Opinion
HHBCV156057975
07-20-2018
Stephanie LAURENZA v. Anthony J. ESPOSITO
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Markle, J.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This is an action for damages arising out of claims between Stephanie Laurenza, ("plaintiff"), and Anthony J. Esposito; ("defendant"), concerning tiling work performed by the defendant at the plaintiff’s home. On March 19, 2018, the plaintiff filed a post-trial amended complaint (complaint). In a two-count complaint the plaintiff alleges breach of contract, violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), and violated the Connecticut Home Improvement Act (HIA) and certain provisions of the Connecticut Home Solicitation Sales Act, under General Statute § 42-135a.
After trial, the plaintiff requested leave to amend the complaint to conform to the proof offered at trial. The court, seeing no objection from the defendant, granted leave to amend the complaint, but issued an order (no. 161.10) requiring that the plaintiff submit a revised amended complaint conforming with Practice Book § 10-60(a)(3). The plaintiff complied with this order by filing her complaint on March 19, 2019.
In her previous complaint, the plaintiff alleged her claims for statutory violations of the Home Improvement Act and the Connecticut Home Solicitations Sales Act and her CUTPA claim in separate counts of the complaint. Although the plaintiff failed to entitle Count Two of the operative complaint "CUTPA," she specifically alleges that the defendant violated statutory provisions which are defined as unfair trade practices pursuant to General Statutes § 42-110b. See Operative Compl., Count Two, ¶ 22. It appears to that the plaintiff is using CUTPA as a vehicle to assert claims that, standing alone, do not amount to private causes of action, which is wholly appropriate. See Scrivani v. Vallombroso, 99 Conn.App. 645, 653, 916 A.2d 827, 832 (2007) ("It is possible to use CUTPA as a vehicle through which to bring a claim, regardless of whether the Home Improvement Act provided a private right of action that could stand alone") the court, therefore, should construe Count Two as a claim for CUTPA.
General Statutes § § 42-135a provides that no agreement in a home solicitation sale shall be effective against a buyer if it is not signed and dated by the buyer, or if the contract does not comply with certain other requirements enumerated in the statutes. For example, the contract must provide certain "Notice of cancellation." See General Statutes § § 42-135a(2).
The defendant admits that he failed to follow the requirements set forth in General Statutes § § 42-141(a) and (b) of the Home Solicitation Sales Act and General Statutes § § 20-427(b) of the HIA, as defined by General Statutes § 42-110b of CUTPA in that he failed to give plaintiff the required notice of cancellation. The defendant makes general denials as to the remaining allegations in the complaint. The trial commenced before this court on January 25, 2018 and post-trial briefs were submitted by the parties on March 26, 2018.
General Statutes § § 42-141(b) provides: "Violation of any of the provisions of sections 42-135a, or 42-137 to 42-139, inclusive, or failure to honor any provisions of the notice of cancellation required by this chapter shall constitute an unfair or deceptive act or practice as defined by section 42-110b."
On May 8, 2017, the defendant filed an answer and special defenses specifically addressing the complaint that the plaintiff filed on March 8, 2017, which was the operative complaint at that time. Practice Book § 10-61 provides: "When any pleading is amended the adverse party may plead thereto within the time provided by Section 10-8 or, if the adverse party has already pleaded, alter the pleading, if desired, within ten days after such amendment or such other time as the rules of practice, or the judicial authority, may prescribe, and thereafter pleadings shall advance in the time provided by that section. If the adverse party fails to plead further, pleadings already filed by the adverse party shall be regarded as applicable so far as possible to the amended pleading." (Emphasis added.) The defendant has failed to plead an answer or special defenses with respect to the complaint. In accordance with § 10-61, the court will consider the defendant’s answer and special defenses filed on May 8, 2017, to the extent applicable to the complaint.
II. FACTUAL FINDINGS
After having considered the credible testimony of the parties and witnesses and the exhibits entered into evidence, the court finds the following facts. The plaintiff is a homeowner who was engaged in a home improvement project of renovating her bathroom. The plaintiff described herself as an individual who has been involved in the real estate business, has made improvements to properties in the past, and is currently employed by a real estate management company. The defendant is a 74-year-old retiree, who had worked as a manual laborer installing tile for some 30 years and who has not worked installing tiles since 2007 with the exception of this one job. The parties came into contact with each other through the defendant’s son who worked with the plaintiff at the real estate management company. Through conversation at the workplace the defendant’s son mentioned to the plaintiff that his father was a tile installer and gave the defendant’s telephone number to the plaintiff who then contacted the defendant for the purpose of obtaining an estimate for the job. After visiting the property the defendant submitted to the plaintiff a handwritten estimate simply set forth on a piece of paper stating the following: Labor $2,250 setting material $146.75, 5-sheet-Back Board $148.30, total $2,550.00. The defendant’s name and telephone number were also written on the estimate (Exhibit 2). The defendant accepted the estimate and the oral terms of the agreement are undisputed. The defendant agreed to tile the plaintiff’s second floor bathroom and provide setting materials and back board and the plaintiff would provide and pay for the glass tiles for the shower walls, floor tiles and grout. The defendant was not to perform any carpentry work or install any backboard for the tiles.
All other handwriting on the exhibit were noted by the plaintiff who used the paper to keep track of her payments to the defendant.
The work commenced sometime in February 2015 and upon completion the defendant inspected the work and paid the defendant $2,250 for his labor and $300 for materials. The plaintiff did not voice any complaints or dissatisfaction to the defendant at that time. In August or September of 2015 the plaintiff contacted the defendant over the telephone regarding a small area of discoloration on the shower wall of the bathroom. Photographs entered into evidence depict an area of discoloration of a reddish, grayish color behind the glass tiling which the plaintiff asserts is the result of mold growth. No testing was conducted to determine if in fact the discoloration was mold. The defendant thereafter returned to the property to inspect the area and offered to address the plaintiff’s complaint and remedy the problem area but the plaintiff refused this offer because she wanted to maintain the evidence for a lawsuit. The defendant further offered to return the money paid to him for labor but the plaintiff also refused the offer.
In support of her claims the plaintiff offered the testimony of Domnic LaPenta, and Steve Gialelis who installed the wall board behind the shower tiles. LaPenta works for Northeast Companies and, testified that he holds several licenses, including licenses for plumbing and electrical work has 20 years of experience in installing tile. La Penta had a working relationship with the plaintiff in that he renovated the first floor kitchen as well as the first floor bathroom of her home. LaPenta was asked by the defendant to inspect the bathroom at issue and render an opinion as to the quality of the workmanship. He testified that he spent one hour looking at the bathroom and inspecting the materials used on the site and rendered an opinion that the entire job was substandard and estimated that the total cost to replace the bathroom would be $25,423.33. The estimate does not present sufficient details as to the breakdown of costs, labor and materials.
LaPenta testified as to six standards of the industry, and opined that the sheet rock used as wallboard material is not rated for bathrooms, that the setting materials (either Mastic or grey thin-set mortar) was not approved for use on glass tiles, and that floor tiles were laid on 1/4 luan board which is not rated for tile. LaPenta conceded on cross examination that the subject wallboard material was never pulled out and examined to determine whether it was sheet rock or Diamond back board, he was not familiar with the Diamond back board product, and he did not know whether it is suitable for use in a bathroom. He further conceded that at his deposition that he had previously stated that grey thin-set mortar was used and was the cause of the discoloration. LaPenta himself testified that Mastic and thin-set are two different products. Mr. LaPenta did not have any knowledge as to who had installed the luan flooring under the floor tiles, nor did he offer any testimony regarding the agreement between the parties. It is undisputed that the defendant had told the plaintiff that Diamond back board was suitable for bathroom use and had the highest standard for water seepage and that the Diamond back board was installed by Steve Gialelis.
The defendant testified that he used a white acrylic setting material which was applied to the walls, a material that the defendant had used in wet and bathroom areas without past complaints.
Steven Gialelis, a carpenter of 40 years testified that he had installed the Diamond back board on the shower walls and that he was persuaded to use that material by the defendant despite the fact that he had always used concrete board in bathrooms in the past. The court finds this witness’s testimony less weighty in considering the issues before the court. Gialelis first claimed that he did not have a romantic relationship with the plaintiff. On cross examination, however, the defendant showed that Gialelis had in fact quit claimed another piece of a property to the plaintiff for no consideration, and had in fact referred to the plaintiff as his "wife" on at least one occasion in public. Moreover, the court finds his testimony to be questionable in regards to his claim that he was persuaded by the defendant to install Diamond back board in lieu of concrete board for shower walls in light of the fact that he was the experienced carpenter, was in charge of the installation of the product, and he was a close friend to the plaintiff. Moreover, this court finds that Mr. Gialelis’s testimony offered no credible evidence that the Diamond back board he installed was the fault of the defendant, nor does his testimony offer any credible evidence that it was the back board that caused the discoloration at issue.
The plaintiff made a notation "Paid Tony $300.00 in cash for materials (cement board)" on the estimate Exhibit 2. What this material was used for and why the plaintiff paid the defendant this sum in addition to the original agreement was never satisfactorily explained.
As to the floor tiling, the defendant readily admits that he laid the tile unevenly in an attempt to compensate for the unevenness of the subfloor, which was sloped. He conceded that it did not look good, there was lippage, and that he was not happy with his work and that is why he offered to remedy it.
III. CLAIMS UNDER THE LAW
A. Breach of Contract
In Count One of the complaint the plaintiff claims the defendant breached the contract in that the work he performed in an unworkmanlike manner. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges the defendant failed to provide and use the proper materials which caused the discoloration of the tile in the shower area and further claims the laying of the floor was substandard creating a tripping hazard and causing the toilet to rock back and forth.
In evaluating whether the plaintiff has met her burden of proof, the court, as the trier of fact, is charged with weighing the evidence and evaluating the credibility of the witness’ testimonies. In this regard, the court may consider a witness’ appearance and demeanor, as well as the witness’ recollection, description, and explanation of the facts. See generally State v. A.M., 156 Conn.App. 138, 152, 111 A.3d 974 (2015), aff’d, 324 Conn. 190, 152 A.3d 49 (2016); State v. Book, 155 Conn.App. 560, 572, 109 A.3d 1027, cert. denied, 318 Conn. 901, 122 A.3d 632 (2015). Additionally, the court may consider the reasonableness or plausibility of witnesses’ testimony and the consistency or inconsistency of their testimony.
The party making a claim has the burden of proving that claim by a fair preponderance of the evidence. As applied here, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the factual claims of her complaint. "The elements of a breach of contract claim are the formation of an agreement, performance by one party, breach of the agreement by the other party and damages." Meyers v. Livingston, Adler, Pulda, Meiklejohn & Kelly, P.C., 311 Conn. 282, 291, 87 A.3d 534, 540 (2014). "It is an implied condition of every service contract that the service will be performed in a workmanlike manner." Ferrigno v. Pep-Boys-Manny, Joe & Jack of Delaware, Inc., 47 Conn.Supp. 580, 582, 818 A.2d 903 (2003).
"Proof of causation ... is classified as part and parcel of a party’s claim for breach of contract damages ... damages for breach of contract are recoverable where: (1) the damages were reasonably foreseeable by the breaching party at the time of contracting; (2) the breach is a substantial causal factor in the damages; and (3) the damages are shown with reasonable certainty." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Meadowbrook Ctr., Inc. v. Buchman, 149 Conn.App. 177, 186, 90 A.3d 219, 226 (2014).
The court, having reviewed the evidence, finds the plaintiff has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence exactly what caused the discoloration of the tiles.
This court is left with the following questions regarding the cause of discoloration: Was it mold? Was it the setting materials? Was it the Diamond back board? Why was the cement board purchased? The court concludes that the plaintiff simply did not meet her burden of proving the defendant laid the tiles in the shower in an unworkmanlike causing the resulting discoloration.
The court next turns to the claim of the improper installation of the floor tiles. The defendant admitted that he laid the tile unevenly in an attempt to compensate for the unevenness of the sub-floor, which was sloped. He conceded that it did not look good, that there was lippage, and that his work resulted in substandard quality/unworkmanlike appearance. The court finds that the plaintiff has met her burden of proving that the defendant breached the contract with respect to the tiles laid on the floor.
B. CUPTA
In Count Two the plaintiff claims the defendant violated CUTPA by violating the HIA and the Home Solicitation Sales Act. In this case the defendant has admitted to being in statutory violation of the Home Improvement Act and the Home Solicitation Sales Act provisions that impose requirements on the contract between a seller and buyer.
CUTPA provides that "[n]o person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." General Statutes § 42-110b(a). In order to enforce this prohibition, CUTPA provides a private cause of action to "[a]ny person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment of a [prohibited] method, act or practice ..." General Statutes § 42-110g(a).
"Our courts have interpreted § 42-110g(a) to allow recovery only when the party seeking to recover damages meets the following two requirements: First, he must establish that the conduct at issue constitutes an unfair or deceptive trade practice ... Second, he must present evidence providing the court with a basis for a reasonable estimate of the damages suffered ... Thus, in order to prevail in a CUTPA action, a plaintiff must establish both that the defendant has engaged in a prohibited act and that, ‘as a result of’ this act, the plaintiff suffered an injury. The language ‘as a result of’ requires a showing that the prohibited act was the proximate cause of a harm to the plaintiff." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Scrivani v. Vallombroso, 99 Conn.App. 645, 651-52, 916 A.2d 827, 831-32 (2007).
The court turns first to violation of the Home Improvement Act and Connecticut Home Sales Soilication Act. "Our Supreme Court has stated on several occasions that under the first requirement, the failure to comply with the Home Improvement Act is a per se violation of CUTPA by virtue of General Statutes § 20-427(b), which provides that any violation of the Home Improvement Act is deemed to be an unfair or deceptive trade practice." Scrivani v. Vallombroso, supra, 99 Conn.App. 652. Likewise, violation of § 42-135a of the Home Solicitation Sales Act is a violation of CUTPA. See General Statutes § § 42-141(b) ("[v]iolation of any of the provisions of sections 42-135a, or 42-137 to 42-139, inclusive, or failure to honor any provisions of the notice of cancellation required by this chapter shall constitute an unfair or deceptive act or practice as defined by section 42-110b)".
The court finds that the plaintiff has established that the defendant was in technical violation of the Home Improvement Act because he did not comply with the requirements the Act imposes upon the individual proving home improvements at time of entering into a contract.
Turning to the second part of the test, the court finds that the plaintiff has not established that the defendant’s violation of CUTPA contributed to the plaintiff’s damages (i.e., the cost of re-tiling the bathroom floor), which is a condition precedent to collecting damages under CUTPA. See Scrivani v. Vallombroso, 99 Conn.App. 645, 653, 916 A.2d 827, 833 (2007) (remanded for articulation because unclear whether lower court determined if violations of Home Improvement Act contributed to plaintiff’s harm). Statutory violations which amount to a violation under CUTPA do not automatically satisfy the two-part test for recovery under CUTPA. See Zhang v. Willis, 2015 WL 7941224 (Conn.Super.Ct. 2015) (although a violation of HIA is per se violation of CUTPA, plaintiff failed to allege facts supporting the inference that plaintiff was damaged by violation); Lunn v. Hussey, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV-01-0085525-S (December 29, 2003, Brunetti, J.) (although defendant violated HIA because contractor not registered and contract did not comply with HIA, no ascertainable loss to establish a violation of CUTPA; "before the court can award damages, the court must find there is a causal connection between the CUTPA violation and the ascertainable loss ... The court finds there is no causal connection between the CUTPA violation and the loss claimed by the plaintiffs. The plaintiff’s loss would have occurred even if there had been a valid home improvement contract and the defendant had been a licensed Home Improvement Contractor").
In considering this claim the court finds pertinent the fact that the plaintiff knew the defendant was a retired tile layer. The defendant was not soliciting business to the public nor did he ever have a history of owning a business or soliciting customers. His work history reflects that he was simply an employee whose job it was to lay tile. On the basis of the foregoing, the court finds that the requirements for recovery of CUTPA damages have not been satisfied.
C. DAMAGES
In the Plaintiff’s claim for damages, she seeks a total of $71,149.75 for the demolition of the existing bathroom and installation of a new bathroom, reimbursement for costs of all the materials she had purchased, costs of litigation and attorneys fees.
The court turns to the issue of damages for breach of contract. "The basic measure of damages for injury to real property is the resultant diminution in its value." Ferri v. Pyramid Construction Co., 186 Conn. 682, 443 A.2d 478, 482 (1982). However, although such diminution in value can be calculated by the cost of repairing the damage, the cost should not exceed the former value and repairs should not increase the value of the property beyond the value prior to being damaged. Id. "[T]he burden of proving damages is on the party claiming them ... It is then the province of the trier of fact to weigh the evidence presented and to determine the credibility and effect to be given the evidence." Gargano, 620. The evidence presented must afford the court with a basis upon which to calculate the damages owed to the plaintiff. See Gargano, 621.
As to Count One the court awards damages to the plaintiff in the amount of the contract, that is $2,550.00.
Punitive Damages
The plaintiff argues that this case is appropriate for punitive damages on several grounds, and relies heavily on Ulbrich v. Groth, 310 Conn. 375, 454, 455 (2013). "In Connecticut, punitive damages are awarded under either specific statutory provisions or the common law. No statute or practice rule, however, establishes a standard for punitive damages awards in general. Instead, various civil statutes provide for punitive damages awards in discrete situations. These statutes usually declare what the governing standard is; whether the award is mandatory or discretionary with the court or trier of fact; and what the amount should be, including whether it is subject to a maximum dollar figure."
"Statutes which provide for punitive damages awards usually specify their amount or establish a maximum dollar figure. Where punitive damages are awarded under the common law, or the applicable statute is silent as to their amount, the general rule is that they are limited to plaintiff’s attorneys fees and nontaxable costs (see Bodner v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 222 Conn. 480, 492 (1992) ). In Bodner, the Court observed that this rule provides some punishment and deterrence in addition to compensation of the victim."
"Where there is no controlling statutory provision, or the provision is silent as to the applicable standard, the courts allow punitive damages when the evidence shows a reckless indifference to the rights of others or an intentional or wanton violation of those rights (Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 155 Conn. 477, 489 (1967) (tort action asserting taking of water privileges), quoted with approval in Tessman v. Tiger Lee Construction Co., 228 Conn. 42, 54 (1993) (CUTPA action), see also, e.g., Champagne v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 212 Conn. 509, 532 (1989) (common-law strict liability action); Markey v. Santangelo, 195 Conn. 76, 77 (1985) (common-law assault and battery action); Triangle Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Silver, 154 Conn. 116, 128 (1966) (breach of contract action founded on tortious conduct) )."
On the basis of the court’s finding that the requirements for recovery of CUTPA damages have not been satisfied, the court need not address punitive damages and attorneys fees under CUTPA.
Sec. 42-110g. Action for damages. Class actions. Costs and fees. Equitable relief. Jury trial. (a) Any person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment of a method, act or practice prohibited by section 42-110b, may bring an action in the judicial district in which the plaintiff or defendant resides or has his principal place of business or is doing business, to recover actual damages. Proof of public interest or public injury shall not be required in any action brought under this section. The court may, in its discretion, award punitive damages and may provide such equitable relief as it deems necessary or proper.
Turning to whether common-law punitive damages for breach of contract might apply, the plaintiff argues that the evidence in this case clearly supports the claim for punitive damages because of the reckless nature of the defendant’s actions as it related to the plaintiff. Specifically, the defendant argues that the following constitutes reckless conduct by the defendant: (1) engaging in vexatious litigation; (2) failing to use appropriate materials; (3) failing to comply with the registration requirements of the HIA and other statutory requirements, despite knowing of them; and (4) producing a work product that was unacceptable to the homeowner.
At the outset, the court notes that the defendant has not engaged in vexatious litigation, nor has the plaintiff presented any law to demonstrate that the defendant engaged in the same. Accordingly, the first and second reasons set forth by the plaintiff are summarily dismissed by the court as not providing sufficient reason to impose punitive damages.
The court turns to the other reasons set forth by the plaintiff to justify punitive damages. The court turns first to the plaintiff’s argument that the defendant acted recklessly by producing work that was unacceptable to the plaintiff. Breach of contract claims do not generally result in punitive damages absent some tortuous conduct. See Triangle Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Silver, supra, 154 Conn. 128 (1966) (breach of contract action founded on tortuous conduct). The court is not persuaded that the defendant’s conduct amounts to anything more than having simply breached a portion of his contract with the plaintiff.
The court turns next to the plaintiff’s argument that the defendant acted recklessly by knowingly disregarding applicable statutory requirements, such as registering as a home improvement contractor. The court is not persuaded. Although the defendant cites to Ulbrich to support its assertion that punitive damages are warranted because the defendant consciously disregarded business norms, the present case is readily distinguishable from Ulbrich. In Ulbrich, wherein the court concluded that the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding punitive damages because the court could reasonably find that the defendants’ conduct was not merely negligent, but "involved a conscious decision to disregard acknowledged business norms."
In the present case, the defendant is a retired laborer who laid tile for a living, and who testified that he only got involved with the plaintiff’s bathroom remodel for the sake of his son, who worked with the plaintiff. Moreover, the defendant actually offered to return the cost of his labor. The present case, unlike the case in Ulbrich, is not the type of case that calls for punitive damages. There is no evidence of evil motive to increase profitability. There is no evidence of evil motive at all. Moreover, the plaintiff has failed to set forth any authority, and the court knows of none, which stands for the proposition that knowingly violating statutory requirements in and of itself constitutes reckless conduct.
To sum, the plaintiff has not introduced any evidence that the defendant acted recklessly. See State v. Jones, 289 Conn. 742, 756, 961 A.2d 322 (2008) ("[a] person acts recklessly with respect to a result ... when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and injustifiable risk that such result will occur" [internal quotation marks omitted] ). Accordingly, the court will not award punitive damages.
Interest
The plaintiff seeks interest pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a. Section 37-3a(a) provides in relevant part that "interest at the rate of ten per cent a year, and no more, may be recovered and allowed in civil actions ... as damages for the detention of money after it becomes payable." "Although § 37-3a does not use the word ‘wrongful’ to describe a compensable detention of money under the statute, this court has long employed that term to describe such a detention." DiLieto v. County Obstetrics and Gynecology Group, P.C., 310 Conn. 38, 50-51, 74 A.3d 1212 (2013). "[T]he term ‘wrongful’ invariably was used interchangeably with ‘unlawful’ to describe the narrow category of claims for which prejudgment interest was allowed under the statute, namely, claims to recover money that remained unpaid after it was due and payable." Id., 51. "[T]he wrongful detention standard of § 37-3a is satisfied by proof of the underlying legal claim, a requirement that is met once the plaintiff obtains a judgment in his favor on that claim." Id., 52. "[A]n award of interest under § 37-3a ... is discretionary with the trial court. Interest is awarded ... when the court determines that such an award is appropriate to compensate the plaintiff for the loss of the use of his or her money. Basically, the question is whether the interests of justice require the allowance of interest as damages for the loss of use of money." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 54.
The court finds that the defendant had offered to return the plaintiff’s money she paid to the defendant prior to the litigation but the plaintiff refused it. Therefore, the damages were not wrongfully withheld and in its discretion, the court denies any award of interest pursuant to § 37-3a.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Judgment shall enter in favor of the plaintiff in Count one of the amended complaint and damages are awarded in the amount of $2,550.00, the amount of the contract. Judgment shall enter in favor of the defendant in Count Two.
General Statutes § § 20-427(c) provides in relevant part: "A violation of any of the provisions of this chapter shall be deemed an unfair or deceptive trade practice under subsection (a) of section 42-110b."
(d) In any action brought by a person under this section, the court may award, to the plaintiff, in addition to the relief provided in this section, costs and reasonable attorneys fees based on the work reasonably performed by an attorney and not on the amount of recovery. In a class action in which there is no monetary recovery, but other relief is granted on behalf of a class, the court may award, to the plaintiff, in addition to other relief provided in this section, costs and reasonable attorneys fees. In any action brought under this section, the court may, in its discretion, order, in addition to damages or in lieu of damages, injunctive or other equitable relief.