Opinion
August 15, 1994
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Wager, J.).
Ordered that the orders are affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
In 1990 this Court reversed certain provisions of the judgment of divorce after affirming an order of the Supreme Court which disqualified the plaintiff husband's attorney (see, Lipton v Lipton, 158 A.D.2d 450). Subsequently, the defendant wife moved to amend this Court's decision and order to require a new trial with respect to the financial issues between the parties. This Court granted the requested relief in a decision and order dated May 21, 1990. As a result, although the parties were divorced, the support received by the defendant wife was paid pursuant to a pendente lite order issued in 1982. This appeal and cross appeal arise as a result of the modification of that pendente lite order.
It is well settled that pendente lite awards should be an accommodation between the reasonable needs of the moving spouse and the financial ability of the other spouse, determined with due regard for the preseparation standard of living (see, Byer v Byer, 199 A.D.2d 298; Beil v. Beil, 192 A.D.2d 498; Polito v Polito, 168 A.D.2d 440). A pendente lite award may be modified upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances (see, Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [9] [b]; Vogel v. Vogel, 156 A.D.2d 671; Kansky v. Kansky, 150 A.D.2d 525). A determination of substantial change in circumstances is a matter addressed to the discretion of the court with each case turning on its particular facts (see, Stempler v. Stempler, 200 A.D.2d 733; Matter of King v. King, 193 A.D.2d 800). Under the circumstances of this case, we discern no error in the Supreme Court's modification of the pendente lite award. Bracken, J.P., Sullivan, Miller and Hart, JJ., concur.