Opinion
Case No. 20010879-CA.
Filed November 28, 2003. (Not For Official Publication)
Appeal from the Fourth District, Provo Department, The Honorable Ray M. Harding Jr.
Gary Buhler, Grantsville, for Appellant.
Rosemond G. Blakelock, Provo, for Appellee.
Before Judges Jackson, Billings, and Greenwood.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Terry Larsen (Husband) appeals from the trial court's judgment on an Order to Show Cause initiated by Connie Larsen (Wife). We affirm.
First, Husband argues that the trial court erred because it did not rule on his timely objection to the proposed order. Husband does not adequately brief this issue because his argument contains no citations to case law or statutory authority, as required by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9). Nonetheless, because it may affect jurisdiction, we address the argument.
In May 2001, Wife initiated an Order to Show Cause, stating that Husband had refused to pay his share of the parties' children's nonroutine medical and dental expenses, as required by the parties' divorce decree. A hearing was held on the Order to Show Cause on June 29, 2001. On September 10, 2001, Husband's Objection to Proposed Order was filed. Then, approximately three weeks later, on October 1, 2001, the trial court entered the signed Order on the Order to Show Cause into the record.
Wife's Proposed Order on Order to Show Cause does not appear in the record.
This court has noted that where a party's objections to a proposed order were before the court, yet the court entered an order without expressly ruling on the objections, the court implicitly denied the objections. See Morgan v. Morgan, 875 P.2d 563, 564 n. 1 (Utah Ct.App. 1994). Similarly, we believe the trial court in this case implicitly denied Husband's objections because they were before the trial court for approximately three weeks before the court signed the proposed order. Therefore, Husband's argument fails and we turn our attention to the merits of his appeal.
Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it required him to reimburse Wife for 50% of nonroutine medical and dental expenses she incurred on behalf of the parties' children. The parties' divorce decree includes a provision making each parent responsible for 50% of these costs. In addition to this provision, according to statute, each parent is "to share equally all reasonable and necessary uninsured medical expenses . . . incurred for the dependent children." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.15(5) (1995). The statute also states that the "parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within 30 days of payment." Id. § 78-45-7.15(7). Further, "a parent incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to . . . recover the other parent's share of the expenses if that parent fails to comply" with subsection 7. Id. § 78-45-7.15(8) (emphasis added).
We cite to the 1995 version of Utah Code Annotated section 78-45-7.15 because it was the statute in effect when the divorce decree was entered in February 1996.
Husband argues that because Wife did not provide him with verification of the expenses, pursuant to subsection 7, the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded Wife the expenses. This court reviews questions regarding child support under an abuse of discretion standard.See Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Utah Ct.App. 1995) ("A trial court's decision regarding child support will not be disturbed absent `manifest injustice or inequity that indicates a clear abuse of . . . discretion.'" (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). By using the term "may," subsection 8 of the statute gives the trial court discretion to grant or deny credit to a parent who incurred medical expenses based on that parent's compliance with subsection 7. Further, Wife submitted, and served on Husband, a verification of costs. Although the verification of costs was not submitted within the statutory time period, we determine that the trial court in this case did not abuse its discretion and therefore uphold the trial court's order regarding medical and dental expenses.
Husband next argues that the trial court erred when it denied him an award for 50% of insurance premiums he paid on behalf of the children. However, the trial court correctly stated that this issue was not before it, as no motions were filed on the issue.
Parties must properly raise issues before the trial court. "A trial court has the opportunity to rule if the following three requirements are met: (1) `the issue must be raised in a timely fashion;' (2) `the issue must be specifically raised;' and (3) a party must introduce `supporting evidence or relevant legal authority.'" Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted).
Finally, Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded Wife 50% of her attorney fees. "In an action to enforce the provisions of a divorce decree, an award of attorney fees is based solely upon the trial court's discretion, regardless of the financial need of the moving party." Lyngle v. Lyngle, 831 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Utah Ct.App. 1992) (footnote omitted). The trial court in this case stated that, although Wife did not prevail entirely upon her claim, she was entitled to an award of 50% of her attorney fees because the Order to Show Cause was necessary to enforce an ambiguous provision in the divorce decree. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its award to Wife.
Additionally, Wife requests attorney fees on appeal. "Generally, when the trial court awards fees in a domestic action to the party who then substantially prevails on appeal, fees will also be awarded to that party on appeal." Id. at 1031. Accordingly, Wife is entitled to attorney fees on appeal, and we remand to the trial court for determination of reasonable fees incurred.
WE CONCUR: Norman H. Jackson, Presiding Judge, and Judith M. Billings, Associate Presiding Judge.