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Lee v. Liu

California Court of Appeals, Sixth District
Apr 24, 2009
No. H032669 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2009)

Opinion


CHING CHING LEE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. HUNG TAO LIU, et al., Defendants and Respondents. H032669 California Court of Appeal, Sixth District April 24, 2009

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. CV806140

Bamattre-Manoukian, ACTING P.J.

I. INTRODUCTION

Appellant Ching Ching Lee signed three promissory notes when she purchased a commercial building in Mountain View. Each promissory note was secured by a deed of trust on the Mountain View property in favor of the noteholders, who included respondents Hung Tao Liu, Huei Fen Hsu, and Yu Chang Tu. Lee failed to make any payments on the promissory notes and two noteholders attempted foreclosure. Lee responded by filing an action in which she sought cancellation of one promissory note, rescission of all three promissory notes, and a permanent injunction barring the defendant noteholders from enforcing the notes and deeds of trust. She claimed that the promissory notes and deeds of trust were invalid because her signatures had been obtained through mistake and fraud, and because no consideration had been given.

Defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that Lee’s claims lacked merit as a matter of law because it was undisputed that Lee had failed to read the promissory notes or have them explained to her before she signed them, defendants had done nothing to defraud her, and Lee had received consideration in exchange for all three promissory notes. The trial court granted the summary judgment motion and Lee appealed. This court reversed the judgment because defendants had failed to meet their initial burden on summary judgment to show as a matter of law that Lee was not entitled to rescission on the ground of unilateral mistake, pursuant to Civil Code section 1689, subdivision (b)(1). (Lee v. Liu (Sept. 1, 2006, H028096) [nonpub. opn.] (Lee I).)

Some of the background information in this opinion has been taken from our prior opinion. (Lee I, supra, H028096.)

Before the decision in Lee I issued, the Mountain View property securing defendants’ promissory notes was sold to a third party in a foreclosure sale. As a result of the foreclosure sale, defendants received the full amounts owing under the promissory notes and deeds of trust, plus interest. Defendants subsequently brought a second motion for summary judgment on the ground that the causes of action in Lee’s complaint, for cancellation of instrument, rescission of promissory notes, and injunctive relief, were moot as a result of the foreclosure sale. The trial court granted the motion and entered judgment in defendants’ favor.

On appeal from the second summary judgment, Lee contends that the trial court erred because, even if rescission of the promissory notes and deeds of trust is not available due to the foreclosure sale, she is nevertheless entitled to equitable restitution and consequential damages. For the reasons stated below, we conclude that Lee’s contentions lack merit and therefore we will affirm the judgment.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Complaint

The allegations in Lee’s complaint concern the circumstances under which she purchased commercial property in Mountain View. Lee alleged that she was a recent immigrant from Taiwan whose primary language is Mandarin Chinese. She was befriended by defendant Mali Kuo, who offered to help Lee with the various matters that Lee encountered in the United States. Kuo gained Lee’s trust and confidence and Lee came to rely on her for financial and investment advice. During their financial dealings together, Lee gave Kuo over $1 million to invest. Kuo’s investment advice included her recommendation that Lee purchase commercial property in Mountain View that Kuo owned.

The trial court granted Lee’s request for dismissal of defendant Mali Kuo without prejudice on September 1, 2005, and she is not a party to this appeal.

Kuo further advised Lee that she could acquire the $2.4 million Mountain View property by obtaining a new loan in the amount of $1.4 million, because Kuo, as the seller, would give Lee a credit of $1 million towards the purchase price since Kuo owed Lee at least $1 million. However, unknown to Lee, Kuo had conspired with defendants to have Lee sign false promissory notes and deeds of trust encumbering the Mountain View property as part of the purchase transaction. When escrow closed, Kuo convinced Lee to sign multiple documents that Lee had not read and did not understand, which included three promissory notes and deeds of trust in favor of defendants.

According to Lee, all of the instruments that she signed were obtained through fraud, mistake, undue influence and without consideration. Based on these allegations, Lee stated three causes of action: (1) a first cause of action for cancellation of a $265,000 promissory note and fourth deed of trust in favor of defendants Liu and Hsu; (2) a second cause of action against all defendants for rescission of the promissory notes and deeds of trust (including the $265,000 promissory note and fourth deed of trust in favor of defendants Liu and Hsu, the $50,000 promissory note and a second deed of trust in favor of defendant Tu, and the $135,000 promissory note and third deed of trust in favor of defendants Liu and Hsu); and (3) a third cause of action against all defendants for a permanent injunction barring them from attempting to enforce the promissory notes and/or deeds of trust and specifically enjoining the use of foreclosure proceedings.

Respondent Tu was not named as a defendant in the original complaint. The first amendment to the complaint, filed November 20, 2002, substituted Tu for Doe I.

B. The First Motion for Summary Judgment

Our prior decision in Lee I, supra, H028096concerned defendants’ first motion for summary judgment, or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of issues (first summary judgment motion). In their first summary judgment motion, defendants conceded for purposes of the motion that several factual allegations made by Lee were undisputed: (1) when Lee signed the three promissory notes, she did not know what she was signing and she did not intend to sign promissory notes and deeds of trust in favor of Liu, Hsu and Tu; (2) when escrow closed on the Mountain View property, Kuo asked Lee to sign “a stack of documents” and told her that they were “routine documents which needed to be signed” to purchase the subject property; (3) Lee signed the promissory notes and deeds of trust “without reading them or knowing that she was signing such documents” because she had misplaced her trust in Kuo, who tricked her; and (4) Lee did not understand English very well and could not read or understand the promissory notes and deeds of trust.

Even assuming that these allegations were true, defendants asserted that Lee could not show that the promissory notes and deeds of trust were invalid and subject to cancellation or rescission. Since Lee had neither read the documents nor had them explained to her before signing them, defendants argued that her claims were precluded by the well established principle of contract law that one who signs a contract without reading it, or, if unable to read, without having the contract read or explained, is deemed to have consented to and to be bound by the terms of the contract. (Randas v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 158, 163.)

Defendants also argued that because it was undisputed that they had not been aware of or participated in Kuo’s alleged wrongdoing, nor had they encouraged or fostered Lee’s mistake in signing the promissory notes and deeds of trust, the instruments were valid and neither cancellation nor rescission was available. Finally, defendants argued that the promissory notes and deeds of trust could not be voided on the ground of lack of consideration because the evidence showed that that Lee had received valuable consideration for each promissory note.

The trial court granted the first summary judgment motion. Lee appealed and this court reversed the judgment, concluding that defendants had not met their initial burden on summary judgment to show as a matter of law that Lee was not entitled to rescission on the ground of unilateral mistake, pursuant to Civil Code section 1689, subdivision (b)(1). In reaching this conclusion, we determined that defendants had made no evidentiary showing that Lee had neglected her legal duty by failing to have the promissory notes and deed of trust explained to her by a person on whom she could rely or place her confidence. (Donovan v. RRL Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 261, 283; Hawkins v. Hawkins (1875) 50 Cal. 558, 559.)

C. The Second Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendants’ second motion for summary adjudication or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of issues (second summary judgment motion), was filed on August 10, 2007. Their primary argument was that the foreclosure sale held on May 27, 2004, in which the Mountain View property was sold to a third party, had caused all three causes of action in Lee’s complaint to become moot as a matter of law.

In support of this argument, defendants asserted that the following facts were undisputed: (1) the Mountain View property was sold at the foreclosure sale for $1.5 million; (2) defendant Liu had been paid the full amount owing, plus interest, under the $265,000 promissory note and fourth deed of trust from the foreclosure sale proceeds; (3) defendant Liu had been paid the full amount owing, plus interest, under the $135,000 promissory note and third deed of trust from the foreclosure sale proceeds; (4) defendant Tu had been paid the full amount owing, plus interest, under the $50,000 deed of trust from the foreclosure sale proceeds; (5) Lee had received a total of $506,847.12 from the foreclosure sale proceeds; and (6) Lee had suffered no damage as a result of the purchase and sale of the Mountain View property.

Based on these undisputed facts, defendants argued that the first cause of action for cancellation of the $265,000 promissory note and fourth deed of trust lacked merit because these written instruments had been satisfied and no longer existed. Defendants relied on Civil Code section 3412 for their contention that a written instrument must be outstanding in order to be cancelled.

Civil Code section 3412 provides, “A written instrument, in respect to which there is a reasonable apprehension that if left outstanding it may cause serious injury to a person against whom it is void or voidable, may, upon his application, be so adjudged, and ordered to be delivered up or canceled.”

As to the second cause of action for rescission of all three promissory notes and deeds of trust, defendants asserted as a matter of law that rescission was no longer available as a result of the foreclosure sale. They argued that where, as here, a change in circumstances prevents the parties from being restored to their original positions, rescission is not possible. The change in circumstances in the present case, defendants explained, included the payment of their promissory notes and deeds of trust from the proceeds of the foreclosure sale of the Mountain View property. Defendants also argued that rescission of the instruments was not available because it would adversely affect the rights of third parties, including the former owner and the lenders.

Additionally, defendants asserted that Lee had not been damaged by the foreclosure sale, for two reasons. First, because it was undisputed that although she had paid nothing for her purchase of the Mountain View property, she had received more than $500,000 from the foreclosure sale proceeds. Second, defendants pointed out that in the companion case, Lee v. Kuo, Santa Clara Superior Court, case No. CV802789, the trial court had ruled that Lee had not been damaged as a result of the purchase and sale of the Mountain View property.

An appeal is presently pending in this court. (Lee v. Kuo, H032436.)

Similarly, defendants asserted that the foreclosure sale had rendered the third cause of action for injunctive relief moot, since the third cause of action sought to enjoin defendants from enforcing the promissory notes and deeds of trust, including enforcement by the use of foreclosure proceedings. Defendants argued that a foreclosure sale cannot be enjoined when the sale has already taken place. They also argued that there was nothing left to enjoin because the promissory notes had been paid and Lee did not owe anything on the notes.

Finally, defendants reiterated the arguments that they had made in the first summary judgment motion: that Lee could not obtain rescission of the promissory notes and deeds of trust because she had failed to read the documents or have them explained to her, and there was no evidence that defendants had participated in Mali Kuo’s alleged wrongdoing in convincing Lee to sign the promissory notes and deeds of trust.

D. The Opposition to the Second Summary Judgment Motion

Lee filed her opposition to the second summary judgment motion on October 15, 2007. Her primary argument was that most of the facts that defendants asserted were undisputed were either “sharply disputed” or “do nothing to support the motion.” (Underscore omitted.) However, the separate statement of disputed and undisputed facts that Lee filed on October 15, 2007, only stated, in response to defendants’ statement of undisputed facts, “[a]ll items disputed at this time in order to preserve the right to claim as disputed at the anticipated continued hearing date.” Lee subsequently filed another separate statement of facts on November 2, 2007, that stated, as to each of defendants’ undisputed facts, that the fact was “Disputed.” However, Lee’s second separate statement of facts did not either set forth the specific facts showing that a triable question of material fact existed or describe the evidence supporting Lee’s contention that the fact was disputed, as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivisions (b)(3), (o)(2) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(f).

During the hearing on the second summary judgment motion, held November 19, 2007, Lee’s attorney asked that Lee’s separate statement of facts be modified to indicate that fact No. 19 was undisputed. Defendant’s undisputed fact No. 19 states, “Lee contends that at the closing of the escrow for her purchase of the [Mountain View] Property, KUO handed her a stack of documents and asked her to sign them, and that KUO did not tell LEE what the documents were or why she needed to sign them, but only that they were routine documents which needed to be signed to purchase the [Mountain View] Property.”

As to defendants’ contention that all three causes of action stated in her complaint were moot as a result of the foreclosure sale, Lee’s entire argument was as follows: “The Defendants make two critical assertions, that Plaintiff was not harmed and that the bell cannot be un-rung. But the property was a commercial property owned and sold as an investment. The foreclosure does not prevent the Court from ordering a disgorgement of wrongful gain. This would be an appropriate remedy here.” We observe that Lee’s argument did not contain any reference to the facts or the law. Lee also requested a continuance of the hearing on the second summary judgment motion for the purpose of obtaining “controverting evidence” that could not be previously obtained.

Lee filed a supplemental opposition to the second summary judgment motion on November 2, 2007, in which she reiterated her previous arguments and asserted that she had not agreed to take a loan from defendants Tu and Liu.

E. The Trial Court’s Order

The trial court issued its order granting defendants’ second summary judgment motion on December 5, 2007.

Regarding the first cause of action for cancellation of instrument, the trial court found that defendants had shown that the $265,000 promissory note and deed of trust were satisfied from the proceeds of the May 27, 2004 foreclosure sale and therefore no instrument existed that could be cancelled. The trial court also found that Lee had failed to “meet her burden to present evidence raising a triable issue of material fact that the instruments to be cancelled are still outstanding.”

As to the second cause of action for rescission, the trial court found as a matter of law that the right of rescission no longer existed because changed circumstances had made it impossible to restore the status quo, since the Mountain View property had been purchased by third parties who had no obligation to return it. The trial court further found that “no equity remains to be done in favor of Plaintiff. She has not been damaged as a result of the purchase and sale of the Property....”

Additionally, the trial court determined that the third cause of action for injunctive relief was moot because Lee no longer owned the Mountain View property and she did not owe defendants any amounts under the promissory notes and deeds of trust.

Finally, the trial court denied Lee’s request for a continuance of the hearing on the second summary judgment motion, noting that the court had previously granted three continuances, including two continuances to allow her to conduct further discovery with respect to the first summary judgment motion, and one prior continuance with respect to the second summary judgment motion.

Judgment was entered on the summary judgment order on January 2, 2008, and Lee filed a timely notice of appeal.

III. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Lee contends that the trial court erred in granting the second summary judgment motion on the ground that the right of rescission no longer exists. She raises no issue on appeal with respect to the summary adjudication of the first cause of action for rescission or the third cause of action for a permanent injunction. Our analysis therefore focuses on the order granting summary adjudication of the second cause of action for rescission, which we will review under the de novo standard of review, as set forth below.

A. The Standard of Review

The standard of review for an order granting a motion for summary judgment is de novo. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)25 Cal.4th 826, 860 (Aguilar.) The trial court’s stated reasons for granting summary judgment are not binding on the reviewing court, which reviews the trial court’s ruling, not its rationale. (Kids’ Universe v. In2Labs (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 870, 878.)

In performing our independent review, we apply the same three-step process as the trial court. “Because summary judgment is defined by the material allegations in the pleadings, we first look to the pleadings to identify the elements of the causes of action for which relief is sought.” (Baptist v. Robinson (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 151, 159.)

“We then examine the moving party’s motion, including the evidence offered in support of the motion.” (Baptist v. Robinson, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 159.) A defendant moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of showing that a cause of action lacks merit because one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established or there is a complete defense to that cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.)

If the defendant fails to make this initial showing, it is unnecessary to examine the plaintiff’s opposing evidence and the motion must be denied. However, if the moving papers make a prima facie showing that justifies a judgment in the defendant’s favor, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (§ 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 849; Kahn v. East Side Union High School Dist. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 990, 1002-1003.)

In determining whether the parties have met their respective burdens, the court must “ ‘consider all of the evidence’ and ‘all’ of the ‘inferences’ reasonably drawn there from [citation] and must view such evidence [citations] and such inferences [citations] in the light most favorable to the opposing party.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.) “There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Id. at p. 850, fn. omitted.) Thus, a party “cannot avoid summary judgment by asserting facts based on mere speculation and conjecture, but instead must produce admissible evidence raising a triable issue of fact. [Citation.]” (LaChapelle v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 977, 981.)

B. The Second Cause of Action for Rescission

We will begin our analysis with an overview of the pertinent rules governing rescission. “A party to a contract may rescind if ‘the consent of the party rescinding... was given by... fraud....’ (Civ. Code, § 1689, subd. (b)(1).) (Gill v. Rich (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1254, 1265.) ‘Rescission for illegality... is a remedy which enables a party, in the circumstances specified, to procure restitutionary relief with respect to a contract that was never enforceable.’ [Citation.]” (People ex rel. Kennedy v. Beaumont Investment, Ltd. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 102, 133 (Beaumont Investment).) “ ‘The consequence of rescission is not only the termination of further liability, but also the restoration of the parties to their former positions by requiring each to return whatever consideration has been received.’ [Citations.]” (NMSBPCSLDHB v. County of Fresno (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 954, 959-960.) Additionally, “after rescission of a contract, the aggrieved party ‘shall be awarded complete relief, including restitution of benefits[.]’ ” (Beaumont Investment, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 133, quoting Runyon v. Pacific Air Industries, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 304, 311, fn. 10.)

However, “[i]t is, of course, fundamental that where the rights of others have intervened and circumstances have so far changed that rescission may not be decreed without injury to those parties and their rights, rescission will be denied and the complaining party left to his [or her] other remedies. [Citation.]” (Beckwith v. Sheldon (1913) 165 Cal.319, 324.) In other words, “ ‘there can be no rescission where the rights of third parties would be prejudiced.’ [Citations.]” (Gill v. Rich, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 1265.) Thus, where the court found that a contract for the purchase of a laundry business was “procured through false representations,” but it was not possible to return the business to the sellers and thereby restore the status quo, the sale could not be rescinded and money damages were properly awarded. (Kasch v. Labor Temple Assoc. (1912) 18 Cal.App. 508, 511-512.)

In the second cause of action for rescission, Lee seeks rescission of all three promissory notes and deeds of trust, alleging that these instruments are invalid because defendants conspired with Mali Kuo to fraudulently cause Lee to sign documents that she did not understand and to which she did not consent. Lee contends that the trial court erred in granting summary adjudication of her cause of action for rescission on the ground that changed circumstances had made it impossible to restore the status quo (since it was undisputed that the Mountain View property had been purchased by third parties who had no obligation to return it.)

While she does not disagree with the trial court’s finding that the status quo cannot be restored, Lee contends that her claim for rescission nevertheless survives because she is entitled to compensation for the damages she suffered as a result of the foreclosure sale. In making this argument, Lee relies upon Civil Code section 1692, which provides in part that “[a] claim for damages is not inconsistent with a claim for relief based upon rescission.” She also asserts that it is well established that where, as here, the status quo cannot be restored, the court may afford the injured party the equitable remedies of restitution and consequential damages.

In response, defendants emphasize Lee’s failure to produce any evidence to show that an issue of material fact exists with regard to the second cause of action for rescission. Defendants also note the complaint includes only a claim for rescission, and does not include a claim for damages, whether “consequential or otherwise.” Further, defendants reiterate their argument below that where, as here, “the rights of others have intervened and circumstances have so far changed that rescission may not be decreed without injury to those parties and their rights, rescission will be denied and the complaining party left to his [or her] other remedies.” Alternatively, defendants argue that since Lee accepted the benefit of the promissory notes and deeds of trust by receiving over $500,000 from the foreclosure sale proceeds, she has waived her right to seek rescission of the instruments.

We agree with defendants that Lee’s argument in her opening brief regarding whether Mali Kuo had a fiduciary relationship with Lee is irrelevant to the issues on appeal.

At the outset, we address the potentially dispositive issue of Lee’s failure to include a claim for damages in her complaint. As we stated in Part A, ante, because “summary judgment is defined by the material allegations in the pleadings, we first look to the pleadings to identify the elements of the causes of action for which relief is sought.” (Baptist v. Robinson, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 159.) Therefore, “summary judgment cannot be denied on a ground not raised by the pleadings. [Citation.]” (Bostrom v. County of San Bernardino (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1654, 1663.) “If either party wishes the trial court to consider a previously unpleaded issue in connection with a motion for summary judgment, it may request leave to amend.” (Id. at pp. 1663-1664.)

We find that Lee’s failure to plead a claim for damages is not fatal to her cause of action for rescission. The general rule is that “a court of equity, having once acquired jurisdiction, will adjust all the differences between the parties arising from the cause of action in order to do complete justice and prevent further litigation, whether or not the particular relief was requested. [Citations.]” (Sears v. Rule (1945) 27 Cal.2d 131, 148-149.) Thus, where the trial court found that a sale of personal property should be rescinded due to the incapacity of the seller, but the property could not be restored due to changes in ownership, the appropriate remedy was a monetary judgment, even though the complaint had “nowhere asked for such relief.” (Swan v. Talbot (1907) 152 Cal. 142, 147.)

Our determination that Lee’s failure to plead a claim for damages does not compel summary adjudication of her cause of action for rescission is not the end of our analysis, since we further determine that summary adjudication was properly granted on another ground. While Lee argues on appeal that she is entitled to maintain her cause of action for rescission in order to seek equitable relief in the form of money damages, we find that Lee has effectively conceded that she suffered no damages.

Defendants’ separate statement of undisputed facts states, as fact No. 32, that Lee “suffered no damage as a result of the [Mountain View property] purchase and sale.” Defendants’ supporting evidence includes Lee’s stipulation in which she acknowledges receipt of $506,847.12 from the foreclosure sale. Defendants therefore met their burden on summary judgment to show as a matter of law that Lee suffered no damages as a result of the purchase and sale of the Mountain View property, and the burden shifted to Lee to show a triable issue of material fact. However, Lee’s separate statement “disputing the separate statement of undisputed material facts submitted by the moving party” merely states that defendants’ fact No. 32 is “Disputed,” without any description of the nature of the dispute or a reference to supporting evidence.

Under the rules applicable to summary judgment motions, Lee’s response to defendants’ fact No. 32 was insufficient to create a triable issue of material fact as to whether she had suffered any damages as a result of the purchase and sale of the Mountain View property. Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (b)(3) provides that the party opposing a motion for summary judgment must include in his or her opposition papers a separate statement that “shall set forth plainly and concisely any other material facts that the opposing party contends are disputed. Each material fact contended by the opposing party to be disputed shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence.” Additionally, Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (p)(2) provides that a plaintiff “may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action or defense thereto.”

Thus, as required by California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(f), “An opposing party who contends that a fact is disputed must state, on the right side of the page directly opposite the fact in dispute, the nature of the dispute and describe the evidence that supports the position that the fact is controverted. That evidence must be supported by citation to exhibit, title, page, and line numbers in the evidence submitted.” In short, once the moving party has met his or her initial burden to show that a cause of action lacks merit as a matter of law, to avoid summary judgment the opposing party must present evidence that reveals a triable issue of material fact. “[T]he opposition to summary judgment will be deemed insufficient when it is essentially conclusionary, argumentative or based on conjecture and speculation. [Citations.]” (Wiz Technology, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1, 11.)

Therefore, since defendants met their initial burden on summary judgment to show that the second cause of action for rescission lacked merit as a matter of law, while Lee failed to meet her burden to show that a triable issue of material fact exists, we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting summary adjudication of the second cause of action for rescission. For that reason, and because Lee does not challenge the trial court’s summary adjudication of the first cause of action for cancellation of instrument and the third cause of action for a permanent injunction, we will affirm the summary judgment.

IV. DISPOSITION

The judgment on the order granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment, entered January 2, 2008, is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to respondents.

WE CONCUR: McAdams, J., Duffy, J.


Summaries of

Lee v. Liu

California Court of Appeals, Sixth District
Apr 24, 2009
No. H032669 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2009)
Case details for

Lee v. Liu

Case Details

Full title:CHING CHING LEE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. HUNG TAO LIU, et al.…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Sixth District

Date published: Apr 24, 2009

Citations

No. H032669 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2009)