorist benefits and workers' compensation benefits from the Metropolitan Council.