Opinion
24A-CR-862
10-23-2024
Donald Lee Leath, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Lisa Diane Manning Plainfield, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Daylon L. Welliver Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court The Honorable Stephenie K. Gookins, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 29D06-2309-F6-6596
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Lisa Diane Manning
Plainfield, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Indiana Attorney General
Daylon L. Welliver
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Crone, Judge.
Case Summary
[¶1] Donald Lee Leath appeals the sanction he received upon admitting to violating the terms of his community corrections placement by committing a new criminal offense. Finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court's order of incarceration, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] In September 2023, Leath was charged with level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine, class A misdemeanor false identity statement, and class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 2. The State also filed a notice of intent to seek habitual offender status. Id. at 3. In November 2023, Leath pled guilty to the methamphetamine charge. Id. at 9. The remaining counts were dismissed, and he was sentenced to 910 days executed, with 180 days to be served in a secure detention facility and 730 days to be served in the Hamilton County Community Corrections (HCCC) work release program. Id.
[¶3] In early February 2024, Leath was arrested and charged with possession of a synthetic drug or lookalike substance, and a notice of noncompliance with community corrections was filed. Id. at 16. HCCC noted that a camera captured the incident and that due to Leath's attempt to circumvent its security "by bringing in a substance that he believed to be Spice, [Leath] is not appropriate for return to residential supervision." Id. at 25-26.
[¶4] At a March 2024 hearing, Leath admitted his noncompliance. Tr. Vol. 2 at 1011. Leath stated that he had previously received substance abuse treatment and could re-enroll. Id. at 13-14. He also introduced various certificates for jail programs that he had completed during the month after his arrest. Id. at 12; Ex. Vol. 3 at 5-15. Leath requested work release and testified that he had a fast food job to which he could return. Tr. Vol. 2 at 13. The State argued that Leath "has a lengthy criminal history" including convictions for theft, criminal mischief, burglary, resisting law enforcement, and battery. Id. at 17. The trial court denied Leath's request, revoked his community corrections placement, and ordered him to serve the remaining 610 days, less credit time served, in a secure detention facility. Appealed Order at 1. Leath appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[¶5] Leath contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to serve his remaining sentence in a secure detention facility rather than returning him to community corrections work release after the revocation of his placement.
[¶6] Probation and community corrections programs serve as alternatives to incarceration, and both are made at the sole discretion of the trial court. Treece v. State, 10 N.E.3d 52, 56 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014), trans. denied. Indeed, a defendant is not entitled to serve his sentence in either probation or a community corrections program; rather, such placement is a matter of grace and a conditional liberty that is a favor, not a right. Id. "Once a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to proceed." Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3(h) offers the trial court the following options when it finds a defendant has violated the terms of probation: (1) "[c]ontinue the person on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions[,]" (2) "[e]xtend the person's probationary period for not more than one (1) year beyond the original probationary period[,]" or (3) "[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing."
[¶7] We review a trial court's selection of a sanction for an abuse of discretion. Overstreet v. State, 136 N.E.3d 260, 263 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019), trans. denied (2020). An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. "When reviewing an appeal from the revocation of probation, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment, and we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Sanders v. State, 825 N.E.2d 952, 954-55 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005), trans. denied. So long as the trial court follows the procedures outlined in Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3, the court may properly order execution of a suspended sentence upon a finding of a single violation by a preponderance of the evidence. Killebrew v. State, 165 N.E.3d 578, 582 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021), trans. denied.
[¶8] Leath does not challenge his admitted violation or argue that the trial court failed to follow the relevant statutory procedures. Rather, Leath maintains that because he "took responsibility" for his new offense, worked to better himself while incarcerated, was in recovery, and "was not beyond the rehabilitative efforts of community corrections," the trial court should have ordered work release. Appellant's Br. at 6, 8. In essence, he disputes the weight given to the mitigating evidence that he presented.
[¶9] We reiterate that so long as the trial court follows statutory procedures the court may properly order execution of all or any part of a suspended sentence upon finding a single violation. Killebrew, 165 N.E.3d at 582. Moreover, in determining the appropriate sanction upon finding a violation, "trial courts are not required to balance aggravating and mitigating circumstances." Id. In any event, given the camera footage, Leath's admission did not provide a significant benefit to the State. Additionally, while we commend Leath for earning certificates during the month between his arrest and sentencing, and we hope that the acquired knowledge will assist him in the future, the trial court was not required to give them any weight.
[¶10] In determining the violation sanction, the trial court observed that HCCC "doesn't want [Leath] back." Tr. Vol. 2 at 18. The trial court then explained that he was not returning Leath to a program where he "owe[d] a bunch of money, [he wasn't] keeping up, and [he] violated for one of the issues that [he's] indicated has been a problem." Id. We cannot say that the trial court's chosen sanction was clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.
According to the HCCC, Leath had an outstanding balance of more than $1,200. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 26.
We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Leath's placement and ordering him to serve his previously suspended sentence in a secure detention facility.
[¶11] Affirmed.
Altice, C.J., and Vaidik, J., concur.