Opinion
B314336
01-28-2022
In re CHRISTOPHER T. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. P.T., Defendant and Appellant. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Gina Zaragoza, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Kelly Emling, Social Justice Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the jurisdictional and dispositional orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. 18CCJP03394, Steff R. Padilla, Judge Pro Tempore. Affirmed. 1
Gina Zaragoza, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Kelly Emling, Social Justice Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
BENDIX, ACTING P. J.
The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) initiated dependency proceedings concerning two children with special and unique needs: 11-year-old Christopher T. and 9-year-old Samantha T. At bottom, DCFS alleged that the children's mother (mother) and father (father) exposed Christopher T. and Samantha T. to a substantial risk of serious physical harm by having them reside in a filthy and unsanitary home, and that mother and father had a limited ability to provide them with adequate care and supervision. The juvenile court later dismissed the dependency petition's averment concerning the squalid conditions of the family home, but found jurisdiction based on the parents' limited ability to manage Christopher's and Samantha's special needs. At a subsequent disposition hearing, the court declared the children dependents, removed them from mother's and father's physical custody, and ordered DCFS to provide family reunification services to the children and their parents.
Father appeals the juvenile court's jurisdictional and dispositional rulings. Father's principal contention is that the parents' decision not to have Christopher and Samantha participate in virtual special education services did not create a 2 substantial risk of serious physical harm to them. Father also contends that even if the juvenile court had jurisdiction over Christopher and Samantha, we must vacate the order removing the children from mother's and father's physical custody.
Mother is not a party to this appeal.
We reject father's first contention because, regardless of whether the children's withdrawal from special education services gave rise to dependency jurisdiction, DCFS offered substantial evidence the children had certain impairments the parents had failed to address, and that those conditions presented a substantial risk of serious physical harm to them. Specifically, Samantha T. had a foot condition that caused her to trip and needed to be remediated with special exercises, and Christopher had violent and self-destructive tendencies (e.g., he would bang his head against the wall when frustrated).
Evidence offered prior to the disposition hearing indicated that Samantha continued to have problems walking and tripped frequently. There was also evidence Christopher was hospitalized and diagnosed with psychosis after he disclosed he killed rats with his bare hands and had expressed his intention to kill a roommate, and the parents had repeatedly failed to permit the agency to conduct a home assessment and did not complete referral paperwork needed for the delivery of developmental disability services to Christopher. Thus, the juvenile court could have reasonably found it was highly probable that removal was necessary to protect the children from a substantial danger to their physical well-being. Finding no error, we affirm the juvenile court's jurisdictional and dispositional rulings. 3
We derive part of the Procedural Background from undisputed portions of the parties' appellate briefing. (See Artal v. Allen (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 273, 275, fn. 2 (Artal) [" '[B]riefs and argument . . . are reliable indications of a party's position on the facts as well as the law, and a reviewing court may make use of statements therein as admissions against the party. [Citations.]' [Citations.]"].)
We summarize only those aspects of the procedural history that are relevant to this appeal.
On February 8, 2021, DCFS filed a dependency petition concerning Stephanie T., Christopher T., and Samantha T. The petition alleged two counts under Welfare and Institutions Codesection 300, subdivision (b)(1) and one count under subdivision (j) of that statute. 4
On the date the petition was filed, Stephanie was 17 years old, Christopher was 11, and Samantha was 9. Additionally, father concedes in his opening brief that he does not challenge any rulings concerning Stephanie. Accordingly, this opinion does not further discuss the procedural history of Stephanie's dependency case.
Undesignated statutory citations are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Section 300, subdivision (b)(1) provides in pertinent part that dependency jurisdiction is proper if "[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of the child's parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child, or the willful or negligent failure of the child's parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child from the conduct of the custodian with whom the child has been left, or by the willful or negligent failure of the parent or guardian to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or by the inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for the child due to the parent's or guardian's mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse." (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).) Subdivision (j) authorizes jurisdiction if "[t]he child's sibling has been abused or neglected, as defined in subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i), and there is a substantial risk that the child will be abused or neglected, as defined in those subdivisions." (§ 300, subd. (j).)
Counts b-1 and j-1 of the petition each alleged the following: "The children[, ] Christopher T[.] and Samantha T[., ] have special and unique needs, including Specific Learning Disabilities and Speech/Language Impairments, requiring special education services. The children's mother . . . and father . . . have demonstrated a limited ability to provide the children with adequate care and supervision by failing to ensure the children's participation in special education services. Further, the mother and father failed to participate in the children's annual IEP meetings. Such limited ability to provide the children with adequate care and supervision on the part of the mother and father endangers the children's physical health and safety and places the children and the children's sibling, Stephanie [T.], at risk of serious physical harm and damage."
"An IEP [(individualized education program)] is a written plan, created by a multi-disciplinary team, setting forth 'the package of special educational and related services designed to meet the unique needs of [a] disabled child.' [Citation.]" (See Perkiomen Valley School Dist. v. R.B. (E.D.Pa. 2021) 533 F.Supp.3d 233, 243, fn. 3; id. at p. 249.)
Count b-2 averred: "On 02/01/2021 and 01/29/2021, . . . Stephanie . . . [T.], Christopher [T.], and Samantha [T.]'s home 5 was found to be in a filthy and unsanitary condition. Such condition included a stale odor emanating from the children's home, a rodent and insect infestation, rodent droppings throughout the home, dead insects in the refrigerator, caged pigeons in the children's bedroom, bird food on the children's bed and on the carpet, and a clutter of boxes, crates, and other miscellaneous items in the living room. Such a filthy and unsanitary home environment established for the children by the children's mother . . . and father . . . endangers the children's physical health and safety, creates a detrimental home environment, and places the children at risk of serious physical harm, damage and danger."
On February 10, 2021, the juvenile court ordered that the children be detained from their parents, and permitted mother and father to have monitored visits with the children.
On March 30, 2021, the court held an adjudication hearing. During the hearing, father introduced photographs depicting the then-existing condition of the family home. The court dismissed counts b-2 and j-1, but sustained count b-1.
The juvenile court held a disposition hearing on July 6, 2021 and July 21, 2021. At the hearing, father testified that at the time Christopher T. and Samantha T. were removed from his care, the following persons were living in father's home: father; mother; their adult son, Patrick T.; their other adult son, Alexander T.; Stephanie T.; Christopher T.; and Samantha T. Father claimed that Alexander T. later moved to a regional 6 center facility. Father also testified that he and mother were "going to have a fresh start" so that they could care for Christopher and Samantha, and that the parents were willing to attend any meetings with the children's school officials and teachers and take the children to their mental health and counseling appointments.
There is no dispute that Alexander T. has special needs, and that mother had told the agency shortly before the dependency proceedings were initiated that Alexander T. required all her attention.
"Regional centers are nonprofit community agencies with which the state contracts, and which coordinate the delivery of services for developmentally disabled individuals." (Stiavetti v. Clendenin (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 691, 697, fn. 3.)
At the conclusion of the disposition hearing, the juvenile court declared Christopher T. and Samantha T. dependents of the court; removed them from mother's and father's physical custody and placed them in foster care; ordered DCFS to provide family reunification services to the parents and their children; and authorized mother and father to have unmonitored visits with the children. Father timely appealed the juvenile court's jurisdictional and dispositional rulings.
DISCUSSION
A. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court's Assertion of Dependency Jurisdiction over Christopher T. and Samantha T.
" 'The three elements for jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b) are:" '(1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms; (2) causation; and (3) "serious physical harm or illness" to the [child], or a "substantial risk" of such harm or illness.'" [Citation.] "The third element . . . effectively requires a showing that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing 7 the child is at substantial risk of serious physical harm in the future (e.g., evidence showing a substantial risk that past physical harm will reoccur)."' [Citation.] Evidence of past conduct may be probative of current conditions. [Citation.] To establish a defined risk of harm at the time of the hearing, there 'must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe the alleged conduct will recur. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (In re D.L. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1146.)
" 'In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jurisdictional findings [of the juvenile court, ] . . . we determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them. "In making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the court's determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court." [Citation.] "We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely determine if there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court. [Citations.]" '" (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773 (I.J.).) Appellant "has the burden of showing the jurisdictional finding[s are] unsupported by substantial evidence." (See In re Giovanni F. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 594, 598.)
As set forth in our Procedural Background, the juvenile court sustained count b-1, which, briefly summarized, alleged that Christopher T. and Samantha T. had special and unique needs, including learning disabilities and speech/language impairments requiring special education services, the parents had failed to ensure that the children participated in these services and did not participate in the children's annual IEP 8 meetings, and the parents' limited ability to provide the children with adequate care and supervision placed the children at risk of serious physical harm and damage.
Father challenges this jurisdictional finding, arguing that "[t]he children were not at a substantial risk of serious physical harm resulting from them not participating in virtual special education services." (Boldface omitted.) DCFS disputes that claim, and further contends, inter alia, that Samantha's "untreated foot issue that caused [her] to trip and fall" and Christopher's violent behavior supported the juvenile court's assertion of dependency jurisdiction. Because we find there was substantial evidence the parents' failure to address adequately Samantha's foot condition and Christopher's aggressive tendencies subjected them to a substantial risk of serious physical harm, we need not determine whether the parents' refusal to have the children participate in virtual special education services also warranted dependency jurisdiction.
As a preliminary matter, we observe that although the juvenile court found that mother and father failed to "ensure the children's participation in special education services" and "participate in the children's annual IEP meetings," the court's jurisdictional finding may be reasonably construed to encompass other omissions on the part of the parents. The text of count b-1 indicates that the two enumerated forms of alleged neglect did not necessarily comprise an exhaustive list, and that the two alleged forms of neglect were identified to "demonstrate[ mother and father had] a limited ability to provide the children with adequate care and supervision."
As discussed in greater detail below, DCFS presented evidence showing that mother and father did not take adequate 9 measures to detect and remediate Samantha's foot problem and Christopher's violent tendencies. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the juvenile court's jurisdictional finding may be supported by evidence other than the parents' failure to provide special education services to their children and their absence from IEP meetings. (See Concerned Citizens Coalition of Stockton v. City of Stockton (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 70, 77 [" 'The true measure of an order . . . is not an isolated phrase appearing therein, but its effect when considered as a whole. [Citations.] . . . If the language of the order be in any degree uncertain, then reference may be had to the circumstances surrounding, and the court's intention in the making of the same.' [Citation.]"].)
We also note that even though DCFS indicates in its respondent's brief that the agency believes evidence unrelated to special education services supports the jurisdictional finding, father does not claim in his reply that count b-1 failed to provide him with adequate notice of the agency's intention to establish jurisdiction based on this other evidence. Accordingly, father waives any such claim. (See In re John M. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1123 (John M.) ["' "[I]f the jurisdictional findings are supported by substantial evidence, the adequacy of the petition is irrelevant." [Citation.]' [Citation.] 'The only exception occurs when a parent claims a petition fails to provide actual notice of the factual allegations. . . .' [Citation.]"]; In re J.F. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 70, 79 (J.F.) ["' "When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived."' [Citation.]"].)
DCFS introduced substantial evidence that the parents failed to supervise adequately and secure appropriate treatment for Samantha's foot issue and Christopher's behavioral problems. 10
There was evidence that mother and father neglected the two children's special and unique needs because they were devoting their attention primarily to Alexander T.'s special needs instead. In particular, in connection with an application for the children's removal from parental custody, a DCFS social worker attested that on January 29, 2021, the social worker "expressed the concerns" to mother and father "regarding the children's medical needs and special needs," and that mother responded that "her adult son, Alexander [T.], who has special needs[, ] requires all of her attention." Similarly, the last minute information report filed on March 23, 2021 shows that on March 18, 2021, "[f]ather reported that he is not able to work until . . . Alexander[ ] is placed in a group home," and "[m]other stated that [father] is . . . unable to participate in any classes because [the] adult son follows [father] around." (Italics omitted.)
Indeed, father tacitly acknowledges the parents did not devote their attention to Christopher and Samantha because of Alexander T.'s presence in the family home. (See Artal, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 275, fn. 2 [holding that a party's arguments may be deemed admissions against that party].) Specifically, father argues, "by the time of the disposition hearing, the parents made a difficult decision in having their adult special needs son, A[lexander] T., residentially placed in a group home so that they can focus on Christopher and Samantha." (Italics added.)
Furthermore, there was evidence that Samantha had a problem with her feet causing her to trip. The jurisdiction report recites that on March 11, 2021, Samantha's resource parent "stated Samantha has her feet 'crooked[, ]'" claimed that Samantha's feet "face outward," and reported Samantha "trips as a result" of this condition. The report also indicates that during a 11 medical examination on February 12, 2021, a nurse noted that Samantha has a condition called" 'intoeing'" and recommended Samantha visit her primary care provider to learn walking exercises to address this issue.
The jurisdiction report also shows that upon examining Christopher on February 17, 2021, medical personnel noted the following:" 'Behavioral Concern-Concern for developmental delay/Autism based on observation in clinic today.'" (Italics omitted.) According to the report, Christopher's resource parent told DCFS on March 11, 2021 that Christopher" 'can become violent' and . . . hits his head when he gets mad at things such as being asked to pick up his school work . . . ." Per the report, Christopher's resource parent said that Christopher had "hurt himself on his head with his hands or by hitting the back of his head on the wall," and that the resource parent found "a bump on the left side of [Christopher's] head" on March 8, 2021.
Based on this evidence, the juvenile court reasonably could have found that mother and father failed to address Samantha's and Christopher's impairments because they were preoccupied with Alexander's special needs. The court was also permitted to infer that the parents' failure to address Christopher's violent behavior and Samantha's mobility challenge exposed them to a substantial risk of serious physical harm. (Cf. John M., supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1121-1122, 1125 [holding that a mother's" 'limited ability'" to "deal with" her disabled son's "violent" 12 conduct and to ensure that he received instruction on how to "navigate safely with a cane" supported the juvenile court's jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b)].) Furthermore, the court does not have to" 'wait until [the children are] seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to protect the child[ren].' [Citation.]" (See I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.) For these reasons, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's assertion of jurisdiction over Christopher and Samantha.
A last minute information report filed on July 21, 2021 indicates that mother provided DCFS with a letter from a regional care center stating that Alexander T. moved into that facility on June 10, 2021, more than two months after the March 30, 2021 adjudication hearing.
Lastly, we observe that in his reply brief, father intimates for the first time that the juvenile court's exercise of jurisdiction over the two children abridged the parents'" 'constitutionally protected liberty interest in directing their children's education.' [Citation.]" It seems father believes that "[a] remote learning survey of more than 1, 500 parents by ParentsTogetherAction" supports his belated constitutional challenge. We reject this claim as untimely. (See Regency Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Carolina Lanes, Inc. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1323, 1326; id. at p. 1333 ["To the extent [appellant] raised new arguments either in its reply papers below or in its reply brief on appeal, we do not reach them."].) 13
We also note that this constitutional claim would not warrant reversal of the juvenile court's jurisdictional finding because that ruling is supported by evidence independent of the parents' decision not to procure virtual special education services for their children.
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court's Order Removing Christopher T. and Samantha T. from Their Parents' Physical Custody
Section 361, subdivision (c)(1) provides in pertinent part: "A dependent child shall not be taken from the physical custody of his or her parents . . . with whom the child resides at the time the petition was initiated, unless the juvenile court finds clear and convincing evidence . . . [¶] [t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor's physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor's parent's . . . physical custody." (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).)
"A juvenile court's removal order at a disposition hearing [issued under section 361, subdivision (c)] will be affirmed on appeal if it is supported by substantial evidence." (See In re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 154.)" '[W]hen reviewing a finding that a fact [warranting a removal order] has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the question before the appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true. Consistent with well-established principles governing review for sufficiency of the evidence, in making this assessment the appellate court must view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give due deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.' [Citation.]" (See 14 id. at p. 155, quoting Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995-996.)
"The juvenile court's orders are 'presumed to be correct, and it is appellant's burden to affirmatively show error.' [Citations.]" (J.F., supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 79.)
For the reasons explained in Discussion, part A, ante, substantial evidence offered prior to the adjudication hearing established, more likely than not, that the parent's neglect of Samantha's mobility impairment and Christopher's aberrant behavior subjected them to a substantial risk of serious physical harm. (See § 355, subd. (a) ["Proof by a preponderance of evidence must be adduced to support a finding that the minor is a person described by Section 300."].) Based on this evidence, along with additional evidence adduced after the adjudication hearing but prior to disposition, the juvenile court rationally could have found it highly probable that returning the children to their parents' care would have subjected Christopher and Samantha to a substantial danger to their physical well-being.
According to a multidisciplinary assessment report attached to the disposition report, Samantha's "[c]aregiver observe[d] Samantha frequently falling when she [was] walking . . . ." (Italics added.) A rational factfinder could conclude this evidence establishes it was highly probable that Samantha's intoeing condition gave rise to a substantial danger to her physical well-being (i.e., by potentially causing her to fall and sustain injury).
Additionally, there was evidence that Christopher's violent behavior was even more dangerous than DCFS had initially reported. The disposition report states that on April 6, 2021, Christopher was hospitalized after (a) Christopher told his 15 caregiver that he had enjoyed killing some rats by" 'bang[ing]'" their heads in, and (b) Christopher's caregiver had discovered that Christopher searched for" '[h]ow to kill someone'" on his computer and wrote a statement on the computer indicating that Christopher wanted to kill his roommate. (Boldface & italics omitted.) The report further states that on April 13, 2021, the hospital reported that Christopher had a diagnosis of" 'Unspecified Psychosis'" and had been prescribed Zyprexa and Benadryl; the report notes the hospital released Christopher to his resource caregiver on April 27, 2021.
Father argues that "by the time of the disposition hearing, the parents made a difficult decision in having their adult special needs son, A[lexander ]T., residentially placed in a group home so that they can focus on Christopher and Samantha." We conclude that, notwithstanding Alexander's absence from the family home, there was substantial evidence establishing it was highly probable that the parents' limited ability to provide Christopher and Samantha with adequate care and supervision presented a substantial danger to their physical well-being.
The disposition report states that on April 15, 2021, father stated that he did not agree with Christopher's hospitalization, and both parents stated they did not want Christopher to take medication, notwithstanding the fact that a social worker had relayed to father and mother "the events that led to Christopher's hospitalization." The report shows that during that conversation with the social worker, mother "stated that Christopher and Samantha both need[ed] to be home," and asserted that "Christopher did not have mental health concerns until after he went into foster care." (Italics omitted.) 16
Furthermore, the disposition report and the last minute information report filed on June 11, 2021 indicate that although DCFS had referred Christopher to the North Los Angeles County Regional Center on March 16, 2021, mother and father did not sign the referral documents until May 18, 2021, even though the agency had reminded the parents about the paperwork on at least five occasions during that period. Additionally, the last minute information reports filed on June 11, 2021 and July 6, 2021 demonstrate that from May 18, 2021 to June 30, 2021, mother and father either ignored or rejected DCFS's repeated requests to conduct a home assessment. The juvenile court could reasonably infer from this evidence that the parents would not cooperate with DCFS, and would not procure the services recommended by the agency and health professionals to address their children's needs. (See also John M., supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1126 [concluding that a mother's failure to "follow through on securing necessary services" for her son supported a removal order].)
The last minute information report filed on July 21, 2021 indicates the parents ultimately allowed the agency to conduct a home assessment on July 19, 2021.
We further note there was evidence suggesting that Christopher needed a great deal of care and attention from his caretakers. As noted earlier, the agency reported Christopher had been hospitalized for his disturbing and violent behavior. Further, the multidisciplinary assessment team report attached to the disposition report (a) recommended that "Christopher's treating clinician further explore intensive support services such as Therapeutic Behavioral Services" to address "his disrupting behaviors in the home and school setting," and (b) found that 17 "Christopher needs an attentive and responsible adult that will support his developmental . . . needs." (Italics added & boldface omitted.) Based on this evidence, the juvenile court could have reasonably inferred that even if mother and father provided Christopher with the level of supervision and care he required, it was highly probable that the parents would once again ignore Samantha's special and unique needs, just as they had done when Alexander T. was in their care. (See Discussion, part A, a nte.)
For the reasons discussed earlier in this section, the juvenile court was entitled to find it was doubtful that the parents were in fact capable of providing Christopher with the level of supervision he required.
Father maintains there were reasonable means by which the children could have been protected without removing Christopher and Samantha from their parents' custody. Specifically, father argues DCFS "could have conducted unannounced home visits, maintained regular contact with the children's school, and ensured that the parents followed up with any services deemed necessary for the children through the Regional Center or other service providers."
Regarding the unannounced home visits, the parents' refusal to allow such visits for a 45-day period is circumstantial evidence that the parents were not inclined to cooperate with the agency's attempts to visit the home. (See also John M., supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1127 [noting that a parent's "refusal to cooperate with [the] agency" may be "evidence that removal [is] necessary"].) The juvenile court could also have reasonably inferred that charging DCFS with maintaining regular contact with the children's school and verifying the parents secured the 18 assistance of service providers would not, standing alone, ensure that Samantha would not trip and hurt herself and Christopher would refrain from engaging in self-destructive behavior while in their parents' care. Unless and until the parents had established they were capable of managing their children's special and unique needs, the court was entitled to find it highly probable that nothing short of removal would safeguard their physical well-being.
C. Father Waived Any Other Challenges to the Juvenile Court's Dispositional Rulings
Aside from contesting the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings and its order removing Christopher T. and Samantha T. from their parents' physical custody, father does not challenge the court's dispositional rulings. For instance, father does not maintain that even if dependency jurisdiction over the children were proper, we should reverse the order requiring him to participate in a developmentally appropriate parenting program. Accordingly, father has waived any remaining challenges to the juvenile court's dispositional rulings. (See J.F., supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 79.) 19
DISPOSITION
We affirm the juvenile court's assertion of dependency jurisdiction over Christopher T. and Samantha T., and the court's dispositional orders concerning these two children.
We concur: CHANEY, J., CRANDALL, J. [*] 20
[*] Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.