Summary
In Little, the complaint alleged that the action was "brought under all other applicable state and federal statutes and laws."
Summary of this case from Rivera v. Horizon Offshore Contractors, Inc.Opinion
No. C 05-01936 MJJ.
July 11, 2005
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND AND DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court are Plaintiff's motion to remand this case to the Superior Court of the State of California and Plaintiff's request for an award of attorney's fees associated with the motion. Also before the Court is Defendant's motion to strike portions of Plaintiff's Complaint and an order for a more definite statement. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion to remand, DENIES Plaintiff's request for attorney's fees, and DENIES Defendant's motion to strike.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On January 26, 2005, longshoreman Robert Padgett (Plaintiff Donna Little's late husband) fell from a gangway, landed on the deck of a ship docked in Redwood City, California, and shortly thereafter died of his injuries. Plaintiff Donna Little, on behalf of herself, her daughter, and Mr. Padgett's estate, filed the instant lawsuit in state court alleging causes of action for wrongful death caused by negligence, wrongful death due to defective product, and a survival action for damages sustained by Padgett after the fall but prior to his death. The Complaint further alleges that the action is brought under general maritime law and "under all other applicable State and Federal statutes and laws." (Complaint at ¶ 5.) On May 10, 2005, Defendant RMC Pacific, joined by Defendant TCB Industrial, timely removed the case to federal court alleging admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). (Notice of Removal at ¶ 3.) Plaintiff timely filed the instant motion to remand on June 3, 2005. Defendant TCB Industrial joined in Plaintiff's motion to remand. Defendant RMC Pacific opposes the motion.
While unanimity of defendants is required in order to effect removal, once the procedure for removal has been met, the only basis for remand is lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
LEGAL STANDARD
A defendant may remove from state to federal court any civil action over which the district court would have had original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over "[a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled," 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1), or "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A motion to remand is the proper procedure for challenging removal, and will succeed only upon a showing that the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. While permitting removal in appropriate cases, the removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. Boggs v. Lewis, 863 F.2d 662, 663 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Shamrock Oil Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-109 (1941). The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant has the burden of establishing that removal was proper. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, remand should be granted if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance. Id.ANALYSIS
I. RemovalIn order to determine whether remand is proper, the Court must determine if it has subject matter jurisdiction. The Court must first assess whether removal of a state action based on maritime jurisdiction is proper. If not, the Court looks to see if an alternative basis for subject matter jurisdiction exists.
A. Removal of State Action Based on Maritime Jurisdiction Is Improper.
Defendant argues that removal based on § 1333(1) was proper. The jurisdictional statute states: "[a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (emphasis added). Courts have consistently held that the "saving to suitors" clause prohibits a defendant from removing a case that has been brought in state court absent an alternative jurisdictional basis such as diversity. Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 371 (1959); see also Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1069 (9th Cir. 2000). Additionally, the Supreme Court has made it clear that "state courts [are] `competent' to adjudicate maritime causes of action in proceedings `in personam,' that is, where the defendant is a person, not a ship or some other instrument of navigation." Madruga v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 346 U.S. 556, 560 — 61 (1954). Moreover, a purely maritime claim cannot be removed by a defendant alleging that application of federal maritime invokes federal question jurisdiction under § 1331. Romero, 358 U.S. at 379-80; Lewis v. Lewis Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438 (2001) ("to define admiralty jurisdiction as federal question jurisdiction would be a `destructive oversimplification of the highly intricate interplay of the States and the National Government. . . .'")
Here, Defendant claims that Plaintiff's failure to specifically allege the "saving to suitors" clause in her Complaint makes removal proper. Yet, a plaintiff "is not required to state the statutory or constitutional basis for his claim, only the facts underlying it." McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting McCalden v. Cal. Library Ass'n, 955 F.2d 1214, 1224 (9th Cir. 1990)). Defendant's very argument was rejected in Triton Container International Ltd. v. Institute of London Underwriters, 1998 WL 750941, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 1998). The court in Triton deemed "meritless" the argument that "because plaintiff did not expressly stylize its state court complaint as one based on the `saving to suitors' clause . . . removal is therefore proper."
Defendant further contends that because concurrent jurisdiction exists, the Complaint "could have been properly be [sic] brought in federal court in the first place." (Opposition at 3-4.) This argument is specious. Under the Romero line of cases, the "saving to suitors" clause allows Plaintiff to file in federal court should she choose to do so. See, e.g., Morris, 236 F.3d at 1069. However, Plaintiff has the option of filing in state court. Id. Accordingly, removal is not appropriate unless an alternative basis of subject matter jurisdiction exists. Id.
B. No Alternative Basis of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Exists.
Defendant claims that even if "general maritime" law does not grant subject matter jurisdiction under § 1333(1), Plaintiff's complaint implicates federal question jurisdiction under § 1331 because it invokes "[f]ederal statutes and laws." (Opposition at 5.) Federal question jurisdiction is implicated when the case "arises under" federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A case "arises under" federal law where federal law either creates the cause of action or "the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turn[s] on some construction of federal law." Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1983) (citations omitted). "[T]he presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the `well-pleaded complaint rule,' which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Rivet v. Regions Bank, 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998) (quoting Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The federal element must be basic and not simply collateral, necessary and not merely possible, pivotal or substantial as opposed to incidental, and direct and essential not attenuated. Hunter v. United Van Lines, 746 F.2d 635, 646 (9th Cir. 1984).
In the instant case, Plaintiff's non-factual allegation that the action is "brought under all other applicable State and Federal statutes and laws" is insufficient to meet the standards of the "well-pleaded complaint rule." The factual allegations establish only a wrongful death action based on state law and general maritime law. None of the allegations establish a tort where the vindication of a right under state law would turn on some construction of federal law. The federal elements of the alleged torts are not basic to the resolution of the matter; they are simply collateral. Resolution of any federal issues is not necessary or pivotal to reaching the wrongful death and survival claims brought by Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court finds that no alternate basis for subject matter jurisdiction under § 1331 exists and GRANTS Plaintiff's motion for remand.
II. Attorney's Fees
28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) provides that "[a]n order remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred as a result of the removal." (emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit has held that an award of attorney's fees is not appropriate if "the defendant had objectively reasonable grounds to believe the removal was legally proper." Valdes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 199 F.3d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 2000).
Defendant could have objectively believed that removal was proper on the grounds that Plaintiff alleged both "maritime law" and "all other applicable State and Federal statutes and laws." Moreover, due to the concurrent subject matter jurisdiction grant for maritime claims, Defendant's objective belief is reasonable. Furthermore, Plaintiff's allegation that there have been "months of delay" is unpersuasive in light of the fact the suit is less than four months old, negotiations have not been completed, one of the defendants, CB Engineering, Inc., who is named in the Complaint has yet to be served, and Plaintiff has not yet made a demand in the case. An award of costs and fees is not warranted on the record before the Court.
III. Defendant's Motion to Strike
Because the Court grants Plaintiff's motion to remand, Defendant's motion to strike portions of Plaintiff's complaint is DENIED as moot.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, DENIES Plaintiff's request for attorney's fees, and DENIES Defendant's motion to strike as moot.