Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. BC356638 Ronald A. Sohigian, Judge.
Law Offices of Gene Koon and Gene Koon for Plaintiffs and Appellants Bud Kurwa and Nargis Kurwa.
DiJulio Law Grop, R. David DiJulio, Michael M. Bergfeld and Ken W. Choi for Defendants and Respondents Polly Fu Ju Cheng and Smart Finance Resources, Inc.
PERLUSS, P. J.
Bud Kurwa and Nargis Kurwa, as trustees of the Kurwa family trust (Kurwa), appeal from the order of dismissal entered after the trial court granted Polly Fu Ju Cheng and Smart Finance Resources, Inc.’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and awarded them attorney fees in Kurwa’s lawsuit seeking to rescind a settlement agreement and asserting claims for money had and received, fraud and negligent misrepresentation. We affirm.
Cheng was erroneously sued as Polly Fu Ju Chen, and the name Chen is contained in the formal case caption in the trial court. Her correct name is used in this opinion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The Original Sale Agreement
Kurwa and Min Chin Lin, Cheng’s husband, entered into a contract in May 2005 for the sale of real property in Acardia for $3,580,000. Cheng, who described herself as a licensed real estate sales agent, represented Lin in the negotiation and documentation of the transaction. Smart Finance Resources, Inc., a licensed real estate broker, is Cheng’s employer and supervising broker.
Although named as a defendant in Kurwa’s lawsuit, Lin was never served and is not a party to this appeal.
2. The Mediation and Settlement Agreement
In July 2005, prior to the close of escrow, Kurwa attempted to cancel the transaction. Lin filed an action for specific performance to enforce the sale agreement. The parties agreed to mediate the dispute and thereafter reached an agreement to settle the lawsuit “and all their differences and disputes.”
A Settlement Agreement and General Release was entered on October 12, 2005 between Kurwa (defined as “SELLER”), on the one hand, and both Lin and Cheng (defined as “BUYER”), on the other hand. The settlement agreement provided the sale price for the property would be increased to $3.7 million. The “Brokers,” a term not defined in the settlement agreement, agreed their total commission on the transaction would be $179,000 (which is equal to 5 percent of the original purchase price), with seller’s broker reducing his commission to $49,500 and buyer’s broker reducing her commission to a total of $129,500. Paragraph 2.4 expressly provided, “This Agreement is an exception to Evidence Code section 1152.5 [sic], and is admissible in evidence in any litigation arising out of enforcement of this Agreement, but for no other purpose and in no other matter.”
The parties agreed in paragraph 1.16 to “[w]aive any and all claims against [the] other party, including but not limited to costs and attorney’s fees, with respect to the Lawsuit.” Paragraph 3.1 releases all claims by the parties asserted in or relating to the specific performance action, including all claims that could have been asserted in the lawsuit. In paragraph 3.2 the parties “acknowledge and agree that this Release applies to all claims that any of them may have against any of the others arising out of the matters to which this Agreement pertains for injuries, damages, or losses to any property, personal or real, or to any persons or entities who are parties to or beneficiaries of this Agreement or parties to the Lawsuit, whether those injuries, damages or losses are known or unknown, foreseen or unforeseen, or patent or latent.” Paragraphs 3.3 and 3.4 waive the protections of Civil Code section 1542 “with respect to the matters set forth in this Agreement and this special release.”
In the portion of the settlement agreement labeled representations, warranties, indemnity, Kurwa, on the one hand, and Lin and Cheng, on the other hand, represented “that it has not relied upon any statement, representation, or promise of any other party to this Agreement... not expressly set out in this Agreement.” In addition, the parties were represented by legal counsel, who signed the settlement agreement indicating “Approved As To Form,” and confirmed in the settlement agreement itself “that it has had an opportunity to seek legal advice from independent lawyers of its own choosing with respect to the advisability of entering into this Agreement and enters into this Agreement either based on that advice or knowingly choosing not to seek such advice, as the case may be.”
Paragraph 5.2 of the settlement agreement, the attorney fee provision, required each party to pay its own attorney fees and costs associated with the settlement agreement or incurred prior to execution of the agreement, but specified, “if any action or proceeding is instituted to enforce the terms of this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable professional fees, including but not limited to attorneys’ fees, incurred in such action or proceeding, and costs of suit, as may be determined by the court.”
3. Kurwa’s Action for Rescission, Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation
On August 8, 2006 Kurwa filed an unverified complaint, and on October 23, 2006 an unverified first amended complaint, seeking to rescind the settlement agreement and to recover the real property sold to Lin and Cheng and alleging causes of action for money had and received against Cheng (commissions in the sum of $120,000), fraud (suppression of fact) and negligent misrepresentation. The critical allegations in Kurwa’s pleading are that Cheng represented she was a real estate agent representing the buyers in the purchase and sale transaction and, as such was entitled to receive a commission and Cheng knew, or reasonably should have known that this representation was false because, as a principal in the transaction, she was not entitled to receive a commission. The first amended complaint specifically alleges Cheng suppressed the fact that she was Lin’s spouse and a principal in the sale transaction and a principal is not entitled to receive a commission for acting as a real estate agent. Kurwa further alleges, “The suppression of facts were [sic] likely to and did mislead plaintiffs and were [sic] made with the intention to induce plaintiffs to agree to the purchase and sale transaction, and the settlement agreement including a commission of $120,000 paid to Chen[g].”
Neither the record on appeal nor the parties’ briefs account for the difference between the $129,500 commission specified for the buyer’s broker in the settlement agreement and the $120,000 in commissions Kurwa sought to recover from Cheng in this lawsuit.
A copy of the settlement agreement was attached to the first amended complaint and incorporated by reference into the pleading.
4. The Trial Court’s Orders Granting Judgment on the Pleadings and Awarding Attorney Fees
Smart Finance Resources answered the first amended complaint with a general denial and affirmative defenses in November 2006. Cheng answered in February 2007. In August 2007 Smart Finance Resources and Cheng moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing the settlement agreement’s full and complete mutual general releases, together with its Civil Code section 1542 waiver, barred Kurwa’s claims; and the provisions for confidentiality of mediation proceedings contained in Evidence Code section 1115 et seq., as broadly interpreted in governing case law, prevented Kurwa from proving its claim of fraudulent or negligent concealment. Smart Finance Resources and Cheng also asserted Lin, who had been named a defendant but never served, was a necessary party to the cause of action seeking to rescind the settlement agreement (specifically, the sale of property by Kurwa to Lin and Cheng).
Kurwa opposed the motion, arguing Cheng’s fraudulent concealment preceded the mediation process and, therefore, the action did not require evidence of any confidential discussions or negotiation; the allegations of fraud in the inducement vitiated the releases in the settlement agreement; and it was entitled to, and was seeking to, rescind only the portion of the settlement agreement providing for payment of commission to Cheng, thus Lin was not an indispensable party to the action.
After hearing oral argument on September 11, 2007 the trial court granted the motion without leave to amend. The court found the claim that Cheng had concealed she was a principal in the transaction had no merit because that fact was actually disclosed in the settlement agreement itself. The court also ruled, even if a commission was not proper for Cheng, Kurwa knew she was the buyer’s agent, as well as a buyer, when he entered the settlement agreement. Any alleged misrepresentation in that regard prior to mediation and the settlement would be barred because of the agreement’s general release and Civil Code section 1542 waiver, and any reliance on discussions during the mediation itself would be barred by the Evidence Code’s protection of the confidentiality of the mediation process.
Lin was dismissed from the action, and judgment was entered on October 22, 2007.
The trial court also granted Smart Finance Resources and Cheng’s motion for attorney fees and costs as the prevailing party under paragraph 5.2 of the settlement agreement. Following briefing on the proper amount of fees, on November 7, 2007 the court awarded $10,082.90 in costs and $47,000 in attorney fees (approximately $4,250 less than requested).
DISCUSSION
1. Standard of Review
We review de novo the trial court’s order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings (Gerawan Farming v. Lyons (2000) 24 Cal.4th 468, 515), assuming the truth of, and liberally construing, all properly pleaded factual allegations in the complaint. (Id. at pp. 515-516; see Kapsimallis v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 667, 672 [“[a]ll properly pleaded, material facts are deemed true, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law”].) On appeal we properly consider evidence outside of the pleadings that was presented to the trial court without objection (Stone Street Capital, LLC v. California State Lottery Com. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 109, 115; O’Neil v. General Security Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 587, 594, fn. 1), as well as matters subject to judicial notice. (Stone Street Capital,at p. 115; Kapsimallis, at p. 672 [“judicially noticeable matters may be considered”].)
An order granting or denying an award of attorney fees is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (See, e.g., MHC Financing Limited Partnership Two v. City of Santee (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1397; Salawy v. Ocean Towers Housing Corp. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 664, 669.) However, the question of a party’s entitlement to attorney fees is a legal issue subject to de novo review. (Connerly v. State Personnel Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1169, 1175-1176; Leamon v. Krajkiewcz (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 424, 431; Carver v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 132, 142.) Similarly, we independently determine as a question of law the scope of a contractual attorney fee provision when the interpretation does not turn on extrinsic evidence. (Kalai v. Gray (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 768, 777; Exxess Electronixx v. Heger Realty Corp. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 698, 705 (Exxess Electronixx).)
2. The Trial Court Properly Granted the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
The premise for Kurwa’s lawsuit—that Cheng negligently misrepresented she was entitled to a real estate commission and fraudulently concealed, as a principal in the transaction, she could not receive a commission—suffers from multiple flaws. First, in Horning v. Shilberg (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 197, 204, the sole case authority on which Kurwa relies for this proposition, the Court of Appeal held, “Where a broker agrees to purchase property on his or her own behalf, there is no agency or employment relationship with a third party and therefore no entitlement to a commission or other compensation.” In the case at bar, of course, Cheng was not purchasing property on her own behalf, but was one of two principals—the other was her husband Lin—in the transaction. Kurwa cites no authority, and we are aware of none, that extends the reasoning of Horning to a situation in which the real estate agent is but one of two or more principals in a transaction.
As discussed, Kurwa’s allegation Cheng failed to disclose she was a principal in the purchase transaction was disproved by disclosures in the settlement agreement itself.
Kurwa also cites Business and Professions Code section 10131, as did the court in Horning v. Shilberg, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at page 203, which defines “broker” as a person who, for compensation or in the expectation of compensation, “does or negotiates to do one or more of the following acts for another or others....”
Second, the Horning court did not hold the provision for a broker’s commission was unenforceable. Rather, it concluded the “agreement to pay a purported ‘commission’ or other compensation to a broker purchasing property on his or her own behalf is, in essence, an agreement to a reduction in the purchase price.” (Horning v. Shilberg, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 204; see id. at p. 205 [“Because Horning, as a principal was not entitled to a real estate commission in the first instance, he cannot successfully claim a lost commission when escrow did not close. Further, by acknowledging Horning was a principal and no brokers were involved in the transaction, Shilberg [the seller] could not have agreed to compensate a ‘broker’ for broker activities. Rather, the parties agreed Horning was entitled to a 3 percent reduction in the purchase price via a rebate if escrow closed.”].) Unlike the situation at issue in Horning, here the sale transaction did close. Accordingly, whether Cheng was entitled to a $120,000 commission from Kurwa or the purchase price paid to Kurwa by Lin and Cheng was reduced by that sum is, as a matter of simple economics, immaterial to Kurwa. Either way, Kurwa as seller would receive $3.7 million less $120,000 (and less any other commissions to be paid to third parties). As a result, any purported nondisclosure or concealment could not support a fraud claim by Kurwa.
Finally, Kurwa does not base his recission or fraud claims on the allegation Cheng affirmatively misrepresented she was entitled to a commission but rather alleges she fraudulently concealed she was not. Kurwa acknowledges Cheng had no fiduciary relationship to him, arguing her duty to disclose arose from assertions made in connection with the original sale agreement (in which it appears only Lin was to be the buyer) that she was a real estate agent and entitled to a commission. Under some circumstances, of course, a party to a transaction has a duty to disclose information that materially qualifies affirmative statements he or she has made. (See Persson v. Smart Inventions, Inc. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1166-1165 [“intentional concealment exists when a party to a transaction, who is under no duty to speak, nevertheless does speak and suppresses facts which materially qualify the facts stated”]; see generally Civ. Code, § 1710, subd. 3.) Even were we to put aside our doubts about the applicability of that principle when the alleged concealment occurs in a separate transaction, subsequent to the one in which the affirmative statement was made, Cheng’s entitlement to a commission in light of her dual status (fully disclosed) as one of the buyers is a legal opinion and, as such, actionable only to the extent Cheng purported to have special knowledge on the subject that Kurwa did not possess. (See Rest.2d Torts, §§ 545, subd. (2) [“[i]f a misrepresentation as to a matter of law is only one of opinion as to the legal consequences of facts, the recipient is justified in relying upon it to the same extent as though it were a representation of any other opinion”], 542 [“The recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation solely of the maker’s opinion is not justified in relying upon it in a transaction with the maker, unless the fact to which the opinion relates is material, and the maker [¶] (a) purports to have special knowledge of the matter that the recipient does not have....”].) Although alleging in the first amended complaint that Cheng knew or reasonably should have known she was not entitled to a commission, Kurwa does not assert Cheng purported to have any special knowledge on the subject or otherwise allege any basis on which a trier of fact could conclude Kurwa, while represented by counsel, reasonably relied on Cheng’s misrepresentation (or nondisclosure) of a pure legal opinion.
The settlement agreement contains mutual releases of all claims relating to the original sale transaction, which necessarily would include any affirmative misrepresentation about Cheng’s entitlement to a commission.
Independent of these serious deficiencies in Kurwa’s theory of the case, as the trial court held, Kurwa’s claims are barred by the mediation confidentiality statutes. (Evid. Code, § 1115 et seq.) The settlement agreement Kurwa alleges was procured by fraud and seeks to rescind was the product of the parties’ mediation to resolve their disputes arising from Kurwa’s cancellation of the original sale agreement. Yet all communications, negotiations or settlement discussions by and between participants in the course of a mediation are confidential: Evidence Code section 1119 “prohibits any person, mediator and participants alike, from revealing any written or oral communication made during mediation.” (Foxgate Homeowners’ Assn. v. Bramalea California, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1, 13 (Foxgate); see Simmons v. Ghaderi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 570, 578.) Further, the parties’ negotiations in connection with the mediation proceedings are confidential “not only during the mediation, but also after the mediation ends.” (Simmons, at p. 580; Evid. Code, § 1126.) “Except in cases of express waiver or where due process is implicated, [the Supreme Court has] held that mediation confidentiality is to be strictly enforced.” (Simmons, at p. 582; Foxgate, at pp. 15-17.)
The agreement itself is admissible pursuant to Evidence Code section 1123, which provides, “A written settlement agreement prepared in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation, is not made inadmissible, or protected from disclosure, by provisions of this chapter if the agreement is signed by the settling parties and any of the following conditions are satisfied: [¶] (a) The agreement provides that it is admissible or subject to disclosure, or words to that effect. [¶] (b) The agreement provides that it is enforceable or binding or words to that effect. [¶] (c) All parties to the agreement expressly agree in writing, or orally in accordance with Section 1118, to its disclosure. [¶] (d) The agreement is used to show fraud, duress, or illegality that is relevant to an issue in dispute.” As discussed, although citing former Evidence Code section 1152.5, which was repealed in 1997, rather than Evidence Code section 1123, paragraph 2.4 of the settlement agreement expressly provides it “is admissible in evidence in any litigation arising out of enforcement of this Agreement.”
Evidence Code section 1119 provides, “Except as otherwise provided in this chapter: [¶] (a) No evidence of anything said or any admission made for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation or a mediation consultation is admissible or subject to discovery, and disclosure of the evidence shall not be compelled, in any arbitration, administrative adjudication, civil action, or other noncriminal proceeding in which, pursuant to law, testimony can be compelled to be given. [¶] (b) No writing, as defined in Section 250, that is prepared for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation or a mediation consultation, is admissible or subject to discovery, and disclosure of the writing shall not be compelled, in any arbitration, administrative adjudication, civil action, or other noncriminal proceeding in which, pursuant to law, testimony can be compelled to be given. [¶] (c) All communications, negotiations, or settlement discussions by and between participants in the course of a mediation or a mediation consultation shall remain confidential.”
To prove Cheng and her counsel did not advise Kurwa or his lawyer that a real estate agent or broker who participated in a transaction as a principal was not entitled to a commission (assuming only for the sake of this analysis that Kurwa’s legal theory is valid), Kurwa necessarily would have to disclose the content of the parties’ settlement discussions and negotiations. That is true whether Kurwa is seeking to prove affirmative misrepresentations or actionable nondisclosures. In either event, the burden of proof is on Kurwa; and that burden cannot be met without use of evidence made inadmissible by the confidentiality statutes. (See Simmons v. Ghaderi, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 588 [“Here, the mediation confidentiality statutes made inadmissible all evidence of an oral contract between plaintiffs and defendant during mediation. Thus, there was no evidence to prove plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim, and defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”]; see Eisendrath v. Superior Court (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 351, 365 [recognizing that mediation confidentiality statutes effectively give control over evidence of certain misconduct to the party engaged in the misconduct but concluding, “we assume that the Legislature considered these limitations on the presentation of evidence when it enacted the statutory scheme”]; cf. Foxgate, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 17 [“none of the confidentiality statutes currently make an exception for reporting bad faith conduct... when doing so would require disclosure of communications”].) Without the possibility of Kurwa producing evidence to prove his fraudulent concealment claim, Cheng and Smart Finance Resources were entitled to the order granting their motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Even if Kurwa did not require evidence of communications made during the mediation process to prove his claims for fraud or rescission, the mediation confidentiality statutes would preclude Cheng from meaningfully defending herself—a result equally at odds with the strong policy favoring mediation adopted by the Legislature. (See Simmons v. Ghaderi, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 578; see generally Foxgate, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 14 [“confidentiality is essential to effective mediation”].) In this regard Cheng would be placed in the same untenable situation as outside counsel forced to defend against a shareholder derivative action to enforce the rights of the corporation when the corporation itself has not waived the lawyer-client privilege, a situation this court considered in McDermott, Will & Emery v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 378. Because the filing of the shareholder action does not waive the privilege, the attorney would be forced “to ‘preserve the attorney client privilege (the client having done nothing to waive the privilege) while trying to show that his representation of the client was not negligent.’” (Id. at p. 384, italics omitted.) We held such a lawsuit could not proceed, granted a peremptory writ of mandate and directed the trial court to enter an order granting the lawyers’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Id. at p. 385.) Similarly in the mediation context, absent strictly limited circumstances not present here (see Simmons, at p. 582), there is no implied waiver of mediation confidentiality, through conduct or otherwise. (Id. at p. 585.) That is, notwithstanding Kurwa’s action concerning the settlement agreement reached in mediation and Cheng’s need to use evidence of the mediation proceedings to defend against that action, the statutory confidentiality rules remain fully in enforce, effectively foreclosing Cheng’s ability to defend herself. As in McDermott, Will & Emery, such an action may not proceed. (See McDermott, Will & Emery, at p. 385.)
3. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Awarding Attorney Fees
a. The settlement agreement authorizes the award of attorney fees to Cheng and Smart Finance Resources
Paragraph 5.2 of the settlement agreement provides, “If any action or proceeding is instituted to enforce the terms of this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable professional fees, including but not limited to attorneys’ fees, incurred in such action or proceeding, and costs of suit, as may be determined by the court.” Citing Schlocker v. Schlocker (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 921, Kurwa argues his lawsuit was not “on a contract,” as required by Civil Code section 1717 , but in tort for fraud in derogation of the contract, and the trial court therefore erred in awarding fees to Smart Finance Resources and Cheng for their successful defense of the action.
Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (a), provides, “In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to other costs. [¶]... [¶] Reasonable attorney’s fees shall be fixed by the court and shall be an element of the costs of suit.”
Although an action premised on fraud in the inducement is not within the ambit of Civil Code section 1717 (see Exxess Electronixx, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p. 711), an action for rescission is an “action on a contract” for purposes of an award of attorney fees and other costs under that provision. (Hastings v. Matlock (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 826, 840-841; accord, Reveles v. Toyota by the Bay (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1152, fn. 6, disapproved on other grounds in Gavaldon v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1246, 1261 and Snukal v. Flightways Manufacturing, Inc. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 754, 775, fn. 6.) “‘California courts liberally construe the term “‘“on a contract”’” as used within section 1717. [Citation.] As long as the action “involve[s]” a contract it is “‘on [the] contract’” within the meaning of section 1717.’” (Blickman Turkus, LP v. MF Downtown Sunnyvale, LLC (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 858, 895; see Care Construction, Inc. v. Century Convalescent Centers, Inc. (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 701, 706 [“‘as long as the action here involved a contract it was “on a contract”’” and within Civ. Code, § 1717].) Because Kurwa sought to rescind the portion of the settlement agreement authorizing the payment of a commission to Cheng, at least to that extent an award of attorney fees was proper.
Indeed, Kurwa attached a copy of the settlement agreement to his complaint, indicating his belief the lawsuit arose “out of enforcement of this Agreement” -- the only situation in which the parties had agreed the settlement agreement would be admissible in evidence.
In general, when a cause of action based on the contract providing for attorney fees is joined with tort or other causes of action not within the ambit of Civil Code section 1717, attorney fees are recoverable only as they relate to the contract action; and the trial court must apportion the fees incurred by the prevailing party. (Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 124, 129.) However, “plaintiff’s joinder of causes of action should not dilute its right to attorney’s fees. Attorney’s fees need not be apportioned when incurred for representation on an issue common to both a cause of action in which fees are proper and one in which they are not allowed.” (Id. at pp. 129-130; see Bell v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 672, 687 [“[a]pportionment is not required when the claims for relief are so intertwined that it would be impracticable, if not impossible, to separate the attorney’s time into compensable and noncompensable units”]; accord, Abdallah v. United Savings Bank (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1101, 1111.) Kurwa’s contract-based rescission claim and the tort claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation in this case arose from the same factual allegations and are governed by identical legal principles. The trial court’s decision not to apportion the fees recovered, therefore, was not error. (See El Escorial Owners’ Assn. v. DLC Plastering, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1365 [apportionment is within the trial court’s discretion]; see also Erickson v. R.E.M. Concepts, Inc. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1073, 1083 [abuse of discretion in apportionment of fees is established only when trial court’s ruling exceeds bounds of reason, considering all the circumstances before it]; Gonzales v. Personal Storage, Inc. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 464, 479 [same].)
b. The court did not abuse its discretion in fixing the amount of fees
As discussed, an order granting an award of attorney fees is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (See MHC Financing Limited Partnership Two v. City of Santee, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 1397.) In particular, “[w]ith respect to the amount of fees awarded, there is no question our review must be highly deferential to the views of the trial court.” (Children’s Hospital & Medical Center v. Bontá (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 777; see also PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 [recognizing trial court’s broad discretion in determining amount of reasonable attorney fees because experienced trial judge is in the best position to decide value of professional services rendered in court].) An appellate court will interfere with a determination of “what constitutes the actual and reasonable attorney fees” “only where there has been a manifest abuse of discretion.” (Fed-Mart Corp. v. Pell Enterprises, Inc. (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 215, 228.)
Smart Finance Resources and Cheng sought to recover total fees of $51,273.50, based on 267.10 hours of attorney time spent litigating the matter for more than one year. Their motion for fees was supported by a declaration from lead counsel and detailed billing records, submitted without any redactions. In opposition, in addition to asserting fees were not recoverable at all under Civil Code section 1717, Kurwa argued the fees sought were unreasonable. The opposition papers provided several specific examples of time Kurwa believed was unnecessary, excessive or duplicative. (For example, Kurwa argued eight hours billed for preparing what was described as a simple motion to quash service of a summons and complaint served on the wrong party was “clearly beyond the bounds of reason.”)
At the hearing on the motion the trial court stated it had fully considered Kurwa’s objections and, based on a weighing of the arguments Kurwa made, reduced the amount awarded to $47,000 (a reduction of slight more than 8 percent). In light of the trial court’s broad discretion in these matters and the evidence presented in support of the award, we cannot say the trial court “manifestly abused its discretion” in awarding $47,000 in attorney fees in connection with this litigation. (See PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1095.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Cheng and Smart Finances Resources, Inc. are to recover their costs on appeal.
We concur: WOODS, J., ZELON, J.