Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-3331-GTV.
August 28, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff filed this action against the Board of Douglas County Commissioners (the "County"), Sheriff Loren Anderson, and Officers Randy Smith, Wes Stewart, Jeremy Kline, and Paula Wunder pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Kansas state law. The case is before the court on Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 31). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The requirement of a "genuine" issue of fact means that the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of fact is "material" if it is essential to the proper disposition of the claim. Id. Essentially, the inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251-52.
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). This burden may be met by showing that there is a lack of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Id. at 325. Once the moving party has properly supported its motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact left for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. "[A] party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment. Id. "Any evidence tending to show triable issues will be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Black Hills Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 34 F.3d 968, 972 (10th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are either uncontroverted or are based on the evidence submitted with the summary judgment papers and viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Immaterial facts and facts not properly supported by the record are omitted. The court specifically notes that Exhibits 1 through 7 attached to Plaintiff's opposition to the motion for summary judgment are not properly authenticated and, therefore, cannot be considered by the court. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) (e); D. Kan. Rule 56.1 (stating that for purposes of summary judgment, documents must be authenticated through a supporting affidavit or deposition excerpt from anyone with personal knowledge of the facts contained in the exhibit); Toney v. Cuomo, 92 F. Supp.2d 1186, 195-96 (D.Kan. 2000) (citations omitted) (same).
Plaintiff is an adult female who resides in Lawrence, Kansas. On April 18, 1999, officers from the Lawrence Police Department arrested Plaintiff and her fiancé for domestic violence. Following their arrests, both individuals were transported to the Douglas County Jail where they were taken to the booking floor for processing.
When Plaintiff arrived on the booking floor, she was seated at a desk with Officer Teehee of the Lawrence Police Department. Officer Teehee is not a party to this action. While Officer Teehee was completing paperwork, Derek Lewis, a detainee sitting at a nearby desk, made a comment to Plaintiff about the attractiveness of her legs. Officer Teehee warned Mr. Lewis to leave Plaintiff alone. The record does not reveal any further comments made by Mr. Lewis to Plaintiff at that time.
Officers later directed Mr. Lewis into Holding Cell No. 3, one of three holding cells located on the booking floor. Holding Cell No. 3 was the same holding cell into which Plaintiff's fiancé and the majority of other male detainees were placed during the booking process. Because Holding Cell No. 3 was not equipped with a toilet, the door to the cell was left unlocked "on occasion" to allow the detainees to leave the cell and use the toilet in nearby Holding Cell No. 1.
Plaintiff was initially allowed to remain seated at a desk that was situated across the hallway from Holding Cell No. 3. While Plaintiff was seated at the desk, Mr. Lewis began making gestures to her through the small glass window in the door of Holding Cell No. 3. When Plaintiff saw her fiancé looking out the glass window from behind Mr. Lewis, she approached the door and attempted to communicate with him. Officer Smith, a jailer with the Douglas County Sheriff's Department, noticed that Plaintiff had approached the door, informed her that she and her fiancé were not permitted to talk, and placed her into Holding Cell No. 2, an adjacent holding cell. Officer Smith did not lock the door to Holding Cell No. 2 after placing Plaintiff inside.
Approximately five minutes later, Mr. Lewis walked out of Holding Cell No. 3, entered Holding Cell No. 2, and sexually assaulted Plaintiff. Plaintiff resisted Mr. Lewis and screamed two or three times during the course of the assault. Officers became aware of a problem only after Officer Smith heard voices in the main hallway of the booking floor and walked out of a nearby office to see that Plaintiff and Plaintiff's fiancé, who had exited Holding Cell No. 3 sometime after Mr. Lewis, were standing unattended in the hallway. At that point, Mr. Lewis walked out of Holding Cell No. 2, Plaintiff accused Mr. Lewis of sexual assault, and an investigation into the incident commenced shortly thereafter.
III. DISCUSSION A. § 1983 Claim
Section 1983 permits an individual to pursue an action against any person who "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage," deprives the plaintiff of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Here, Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated her constitutional rights by failing to take reasonable measures to protect her from other detainees in the Douglas County Jail.
The court recognizes at the outset that at the time of the alleged violation, Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee, i.e., a person who had been charged with a crime but who had not yet been tried on the charge. Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1493 (10th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). Whereas inmates who have already been charged with and adjudged guilty of a crime are protected by the Eighth Amendment, pretrial detainees are protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Lopez v. LeMaster, 172 F.3d 756, 759 n. 2 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16 (1979)). The distinction is primarily one of formality, however, because to determine whether a pretrial detainee's rights have been violated under the Fourteenth Amendment, the court applies an analysis identical to that applied in Eighth Amendment cases. Id. (citing Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 643 (5th Cir. 1996)).
While municipalities and prison officials cannot absolutely guarantee the safety of their prisoners, the Eighth Amendment imposes a duty upon them to take reasonable measures to ensure their safety. Id. at 759 (citations omitted). This duty includes the duty to protect prisoners from suffering harm at the hands of other prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (citations omitted). In short, municipalities and prison officials are prohibited from acting with "deliberate indifference" toward the safety of inmates. Id. at 834 (citations omitted) (outlining "deliberate indifference" standard for prison officials); Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1307-08 (10th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted) (explaining "deliberate indifference" standard for municipalities).
1. Individual Capacity vs. Official Capacity Claims
Defendants first argue that Plaintiff's complaint asserts a § 1983 claim against Defendants Anderson, Smith, Stewart, Kline, and Wunder only in their official capacities, and not in their individual capacities. In support, they point out that the caption to Plaintiff's complaint names the officials as defendants in the case, but does not specify in which capacity or capacities they are being sued.
While the caption to a complaint is certainly informative, it is not dispositive. Pride v. Does, 997 F.2d 712, 715 (10th Cir. 1993). "[W]here the complaint fails to specify the capacity in which the government official is sued, we look to the substance of the pleadings and the course of the proceedings in order to determine whether the suit is for individual or official liability." Id. (citing Houston v. Reich, 932 F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir. 1991) (further citations omitted)).
Plaintiff's complaint is admittedly less than clear as to whether Plaintiff is suing Defendants Anderson, Smith, Stewart, Kline, and Wunder in their official capacities, individual capacities, or both. The pleadings and the course of litigation make clear, however, that Plaintiff is suing the officials in both capacities. Foremost, Plaintiff's complaint seeks punitive damages under § 1983, a form of relief that is not available against either a municipality or an individual acting in his official capacity. Id. (citations omitted); Veith v. City of Coffeyville, No. 96-2364-GTV, 1996 WL 705365, at *2, 3 (D.Kan. Nov. 13, 1996) (citations omitted). Additionally, Defendants raise the defense of qualified immunity in their answer to Plaintiff's complaint, which indicates that Defendants perceive Plaintiff's complaint as asserting a § 1983 claim against them in their individual capacities. See Pride, 997 F.2d at 715-16 (citations omitted). Finally, Plaintiff states in her memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment that she "intended for the defendants to be named in both capacities." Thus, the court concludes that Plaintiff has asserted a § 1983 claim against Defendants Anderson, Smith, Stewart, Kline, and Wunder in both their individual and official capacities.
2. Claims Against Individual Defendants
Defendants next argue that, to the extent that Plaintiff's complaint advances a claim against Defendants Anderson, Smith, Stewart, Kline, and Wunder in their individual capacities, they are entitled to summary judgment pursuant to the doctrine of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields an individual government official performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages insofar as his conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (citations omitted). The defense of qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). It constitutes "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability. . . ." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
Because of the extremely broad protection qualified immunity affords to government officials, the court addresses summary judgment motions that raise the defense differently from other summary judgment motions. Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Once a defendant asserts the qualified immunity defense, the plaintiff assumes a "`heavy two-part burden.'" Id. at 1128 (quoting Albright v. Rodriguez, 51 F.3d 1531, 1534 (10th Cir. 1995) (further citation omitted)). "The plaintiff must first establish that the defendant's actions violated a constitutional or statutory right. If the plaintiff establishes a violation of a constitutional or statutory right, he must then demonstrate that the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the defendant's unlawful conduct." Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). "[A]lthough [the court] review[s] the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the record must clearly demonstrate the plaintiff has satisfied his heavy two-part burden; otherwise, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity." Id. (internal citation omitted). If the plaintiff satisfies the two-part burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that "no material issue of fact remain as to whether his or her actions were objectively reasonable in light of the law and the information he or she possessed at the time." Martin v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 909 F.2d 402, 405-06 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting Zuchel v. Spinharney, 890 F.2d 273, 274 (10th Cir. 1989) (further citations omitted)).
For Plaintiff to establish that Defendants violated her constitutional rights by failing to protect her from other detainees in the Douglas County Jail, she must show that: (1) she was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm to her safety; and (2) Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to that substantial risk, i.e., Defendants knew of and disregarded the substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 837. Thus, Plaintiff must establish an objective criteria — that there was a substantial risk of serious harm — as well as a subjective criteria — that Defendants knew of and disregarded the substantial risk of serious harm. Id. To meet the subjective component, Defendants "must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [they] must also draw the inference." Id. at 837. Whether Defendants "had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence, and a factfinder may conclude that [Defendants] knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious." Id. at 842 (citations omitted). For example, the Supreme Court explained in Farmer that:
[I]f an Eighth Amendment plaintiff presents evidence showing that a substantial risk of inmate attacks was longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past, and the circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being sued had been exposed to information concerning the risk and thus must have known about it, then such evidence could be sufficient to permit a trier of fact to find that the defendant-official had actual knowledge of the risk.
Id. at 842-43 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendants do not argue that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the objective element, i.e., that Plaintiff was detained under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm to her safety. Although the court considers it a close question as to whether the risk to Plaintiff in this case was "substantial," the court will assume for purposes of this opinion that Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to satisfy the objective element. First, sexual assault constitutes a serious harm. Second, the evidence indicates that Plaintiff was detained under conditions posing an at least arguably substantial risk of sexual assault. Plaintiff was confined by herself in a holding cell that was directly adjacent to a holding cell detaining several men, including Mr. Lewis, who had previously openly commented on the attractiveness of Plaintiff's legs and who continued to gesture to Plaintiff from his holding cell after being warned to leave Plaintiff alone. Neither Plaintiff's holding cell nor the adjacent holding cell was locked, and the record is devoid of any evidence indicating that the officials took any significant measures to supervise the detainees under such circumstances. In fact, the evidence indicates that, despite Plaintiff screaming two or three times during the course of the sexual assault, officers became aware that Mr. Lewis had entered Plaintiff's holding cell and assaulted her only after one of the officers noticed that Plaintiff and Plaintiff's fiancé were standing unattended in the hallway outside of their holding cells. For these reasons, the court determines that Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that she was detained under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm to her safety.
Having concluded that Plaintiff has satisfied the objective element, the court now examines whether Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to show that each individual defendant acted with deliberate indifference toward Plaintiff's safety, i.e., whether each individual defendant knew of and disregarded the substantial risk of sexual assault.
a. Officer Smith
At the time of the alleged assault, Officer Smith was a jailer with the Douglas County Sheriff's Department who was processing detainees on the booking floor of the Douglas County Jail. The evidence shows that Officer Smith was aware that several men were being detained in Holding Cell No. 3, and that the door to Holding Cell No. 3 was being left unlocked "on occasion" so that the men could leave the cell and use a toilet located in a different cell. The evidence also shows that, after discovering that Plaintiff was attempting to communicate with her fiancé through the glass window of Holding Cell No. 3, Officer Smith placed Plaintiff into Holding Cell No. 2, a holding cell directly adjacent to Holding Cell No. 3, and did not lock the door.
Under the Tenth Circuit's summary judgment standards for the qualified immunity defense, Plaintiff is required to satisfy the heavy burden of presenting evidence that Officer Smith was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's safety. Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the court determines that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy her burden. Although the evidence shows that Officer Smith placed Plaintiff in an unlocked cell adjacent to Mr. Lewis' unlocked cell, Plaintiff has presented no evidence that Officer Smith was in any way aware that Mr. Lewis might pose a threat to Plaintiff's safety. Plaintiff has not shown that Officer Smith was aware of the comment that Mr. Lewis purportedly made to Plaintiff about the attractiveness of her legs, that he was aware that Mr. Lewis gestured to Plaintiff through the window of Holding Cell No. 3, or that he was in any other manner aware that Mr. Lewis might be a problem. In fact, the only evidence related to Officer Smith's knowledge of Mr. Lewis' propensities is a statement he offers in an affidavit that there is nothing he "recall[s] about [Mr.] Lewis' conduct that evening that suggested that he was going to be a problem to anyone on the booking floor." Plaintiff provides no evidence to controvert Officer Smith's statement.
Presumably given the dearth of evidence relating to Officer Smith's knowledge of Mr. Lewis' propensities, Plaintiff intimates in her opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment that Officer Smith should have been aware of the substantial risk of sexual assault in this case because the risk was obvious. Unfortunately, Plaintiff fails to present any competent evidence that would satisfy the obviousness paradigm outlined by the Supreme Court in Farmer. 511 U.S. at 842-43. For instance, Plaintiff offers no evidence that the risk of sexual assault of female detainees by male detainees at the Douglas County Jail was "longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past," or that Officer Smith was exposed to any such information. The only evidence related to the issue of previous assaults at the Douglas County Jail is a statement Officer Smith gives in his affidavit that prior to the alleged assault in this case, he "was not aware of any incident in which a male detainee assaulted a female detainee as a result of holding cells being unlocked." Plaintiff's failure to present any evidence of such assaults undermines her contention that the risk was obvious. See, e.g., Butera v. Cottey, 285 F.3d 601, 608 (7th Cir. 2002) ("[Plaintiff's] claim fails because he has offered no evidence that any incident of sexual assault, other than his own, has ever occurred in [his cellblock]").
The only evidence Plaintiff offers to support her claim that Officer Smith acted with deliberate indifference to her safety is a February 28, 2000, letter from Plaintiff's expert witness, Frederick Postill, to Plaintiff's attorney. In the letter, Mr. Postill summarizes several pieces of literature allegedly issued by the National Sheriff's Association and the American Correctional Association which state, among other things, that male and female detainees should be separated from one another in detention facilities. At the conclusion of the letter, Mr. Postill offers the following preliminary opinion:
It is my preliminary opinion that as of April 1999 the County of Douglas, the County Sheriff and his jail staff on duty at the time [Plaintiff] was booked into and housed at the jail, failed to fulfill their duty to separate male and female inmates. This failure of well-established national correctional standards of care demonstrates a deliberate indifference to the welfare and safety of [Plaintiff] while she was in their custody and control.
In addition to being "preliminary" and rather conclusory, Mr. Postill's opinion purports to draw a legal conclusion from the facts of this case. Because such a legal conclusion is an improper subject for expert testimony, the court disregards it in considering Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Abbott v. Chem. Trust, No. 01-2049-JWL, 2001 WL 492388, at *5 n. 13 (D.Kan. Apr. 26, 2001) (citing A.E. ex rel. Evans v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 25, 936 F.2d 472, 476 (10th Cir. 1991)).
In sum, the court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to carry her burden of presenting evidence to show that Officer Smith acted with deliberate indifference to her safety. Thus, Officer Smith is entitled to qualified immunity, and the court grants summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff's individual capacity claim against him on that basis.
b. Officer Stewart
At the time of the alleged assault, Officer Stewart was a jailer with the Douglas County Sheriff's Department who was working in conjunction with Officer Smith processing detainees on the booking floor of the Douglas County Jail. The record is devoid of evidence relating to Officer Stewart's specific activities prior to the alleged assault, other than indicating that Officer Stewart was "assigned to booking all prisoners who came onto the booking floor," which presumably included Plaintiff and Mr. Lewis. For substantially the same reasons as those outlined with respect to Officer Smith, the court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy her heavy burden of showing that Officer Stewart was deliberately indifferent to her safety. Again, Plaintiff presents no evidence that Officer Stewart was in any way aware that Mr. Lewis, or other male detainees in general, might pose a threat to Plaintiff's safety. Officer Stewart states in an affidavit that, "I had no knowledge of any problem between Lewis and [Plaintiff] until after I heard [Plaintiff's] comments while sitting on the booking floor following the incident." Officer Stewart also states that he "was not aware that the door to Holding Cell No. 2 had been left unlocked until after the incident," and that, prior to this incident, he was "not aware of any incident in which a male detainee assaulted a female detainee as a result of holding cells being left unlocked." Other than the inadmissible "preliminary" opinion of her expert witness, Mr. Postill, Plaintiff offers no evidence to controvert any of Officer Stewart's statements. Because Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that Officer Stewart was deliberately indifferent to her safety, Officer Stewart is entitled to qualified immunity, and the court grants summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff's individual capacity claim against him on that basis.
c. Officer Kline
At the time of the alleged assault, Officer Kline was a jailer with the Douglas County Sheriff's Department who was working in a back room of the booking floor handling the fingerprinting and photographing of detainees. Officer Kline "was unaware that [Plaintiff] was even on the booking floor until [he] learned later from other jailers that an incident had occurred between her and another detainee."
As an initial matter, the court notes that a defendant will not be held liable under § 1983 unless the plaintiff can show that the defendant personally participated in the alleged violation. Jenkins v. Wood, 81 F.3d 988, 994 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 1976)). Here, the evidence shows that Officer Kline was working in a back room prior to the alleged assault and was not even aware that Plaintiff was on the booking floor until after the alleged assault. Although Plaintiff contends that Officer Kline was personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivation in that "[a]ll [he] had to do was to lock a cell to prevent what happened," the court concludes that the fact that Officer Kline's duties required him to work in a back room where he had no knowledge that Plaintiff was even on the booking floor demonstrates that he had no personal participation in the alleged violation. Accordingly, the court grants summary judgment to Officer Kline on that basis.
Even if the court were to determine that Officer Kline personally participated in the alleged violation, the court nevertheless concludes that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy her heavy burden of showing that Officer Kline acted with deliberate indifference to her safety. As was the case with Officers Smith and Stewart, Plaintiff presents no evidence that Officer Kline was in any way aware that Mr. Lewis, or other male detainees in general, might pose a threat to Plaintiff's safety. As noted, Officer Kline was not even aware that Plaintiff was on the booking floor until after the alleged assault. In addition, Officer Kline also states in an affidavit that, "prior to this incident I was unaware of any incident in which a male detainee assaulted a female detainee as a result of holding cells being unlocked." Other than the inadmissible "preliminary" opinion of Mr. Postill, Plaintiff offers no evidence to controvert any of Officer Kline's statements. Because Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that Officer Kline was deliberately indifferent to her safety, Officer Kline is entitled to qualified immunity, and the court grants summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff's individual capacity claim against him on that basis as well.
d. Officer Wunder
At the time of the alleged assault, Officer Wunder was a jailer with the Douglas County Sheriff's Department who was the officer in charge of Officers Smith, Stewart, and Kline. The evidence shows that as the officer in charge, she was required "to stay for the majority of the shift in the Control Room which is at one end of the booking floor and has a Plexiglas window through which [she] can view the majority of the booking floor including the doors to Holding Cells 1, 2, and 3." The evidence also shows that on the night of the alleged assault, Officer Wunder spent her time in the Control Room working at a desk finishing paperwork.
For the reasons previously articulated, the court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy her heavy burden of showing that Officer Wunder acted with deliberate indifference to her safety. As was the case with the other officers, Plaintiff presents no evidence that Officer Wunder was in any way aware that Mr. Lewis, or other male detainees in general, might pose a threat to Plaintiff's safety. Officer Wunder states in an affidavit that she had not heard of any problems between Plaintiff and Mr. Lewis until after the alleged assault had occurred. She also states that she was unaware that the door to Holding Cell No. 2 had been left unlocked after [Plaintiff] was placed in the cell until after the incident," and that, prior to this incident, she was "not aware of any incident in which a female detainee had been assaulted by a male detainee as a result of holding cells being left unlocked." Other than the inadmissible "preliminary" opinion of Mr. Postill, Plaintiff offers no evidence to controvert Officer Wunder's statements. Because Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that Officer Wunder was deliberately indifferent to her safety, Officer Wunder is entitled to qualified immunity, and the court grants summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff's individual capacity claim against her on that basis.
e. Sheriff Anderson
Sheriff Anderson is the sheriff of Douglas County, Kansas. As Sheriff, he has supervisory authority over the Douglas County Jail. Sheriff Anderson was not present at the jail on the night of the alleged assault.
As a supervisor, Sheriff Anderson may be held individually liable under § 1983 only if an "`affirmative link' exists between the constitutional deprivation and either the supervisor's personal participation, his exercise of control or direction, or his failure to supervise." Butler v. City of Norman, 992 F.2d 1053, 1055 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1527 (10th Cir. 1988)). However, when the plaintiff is unable to demonstrate an underlying constitutional violation on the part of the subordinate officers, there can be no action against the supervisor for his role in training or supervising them. Apodaca v. Rio Arriba County Sheriff's Dep't, 905 F.2d 1445, 1447-48 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986)). Here, Plaintiff's claim against Sheriff Anderson is based entirely on his alleged failure to adequately train and supervise Defendants Smith, Stewart, Kline, and Wunder. Because the court has already determined that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any constitutional violations by those defendants, the court grants summary judgment to Sheriff Anderson on Plaintiff's individual capacity claim against him.
3. Claim Against the County
Defendants also contend that the County is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's § 1983 claim. A suit against individual defendants acting in their official capacities is essentially the same as a suit against the County. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). To the extent that Plaintiff's § 1983 claim is brought against Defendants Anderson, Smith, Stewart, Kline, and Wunder in their official capacities, it is essentially the same as her suit against the County.
As was the case with Plaintiff's supervisory liability claim against Sheriff Anderson, "[a] municipality may not be held liable where there was no underlying constitutional violation by any of its officers." Hinton v. City of Elwood, 997 F.2d 774, 782 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing Heller, 475 U.S. at 799). Because the court has already concluded that no underlying constitutional violation was committed by any of the individual defendants in this case, the court grants summary judgment to the County and to Defendants Anderson, Smith, Stewart, Kline, and Wunder in their official capacities as well.
4. Punitive Damages Claim
Finally, Defendants argue, "[t]o the extent that the plaintiff seeks to recover punitive damages against the Board or the individual defendants in their official capacity, such damages are not available as a matter of law." Plaintiff concedes this argument in her opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment, and the court agrees that Defendants' argument is valid. A plaintiff "may not seek punitive damages against a municipality on a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Veith, 1996 WL 705365, at *2 (citing City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981) (further citations omitted)). Similarly, "[i]ndividual defendants sued in their official capacity are immune to claims for punitive damages brought under § 1983." Id. at *3 (citing Scheideman v. Shawnee County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 895 F. Supp. 279, 283 (D.Kan. 1995)). Accordingly, the court grants summary judgment to the County and Defendants Anderson, Smith, Stewart, Kline, and Wunder, acting in their official capacities, on Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages under § 1983.
B. State Law Negligence Claim
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim for negligence under Kansas state law because Plaintiff failed to adequately comply with K.S.A. § 12-105b(d) prior to filing her action. Having already granted summary judgment on Plaintiff's § 1983 claim, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). Given this, the court dismisses without prejudice Plaintiff's state law negligence claim, and denies without prejudice as moot Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to that claim.
IT IS, THEREFORE, BY THE COURT ORDERED that Defendants' motion is granted with respect to Plaintiff's § 1983 claim as to all Defendants and denied without prejudice as moot with respect to Plaintiff's state law negligence claim.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that because the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in this case, Plaintiff's state law negligence claim is dismissed without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.