Opinion
No. 04-16-00770-CR
06-06-2018
Frederick LEE, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
APPELLANT ATTORNEY: Dean A. Diachin, Assistant Public Defender, 101 W. Nueva, Suite 370, San Antonio, TX 78205. APPELLEE ATTORNEY: Jennifer Rossmeier Brown, Assistant Criminal District Attorney, 101 W. Nueva St., Suite 715, San Antonio, TX 78205.
APPELLANT ATTORNEY: Dean A. Diachin, Assistant Public Defender, 101 W. Nueva, Suite 370, San Antonio, TX 78205.
APPELLEE ATTORNEY: Jennifer Rossmeier Brown, Assistant Criminal District Attorney, 101 W. Nueva St., Suite 715, San Antonio, TX 78205.
Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice, Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice, Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Opinion by: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
On October 26, 2016, Appellant Frederick Lee was convicted by a Bexar County jury of one count of sexual assault of a child and two counts of indecency with a child. The trial court subsequently assessed punishment at thirty-years' confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Lee raises two issues on appeal: (1) his defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel, and (2) the State produced insufficient evidence to support punishment pursuant to the habitual offender statute.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 29, 2013, Lee married Sandra and they began living together in Sandra’s home in Converse, Texas, with Sandra’s two daughters from a previous marriage. In the fall of 2013, Lee left Sandra and moved to California. On October 24, 2013, Lee left Sandra a voice message "that he had kicked in the door [at their residence]." Sandra immediately picked up both of her daughters from school, called the police, and waited on the side of the road for someone to escort her back into her home. While she was waiting for the officers, Lee pulled up next to her vehicle; he was "very irate and angry." Sandra told Lee the officers were on their way, and he left. When the officers arrived, they escorted Sandra and her daughters to the residence.
The officers checked the residence to ensure Lee was no longer on the premises. When they came back down the stairs, B.W., Sandra’s older daughter, reported to Sandra and the officer that Lee had been molesting her. Lee was eventually charged with two counts of sexual assault of a child, three counts of indecency with a child, and one count of sexual performance by a child, all stemming from alleged sexual acts with Sandra’s sixteen-year-old daughter, B.W. After three days of trial, and two days of deliberations, the jury convicted Lee of one count of sexual assault of a child and two counts of indecency with a child; the jury returned not-guilty verdicts on the remaining counts. The trial court assessed punishment at thirty-years' confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.
We turn first to Lee’s claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
A. Standard of Review
To determine whether defense counsel’s representation was ineffective, the United States Supreme Court set out a two-prong test: (1) "[t]he defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient" and (2) "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ; accord Ex parte Moore , 395 S.W.3d 152, 157–58 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) ; Menefield v. State , 363 S.W.3d 591, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). To establish the first prong, deficient performance, Lee must prove that defense counsel’s performance " ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness’ under prevailing professional norms and according to the necessity of the case." Ex parte Moore , 395 S.W.3d at 157 (quoting Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687–88, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ). To establish harm, Lee "must demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his attorney’s performance or that ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ " Id. at 158 (footnoted omitted) (quoting Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ).
Appellate courts are tasked to view matters "from the viewpoint of an attorney at the time he acted, not through 20/20 hindsight." Ex parte Jimenez , 364 S.W.3d 866, 883 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) ; accord Ex parte Overton , 444 S.W.3d 632, 640 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). We are also "highly deferential" toward defense counsel’s actions and we "presum[e] that counsel’s actions fell within the wide range of reasonable and professional assistance." Garza v. State , 213 S.W.3d 338, 348 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Bone v. State , 77 S.W.3d 828, 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ).
"While a single error will not typically result in a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel, an egregious error may satisfy the Strickland prong on its own." Lopez v. State , 343 S.W.3d 137, 143 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) ; see also Thompson v. State , 9 S.W.3d 808, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (explaining appellate courts are "especially hesitant to declare counsel ineffective based upon a single alleged miscalculation during what amounts to otherwise satisfactory representation, especially when the record provides no discernible explanation of the motivation behind counsel’s actions—whether those actions were of strategic design or the result of negligent conduct"). Acknowledging that "a single egregious error of omission or commission" can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, we nevertheless recognize that "the allegation[s] of ineffectiveness must be firmly founded in the record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness." Thompson , 9 S.W.3d at 814 (citing McFarland v. State , 928 S.W.2d 482, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) ).
B. Arguments of the Parties
Lee argues the failure of defense counsel to thoroughly investigate B.W.’s hypothyroid condition, which she was being treated for during the timeframe of the alleged abuse, was objectively deficient and therefore denied Lee his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Lee asserts that defense counsel’s failure to fully investigate B.W.’s hypothyroid condition resulted in defense counsel’s inability to use B.W.’s condition as a defense. Lee also argues that defense counsel’s admission of ineffective assistance of counsel is sufficient to rebut any presumption of effective assistance of counsel.
The State argues Lee cannot rely on a single isolated event to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. The State contends defense counsel’s actions evidenced a sound trial strategy and Lee fails to establish how this strategy was unreasonable. Furthermore, the State argues that defense counsel’s admission was made while attempting to justify her request for additional time to review B.W.’s medical records; and, defense counsel’s single statement is not affirmative evidence that her representation fell below the standard of reasonable assistance.
C. Deficient Performance
1. Facts Pertaining to B.W.’s Thyroid Condition
Lee’s complaint is based on actions taken by defense counsel regarding State’s Exhibit #2. State’s Exhibit #2 contains thirty-eight pages of B.W.’s medical records of the Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner’s (SANE) examination of B.W., that took place on November 15, 2013; the records were offered under the business records exception through the custodian of the records. Both parties agree that, prior to trial, defense counsel only had access to the first twelve pages of the State’s Exhibit #2 (the "medical-forensic exam report"). The remaining twenty–six pages, which were not accessible to defense counsel, included the SANE nurse’s psychosocial report (the "behavioral and emotional assessment"). The prosecutor acknowledged seeing the psychosocial report for the first time when the custodian of the records brought the file to court. Based on defense counsel’s objection, although the trial court allowed the SANE nurse to use the exhibit to refresh her recollection during her testimony, it withheld ruling on the exhibit’s admission. When the SANE nurse offered her opinion, based on all of the records contained within State’s Exhibit #2, defense counsel renewed her objection. The trial court excused the jury with instructions to return the following morning.
After being provided the evening to review the entire contents of State’s Exhibit #2, defense counsel filed a motion for continuance asserting that the medical records, specifically the discussions of the hypothyroid condition contained within the psychosocial report, constituted a surprise to the defense. Defense counsel asserted that the medical records provided by the State prior to trial, including recordings and videos, did not include or refer to any medications being taken by B.W. The State countered that the audio recording of B.W.’s Child Protective Services interview, contained in State’s Exhibit #3, and a summary of the interview, were provided to defense counsel prior to trial and included discussions regarding B.W.’s hypothyroid condition and the required medication.
After the trial court reviewed State’s Exhibit #3, the following exchange occurred:
Trial Court: [A]fter having reviewed what has now been marked as State’s Exhibit 3, ... [the defense] did have notice through an oral interview that [B.W.] was currently taking thyroid meds and it was also in a written form, so I don't see any surprise.
Defense Counsel: Right. And I can understand that you couldn't see the surprise, Judge, but I'm the one that’s handling the case from the very—not from the beginning. I came in much later into the case.
Trial Court: Okay.
Defense Counsel: But so if my focus when I'm listening to the oral and videos of the interviews is the different stories she’s telling, I'm not concerned about the thyroid, obviously, because I didn't make a note of it in my own notes. That’s the only thing I have as a reference point coming into trial, my own notes. They don't give us copies of that.
And so, if what the Court and the State wants to say is that I'm responsible for every sentence in that written report that I didn't review. I reviewed the audio. It was a three-hour, four-hour afternoon at the DA’s office. And it’s not one thing that you can just hear one time and you're done, you have to go over and over. And so, my focus was the statements the complainant had made.
So yes, I was surprised yesterday, especially last night in reviewing everything, that she—the front page of the State’s Exhibit 2 says she’s currently on medication on November 13th, 2013, and that she takes it daily. And so, that was a surprise to me.
I know that you're saying, Well, you should be responsible for everything in there. Then I guess the next thing is that I'm ineffective if that’s the case. My—the basis of my motion is the medical records and I—I just ask for a delay to get those....
Trial Court: Okay. In regards for your Motion for Continuance After Trial has Begun, I'm going to deny it.
Lee contends defense counsel "freely and explicitly admitted that her failure to secure and review [B.W.’s] medical records was not the product of sound strategy, but rather was caused by unprofessional oversight and neglect."
2. Actions Required by Counsel to Satisfy Duty to Make Reasonable Investigation
The United States Supreme Court held that defense "counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary." Wiggins v. Smith , 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (quoting Strickland , 466 U.S. at 690–91, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ); see also Ex parte Flores , 387 S.W.3d 626, 636 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (determining trial counsel’s duty is not to find the "best" or most qualified expert but, instead, their duty "is to investigate the facts of the case and determine if an expert is necessary to present the defendant’s case to the jury"). Specifically, in cases involving ineffectiveness of counsel, "a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments." Wiggins , 539 U.S. at 521–22, 123 S.Ct. 2527 (quoting Strickland , 466 U.S. at 690–91, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ); accord Ex parte Bowman , 533 S.W.3d 337, 350 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). Trial counsel is constitutionally ineffective when "incomplete investigation was the result of inattention, not reasoned strategic judgment." Wiggins , 539 U.S. at 534, 123 S.Ct. 2527. Even assuming defense counsel failed to investigate B.W.’s hypothyroid and any alleged effects resulting therefrom, Lee was still required to prove counsel’s failure to investigate resulted in ineffective representation at trial.
3. Analysis
Lee’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel stems almost exclusively from the single exchange in the record between defense counsel and the trial court, which as the State points out, was made during an argument seeking a mid-trial continuance to secure and review B.W.’s medical records. See Lopez , 343 S.W.3d at 143 ; Thompson , 9 S.W.3d at 813. We further note that Lee’s argument, that defense counsel’s failure to fully investigate B.W.’s hypothyroid condition constituted ineffective assistance, is based on his unsupported theory that B.W.’s hypothyroid condition, or the medications, left her "more prone to conflate fantasy with reality or predispose her to outright fits of fabrication."
In the instant case, defense counsel explained that her focus, throughout trial and while reviewing complainant’s statements to CPS, was to attack B.W.’s credibility—specifically the numerous stories she told and the inherent conflicts within them. In other words, defense counsel was focusing her attention on the inconsistency of B.W.’s allegations against Lee. Defense counsel actively pursued the many inconsistencies in the testimony to show that B.W. fabricated the claims against Lee. See Humphrey v. State , 501 S.W.3d 656, 660 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. ref'd) ("Proper trial strategy includes cross-examination with an intent to discredit witnesses by pointing out inconsistencies."); see also Josey v. State , 97 S.W.3d 687, 696 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.) ("We cannot say attempting to discredit one or both of the State’s primary witnesses is improper trial strategy or otherwise falls below the level of an objectively reasonable standard of conduct."). Defense counsel maintained this focus during trial when she thoroughly cross-examined B.W. and revealed many of the inconsistencies to the jury.
The record supports that defense counsel made opening and closing statements, conducted extensive voir dire and cross-examination of all the witnesses, made timely objections, introduced evidence, and presented witnesses in defense of Lee. During the span of the trial, the State produced seven witnesses, all of which defense counsel cross-examined; defense counsel also produced four witnesses in Lee’s case-in-chief. See Ferguson v. State , 639 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982) (finding defense counsel’s representation "more than sufficient" because the record indicated defense counsel filed numerous pretrial motions, cross-examined all the witnesses the State presented and presented their own witnesses, presented argument at both the guilt-innocence and punishment phases and exhibited sufficient knowledge of the facts surrounding the defendant’s case); see also Gonzales v. State , 626 S.W.2d 888, 894 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1981, pet. ref'd) (finding defense counsel provided effective representation as a whole because the record revealed "there was vigorous representation, excellent objections made and exceptions taken to rulings of the court with proper preservation of evidence for review, ample cross-examination of those witnesses who offered incriminating testimony against appellant and adequate examination of the only witness who could substantiate appellant’s defense of alibi"); Garcia v. State , No. 04-13-00818-CR, 2015 WL 2124799, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 6, 2015, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
Defense counsel exhibited an in-depth knowledge and understanding of the facts and circumstances surrounding Lee’s case. Additionally, defense counsel’s strategy appeared to have at least some effect on the jury—the jury returned a guilty verdict on one count of sexual assault of a child and two counts of indecency with a child by contact, but the jury also returned not guilty verdicts on the remaining counts—including one count of sexual assault of a child, one count of indecency with a child by contact, and one count of inducing sexual performance by a child.
4. Conclusion
Based on a review of the entire record, we conclude defense counsel’s attempt to discredit the State’s principal witness was a "proper trial strategy," see Josey , 97 S.W.3d at 696. Even assuming an investigation would have shown B.W. was "more prone" to fabricate or lie about the allegations, Lee failed to rebut the strong presumption that his defense counsel’s performance was within the range of reasonable professional assistance, see Lopez , 343 S.W.3d at 142 ; Ex parte Moore , 395 S.W.3d at 157. Because Lee failed to prove Strickland ’s first prong, that defense counsel’s performance was deficient, we need not address whether he was prejudiced by defense counsel’s performance. See Thompson , 9 S.W.3d at 813 (citing Ex parte Menchaca , 854 S.W.2d 128, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) ) ("Failure to make the required showing of either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness claim.").
We next turn to Lee’s assertion that the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to support a sentence pursuant to Texas Penal Code section 12.42(d). See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) (West Supp. 2017).
HABITUAL OFFENDER
A. Standard of Review
Because Lee challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of true to the Habitual Offender enhancement under Texas Penal Code Section 12.42(d), "we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt." Wood v. State , 486 S.W.3d 583, 589 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) ; accord Clayton v. State , 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ); see also Brooks v. State , 323 S.W.3d 893, 894–95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). "We ‘determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.’ " Clayton , 235 S.W.3d at 778 (quoting Hooper v. State , 214 S.W.3d 9, 16–17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ). B. Arguments of the Parties
Texas Penal Code Section 12.42(d) provides as follows:
[I]f it is shown on the trial of a felony offense other than a state jail felony punishable under Section 12.35(a) that the defendant has previously been finally convicted of two felony offenses, and the second previous felony conviction is for an offense that occurred subsequent to the first previous conviction having become final, on conviction the defendant shall be punished by imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for life, or for any term of not more than 99 years or less than 25 years.
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.42(d).
Lee argues that the trial court erred during the punishment phase because the State did not produce sufficient evidence linking Lee to two final, non-aggravated state jail felony convictions. Specifically, Lee asserts the documents from Louisiana are insufficient because the materials (1) do not contain a judgment or evidence of conviction, (2) do not show a sentence was served in an actual penitentiary, (3) do not establish either conviction was "final" under Louisiana law, and (4) do not connect Lee to the prior crimes by anything other than common identifiers. Lee argues the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the same Frederick Lee identified in the other two crimes.
The State argues the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion that Lee was the same Frederick Lee identified in State’s Exhibit #4 by common identifying information. The State also asserts they are not required to establish a prior conviction in a particular manner or by particular documentation.
C. Linking Defendant to Prior Offense
1. Necessary Proof
"To establish that a defendant has been convicted of a prior offense, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) a prior conviction exists, and (2) the defendant is linked to that conviction." Flowers v. State , 220 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). "No specific document or mode of proof is required to prove these two elements." Id. "The trier of fact weighs the credibility of each piece of evidence and determines whether the totality of the evidence establishes the existence of the alleged conviction and its link to the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt." Wood , 486 S.W.3d at 589. The Court of Criminal Appeals likened this process to that of "a jigsaw puzzle where the pieces alone may have little meaning but when put together form a picture showing that the defendant is the person who committed the alleged prior offense." Id. (citing Flowers , 220 S.W.3d at 923 ).
2. Prior Convictions Offered by the State
During the punishment phase, the State alleged two prior offense enhancements. The first, cause number 393-211 in the Criminal District Court in the Parish of Orleans, Louisiana, provided Defendant Frederick D. Lee was convicted of felony possession of cocaine on September 15, 1998. The second offense, cause number 423-520 in the Criminal District Court in the Parish of Orleans, Louisiana, identified Defendant Frederick D. Lee was convicted of felony possession of cocaine on November 30, 2001. Appellant Lee entered a plea of "not true" to both enhancements. The State presented evidence of the prior convictions through certified court documents from Louisiana contained in State’s Exhibit #4.
The documents regarding cause number 393-211 provided the following information about the first arrest and conviction: (1) Frederick D. Lee was arrested on July 1, 1997 for possession of cocaine pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statute section 40:967(C)(2) ; (2) a bill of information was filed on November 17, 1997; (3) Frederick D. Lee plead guilty to possession of cocaine on September 15, 1998, and was sentenced to five years' probation; and (4) after determining Lee violated the terms of his probation, he was sentenced to one-year confinement in the Department of Corrections on January 6, 2000.
The pertinent sections of Louisiana Revised Statute, section 40.967(C), at the time of the offense, provided as follows:
C. Possession. It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled dangerous substance ... [cocaine].
(2) Any person who violates this Subsection as to any other controlled dangerous substance shall be imprisoned with or without hard labor for not more than five years and, in addition, may be sentenced to pay a fine of not more than five thousand dollars.
La. Stat. Ann. § 40.967(C)(2) (2001).
Additionally, the documents regarding cause number 423-520 provided the following information about the second arrest and conviction: (1) Frederick D. Lee was arrested on June 5, 2001 for felony possession of cocaine, in violation of Louisiana Revised Statute section 40.967(C)(2), see LA. STAT. ANN. § 40.967(C)(2) (2001); (2) a bill of information was filed on July 26, 2001 which contained information about the 1998 conviction; and (3) Frederick D. Lee plead guilty to possession of cocaine, was sentenced as a multiple offender after admitting to being the same person convicted in cause number 393-211 on November 30, 2001, and was sentenced to thirty months "of hard labor" in the Department of Corrections.
Louisiana Revised Statute section 15:529.1(A)(1) provides that any defendant that has previously been convicted "of a felony-grade violation [under] the Louisiana Controlled Dangerous Substances Law ..., shall be punished as follows:"
(a) If the second felony is such that upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life, then the sentence to imprisonment shall be for a determinate term not less than one-half the longest term and not more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction;
La. Stat. Ann. § 15:529.1 (West 2006). Because the underlying statute provided for a penalty range of imprisonment of "not more than five years," see id. § 40:967(C)(2), Lee faced imprisonment of "not less than one-half the longest term," (i.e., two-and-one-half years or thirty months), "and not more than twice the longest term" (i.e., ten years), see id. § 15:529.1.
State’s Exhibit #5 provided information relating to the instant case. Based on the totality of the State’s evidence, the trial court found the enhancement allegations to be true and sentenced Lee to a thirty-year prison sentence.
The documents contained within State’s Exhibit #4 support that Lee was convicted in cause number 393-211, "a felony grade violation" and was ultimately sentenced to one-year imprisonment. After serving his sentence, Lee was arrested on the charges contained in cause number 423-520. Lee’s plea agreement not only admits guilt to the new felony cocaine possession charge, but further admits he is the same individual previously convicted under cause number 393-211. Because Lee was previously convicted of felony possession, the Louisiana code elevated the second felony possession to a possible punishment range of no less than thirty-months' and no more than ten-years' imprisonment. See LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:529.1 (2006); 40:967(C)(2). Lee was sentenced to thirty-months' imprisonment.
Thus, the record supports both cause numbers in State’s Exhibit #4 were felony offenses and punishable by imprisonment pursuant to Louisiana Statute. See LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:529.1 ; 40:967(C)(2). Additionally, the offenses were felonies pursuant to Texas Penal Code section 12.41(1), which provides than any out of state conviction, punishable by imprisonment in "another penitentiary," is classified as a third-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.41(1) (West 2011). Because the Louisiana statutes further provide that both of Lee’s offenses, committed pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statute section 40:967(C)(2), may be used for enhancement purposes, the convictions contained within State’s Exhibit #4 were final convictions for enhancement purposes. See Brown v. State , 508 S.W.3d 453, 460 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, pet. ref'd) ("[W]hen a foreign conviction may be properly used for enhancement purposes in the state in which it arose, it may likewise be used in Texas.").
We, therefore, turn to the evidence linking Lee to the prior convictions.
3. Evidence Linking State’s Exhibit #4 to Lee
We remain mindful that the State need not prove a defendant’s prior conviction in any specific manner or with any specific documents. Flowers , 220 S.W.3d at 922. The State’s burden requires proof that a prior conviction exists and that the defendant is linked to the conviction. Id. at 921. Conceding that "a certified copy of a final judgment and sentence may be a preferred and convenient means," the Flowers Court explained there are several ways in which the State can prove the required elements for the enhancement.
(1) the defendant’s admission or stipulation, (2) testimony by a person who was present when the person was convicted of the specified crime and can identify the defendant as that person, or (3) documentary proof (such as a judgment) that contains sufficient information to establish both the existence of a prior conviction and the defendant’s identity as the person convicted.
Flowers , 220 S.W.3d at 921–22 (footnotes omitted).
a. Certified Copies of Louisiana Convictions
State’s Exhibit #4 provided documentary proof through certified court documents showing that Frederick D. Lee entered a plea of guilty to possession of cocaine on two different occasions. Additionally, in cause number 423-520, Frederick D. Lee stipulated that he was pleading guilty not only to possession of cocaine, but also that he was a habitual offender, having been "the same person convicted in cause number 393-211 on November 30, 2001."
The exhibit presented at sentencing provides evidence of the different dates associated with the prior convictions. There is no overlap between the timeline of the first conviction and the arrest of the second conviction. Considering the totality of the State’s documentation, a reasonable trier of fact could have found Lee was convicted of two prior felonies in Louisiana. See Clayton v. State , 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (examining all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determining whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt) (citing Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ).
b. Other Identifying Evidence
The State presented three other exhibits, containing fingerprints taken when Lee was booked by Bexar County Sherriff’s Office, that were not admitted into evidence. Roxanne Rosas, the State’s fingerprint examiner, testified that the fingerprints on the three other exhibits were the fingerprints taken from Lee in the courtroom. However, because the fingerprints contained within State’s Exhibit #4 were not of sufficient quality, Rosas was unable to make a full comparison between the fingerprints taken in court and the fingerprints contained within State’s Exhibit #4. We must therefore look to further evidence of identifiers linking Lee to the prior convictions contained in State’s Exhibit #4. See Flowers , 220 S.W.3d at 921, 925 (holding State proved prior DWI conviction despite that conviction printout did not contain appellant’s fingerprints); Williams v. State , 946 S.W.2d 886, 895 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no pet.) (holding that a rational trier of fact could have found Williams was the same Andrew Earl Williams previously convicted of two DWI convictions based solely on information in driver’s license and driving record).
State’s Exhibit #4 contained identifying information within the certified documents. Cause number 393-211 included the defendant’s name (Frederick D. Lee), sex (male), race (black), and date of birth (October 31, 1976), and an address. Cause number 423-520 included the defendant’s name (Frederick D. Lee), sex (male), race (black), date of birth (October 31, 1976), address, height, weight, social security number (last four digits XXXX), hair color, eye color, and fingerprints. State’s Exhibit #5 is Lee’s booking slip for the current offense, from the Bexar County Sheriff’s Office. The exhibit contained identifying information including Lee’s name (Frederick Lee), sex (male), race (black), date of birth (October 31, 1976), address, height, weight, social security number (last four digits XXXX), hair color, and eye color.
The State also presented Sandra’s testimony that Lee’s birthday was October 31, 1976. Included in the defense exhibits were Lee’s divorce decree, in which Lee is identified as "Frederick D. Lee" and a letter from Lee’s aunt, in which Lee is referred to as "Frederick Devonne Lee" who moved to Texas from Louisiana in August of 2005 after Hurricane Katrina. Based on all of the evidence presented, the record supported that a black male, from Louisiana, born on October 31, 1976, with a social security number ending in XXXX, named Frederick Lee, committed all three offenses. See Flowers , 220 S.W.3d at 925 (explaining that "although it is conceivable that there are two men ... with the same date of birth, living at the same address, with the same personal descriptors, ... it is not likely."); see also Ex parte Warren , 353 S.W.3d 490, 495 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (orig. proceeding) (noting that appellant made no attempt to challenge that he had never been convicted of them, only that the State failed to connect the convictions to the defendant); cf. Prihoda v. State , 352 S.W.3d 796, 809–10 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. ref'd) (holding comparison of defendant’s signatures, without more, was insufficient to link defendant to prior convictions).
c. Analysis
Although not all of the identifiers in State’s Exhibit #4 matched the information given in Exhibit #5, there were several consistencies. While it is possible that another black male with the same name and birthday, who was living in Louisiana at the same time as Lee, used his name, birthdate, and social security number in two different convictions, it is unlikely. See Flowers , 220 S.W.3d at 925.
Much like the puzzle pieces in Flowers , the identifying information contained within these exhibits is internally consistent. See id. at 920–21. When looking at all of the puzzle pieces, in other words the totality of the evidence, in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings, see Wood , 486 S.W.3d at 589, we conclude a reasonable trier of fact could determine that the Frederick D. Lee convicted in Louisiana cause numbers 393-211 and 423-520, as evidenced in State’s Exhibit #4, is the same Frederick Lee convicted of aggravated sexual assault in the present case. See Clayton , 235 S.W.3d at 778 (examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict). We, therefore, conclude the record contains sufficient evidence to support the enhanced punishment pursuant to the habitual offender statute.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled each of Lee’s issues on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.