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Lawrence v. Bunch

California Court of Appeals, Second District, First Division
Jul 28, 2008
No. B199401 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 28, 2008)

Opinion

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. YQ008537, John L. Lynch, Judge.

Kosnett & Durchfort and David E. Durchfort for Defendant and Appellant.

Michael Lawrence, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Respondent.


MALLANO, P.J.

Kristine Bunch appeals a restraining order for protection issued under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act. (“DVPA”; Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.) We affirm the order.

All section references are to the Family Code except where otherwise noted.

FACTS

Bunch dated Michael Lawrence for about eight months. The relationship ended in December 2006, when Bunch learned that Lawrence had been in a relationship with another girlfriend at the same time he was dating Bunch.

In March 2007, Lawrence filed an application for a restraining order against Bunch under the DVPA. Lawrence’s application alleged that Bunch had harassed him, his family, and his girlfriend by repeatedly calling them both at their homes and their places of employment. Lawrence further alleged that Bunch had published derogatory comments about him on the internet, sent several e-mails to him and his family, and arrived uninvited at their homes. This behavior led Lawrence and his family to contact the police on two separate occasions.

Lawrence (in pro. per.) has filed a motion to “augment” the record on appeal. He has submitted police reports, transcriptions of texts that Bunch sent him, reports from a phone trap to show the number of times she called, and a copy of the blog that Bunch wrote about Lawrence. While Lawrence alluded to this evidence in the trial court, none of this evidence appears to have been introduced into evidence. We disregard all matters not presented to the trial court. Lawrence’s motion to augment the record is denied.

Bunch answered Lawrence’s application and filed her own application for restraining order under the DVPA. Bunch’s application alleged that she suffered emotional distress due to her breakup with Lawrence, that Lawrence and his family had harassed her by repeatedly calling her, threatening her, and reporting her behavior to her employer.

At a hearing in March 2007, both Bunch and Lawrence addressed the trial court. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court issued a restraining order against Bunch.

DISCUSSION

I.

Bunch contends the restraining order against her must be reversed because the trial court applied the wrong legal standard at the hearing on the parties’ competing applications. We disagree.

A.

Bunch first contends the DVPA requires proof of violence or sexual abuse before a restraining order may be issued. We disagree. The DVPA is not so limited. Section 6203 defines “abuse” for purposes of the DVPA. Section 6203, subdivisions (a), (b), and (c) address bodily injury, sexual assault and fear of imminent bodily injury. Section 6203, subdivision (d), however, further defines “abuse” to include “engag[ing] in any behavior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to Section 6320.” Under section 6320, a court may enjoin stalking, threats, and harassment, including annoying telephone calls, and contact, either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, which disturb the peace of the other party. The statutory scheme refutes Bunch’s proposition that actual violence or sexual abuse is a necessary requisite for a restraining order under the DVPA.

B.

Bunch next contends the restraining order must be reversed because “there is some indication” that the trial court treated the cause as a civil harassment matter under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, rather than as a domestic violence matter under the DVPA. Bunch, however, has failed to cite any legal authority supporting her proposition that the standards under the two statutory schemes are materially different.

A temporary restraining order may be granted under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 when the court finds that a person has suffered “harassment.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6, subd. (a).) Harassment is defined as “unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the plaintiff.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6, subd. (b).) A “course of conduct” is defined as a “pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose, including following or stalking an individual, making harassing telephone calls to an individual, or sending harassing correspondence to an individual by any means, including but not limited to the use of public or private mails, interoffice mail, fax, or computer e-mail.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6, subd. (b)(3).)

The types of conduct which may be enjoined under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 are similar to those which may be enjoined under the DVPA, and Bunch’s arguments on appeal simply have not persuaded us that the standard for issuance of a restraining order are materially different. Thus, even assuming the trial court used the standard under the Code of Civil Procedure rather than the standard under the DVPA, we are not persuaded that the result would have been any different.

C.

In a variation on her previous argument, Bunch contends “it might have been more appropriate” for the trial court to have issued a civil harassment injunction under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6. We disagree. Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 was enacted to protect a person from harassment, regardless of the nature of his or her relationship with the harasser. By contrast, the DVPA was enacted later to protect parties who were involved specifically in a domestic relationship, including a dating relationship, and was envisioned to provide a more expedient and less expensive process than was available under the Code of Civil Procedure. The DVPA defines a “dating relationship” to mean “frequent, intimate associations primarily characterized by the expectation of affection or sexual involvement independent of financial considerations.” (§ 6210.) Both parties agreed that this definition accurately describes their situation, thereby making the restraining order under the DVPA wholly appropriate.

II.

Bunch contends the evidence does not support the restraining order because it did not establish that she had physically injured Lawrence or that she posed a threat to Lawrence’s safety. Bunch, however, fails to recognize that “abuse” as defined by section 6320 includes not only physical injury or assault, but persistent contacting or invading the peace of the person who is asking for the order of protection. Although Bunch never physically injured Lawrence, we are satisfied that his sworn allegations set forth in support of his application for a restraining order were sufficient to support the trial court’s order. Bunch’s actions were so offensive that Lawrence and his family called the police on more than one occasion, and a criminal proceeding was filed against Bunch. In short, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Bunch engaged in abuse as defined by the DVPA.

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s restraining order for protection is affirmed.

We concur: ROTHSCHILD, J., NEIDORF, J.

Retired Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.


Summaries of

Lawrence v. Bunch

California Court of Appeals, Second District, First Division
Jul 28, 2008
No. B199401 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 28, 2008)
Case details for

Lawrence v. Bunch

Case Details

Full title:MICHAEL LAWRENCE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. KRISTINE BUNCH, Defendant…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Second District, First Division

Date published: Jul 28, 2008

Citations

No. B199401 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 28, 2008)