Opinion
NO. 2012-CA-001493-MR
06-21-2013
KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION APPELLANT v. BRUCE COPELAND AND BERRY PLASTICS APPELLEES
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Amy F. Howard Frankfort, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE BRUCE COPELAND: Mark D. Esterle Bowling Green, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL FROM SIMPSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JANET J. CROCKER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 11-CI-00210
OPINION
AFFIRMING
BEFORE: ACREE, CHIEF JUDGE; DIXON AND THOMPSON, JUDGES. DIXON, JUDGE: The Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission (the KUIC) appeals an order of the Simpson Circuit Court that reversed the KUIC's decision denying unemployment benefits to Bruce Copeland. Finding no error, we affirm.
Copeland began working for Berry Plastics as a machine operator on May 15, 2006. On January 15, 2010, Copeland had hip surgery for a non-work related problem. He was off work until July 5, 2010. Copeland returned to work for approximately two weeks, and was subsequently taken off work by his physician to address a knee problem attributable to Copeland's hip condition. Copeland utilized his short term disability benefits and remained off work for several months to treat his knee condition. On January 13, 2011, Berry sent a letter to Copeland advising him that his short term disability benefits would be exhausted on January 23, 2011. The letter explained that Berry would discharge Copeland from employment on that date unless he reported to work. Copeland contacted Berry and requested to use vacation time until his doctor's appointment on January 26, 2011, when he would be released from medical restrictions and authorized to return to work. Berry denied Copeland's request and discharged him on January 23, 2011.
Copeland testified that he received the letter on January 17, 2011.
Copeland applied for unemployment insurance benefits, and the Division of Unemployment Insurance determined that he was not eligible for benefits because he voluntarily quit his job without good cause attributable to the employment. Copeland appealed the determination to the appeals branch, and an administrative hearing was held on April 12, 2011. Copeland testified on his own behalf, and a representative for Berry did not appear at the hearing. The referee admitted evidence that included Copeland's termination letter and documents Berry submitted to the Unemployment Insurance Division. The referee affirmed the initial determination denying benefits. The referee made a specific finding of fact that Copeland's "employment was terminated by the employer effective January 23, 2011." The referee concluded that Copeland was disqualified from receiving benefits because he voluntarily left his employment for health reasons that were not related to his work. Copeland appealed the decision to the KUIC, which affirmed the referee and adopted the referee's findings as its own.
Copeland filed a complaint in Simpson Circuit Court seeking judicial review of the KUIC's decision. On July 27, 2012, the circuit court reversed the KUIC, concluding that the decision was erroneous as a matter of law. The KUIC now appeals the circuit court's order, arguing that the KUIC properly applied the law to the facts of this case and that the court erred by reversing its decision.
In Thompson v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 85 S.W.3d 621 (Ky. App. 2002), this Court stated the relevant standard of review:
Upon review of an administrative agency's adjudicatory decision, an appeal court's authority is somewhat limited. The judicial standard of review of an unemployment benefit decision is whether the KUIC's findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence and whether the agency correctly applied the law to the facts. Substantial evidence is defined as evidence, taken alone or in light of all the evidence, that has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable people.Id. at 624 (internal citations omitted).
The facts of this case were not in dispute. The evidence established that Berry terminated Copeland when his short term disability expired and he had not been released by his physician to return to work. The circuit court held that the KUIC misapplied the law to its factual findings by concluding that Copeland voluntarily quit his employment; accordingly, our review addresses the application of the law to the undisputed facts of this case.
This case involves the application of Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 341.370(1)(c), which provides that a claimant is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits when "[h]e has left his most recent suitable work . . . voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employment." Copeland had the burden of proof to establish that he did not voluntarily quit without good cause attributable to his employment. Thompson, 85 S.W.3d at 625. The term "voluntarily" means that the claimant's decision to leave his employment was "freely given" and resulted from the claimant's "own choice or full consent." Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. Young, 389 S.W.2d 451, 453 (Ky. 1965). Furthermore, "good cause" for voluntarily leaving suitable work "exists only when the worker is faced with circumstances so compelling as to leave no reasonable alternative but loss of employment." Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. Murphy, 539 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Ky. 1976).
The KUIC asserts that Copeland was disqualified from receiving benefits because he voluntarily chose to utilize his short term disability in order to treat a non-work related injury. Since Copeland exhausted his leave and did not return to work, the KUIC reasons that the termination must be viewed as a voluntary quit initiated by Copeland. Finally, the KUIC emphasizes that quitting work due to a non-work related illness or injury is not "attributable to the employment." Broadway & Fourth Ave. Realty Co. v. Allen, 365 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Ky. 1963).
After careful review, we believe the KUIC's position disregards the concept of voluntariness noted in Young, supra. It is misleading for the KUIC to characterize Copeland as freely choosing not to return to work for medical reasons. According to Copeland's undisputed testimony, he contacted the benefits administrator at Berry each time he had a doctor's appointment to inquire about the duration of his disability leave. Prior to receiving the termination letter, Copeland's conversations with the benefits administrator had left him with the impression that he had "plenty of time" to finish his treatment for his knee. Once Copeland learned his benefits were about to expire, he requested to use vacation time for January 23-26, 2011, because he would be released to return to work following his doctor's appointment on January 26. Berry did not participate in the administrative hearing or present any evidence contradicting Copeland's testimony. The evidence of record clearly established that Berry terminated Copeland's employment on January 23, 2011.
Copeland had the burden of proof to establish that he did not voluntarily quit without good cause attributable to his employment. Thompson, 85 S.W.3d at 625. "[A] person cannot quit voluntarily unless the decision to do so is '. . . freely given and proceeding from one's own choice or full consent.'" Nichols v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 677 S.W.2d 317, 321 (Ky. App. 1984), quoting Young, 389 S.W.2d at 453. Under the facts of this case, we are satisfied that the Circuit Court correctly determined that Copeland had not freely chosen to leave his employment, and was therefore entitled to unemployment benefits. Thus, we conclude the trial court properly reversed the decision of the KUIC.
For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the order of the Simpson Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Amy F. Howard
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE BRUCE
COPELAND:
Mark D. Esterle
Bowling Green, Kentucky