Opinion
April 13, 1987
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Orange County (Patsalos, J.).
Ordered that the orders are affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.
It is beyond cavil that an X-ray report is normally entitled to protection from disclosure since it constitutes a confidential communication between a physician and patient (Parker v Boston Maine R.R., 5 A.D.2d 1035; CPLR 4504 [a]; 3101 [d]). Nevertheless, in the case at bar, during an examination before trial of the defendant Lumley, the plaintiff's attorney (1) produced and marked for identification a written preliminary X-ray report, purportedly prepared by Lumley, concerning a patient who was not involved in any way in the instant litigation, and (2) refused to provide Lumley's attorney with any information as to how he had obtained this particular X-ray report.
Under these circumstances, Special Term did not abuse its discretion in directing the plaintiff to divulge "how the x-ray in question was obtained, and whether a valid authorization was obtained or otherwise be precluded from any use of the report" (see, Boddy v Parker, 45 A.D.2d 1000; see also, Hughson v St. Francis Hosp., 93 A.D.2d 491).
We have examined the plaintiff's remaining arguments and find them to be without merit (see, Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 N.Y.2d 403; Doxtator v Swarthout, 38 A.D.2d 782; Rouse v County of Greene, 115 A.D.2d 162; Barbato v Tuosto, 38 Misc.2d 823; CPLR 3126, 3101 [a]). Mangano, J.P., Rubin, Kooper and Harwood, JJ., concur.