Opinion
Civil Action 3:24-CV-689
07-26-2024
NOBLE LESTER KEITH LA RONDE-BEY, Plaintiff v. MICHAEL CHICA, et al., Defendants
MUNLEY, D.J.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
William I. Arbuckle, U.S. Magistrate Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
Noble Lester Keith La Ronde-Bey (“Plaintiff”) initiated what appears to be a civil rights and RICO lawsuit against state and local police, prosecutors, employees of a county jail, and two judges, arising out of two arrests that took place on June 11, 2023.
Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, sought and was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Therefore, his Complaint is subject to the screening provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Under this statute, the Court is required to dismiss any action that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
After reviewing Plaintiff's Complaint, we determined that it failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and therefore would be vulnerable to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). We issued an order explaining why the Complaint was deficient and gave Plaintiff an opportunity to submit an amended complaint on or before July 5, 2024. No amended complaint was received. Accordingly, it will be recommended that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed without further leave to amend, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
II. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff was arrested twice within a single day. We will summarize Plaintiff's allegations regarding these arrests, and the allegations set out in Plaintiff's Complaint below.
A. Plaintiff's First June 11, 2023 Arrest
On or around June 11, 2023, Plaintiff and his girlfriend drove his girlfriend's car to Dansbury Park, located in East Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania. They talked in the car, but at some point, fell asleep. Around 1:30 a.m. the police happened upon them and woke them up. The police advised Plaintiff and his girlfriend that they were “trespassing,” and asked them to provide identification. The girlfriend complied. Plaintiff alleges he told police he did not have identification with him. Police instructed Plaintiff to get out of the car, and when he complied, they conducted a pat down search. According to Plaintiff, the police discovered a knife, cannabis, rolling papers, and court papers. The police seized those items.
The police then asked the girlfriend for permission to search the vehicle for any additional weapons. The girlfriend allegedly granted permission but reported that one bag in the vehicle belonged to Plaintiff. Plaintiff suggests the girlfriend did not consent to the search of Plaintiff's bag. The police searched the vehicle, including Plaintiff's bag. They found a cannabis grinder in Plaintiff's bag. Plaintiff alleges he explained that the cannabis was “part of [his] religious freedoms.” (Doc. 1, p. 15). Plaintiff was arrested.
Plaintiff was taken to the Monroe County Correctional Facility (“MCCF”) to be “booked and released.” (Doc. 1, p. 15). Regarding this first arrest, it appears Plaintiff was charged with providing false identification to law enforcement in violation of 18 Pa. C.S. § 4914(a). State court records suggest Plaintiff pleaded guilty to this charge on August 29, 2023. Nonetheless, in his Complaint, Plaintiff asserts:
Docket Sheet, Commonwealth v. Noble Lester Keith Laronde-Bey, No. CP-45-CR-0002043-2023 (C.C.P. Monroe Cnty.), p. 1 and Commonwealth v. Noble Lester Keith Laronde-Bey, No. MJ 43202-CR-0000192-2023 (Magis. Ct.) available at https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/CaseSearch (last viewed July 25, 2024).
Commonwealth v. Noble Lester Keith Laronde-Bey, No. MJ 43202-CR-0000192-2023 (Magis. Ct.), p. 3.
It is not unlawful for me to possess a nationality card which is a real ID. 1508 specifically mentioned identification documents-18 USC 1028 of title 18 designates 3 special nonfederal identification documents and gives some preferred treatment. These three documents, in absence of a nationality identity card are the prime means by which an individual establishes his identity in the United States. The three documents are (a) birth certificate, (b) driver's license, & (c) personal identification
card. There was no absence of the nationality card so none of the other identifications were needed.(Doc. 1, p. 16).
B. Plaintiff's Second June 11, 2023 Arrest
When Plaintiff was released from MCCF after the first arrest, he asked that his belongings be returned. Plaintiff does not identify which belongings he asked for. According to the Complaint, a member of the MCCF staff told Plaintiff he did not have Plaintiff's property. Plaintiff alleges the staff member then became aggressive and attacked Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that this MCCF staff member ripped Plaintiff's jacket and shirt, hit Plaintiff, and put Plaintiff in a choke hold. Plaintiff alleges he was cut in various places. Despite this encounter, Plaintiff was permitted to leave the facility.
As soon as Plaintiff left MCCF, he went to a local hospital for medical treatment. While there, Plaintiff told medical staff he wanted to press charges against the MCCF staff member who attacked him. The medical staff called the state police. When the state police arrived, they arrested Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that when he arrived back at MCCF he was stripped and between eight and ten members of the MCCF staff beat him and kicked him. Plaintiff alleges he did not resist.
State Court records show that Plaintiff was charged with simple assault, aggravated assault, and harassment. Monetary bail was set the day of his arrest, and Plaintiff was unable to post bond. Approximately one month later, on July 13, 2023, Plaintiff was released on unsecured bail. On June 25, 2024, Plaintiff was found not guilty of all charges following a jury trial.
Docket Sheet, Commonwealth v. Lester Keith Laronde, No. MJ-43302-CR-0000260-2023 (Magis Ct.), available at https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/CaseSearch (last viewed July 25, 2024).
Docket Sheet, Commonwealth v. Lester Keith Laronde, No. CP-45-CR-0001524-2023 (C.C.P. Monroe Cnty.), p. 2, available at https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/CaseSearch (last viewed July 25, 2024).
Id.
Id. at p. 10.
C. Allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint and Procedural History in This Case
On April 22, 2024, Plaintiff lodged his Complaint, in which he names the following Defendants (in their individual and official capacities):
(1) Michael Chica, Stroud Area Regional Police;
(2) Rich P. White, Assistant District Attorney-Monroe County;
(3) Tyler Mitchell, Stroud Area Regional Police;
(4) Justin Garcia, MCCF;
(5) Gary Haidle, MCCF Warden;
(6) James Thomas Fuller, Jr., Assistant District Attorney-Monroe County;
(7) Andrew Michael Kroeckel, Assistant District Attorney-Monroe County;
(8) Shane M. Walton, Pennsylvania State Police;
(9) Michael Muth, Magisterial District Judge-Monroe County; and
(10) Jennifer Harlacher Sibum, Common Pleas Judge-Monroe County.
In his Complaint, when asked to identify what statutory rights Defendants violated, Plaintiff wrote:
Violations for the constitution for the United States Republic; violation of religious freedom; illegal searches; systematic genocide; excessive bail; kidnapping; ransom; denationalization; excessive force; unlawful arrests; extortion; assault; racketeering; armed robbery; corpus delecti[.](Doc. 1, p. 3).
When asked to describe the facts underlying his claims, Plaintiff wrote:
I was detained, illegally searched, racially profiled, unlawfully arrested, kidnapped, denied some of my religious freedoms, denationalized, and was robbed by various armed security people. Heather Kehler witnessed this. I was assaulted and had excessive force used upon me by correctional staff. I had my religious freedoms violated and was kidnapped in confinement by the warden. I was denationalized, held for ransom, charged with excessive bail, and extorted by judges ad[sic] assistant district attorneys. They all conspired together by racketeering against me.(Doc. 1, p. 5). He also poses approximately 17 questions, such as “what form of government was sanctioned for the United States?” and “Is Article 4 Section 4 False?” (Doc. 1, pp. 15-16).
Plaintiff also includes similar allegations in additional pages added to the complaint, including a document called “Affidavit of Fact Writ of Discovery.” (Doc. 1, pp. 14-15, 17).
Plaintiff requests $7 million in damages, and explains:
The reason I am asking for the amount of money damages is because I think a message should be sent to everyone in North America that you should not rape, murder, pillage or do treason, sedition involuntary servitude, slavery, terrorism, fraud, extortion, grand theft, robbery, conspiracy and racketeering against a Native American Moor.(Doc. 1, p. 16).
Along with his Complaint, Plaintiff sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 2). His request was granted, and his Complaint was reviewed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). (Docs. 5, 6). In its June 5, 2024 Screening Order, the undersigned explained why Plaintiff's claims could not proceed as set forth in his Complaint. (Doc. 6). In the same Order, Plaintiff was given until July 5, 2024 to submit an amended complaint and was told that if he failed to submit an amended complaint by that deadline, his entire case may be dismissed. To date, no amended complaint has been received and no additional time for amendment was requested.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
Before reviewing Plaintiff's Complaint, it is helpful to restate the legal standard for screening complaints filed by litigants proceeding in forma pauperis. We will also discuss some of the relevant pleading requirements for bringing constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the pleading requirements for claims under the RICO Act.
A. Screening Complaints Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)
This Court has a statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review of complaints brought by plaintiffs who have been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and must dismiss a case sua sponte if: (1) the allegation of poverty is untrue, (2) the action is frivolous or malicious, (3) the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (4) the complaint seeks money damages from a defendant who is immune from suit.
When conducting this screening analysis, district courts apply the standard governing motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, the district court must:
See, e.g., Endrikat v. Ransom, No. 1:21-CV-1684, 2022 WL 4111861, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2022) (“In dismissing claims under §§ 1915(e), 1915A, and 1997e, district courts apply the standard governing motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
“accept the facts alleged in [a plaintiff's] complaint as true,” “draw[ ] all reasonable inferences in [his or her] favor,” and “ask only whether [that] complaint, liberally construed, . . . contains facts sufficient to state a plausible . . . claim.” Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 774, 782 (7th Cir. 2015).
Shorter v. United States, 12 F. 4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021).
A court need not “credit a complaint's ‘bald assertions' or ‘legal conclusions,'”and does not need to assume that a plaintiff can prove facts not alleged.
Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
In screening complaints under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court generally relies on the complaint, attached exhibits, matters of public record, and items subject to judicial notice. Therefore, a district court may properly take judicial notice of state court records during its screening analysis, and has done so in this case.
Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007).
Fed.R.Evid. 201; Sands, 502 F.3d at 268; Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs. of Chester Cnty., 108 F.3d 486, 498-99 (3d Cir. 1997) (observing that a Court may take judicial notice of its own records, especially in the same case); Commonwealth of Pa. v. Brown, 373 F.2d 771, 778 (3d Cir. 1967) (“a federal court may take judicial notice of matters of record in state courts within its jurisdiction.”).
Moreover, where a litigant is proceeding without an attorney, his pleading:
must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). If the court can reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or the litigant's unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); U.S. ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (A “petition prepared by a prisoner . . . may be inartfully drawn and should . . . be read ‘with a measure of tolerance'”); Freeman v. Department of Corrections, 949 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1991). Under our liberal pleading rules, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997) (overruled on other grounds); see also Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir.
1996) (discussing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) standard); Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990) (same).
However, there are limits to the court's procedural flexibility: “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim . . . they cannot flout procedural rules - they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
Graham v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., No. 21-148, 2022 WL 2874724, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 2871331 (W.D. Pa. July 21, 2022).
B. Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
“Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” “It is well settled that § 1983 does not confer any substantive rights, but merely ‘provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish two things: (1) a deprivation of a federally protected right; and (2) that the deprivation was committed by a person or persons acting under color of state law.
Shuman ex rel. Shertzer v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005).
Williams v. Pa. Hum. Rels. Comm'n, 870 F.3d 294, 297 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cnty., 757 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2014)).
Woloszyn v. Cnty. of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 689 (3d Cir. 1997)).
“Claims under Section 1983 can take two forms: an ‘individual capacity' lawsuit, which are those brought against a government official to hold him or her personally liable, and an ‘official capacity' action, which seeks to hold the official's government entity liable for actions taken by the official.”
Roberts v. Pennsylvania, No. 22-4829, 2023 WL 6278874, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 2023) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985)).
Liability under § 1983 is personal in nature. In individual capacity claims, a plaintiff must allege facts that demonstrate “the defendants' personal involvement in the alleged misconduct.” It is not enough to state “a mere hypothesis that an individual defendant had personal knowledge of or involvement in depriving the plaintiff of his rights.” Personal involvement can include direct wrongful conduct by a defendant, allegations of personal direction, or allegations of actual knowledge and acquiescence of the alleged violation of a federal right.
Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020); Murray v. Wetzel, No. 1:17-CV-1637, 2021 WL 5500511, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 2021) (“Personal involvement can include direct wrongful conduct by a defendant, but it can also be demonstrated through evidence of personal direction or actual knowledge and acquiescence.” (internal quotations omitted)).
Gannaway v. PrimeCare Med., Inc., 150 F.Supp.3d 511, 526 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (citing Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 133 (3d Cir. 1986)), aff'd sub nom, Gannaway v. PrimeCare Med., Inc., 652 Fed.Appx. 91 (3d Cir. 2016).
Murray, 2021 WL 5500511, at *5.
“[O]fficial-capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” If a defendant is acting as an agent of a municipality, and a plaintiff wishes to recover under § 1983 from that municipality, a plaintiff must:
Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (quoting Graham, 473 at 165 (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. Of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
(1) identify a policy or custom that deprived [them] of a federally protected right; (2) demonstrate that the municipality, by its deliberate conduct, acted as the “moving force” behind the alleged deprivation; and (3) establish a direct causal link between the policy or custom and the plaintiff's injury.
Blasi v. Borough of Pen Argyl, No. 14-1354, 2015 WL 4486717, at *5 (E.D. Pa. July 23, 2015) (citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)).
A municipality “can only be liable when the alleged constitutional transgression implements or executes a policy, regulation or decision officially adopted by the governing body or informally adopted by custom.” A policy “is a statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by a government body's officers.” A custom need not be formally adopted by the municipality but may impose liability where “the relevant practice is so widespread as to have the force of law.” A plaintiff is also able to bring a municipal liability Monell claim “under certain circumstances” where constitutional violations result from a municipality's failure to train municipal employees.
Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. 658).
Id. (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690).
Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla., 520 U.S. at 404 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91).
City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).
C. RICO Claims
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act makes it unlawful for “any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.” To establish a RICO claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), a plaintiff must show: “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.” An “enterprise” includes “any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” A “pattern” of racketeering activity requires at least two predicate acts of racketeering within a ten-year period. The RICO statute also lists acts that constitute “racketeering activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) makes it unlawful for any person to conspire to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985).
A plaintiff only has standing to bring a RICO claim if, and can only recover to the extent that, he has been injured in his business or property by the conduct constituting the violation. Thus, a plaintiff must allege (and eventually prove) that he suffered a concrete financial loss in the form of an injury to business or property. Allegations of “personal injury or emotional harm are not proper bases for a RICO claim.”
Cabbagestalk v. United States, No. CV 21-4902 (SDW), 2021 WL 2260517, at *4 (D.N.J. June 3, 2021).
IV. DISCUSSION
We construe Plaintiff's Complaint as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that his rights under the United States Constitution were violated, and a claim under the RICO Act. Plaintiff's claims, however, cannot proceed as pleaded. Regarding both his constitutional and RICO Act claims, Plaintiff's factual allegations are too vague.
A. Plaintiff's Constitutional Claims Should be Dismissed
Plaintiff names ten Defendants in their official and individual capacity in his Complaint. On the form he used to draft his Complaint, Plaintiff was asked to identify the facts underlying his claims. This prompt also suggested Plaintiff discuss what happened to him, whether anyone else was involved, who else saw what happened, and as is especially important in a complaint naming multiple defendants, “who did what?” (Doc. 1, p. 5). Plaintiff does not identify who did what. Instead, his recitation of the facts underlying his claims uses “they” or “them” without identifying which Defendant or combination of Defendants engaged in which allegedly unconstitutional conduct.
It does not seem likely that all Defendants were present for each incident described. For example, Plaintiff alleges that “they” arrested him in a public park at 1:30 a.m. It seems unlikely the judges named as Defendants arrested Plaintiff at 1:30 a.m. in a public park.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure explain that “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Each averment must be “simple, concise, and direct,” and the complaint must “state its claims . . . in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Fundamentally, a complaint must provide fair notice of what claim is brought against each Defendant and the grounds upon which those claims rest.
Bressi v. Northumberland Cnty. Children and Youth Servs., No. 23-2156, 2023 WL 8866573, at *1 (3d Cir. Dec. 22, 2023); Shaikh v. Dept. of Banking & Ins., Div. of Ins., No. 19-14092(GC) (TJB), 2024 WL 1929966, at *5 (D.N.J. Apr. 30, 2024) (dismissing a complaint where the litigant asserted multiple claims against multiple defendants “without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought against.”).
Plaintiff's Complaint, as written, leaves Defendants (and this Court) to guess what many of his claims are, and which claim is brought against which Defendant. Therefore, dismissal is appropriate.
See Binsack v. Lackawanna Cnty. Prison, 438 Fed.Appx. 158, 159-61 (3d Cir. 2011).
B. Plaintiff's RICO Claim Should be Dismissed
Plaintiff's RICO claim is also too vague to proceed. Plaintiff did not include enough information in his Complaint to plead the elements of a civil RICO claim. Furthermore, Plaintiff requests damages for personal injury and emotional stress only. (Doc. 1, p. 5) (describing his injuries as “I was cut and have scars. I was peeing blood. I had a sore neck. Mental Stress, anxiety, and depression.”). As explained in the legal standard section of this Report, RICO damages may be awarded for damages to a business or property, not for personal injury or emotional stress. Therefore, Plaintiff's RICO claims should be dismissed.
C. Leave to Amend
If a complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a district court must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Here, Plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended complaint on or before July 5, 2024, and was advised that if he did not his entire case may be dismissed. That deadline has passed, and no amended complaint was received. Therefore, we find that granting further leave to amend is futile.
Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 2002).
V. RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that:
(1) Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, without further leave to amend; and
(2) The Clerk of Court be directed to CLOSE this case.
NOTICE OF LOCAL RULE 72.3
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.