Opinion
NO. 03-19-00841-CV
08-14-2020
Clayton Laake, Appellant v. Amber Ray Laake, Appellee
FROM THE 155TH DISTRICT COURT OF FAYETTE COUNTY
NO. 2017V-034 , THE HONORABLE JEFF R. STEINHAUSER, JUDGE PRESIDING MEMORANDUM OPINION
Clayton Laake challenges certain terms of the district court's final decree granting him a divorce from Amber Ray Laake. We will affirm.
Because the parties share a surname, we will refer to them by given names.
BACKGROUND
Clayton filed for divorce from Amber in a Fayette County district court in February 2017. The couple have two children together. When the couple's attempts to reconcile proved unsuccessful, the matter proceeded to final hearing in 2019. After the hearing, the district court rendered a final decree awarding Clayton a divorce, dividing the estate, and ordering Clayton to pay child support. Clayton filed this appeal.
DISCUSSION
Clayton raises what he describes as nine points of error. To facilitate this discussion, we will consolidate his nine arguments into three broad issues on appeal. See Gunnarson v. State, No. 03-18-00738-CV, 2020 WL 913050, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 26, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("To facilitate this discussion, we will consolidate and summarize these arguments into three broad issues on appeal." (citations omitted)). First, Clayton contends the district court erred by failing to file findings of fact and conclusions of law. Second, he argues that the district court abused its discretion in its treatment of the couple's community and separate property. And third, he argues that the district court abused its discretion in calculating child support. We will address these arguments in turn.
Findings and Conclusions
Clayton first argues that the district court erred or abused its discretion by failing to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law. We disagree. When, as here, a case is tried in a district court without a jury, any party may request that the court state in writing its findings of fact and conclusions of law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 296. A request for findings and conclusions under Rule 296 must be filed within twenty days of the date the judgment is signed. See id. Once a litigant files a timely request, the trial court must issue its findings of fact and conclusions of law within twenty days. See id. R. 297.
In this case, the district court's decree is dated August 28, 2019. Any request for findings of fact and conclusions of law was due twenty days later, on September 17, 2019. It is undisputed that Clayton did not file his request by that date, but instead did so two days later on September 19. The district court was therefore under no obligation to issue findings and conclusions. See Schoeffler v. Denton, 813 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ) (holding, where no request was timely presented to the trial court, that appellants "cannot complain of the trial court's failure to prepare and file findings of fact and conclusions of law"). We overrule Clayton's first issue.
Division of Property
Clayton next contends the district court abused its discretion in dividing the estate, challenging the treatment of Amber's separate property and the treatment of certain community property. The trial court has broad discretion when dividing the estate of the parties; its division should be corrected on appeal only when a clear abuse of discretion has been shown. Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1981). Under this standard, legal and factual sufficiency arguments are not independent grounds of error but are merely relevant factors in assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion. Zeifman v. Michels, 212 S.W.3d 582, 587 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied). The court abuses its discretion if it effects a division of property that is manifestly unjust. Magill v. Magill, 816 S.W.2d 530, 534 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
Separate Property
Clayton first challenges the district court's treatment of some of Amber's separate property, including certain real estate, an approximately $40,000 gift from Amber's mother, and a $5,000 inheritance from Amber's father. Clayton's arguments are not persuasive.
With respect to Amber's real estate, Clayton contends that he was entitled to over $50,000 in reimbursement for improvements he made to the property. A party seeking reimbursement bears the burden of proving its right to, and the amount of, reimbursement. Jensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Tex. 1984). The right of an estate to reimbursement from another estate is an equitable right and should be determined by equitable principles. Tex. Fam. Code § 3.402(b); Anderson v. Gilliland, 684 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tex. 1985). In evaluating a request for reimbursement, the trial court must consider all the relevant facts and circumstances. See Penick v. Penick, 783 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Tex. 1988). Any benefit from the use or enjoyment of property should be taken into account. Id.; see also Tex. Fam. Code § 3.402(c). Great latitude must be given to the trial court in resolving a litigant's claim for reimbursement. Penick, 783 S.W.2d at 194.
In this case, we conclude the district court could have determined that Clayton failed to meet his burden to prove his right to any reimbursement for improvements to the real estate. In support of his request for reimbursement, Clayton testified to an array of numbers that allegedly represent the value of various improvements Clayton made to the property. Clayton did not offer any other evidence of the value of those improvements or explain how he himself is qualified to opine as to that value. He conceded that the couple had jointly used Amber's land in part as a homestead and in part to graze cattle and other livestock, but he did not testify as to the value, if any, of those benefits. Clayton even admits that he did not provide a spreadsheet or other accounting from which the court might have calculated reimbursement. At one point while Clayton was testifying on the reimbursement issue, the district court interrupted and cautioned, "You need to be specific when you are testifying because it's very difficult to follow what you're saying because you are contradicting yourself at different points." On this record, we conclude the district court—as the sole arbiter of the evidence, see In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009)—could have discredited Clayton's testimony and determined that Clayton had not satisfied his burden to show a right to reimbursement for improvements to Amber's property.
With respect to Amber's gift and inheritance, Clayton's argument is not entirely clear. No one disputes that the gift and inheritance, when received, constituted separate property. See Tex. Fam. Code § 3.001 ("A spouse's separate property consists of: (1) the property owned or claimed by the spouse before marriage; (2) the property acquired by the spouse during marriage by gift, devise, or descent; and (3) the recovery for personal injuries sustained by the spouse during marriage, except any recovery for loss of earning capacity during marriage."). Clayton contends, "Amber did not offer any testimony or evidence tracing the funds from the time it was [sic] deposited in the bank . . . to the payment of the unspecified community property debts." This is a not an accurate characterization of Amber's testimony. With respect to the proceeds from the gift and inheritance, Amber testified that she used some of the proceeds to pay off personal loans, some to contribute to the household, and that she was not certain what happened to the rest of the proceeds. This testimony might have some bearing on the classification of these assets as community or separate property. See In re Marriage of Royal, 107 S.W.3d 846, 851 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, no pet.) (holding that separate property became community property when used to purchase jointly owned property). But regardless of how Amber used the proceeds from her gift and inheritance, the record does not reflect that the district court awarded Amber any property as compensation or reimbursement for the gift and inheritance she originally received as separate property. Clayton appears to complain that the district court awarded Amber a tract of land as reimbursement or compensation for her contribution of some of her separate property to the household. However, there is no indication in this record that the district court did so. Thus, it is unclear what judicial action Clayton complains of. Because we cannot discern Clayton's argument with respect to the gift and inheritance, we conclude he has not satisfied his burden to show a clear abuse of discretion. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i).
Community Property
Clayton also challenges the district court's division of community property. "Community property owes its existence to the legal fact of marriage, and when the parties to that compact determine their relationship should end, property acquired during marriage is and should be divided among them in a just and right manner." Schlueter v. Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d 584, 588 (Tex. 1998) (quoting Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210, 223 (Tex. 1982)); see also Tex. Fam. Code § 7.001 (providing that "court shall order a division of the estate of the parties in a manner that the court deems just and right"). The "just and right" standard is the sole method used to divide community property upon divorce. Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d at 588. "Such a standard may at times lead to a disproportionate division of assets and liabilities of the parties, depending on the circumstances that courts may consider." Id.; see also Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 699 (listing nonexclusive factors court may consider in dividing community estate). "When the circumstances demonstrate a reasonable basis for it, a trial court may order an unequal division of community property." Leax v. Leax, 305 S.W.3d 22, 34 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied).
Clayton contends the district court abused its discretion in dividing the marital estate, arguing that the court should not have awarded Amber all of the approximately $33,000 in her Teacher Retirement System (TRS) account and nearly all the contents of their home. Both parties agree that the TRS account and the contents of the home are community property, and the record does not reflect the district court's reasoning in awarding this property to Amber. However, to prevail on appeal, Clayton must show that this award had more than a de minimis effect on the just and right division of the entire estate. Rusk v. Rusk, 5 S.W.3d 299, 316 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied). He cannot do so here. Due to the lengthy list of assets held by the marital estate, Clayton's estate, and Amber's estate, division of their property was complex. Among the three estates were a transportation business, five tracts of land, a time share, eight vehicles, cattle and other livestock, multiple bank and retirement accounts, and several loans. Although Clayton is correct that the district court awarded Amber the contents of her TRS account and the contents of the marital home, the district court also awarded Clayton the transportation business and the income from that business, which Clayton stipulated was part of the community estate. In addition, Amber agreed to take some of the debt that otherwise would have been divided between herself and Clayton. On this record, we cannot say the division of the entire estate is so disproportionate as to be manifestly unjust. Magill, 816 S.W.2d at 534. As a consequence, Clayton has not shown the abuse of discretion necessary to prevail on appeal, and we overrule his arguments to the contrary.
The record is inconsistent as to the value of this account.
It is unclear from the record what the transportation business is worth.
Child Support
In his final issue on appeal, Clayton contends the district court erred in its calculation of $11,628.75 in retroactive child support. The "paramount guiding principle" in child support determinations must always be what reasonably serves the best interest of the child or children. Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74, 81 (Tex. 2011). "The amount of a periodic child support payment established by the child support guidelines in effect in this state at the time of the hearing is presumed reasonable, and an order of support conforming to the guidelines is presumed to be in the best interest of the child." Tex. Fam. Code § 154.122. An award of child support will not be disturbed in absence of a clear abuse of discretion. Aguilar v. Barker, 699 S.W.2d 915, 917 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ). A court abuses its discretion if it acts unreasonably or without regard for governing legal principles. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d at 78.
In this case, Amber testified that she had raised the children for seven months during the separation with no monetary support from Clayton, and Clayton does not deny that Amber is entitled to seven months of retroactive child support. Clayton instead contends that the award of $11,628.75 is excessive. But the district court looked to testimony regarding Clayton's income and to the State of Texas child support guidelines in calculating a monthly award of $1,661.25. See Tex. Fam. Code 154.125 (setting forth guidelines). The district court then multiplied that monthly obligation by seven to arrive at a total retroactive award of $11,628.75 for the seven months of separation. On this record, Clayton has not shown how the district court abused its discretion by relying on the guidelines and undisputed evidence of Clayton's income in calculating child support. See id. § 154.122. We overrule Clayton's final issue on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Finding no error or abuse of discretion in the final decree of divorce, we affirm that decree.
/s/_________
Edward Smith, Justice Before Justices Goodwin, Kelly, and Smith Affirmed Filed: August 14, 2020