Plaintiff commenced this action against numerous Defendants of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New York State law. Dkt. No. 1, Compl. The filing fee in this action has not been paid, but Plaintiff has filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Dkt. No. 2. The matter has been referred to the undersigned for an initial review pursuant to L.R. 72.3.

I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE COMPLAINT

A. Governing Legal Standard

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) directs that, when a plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, “(2) . . . the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that - . . . (B) the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Thus, even if a plaintiff meets th financial criteria to commence an action in forma pauperis, it is the court's responsibility to determine whether the plaintiff may properly maintain the complaint that he filed ii this District before the court may permit the plaintiff to proceed with this action in forma pauperis. See id.

To determine whether an action is frivolous, a court must look to see whether the complaint “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).

Likewise, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a court must review any “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity” and must “identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint . . . is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or . . . seeks monetary relief from t defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; see also Carr v. Dvorin 171 F.3d 115, 116 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam); Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating that both sections 1915 and 1915A are available to evaluate pro st i prisoner complaints).

Review of Plaintiff's claims is warranted under this section given that he was incarcerated at the time the action was filed.

In reviewing a pro se complaint, the court has a duty to show liberality toward pro se litigants, see Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam), and should exercise “extreme caution . . . in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served and both parties (but particularly the plaintiff) have had an opportunity to respond.” Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, a court should not dismiss a complaint if the plaintiff has stated “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

Although a court should construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not show[n] - that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Thus, a pleading that only “tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” will not suffice. Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

B. Summary of the Complaint

According to the allegations in the Complaint, Plaintiff was involved in a traffic stop on February 7, 2023. Compl. at p. 25. Plaintiff was not the driver of the vehicle stopped by law enforcement. Id. Plaintiff maintains that the stop was improperly prolonged through coercion and that he was drugged at the scene of the stop. Id. at pp. 7 & 25. He alleges that he was illegally and without legal basis handcuffed and brought to a police station where he was then chained to the wall. Id. at pp. 8 & 25. He claims that he lost consciousness as a result of being drugged. Id. at p. 8. He claims he was then denied medical care while incarcerated at the St. Lawrence County Correctional Facility. See, e.g., id. at p. 30. He also alleges that throughout the ensuing criminal court proceedings, Defendants conspired to violate his rights both in the grand jury proceedings and in open court by falsifying evidence and otherwise denying him the ability to fully defend himself. See generally id. at pp. 12-15.

Page citations are to page numbers generated by the Court's CM/ECF system.

C. Analysis of the Complaint

1. Eighth Amendment Claims

Throughout the Complaint, Plaintiff purports to assert Eighth Amendment claims regarding his treatment by law enforcement Defendants at or near the time of his arrest. See, e.g., Compl. at pp. 8, 9, & 10. Courts have consistently recognized that “the Eighth Amendment does not apply ‘until after conviction and sentence.'” Wright v. New York City, 2012 WL 4057958, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2012) (quoting United States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37, 47 (2d Cir. 1999)); see also Lindsey v. Butler, 43 F.Supp.3d 317, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“the Eighth Amendment attaches only after conviction”). Plaintiff's allegations regarding his detention without a conviction, therefore, do not implicate the Eighth Amendment and should be dismissed with prejudice.

2. Absolute Immunity and State Action

In actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 judges enjoy absolute immunity from suit for actions taken in the performance of their duties. Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that “[j]udges enjoy absolute immunity from personal liability for ‘acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction'”) (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967)). The Complaint specifically alleges that Defendant Stories took actions that allegedly violated Plaintiff's rights through the manner by which he has conducted judicial proceedings. Compl. at pp. 20, 22, & 23-24. This conduct clearly relates to the official duties of a judge and so Plaintiff's claims in this regard are barred by absolute immunity. Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d at 51; Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009) (“acts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before the judge are considered judicial in nature”).

Prosecutors enjoy the same immunity from suit. Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 261-62 (2006). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Charpentier violated his rights during the presentation of his case to the grand jury and in court proceedings. See, e.g., Compl. at pp. 12-15. “The presentation of a case to a grand jury falls squarely within the prosecutor's traditional function and is thus subject to absolute immunity.” Maglione v. Briggs, 748 F.2d 116, 118 (2d Cir. 1984). “The fact that Plaintiff's claim is premised on an alleged conspiracy does not deprive [Defendant] of absolute immunity.” Pinaud v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 52 F.3d 1139, 1148 (2d Cir. 1995).

Defendants Reindeau, Farrell, Mcgahan and Applebe are alleged to have acted as counsel for Plaintiff during his criminal proceedings and Plaintiff makes multiple allegations against them regarding that representation, including failing to provide him with adequate representation. See, e.g., Compl. at pp. 12-14, 22, 33, & 42. A claim under section 1983 requires that there be state action. Flagg v. Yonkers Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, FA, 396 F.3d 178, 186 (2d Cir. 2005). Courts have routinely agreed, however, that criminal defense counsel are not state actors for purposes of section 1983. Washington v. Bergman, 2019 WL 3947790, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. July 29, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 3942974 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2019) (citing cases). This is true even if counsel is appointed as a public defender. See Fisk v. Letterman, 401 F.Supp.2d 362, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing cases). Plaintiff has offered no basis for finding that these attorneys were state actors and so all claims brought against them in the fourteenth and fifteenth causes of action should be dismissed.

Dismissal of the attorneys in this case also warrants dismissal of the fourth and fifth causes of action which allege a conspiracy to present false evidence to the grand jury.

“In addition, a section 1983 action is not the appropriate vehicle to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Welch v. Schenectady Cnty., 2022 WL 3904113, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 3908798 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2022) (internal quotation omitted) (citing cases). This warrants dismissal of the fourteenth cause of action on the merits.

3. Plaintiff's Detention on February 7, 2023

Plaintiff's first designated cause of action alleges that Defendants Shattick, Yerdon, Tate, Merria, Burdette, Anderson and Bigwarfe violated his right to be free from unreasonable seizure when they falsely arrested him. Compl. at pp. 7-9. His second claim alleges that Yerdon, Tate, Merria, Burdette, Anderson, Shattick, and Bigwarfe failed to intervene in that violation of his rights. Id. at pp. 9-10.

A claim for false arrest or false imprisonment is evaluated pursuant to the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See Smith v. City of New York, 388 F.Supp.2d 179, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 366 (2d Cir. 1992)). The elements of such a claim, whether brought under Section 1983 or New York common law, are as follows: “(1) the defendant intentionally confined the plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff was aware of the confinement; (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement; and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.” Id. (citing Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 1994)). Here, Plaintiff claims that he was “illegally seized” during a traffic stop by law enforcement. The allegations are sufficient to permit this claim to proceed.

The Court also recommends that the failure to intervene claim be permitted to proceed to require a response from Defendants. State actors have a duty to intervene when they witness the violation of constitutional rights by other state actors. Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 129 (2d Cir. 1997). Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged, at least in the alternative, that these Defendants may be liable under this theory.

4. Medical Care

Plaintiff's third and sixteenth causes of action allege that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. See Compl. at pp. 10-11 & 22-23. Though stated in very broad terms, the Court is cognizant of its obligation to view the facts broadly in favor of Plaintiff, Dawson v. Lippiccolo, 590 F.Supp.3d 514, 516 (E.D.N.Y. 2022), and so the Court finds that Plaintiff's allegations are sufficient at this stage of the proceedings to require a response from the Defendants named in those causes of action.

5. Municipal Liability

The sixth cause of action identifies the St. Lawrence County Sheriff's Department and the St. Lawrence County Correctional Facility as Defendants to a claim of municipal liability. Compl. at p. 15 (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N. Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). “[Liability under Monell is permitted only where a plaintiff successfully alleges that a constitutional deprivation was caused by municipal policy or custom.” Lewis v. Onondaga Cnty., NY, 2024 WL 2835141, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 21,2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 2836102 (N.D.N.Y. June 4, 2024). Here, Plaintiff's Monell claim must be dismissed because he “fails to clearly identify or demonstrate an unconstitutional policy that would support a claim of municipal liability. He does not offer any evidence of a purported policy, practice, or custom which caused his claimed [constitutional] violation[s].” Fergerson v. Dep't of Educ. of City of New York, 2011 WL 308269, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2011). This cause of action should, therefore, be dismissed with leave to replead as to St. Lawrence County.

The correctional facility, as distinct from the County, is not a proper party to a section 1983 claim and should be dismissed with prejudice. See Miles v. Albany Corr. Facility, 2010 WL 3946956, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 3940956 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2010).

6. Supervisory Liability

Plaintiff's seventh claim seeks to hold certain supervisory officials liable because when they were “holding and acting in their respective positions as supervisors were aware of each constitutional violation and chose not to act.” Compl. at p. 16.

“[P]ersonal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.” Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Moffitt v. Town of Brookfield, 950 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1991)). A supervisory official “may not be held liable for damages for constitutional violations merely because he held a high position of authority.” Black v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1996). In Tangreti v. Bachmann, the Second Circuit made clear “there is no special rule for supervisory liability. Instead, a plaintiff must plead and prove ‘that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.'” 983 F.3d 609, 618 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676). The Defendants named in this cause of action, therefore, cannot be held liable simply by virtue of their supervisory position. Moreover, each is named as a Defendant with respect to their own involvement in individual events. The Court, therefore, recommends dismissal of the supervisory liability claim.

7. Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act Claims

The eighth cause of action alleges that in several different incidents a total of seventeen named individual Defendants acted in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. Compl. at pp. 17-18. However, “neither statute provides for individual liability.” Dees v. Zurlo, 2024 WL 2291701, at *16 (N.D.N.Y. May 21, 2024) (citing cases). The Court, therefore, recommends that those claims be dismissed with prejudice as to the individual Defendants, but that Plaintiff be permitted to replead those claims against a proper party.

8. Section 1985 Conspiracy Claims

The ninth claim alleges that certain Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Compl. at pp. 19-20. The elements of a claim under § 1985(3) are: “(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of equal protection of the laws, . . .; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is ... deprived of any right of a citizen of the United States.” Brown v. City of Oneonta, N.Y., 221 F.3d 329, 341 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 7 F.3d 1085, 1087 (2d Cir. 1993)). “Furthermore, the conspiracy must also be motivated by ‘some racial or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidious discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action.'” Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 7 F.3d at 1088 (quoting United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 829 (1983)). Plaintiff's Complaint makes no allegation that the conduct alleged by Defendants was motivated by any racial or other class-based animus. He, therefore, has failed to plead a cognizable section 1985 claim. His tenth cause of action asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986, Compl. at pp. 20-21, but because “a § 1986 claim must be predicated on a valid § 1985 claim,” Brown v. City of Oneonta, N. Y., 221 F.3d at 341, that claim should also be dismissed with leave to amend.

9. State Law Claims

Plaintiffs Eleventh, Twelve, and Thirteenth causes of action name all Defendants in claims for negligence, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Compl. at p. 21. These claims should be dismissed with leave to replead. Plaintiff offers no specifics as to any of these claims. The various Defendants are accused of a variety of misconduct over a span of time elsewhere in the Complaint and the broad assertion that all are liable for these state law torts without any explanation of how each is alleged to have committed the torts is not permissible. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) “requires a ‘showing,' rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n.3. Plaintiff has not made that showing with his current pleadings.

II. MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

Plaintiff has also moved for the appointment of counsel. Dkt. No. 8. That Motion is denied.

A party has no constitutionally guaranteed right to the assistance of counsel in a civil case.” Leftridge v. Connecticut State Trooper Officer No. 1283, 640 F.3d 62, 68 (2d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). Courts cannot utilize a bright-line test in determining whether counsel should be appointed on behalf of an indigent party. Hendricks v. Coughlin, 114 F.3d 390, 392-93 (2d Cir. 1997). Instead, a number of factors must be carefully considered by the court in ruling upon such a motion. As a threshold matter, the court should ascertain whether the indigent's claims seem likely to be of substance. A motion for appointment of counsel may be properly denied if the court concludes that the plaintiff's “chances of success are highly dubious.” Leftridge v. Connecticut State Trooper Officer No. 1283, 640 F.3d at 69. If the court finds that the claims have substance, the court should then consider:

[T]he indigent's ability to investigate the crucial facts, whether conflicting evidence implicating the need for cross-examination will be the major proof presented to the fact finder, the indigent's ability to present the case, the complexity of the legal issues and any special reason in th[e] case why appointment of counsel would be more likely to lead to a just determination.

Terminate Control Corp. v. Horowitz, 28 F.3d 1335, 1341 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1986)). This is not to say that all, or indeed any, of these factors are controlling in a particular case. Rather, each case must be decided on its own facts. Velasquez v. O'Keefe, 899 F.Supp. 972, 974 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d at 61).

In the present matter, the case is at a very early stage. Indeed, only allegations have been made at this point; no evidence has yet been submitted relating to Plaintiff's claims. Defendants have not yet responded to the Complaint. As such, at this early stage, Plaintiff has not met the threshold requirement of demonstrating that his claims seem likely to be of substance. See Brown v. Utica Police Dep't, 2017 WL 5514518, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2017) (“Where there are merely unsupported allegations, the moving party does not meet the first requirement imposed by the Second Circuit for appointment of pro bono counsel.”) (citation omitted)).

Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion is DENIED, with leave to renew at a later stage of the case.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, it is hereby

RECOMMENDED, that Plaintiff's Complaint be DISMISSED with prejudice as to Plaintiff's fourth, fifth, seventh, fourteenth, fifteenth, and seventeenth causes of action, as well as, all Eighth Amendment claims, and Defendants Storie, Charpentier, Reindeau, Farrell, Mcgahan, and St. Lawrence County Correctional Facility; and it is further

RECOMMENDED, that Plaintiff's sixth, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelve, and thirteenth causes of action be DISMISSED with leave to amend; and it if further

RECOMMENDED, that Plaintiff's first, second, third, and sixteenth causes of action be permitted to proceed and Defendants be directed to respond; and it is

ORDERED, that the Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Dkt. No. 8) is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Report Recommendation and Order upon the parties to this action.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72 & 6(a). Dated: September 23, 2024

If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the order was mailed to you to serve and file objections. FED. R. CIV. P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a)(1)(C).

Lawrence v. Shattick

Opinion

Lawrence v. Shattick

Lawrence v. Shattick

Case Details

Citations

Lawrence v. Shattick

Opinion

Lawrence v. Shattick

Lawrence v. Shattick

Case Details

CitationsCopy Citation

Citations