Opinion
C.A. No. 03-70 S
February 5, 2004
Kantz Laporte for Appellant
Michael Grant for Appellee
Report and Recommendation
Plaintiff Kantz Laporte, pro se, filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming as a defendant A.T. Wall, Director of the Rhode Island Department of Corrections. In his Complaint, plaintiff alleges that he was stip-searched while incarcerated at the Intake Service Center at the Adult Correctional Institutions in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.
Plaintiff also names as defendants "Intake Officers." However, plaintiff has failed to Amend his Complaint, naming their identity, nor has he effected service on any person other than A.T. Wall.
Presently before the Court is Wall's motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Plaintiff has not objected. This matter has been referred to me pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for a report and recommendation. For the reasons that follow, I recommend that defendant Wall's motion for summary judgment be granted.
Undisputed Facts
On May 24, 2001, local police arrested the plaintiff and transported him to the Rhode Island Department of Correction's Intake Service Center ("Intake") at the Adult Correctional Institutions. A.T. Wall, at all times pertinent in the Complaint, served (and continues to serve) as the Director of the R.I. Department of Corrections ("DOC").
When the plaintiff arrived at Intake, Wall was not physically present, nor was he made aware of plaintiff's arrival. Wall was not contacted by any subordinate concerning any issues involving the plaintiff. The undisputed facts demonstrate that Wall had no involvement with any commitment procedure involving the plaintiff and has no knowledge of the plaintiff being subjected to any strip search at Intake. Accordingly, Wall has moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff has not opposed the motion.
Discussion
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment's role in civil litigation is "to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial". Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1990). Summary judgment can only be granted when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions of file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
Rule 56 has a distinctive set of steps. When requesting summary judgment, the moving party must "put the ball in play, averring `an absence of evidence to support a nonmoving party's case.'"Garside, 895 F.2d at 48 (quoting Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)). The nonmovant then must document some factual disagreement sufficient to deflect brevis disposition. Not every discrepancy in the proof is enough to forestall summary judgment; the disagreement must relate to some issue of material fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-248 (1986).
On issues where the nonmovant bears the ultimate burden of proof, he must present definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion. See id. at 256-257. This evidence "cannot be conjectural or problematic; it must have substance in the sense that it limns differing versions of the truth which a fact Finder must resolve at an ensuing trial." Mack v. Great Atl. Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir. 1989). Evidence that is merely colorable or is not significantly probative cannot deter summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-257.
Plaintiff has brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. . . .42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order to maintain a section 1983 action, the conduct complained of must be committed by a person acting under color of state law and the conduct must have deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right or a federal statutory right. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). Here, there is no dispute that defendant Wall acted under the color of state law. Wall contends, however, that the undisputed facts demonstrate that he did not violate plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. I agree.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches." See U.S. CONST, amend. IV. Both convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees retain constitutional rights despite their incarceration, including basic Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979). These rights maybe subject to restrictions and limitations based on the fact of confinement, the legitimate goals and policies of the penal institution, and the need of the institution to maintain security and internal order. Id. at 545-46. "[W]hen an institutional restriction infringes a specific fundamental guarantee" — here the Fourth Amendment, "the practice must be evaluated in light of the central objective of prison administration, safeguarding institutional security."Id. at 546. The test for determining whether a search passes constitutional muster is "reasonableness." Id. at 560. Reasonableness depends upon the particular circumstances in which the search takes place.
Plaintiff seeks to hold Wall responsible for an alleged strip search that occurred when he arrived at Intake. However, the undisputed facts demonstrate that Wall did not participate in any strip search of the plaintiff, if one in fact occurred. The undisputed facts also demonstrate that, if a strip search occurred, Wall had no knowledge of it. Thus, Wall had no direct involvement in any strip search of the plaintiff.
Alternatively, if the plaintiff is seeking to hold Wall responsible based upon an unconstitutional strip search policy or custom at the DOC, plaintiff has failed to identify any policy or custom applied to him, has failed to demonstrate that the policy or custom applied to him is unconstitutional, and has failed to demonstrate that the policy or custom's enactment or enforcement was endorsed by Wall.
The Court recognizes that certain strip search policies at the DOC have been found by this Court to be unconstitutional. See Roberts v. State of Rhode Island, 175 F. Supp.2d 176 (D.R.I. 2000) aff'd 239 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 2001). However, at the time of plaintiff's incarceration, the policies at issue in Roberts had been changed in accordance with this Court's ruling.
There are simply no facts present demonstrating any wrongdoing by Wall. Plaintiff may not maintain this action against Wall without demonstrating facts connecting him to an alleged wrongdoing. Fernandez v. Chardon, 681 F.2d 42, 55 (1st Cir. 1982); Lopez Morales v. Otero de Ramos, 725 F. Supp. 106, 106-107 (D.P.R. 1989). Accordingly, since Wall's motion for summary judgment is unopposed, and for the reasons stated, Wall's motion should be granted. I so recommend.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, I recommend that Wall's motion for summary judgment be granted. Any objection to this Report and Recommendation must be specific and must be filed with the Clerk of Court within ten days of its receipt. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); Local Rule 32. Failure to file timely, specific objections to this report constitutes waiver of both the right to review by the district court and the right to appeal the district court's decision. United States v. Valencia-Copete, 792 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Park Motor Mart, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 616 F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1980).