Opinion
4:09-cv-481.
January 21, 2010
MEMORANDUM
THE BACKGROUND OF THIS MEMORANDUM IS AS FOLLOWS:
This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation ("R R") of Magistrate Judge Malachy E. Mannion (Doc.9), filed on December 29, 2009, which recommends that the petition of Edward M. Little ("Petitioner" or "Little"), for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 be dismissed. No objections to the R R have been filed by any party. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will adopt the R R.
Objections were due by January 15, 2010.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When, as here, no objections are made to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation, the district court is not statutorily required to review the report before accepting it. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985). According to the Third Circuit, however, "the better practice is to afford some level of review to dispositive legal issues raised by the report." Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d 874, 878 (3d Cir. 1987). "[T]he court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation." Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), advisory committee notes; see also Henderson, 812 F.2d at 878-79 (stating "the failure of a party to object to a magistrate's legal conclusions may result in the loss of the right to de novo review in the district court"); Tice v. Wilson, 425 F. Supp. 2d 676, 680 (W.D. Pa. 2006); Cruz v. Chater, 990 F. Supp. 375-78 (M.D. Pa. 1998); Oldrati v. Apfel, 33 F. Supp. 2d 397, 399 (E.D. Pa. 1998). The Court's examination of this case confirms the Magistrate Judge's determinations.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on March 16, 2009. (Doc. 1). The Petitioner also filed a brief in support of his Petition. Named as the respondent is Ricardo Martinez, Warden at FCI-Allenwood (hereinafter "Respondent"). After service, the Respondent filed a response and exhibits. Petitioner then filed a traverse and a motion for summary judgment.
The one-page motion for summary judgment was not supported by a brief as required by L.R 7.5, thus, it is deemed to be withdrawn.
Within the Petition, the Petitioner challenges the authority of the Bureau of Prisons as it relates to the collection of a $200 special assessment and his participation in the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program ("IFRP"). Specifically, the Petitioner alleges that only the sentencing court has the ability to collect the fines from him or set a schedule by which those fines are to be paid. On December 29, 2009, Magistrate Judge Mannion filed the instant R R, recommending dismissal of the Petition.
III. DISCUSSION
Magistrate Judge Mannion aptly notes that the Petition, inasmuch as it attacks the execution of Petitioner's sentence, is properly brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Magistrate Judge Mannion recommends that the petition be dismissed as moot because the Petitioner has paid any and all court-ordered fines and is not longer a participant in the IFRP. Moreover, at the time the Petition was filed, Petitioner's fines were fully paid and he was no longer an IFRP participant.
As we have already mentioned, neither Respondents nor the Petitioner have filed objections to this R R. Because we agree with the sound reasoning that led the Magistrate Judge to the conclusions in the R R, we will adopt the R R in its entirety. With a mind towards conserving judicial resources, we will not rehash the reasoning of the Magistrate Judge; rather, we will attach a copy of the R R to this document, as it accurately reflects our consideration and resolution of the casesub judice. An appropriate Order shall issue.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
For the convenience of the reader of this document in electronic format, hyperlinks to the court's record and to authority cited have been inserted. No endorsement of any provider of electronic resources is intended by the court's practice of using hyperlinks.
I. Procedural Background.
On March 16, 2009, Edward M. Little, petitioner, an inmate at FCI-Allenwood, White Deer, Pennsylvania, filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). The petitioner also filed a brief in support of his petition. (Doc. 2). Named as respondent was Ricardo Martinez, the Warden at FCI-Allenwood. (Doc. 1).The habeas petition was served and Respondent filed his Response, with attached exhibits, on April 17, 2009. (Doc. 6 and Exs. 1-7). The petitioner filed a Traverse on April 23, 2009 and a Motion for Summary Judgment on June 26, 2009. (Doc. No. 8).
The one page motion for Summary Judgment was not supported by a brief as required by MDPA Local Rule 7.5, and therefore is deemed withdrawn. However, even if the court were to reach the merits of the motion for Summary Judgment, since it involves the same issue as the instant habeas petition, the same recommendation would have been made.
The petitioner's habeas petition is now ripe for disposition.
II. Claim of Habeas Petition.
In his petition and supporting brief, the petitioner stated:
[T]he Bureau of Prisons' ("BOP") imposed sanctions against Federal prison inmate for his failure to acquiesce in the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program ("IFRP"), restitution repayment schedule was not in accordance with law, warranting writ of habeas corpus; sentencing court, although declaring Mandatory Victim's Restitution Act ("MRVA"), restitution `due during period of imprisonment,' had no established specific schedule of payments to be collected during incarceration; and BOP lacked authority to substitute its own schedule.
(Docs. 1, 2). Specifically, it appears that the petitioner claims that the BOP had no authority to collect his $200.00 Special Assessment, under § 3664 and that only the Court may collect or determine the amount of his payments. The petitioner also claims that only the sentencing court had authority to set a schedule of payments for federal inmates during the period of incarceration and that this authority cannot be delegated to the BOP. (Docs. 1, 2).
Petitioner interchangeably uses the terms fine, restitution and/or fee. While they are different, for purposes of this report, the court will assume he is referring to his Special Assessment when any of those terms are discussed.
The petitioner seeks relief in the form of a "removal of all BOP imposed fee or IFRP collections" against him. He asks that no sanctions by the BOP be imposed and that we institute "a legal, permanent bar from the BOP reinstalling any collections of any type, or sanctions." (Doc. 1). He asks for "immediate imposition under § 3664, that the BOP must remove all imposed fee collections on inmates that do not contain an express, direct Court Order signed by a Magistrate Judge, directly ordering the collection and the imposed schedule of collection thereof, as designated by law, be imposed and forever barred from reimposition on any inmate, by the BOP." (Doc. 2).
Apparently referring to the BOP's Inmate Financial Responsibility Program.
The respondent claims that federal habeas relief is not an appropriate remedy because the petitioner's claims do not concern the fact or the duration of his confinement in prison. (Doc. 6 at 3). The respondent also claims that even if the petitioner's case was allowed to proceed, "the petition should still be dismissed since the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has already found the provisions of the IFRP to be constitutional." (Doc. 6, at 4).
As to the constitutionality of the IFRP, the court agrees that the Third Circuit has found the provisions of the IFRP to be constitutional. See Pinet v. Grondolosky , 2009 WL 2942699, *1 (3d Cir.); James v. Quinlan , 866 F. 2d 627 (3d Cir. 1989).
For the reasons stated below, the court agrees with the Petitioner that his claim is properly brought in a petition for writ of habeas corpus because it challenges the execution of his sentence. However, after substantive review, the petition should be dismissed as moot.
III. Discussion.
The petitioner challenges the BOP's authority to collect payments under § 3664 claiming that only the Court may collect payments or determine the amount of those collections. The petitioner also claims that only the sentencing court has authority to set a schedule of payments for federal inmates during the period of incarceration and that this authority cannot be delegated to the BOP. (Doc. 1 and 2)
As a general rule, a petition under § 2241 is properly brought where the petitioner is seeking to challenge the carrying out, or the execution of, his sentence (e.g., the calculation of good time credits, the running of the sentence, the calculation of the ending date, etc.) and not the sentence as imposed. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky , 410 U.S. 484 (1973); Gomori v. Arnold , 533 F.2d 871, 875 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 851 (1976) ("Furthermore, the United States Courts of Appeals have consistently held that a challenge to a sentence as executed by the prison and parole authorities may be made by petition for a writ of habeas corpus [i.e., a Section 2241 petition], whereas a challenge to the sentence as imposed must be made under 28 U.S.C. § 2255."); Thomas v. Miner , 232 Fed.Appx. 207, 208 (3d Cir. 2007) ("In addition, federal prisoners may proceed under § 2241 when their challenge is directed to the execution, as opposed to the validity, of their sentence.").
Here, the petitioner's challenge goes directly to the execution of his sentence, namely whether the BOP has authority to set the terms of his Special Assessment payments while he is incarcerated. These claims fall squarely within those properly raised in a petition for habeas corpus under § 2241. U.S. v. Walker , 149 Fed.Appx. 55, 57 (3d. Cir. 2005) (citing Coady v. Vaugh , 251 F.3d 480, 485 (3d Cir. 2001); Mujahid v. Crabtree , 999 F.Supp. 1398, 1401 (D.Or. 1998), aff'd, 172 F.3d 57 (9th Cir. 1999)). See Costigan v. Yost , 2008 WL 5062365 at *1 (3d Cir. Dec. 2, 2008) ("Because Costigan's challenge goes directly to execution of the sentence (i.e., whether the BOP has authority to set the terms of the payment of the special assessment), the claim falls squarely within those properly raised in a petition for habeas corpus under § 2241.") (citing Coady v. Vaugh , 251 F.3d 480, 485 (3d Cir. 2001). See also United States v. Hakin , Slip Copy, 2008 WL 5378269 (E.D. Pa. December 18, 2009) (treating a challenge to the BOP's authority as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241); U.S. v. Wynn , 328 Fed.Appx. 826 (3d. Cir. 2009) (stating that a challenge to the manner in which the BOP is encouraging a prisoner to pay money he owes is a challenge to the execution of his sentence and may be properly brought in a habeas petition pursuant to28 U.S.C. § 2241 or a civil rights action against prison officials challenging the conditions of his confinement.); Goodwin v. Martinez , Slip Copy, 2009 WL 3833920, Civil No. 09-474, M.D. Pa. (November 16, 2009 Memorandum and Order in which Court granted Petitioner's reconsideration motion and re-opened his case since the Court found that Petitioner was challenging the legality of his federal sentence imposed by the District Court.) In sum, it appears that the Third Circuit has specifically ruled that this type of matter may appropriately be brought by a habeas corpus petition pursuant to § 2241.
Next, the respondent argues that the petitioner's claim should be dismissed as moot. (Doc. 6 at 5). In Spencer v. Kemna , 523 U.S. 1 (1998), the Court stated that "[t]he parties must continue to have a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit. This means that, throughout the litigation, the Plaintiff must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the Defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Id. (Citations omitted).
In Nkemakolam v. Decker , 2005 WL 2715905, *2 (M.D. Pa.), the Court stated:
The case or controversy requirement of Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings. Parties must continue to have a "`personal stake in the outcome' of the lawsuit." Lewis v. Continental BankCorp. , 494 U.S. 472, 477-78, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 108 L.Ed.2d 400 (1990); Preiser v. Newkirk , 422 U.S. 395, 401, 95 S.Ct. 2330, 45 L.Ed.2d 272 (1975). In other words, throughout the course of the action, the aggrieved party must suffer or be threatened with actual injury caused by the defendant. Lewis , 494 U.S. at 477 . The adjudicatory power of a federal court depends upon "the continuing existence of a live and acute controversy." Steffel v. Thompson , 415 U.S. 452, 459, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974) (emphasis in original). "The rule in federal cases is that an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed." Id. at n. 10 (citations omitted). "Past exposure to illegal conduct is insufficient to sustain a present case or controversy . . . if unaccompanied by continuing, present adverse effects." Rosenberg v. Meese , 622 F.Supp. 1451, 1462 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (citing O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974)); see also Gaeta v. Gerlinski, Civil No. 3:CV-02-465, slip op. at p. 2 (M.D.Pa. May 17, 2002) (Vanaskie, C.J.).
In the instant matter, the petitioner is no longer participating in the IFRP since he does not have a balance for special assessments, court-ordered restitution, fines, or other court costs. (Doc. 6, Ex. 2, Att. 2). While the petitioner was ordered to pay a felony assessment in the amount of $200.00 in connection with his criminal conviction, he began to pay the assessment in December of 2005 and he completed payments in January 2007, more than two years prior to the filing of the instant petition. (Doc. 6, Ex. 2, Att. 1 and 2).
Since the petitioner is not presently a participant in the IFRP, nor was he at the time his petition was filed, his petition is moot and should be dismissed.
IV. Recommendation.
Based upon the foregoing, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT:
1) The Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be dismissed as moot; and,
2) The Motion for Summary Judgement (Doc. No. 8) be deemed withdrawn.