Summary
addressing IDEA administrative exhaustion under the discussion heading of subject matter jurisdiction
Summary of this case from K. F. v. Francis Howell R-III School DistrictOpinion
Civil No. 02-3611 (DWF/RLE)
September 18, 2002
Margaret O. Kane, Esq., Amy Goetz, Esq., Center for Education Law, St. Paul, MN, for Plaintiffs.
Peter A. Martin, Esq., Knutson Flynn Deans, Mendota Heights, MN, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Introduction
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the undersigned United States District Judge on September 16, 2002, pursuant to Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. This case involves a dispute over the appropriate public educational placement for Plaintiff Christopher Larson as that placement is determined by the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act ("IDEA"). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' motion is denied.
Background
Plaintiff Christopher Larson ("Christopher") is ten years old, and, last spring, he completed the fourth grade. He is the child of Virginia and Brian Larson ("the Parents"). For most of the 2001-2002 school year, Christopher was enrolled in Falls Elementary School, an elementary school within the legal boundaries of Defendant Independent School District No. 361 ("the District").
Christopher was identified as a "child with a disability" as defined by IDEA when he was in first grade; at that time, Christopher was enrolled in the Red Lake Falls, Minnesota, school district. The Red Lake Falls school district determined that Christopher suffered from an "emotional or behavioral disorder" ("EBD"), specifically Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. Accordingly, the Red Lake Falls school district determined that Christopher was entitled to special educational services.
Christopher and his parents moved from Red Lake Falls to North Dakota, and, finally, at the end of the 1999-2000 school year, Christopher and his parents moved to International Falls, Minnesota. The Parents enrolled Christopher in the District in August of 2000.
In September of 2000, the Parents and the District agreed upon an Individual Educational Plan ("IEP") for Christopher. The IEP was designed to assist Christopher in behavior modification, specifically to refrain from making inappropriate noises during class and to assist Christopher in appropriately interacting with his peers. The IEP provided 225 minutes per week of direct special educational instruction and 10 minutes per week of indirect special educational instruction. In addition, the IEP provided Christopher with a number of behavioral supports, including access to a quiet area, regular feedback, and additional time for assignment completion.
By all accounts, Christopher did quite well during the 2000-2001 academic year. Christopher excelled academically, and, in class, his behavior was acceptable. Christopher's only real problem appeared to be controlling his behavior in unstructured settings such as on the playground or on the school bus.
During the 2001-2002 school year, Christopher's IEP was changed. He continued to receive behavioral supports; indeed, the intensity of his behavioral modification program appears to have been improved. The record indicates that during the 2001-2002 school year, Christopher received less special educational instruction, either direct or indirect.
On March 15, 2002, Christopher assaulted and choked a third grade student on the playground. The police were called, but no charges were filed. After the incident, Christopher threatened the child, indicating that he would kill the child. Christopher was suspended for two days for the incident.
In light of this incident, the District scheduled a meeting with the Parents. The District noted its concern over the gravity of this incident and also noted that Christopher had been, on a number of occasions, "cruel" to a female student who was formerly his friend. The District suggested having Christopher evaluated at Northwoods Children's Services in Duluth. Mrs. Larson apparently expressed some interest in having the assessment completed, but was concerned about her ability to pay for the in-patient assessment. Accordingly, the District put the Parents in contact with the a social worker employed by Koochiching County.
It appears that the Parents are separated or divorced, and the conversation about the Northwoods assessment was between the District and Virginia Larson.
At some point after this initial contact, Koochiching County commenced a Child In Need of Protection or Services ("CHIPS") proceeding, seeking a court order compelling Christopher to obtain in-patient evaluation at Northwoods. Ultimately, the Parents consented to having Christopher evaluated at Northwoods.
The Parents contend that the District encouraged the County to seek the CHIPS order, and assisted the District in obtaining the order. The Parents further contend that the CHIPS petition was sought without their consent or permission. The Parents assert that they agreed to the Northwoods assessment because they believed that they might otherwise lose custody of Christopher, that their consent was entirely coerced.
Christopher was placed at Northwoods for assessment from April 3, 2002, until May 8, 2002, at which point he returned to the District.
The parties disagree about what happened then. The Parents assert that the District would not allow Christopher to return to Falls Elementary School, insisting instead upon providing homebound services, but that the District did not begin providing those homebound services until May 16. The District, in stark contrast, contends that the Parents were the ones insisting on keeping Christopher out of the Falls Elementary School and that the Parents insisted upon homebound education. Regardless of which party was responsible, Christopher was schooled at home, with some educational services provided by the District, for the remainder of the 2001-2002 school year.
In addition to this obvious factual dispute, there is also some confusion in the record about what administrative steps were being taken during this time frame. It appears that an IEP team meeting was held on May 16, 2002. However, it is not clear whether a revised IEP was developed as a result of that meeting. If one was developed, the record does not indicate whether the Parents ever officially objected to it, thereby triggering the conciliation and mediation procedure required by law. See Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 432 v. J.H. By and Through R.H., 8 F. Supp.2d 1166 (D.Minn. 1998).
On April 11, 2002, obviously before any change to Christopher's IEP and apparently before the Parents voiced any objection to Christopher's then-current IEP, the Parents requested a due process hearing regarding Christopher's educational placement. After several delays, the independent hearing officer ("IHO") issued his memorandum decision on August 7, 2002. The decision, which mirrored the proposed findings and conclusions of the Parents almost verbatim (right down to including some of the same transcription errors), ordered that Christopher be placed at Indus Elementary School in ISD 363, and that the District pay for the placement and transportation.
It should be noted that this decision went 76 days beyond the 45 calendar day limit for an IHO's decision, required by Minn. Stat. § 125A.09, subd. 7. As the late Chief Justice Peter Popovich, of the Minnesota Supreme Court, often said, "Justice delayed is justice denied." That adage rings especially true in the context of the IDEA and the provision of educational services to children with special needs. The need for rapid resolution of these conflicts is reflected in the 30-day time limit an HRO has within which to render a decision if the case is appealed, as the instant case has been. Whatever the reasons for the delay in this matter, it is clear that the extension of time has compromised the interests of this child.
The Federal and State statutes and regulations clearly contemplate that these disputes should be resolved by an impartial and independent hearing officer. The parties and the public have a right to expect that the officers conducting these hearings will be neutral, will be knowledgeable about the law, will listen to and weigh all the evidence presented, and will make a fair and independent decision about how the law applies to the facts before him. When a judge or hearing officer adopts, almost verbatim, the proposed findings of one party — even going so far as to adopt the same confusing order of proposed facts, the same obvious transcription errors — it is difficult to believe that the hearing provided was truly impartial and independent. At a minimum, such behavior must undermine public trust in the system and compromise the integrity of a process designed to protect our most vulnerable citizens.
On August 16, 2002, the District appealed the IHO's decision to the Minnesota Department of Children, Families Learning ("MDCFL"). MDCFL appointed Gregory L. Wright to act as the hearing review officer ("HRO"). HRO Wright has indicated that he will issue an opinion by September 19, 2002.
On August 21, 2002, the Parents requested a meeting with the District for purposes of drafting an IEP consistent with the IHO's decision. The District declined to implement the IHO's decision, noting that the IHO lacked the legal authority to order such a remedy and that, regardless, pending resolution of all appeals, Christopher's stay-put placement is with the District.
On August 28, 2002, the Parents sought a preliminary injunction from the HRO. Specifically, the Parents requested an order compelling the District to implement the IHO's decision. The HRO issued an order denying that request and rejecting the Parents' argument that the statutory stay-put placement shifted upon the IHO's decision in favor of the Parents.
The Parents did not send Christopher to school on September 3, 2002, the first day of classes. The Parents informed the District that they wished to keep Christopher at home and to receive homebound services. The District is providing such services, but has repeatedly extended a request to have Christopher return to a regular classroom at Falls Elementary School.
The Parents filed this action and moved for emergency injunctive relief. The Parents contend that the District is violating the IDEA by not implementing the IHO's order. The District objects to the issuance of injunctive relief, arguing that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the Parents have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies; that the appropriate placement for Christopher pending resolution of all appeals is his stay-put placement and that the IHO's decision did not alter that placement; and that the IHO exceeded his authority in granting the relief he granted.
Discussion 1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Parties may not file an IDEA action in Federal Court until they have exhausted all available state administrative review procedures. See, e.g., Blackmon ex rel. Blackmon v. Springfield R-XII Sch. Dist., 198 F.3d 648 (8th Cir. 1999); Moubry v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 696, 9 F. Supp.2d 1086 (D. Minn. 1998). There is no question that administrative review of this controversy is still pending before the state HRO.
However, there is some question about whether the administrative procedure which has taken place to date signifies anything. As noted in the factual recitation above, the record does not make clear whether the parties followed the comprehensive and mandatory sequential administrative process defined in the Minnesota Statutes and regulations and, thus, whether the statutory prerequisites for seeking a due process hearing were met. If they were not, then the IHO had no subject matter jurisdiction, and the HRO has no subject matter jurisdiction. See Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 432 v. J.H. By and Through R.H., 8 F. Supp.2d 1166 (D.Minn. 1998). If that is the case here, then this entire procedure collapses like a house of cards, leaving the Court certainly without jurisdiction to hear the matter before it. Nevertheless, the District has not argued that point and, therefore, the Court must assume that the due process hearing was properly convened.
The only exception to the exhaustion requirement is that a party may circumvent the administrative process if the party can demonstrate that exhaustion would be futile or inadequate to protect the party's rights. See Honig v. Doe, 108 S.Ct. 592 (1988); Covington v. Knox County Sch. System, 205 F.3d 912, 917 (6th Cir. 2000). Where, as here, a party seeks an injunction to enforce the stay-put provision of the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j), the party need not exhaust administrative remedies before seeking such injunctive relief from the District Court. See Cole v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville and Davidson County, Tenn., 954 F. Supp. 1214, 1221 (M.D. Tenn. 1997). Under such circumstances, it is obvious that exhaustion of the administrative process would be inadequate to protect the party's rights; if exhaustion were required, it would defeat the very purpose of the stay-put provision, namely to ensure that the status quo is maintained throughout the administrative process. See id.
Accordingly, given the nature of the relief sought and the limited question presented by the motion, the Court finds that the pendency of administrative proceedings is not a bar to this Court's exercise of jurisdiction.
2. Stay-Put Placement
The so-called "stay-put" provision of the IDEA provides that "during the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to [the IDEA] . . ., unless the State or local educational agency and the parents otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then-current educational placement of such child." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j). The crux of the issue before the Court is whether the decision of the IHO, adopting the position of the Parents, constituted an agreement between either the State or local educational agency and the Parents such that the stay-put placement shifted from the District to the placement ordered by the IHO.
The law seems clear that a decision by an HRO, a "level 2" administrative decision, would be deemed an agreement between the State and the Parents which would implicate the appropriate stay-put placement. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.514(c) ("If the decision of a hearing officer in a due process hearing conducted by the SEA or a State review official in an administrative appeal agrees with the child's parents that a change of placement is appropriate, that placement must be treated as an agreement between the State or local agency and the parents for purposes of [the stay-put provision]"). The law is not nearly so clear about whether a decision by an IHO, a "level 1" administrative decision, should be afforded the same statutory import. See T.H. v. Bd. of Educ. of Palatine Comty. Consol. Sch. Dist., 55 F. Supp.2d 830 (N.D.Ill. 1999) (holding that an IHO decision is an agreement between the parents and the State agency); Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 86 F. Supp.2d 354, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that an IHO decision, which was clearly a decision by a local administrative hearing officer, was not an agreement with the parents for purposes of the stay-put provision). The issue, as applied to Minnesota's particular two-tiered system, appears to be one of first impression. After carefully considering the administrative structure provided by Minnesota law, the Court concludes that the IHO decision, adopting the position of the parents, does not constitute an agreement which would affect the stay-put placement.
The District notes that the regulation regarding parent/agency agreement references only State-level administrative review; the omission of any reference to local administrative review, the District argues, indicates that the same inference — that an administrative review finding favoring the parents constitutes an agreement with the parents — should not attach to local administrative decisions. The District further argues that, in Minnesota, the IHO level of review is a local administrative process.
The Plaintiffs argue that the same rationale which dictates that a State hearing review officer's decisions constitute the agreement of the State should apply to a local administrative process. Thus, even assuming the IHO decision is truly a local decision, it should be considered an agreement between the Parents and the local educational agency sufficient to implicate that stay-put provision.
The Court feels that both parties have missed the mark.
First, the Court notes that the notion that the IHO level of review is local is a legal fiction. The IHO in this case was appointed by the CFL from a list maintained by the State. The list consists of individuals who are selected and trained by the State. Moreover, although the District pays the IHO for his time, the District is reimbursed by the State. If the IHO is a "local official," he is one in name only, and it is difficult to fathom that any decision he makes should be attributed to the local school district.
However, that said, whether the IHO is considered a State or local official, the Court finds that his decision does not constitute an agreement between the Parents and any educational agency for purposes of the stay-put provision. Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 125A.09, subd. 7, the decision of the IHO is "binding on all parties unless appealed to the commissioner. . . ." The necessary corollary to this rule is that, if one party appeals the IHO's decision, that decision is not binding on any party. This language is in direct contrast to the same statute's discussion of the HRO's decision; the statute indicates that the HRO's decision is final unless appealed, but there is no suggestion that it is ever non-binding.
The non-binding nature of the IHO's decision clearly removes this situation from those contemplated by the Code of Federal Regulations or either of the cases which have grappled with this issue. Indeed, it strains the bounds of reason to consider a non-binding decision by an independent hearing officer as an agreement between anybody, particularly an agreement which profoundly affects the statutory rights of the parties. The Court finds that, under the particular administrative scheme in Minnesota, the stay-put provision exception is not invoked by an IHO decision favorable to the Parents.
For the reasons stated, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 2) is DENIED.