Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:02-CV-1102-K.
June 21, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This case involves a refrigerator water valve which leaked in Plaintiffs' home in April of 2001. The damage caused by the leak was paid for by State Farm Lloyds ("State Farm"), which is the real plaintiff-in-interest in this case. Plaintiffs allege that the water valve manufactured by Defendant Emerson Electric Co. ("Emerson") suffered from a manufacturing defect, and allege negligent manufacture, strict products liability, and breach of warranty against Defendants.
This matter came before the Court for a two-day bench trial beginning December 1, 2003. The Court, having received and considered the evidence presented and having heard the testimony of witnesses and the argument of counsel, hereby renders the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. As permitted by Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a), the Court sets out its findings and conclusions in this memorandum opinion and order.
I. Background
At issue here is the question of whether Defendants Whirlpool Corporation ("Whirlpool") and Emerson should be held liable for the failed water valve in Plaintiffs Adi and Susan Kourim's refrigerator. State Farm paid the claim for water damage submitted by Plaintiffs, and State Farm is the real plaintiff in interest in this case. Plaintiffs bring this case against Defendants based on breach of warranty and strict products liability causes of action.
This case involves a solenoid-operated water valve ("valve") manufactured by Emerson Appliance Controls, a division of Emerson, in the fiftieth week of 1996. The valve was incorporated in a refrigerator manufactured in January 1997 by Whirlpool, and is the basis of this suit.
The valve is meant to control the volume of water that enters the icemaker in the refrigerator's freezer. The icemaker unit inside the freezer contains the controls that operate the valve, and at the proper time, the controls connect power to the valve to dispense water into the freezer tray. After a certain amount of time elapses, the icemaker disconnects power to the valve so that it will shut off. The water in the freezer tray freezes and is ejected from the tray in the form of icecubes, and the freezer tray is then refilled for the next cycle.
The refrigerator containing the valve was purchased by Adi and/or Susan Kourim in 1997 for use in their residence located at 3725 Shenanhoah, Dallas, Texas. The refrigerator was used continuously from 1997 until April 19, 2001. On or about April 19, 2001, the Kourims suffered a substantial leak in the kitchen of their home, which flowed into adjacent rooms.
Pursuant to its policy of insurance, State Farm paid for repairs to the Kourims' house and associated expenses, the total cost of such payments equaling $84,619.38. State Farm then tendered a subrogation claim to Emerson and Whirlpool for $84,619.38. Whirlpool and Emerson denied State Farm's subrogation claim.
Because Whirlpool and Emerson denied State Farm's subrogation claim, the Kourims, on behalf of State Farm, brought this action against Defendants for breach of warranty, negligence, and strict liability in connection with the failure of the valve.
II. Breach of Warranty
Texas law provides that, unless excluded or modified, a warranty that goods shall be merchantable when sold is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. See Tex. Bus. Comm. Code § 2.314(a). State Farm alleges that the valve manufactured by Emerson and sold by Defendants was not merchantable, thus breaching the implied warranty of merchantability.
Defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on the breach of warranty claim, which Plaintiffs failed to respond to. In the motion, Defendants allege that the breach of warranty claim asserted is time-barred.
Under Texas law, warranty claims accrue on the date the product in question is sold, and the statute of limitations extends for four years. See Tex. Bus. Comm. Code § 2.725; see also Allgood v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 80 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 1996); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Certainteed Corp., 710 S.W.2d 544, 546 (Tex. 1986). This time limitation is tolled only when there is an express warranty on the product which explicitly extends to future performance. See Allgood, 80 F.3d at 171 (citing Safeway Stores, Inc., 710 S.W.2d at 547). As the defense of statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, Defendants have the burden of establishing the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. See U.S. v. Retirement Services Group, 302 F.3d 425, 430 (5th Cir. 2002).
Defendants argue that because Plaintiffs did not bring suit in this case until April 15, 2002, their breach of warranty claim is time-barred. The Court agrees. As stated above, Defendants' statute of limitation defense fails as a matter of law if they prove that, more likely than not, the Kourims purchased the refrigerator at issue here more than four years before the accident occurred.
The evidence shows that Defendants have met their burden. First, Plaintiffs have stipulated that the valve itself was manufactured in December of 1996, and was installed as part of the Kourims' refrigerator in January of 1997. Additionally, Plaintiffs' expert, John Scates, testified at trial that Plaintiffs' refrigerator had been in service for over four years before the leaking occurred on April 19, 2001.
Accordingly, Defendants have established by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiffs' breach of warranty claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, which lasts four years and began running in January of 1997. Therefore, Plaintiffs' breach of warranty claim fails as a matter of law. Defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law on the breach of warranty issue is GRANTED, and judgment will enter that Plaintiffs take nothing on their breach of warranty claim.
III. Strict Liability — Manufacturing Defect
Under Texas law, section 402A fo the Restatement (Second) of Torts governs claims for strict liability. See American Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 426 (Tex. 1997) (citing Firestone Steel Profs. Co. v. Barajas, 927 S.W.3d 608, 613 (Tex. 1996)). Section 402(A) states that anyone who sells any product in a defective condition which is unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (1) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (2) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. See Grinnell, 951 S.W.3d at 426 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965)). A product may be unreasonably dangerous due to a defect in its marketing, design, or manufacturing. See Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d at 426.
Plaintiffs' First Amended Petition allege that Defendants should be held strictly liable to Plaintiffs because "the water valve in question deviated in quality from the design of other Emerson valves at the time it left Emerson Electronic. The valve contained a manufacturing defect in that it was not properly vulcanized and/or cross linked." Therefore, Plaintiffs allege that the water valve suffered from a manufacturing defect.
A plaintiff may recover on a manufacturing defect claim when the construction or quality of a finished product deviates from the specifications or planned output in a manner that renders it unreasonably dangerous, if the defect existed at the time the product left the seller and the defect was the producing cause of the plaintiff's injuries. See id. at 434 (Tex. 1997); Dico Tire, Inc. v. Cisneros, 953 S.W.2d 776, 783 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1997, pet. denied). If a plaintiff has no direct evidence of a manufacturing defect, he may establish a defect through circumstantial evidence by proving both (1) proper use of the product by the plaintiff, and (2) the product's malfunction. See Parsons v. Ford Motor Co., 85 S.W.3d 323, 329-30 (Tex.App. — Austin 2002, pet. denied). However, the plaintiff must trace the defect to the product's manufacturer. See id.
A. Emerson's Specifications or Planned Output
Plaintiffs presented no evidence to the Court regarding Emerson's design specifications or planned output of the water valves at issue here. While Plaintiffs complain that the rubber comprising the armiture tip of the water valve was defectively manufactured, they offer no evidence of how the valve in question deviated from nondefective valves manufactured by Emerson. Indeed, Plaintiffs failed to present evidence on the issue of what the specifications or planned output of the water valves were at the time of manufacture. An absence of such evidence is fatal to Plaintiffs' claim. See Flock v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 2001 WL 34111723, *14 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2001). In practicality, a manufacturing defect claim which fails to focus on how a product deviated from its planned output or specifications is actually a design defect claim masquerading as a manufacturing defect claim. See Grinnell, 951 S.W.3d at 434.
However, as will be shown below, even if Plaintiffs had presented evidence of Emerson's specifications and planned output of the water valves, they are unable to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a manufacturing defect was the cause of the water valve's failure.
B. Circumstantial Evidence of a Manufacturing Defect
As stated above, a product's malfunction, coupled with the lack of any evidence suggesting that the product had been tampered with since it left the manufacturer, is circumstantial proof of a defect. See Rios, 2004 WL 343541, at *3. Here, the parties do not dispute that the water valve in the Kourims' refrigerator failed. The only issue is whether the failure can be traced to Emerson.
Because the product did malfunction, and because the evidence established that the valve was never tampered with by Plaintiffs or anyone else, there is circumstantial evidence that the valve suffered from a manufacturing defect. However, the age and use of a product which is claimed to be defective can support or defeat the circumstantial weight of the malfunction as proof of the defect. See General Motors Corp v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 350 (Tex. 1977).
The evidence indicates that the age of the valve could have played a role in the failure of the valve. Defendants called Arthur Kessler of Emerson Appliance Controls as one of its witnesses at trial. On cross-examination, Mr. Kessler testified that the average life cycle of the valves at issue is five to six years under normal use. The valve in this case failed after over four years' use. Plaintiffs did not contest this testimony at trial. Therefore, Mr. Kessler's testimony gives rise to the possibility that the valve failed because of its age, not due to a manufacturing defect.
Additionally, Defendants raise the possibility that chloramine in the water sent to the Kourims' home caused the rubber to deteriorate. The Kourims' home is in the town of Highland Park, Dallas County, Texas. Drinking Water Quality Reports for Highland Park from 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002 are before the Court as Defense Exhibit A, and each report shows that the city uses chloramine in the water supply to disinfect the water sent to citizens' homes. Defendants' expert witness, Steven Reiber, Ph.D., is the Director of the Water Quality and Corrosion Services Laboratory in Bellevue, Washington. In a letter admitted before the Court as Defense Exhibit B, Dr. Reiber states that research has "identified chloramine disinfectants as being uniquely injurious to many different elastomeric (rubber) types. The susceptibility of a wide range of different elastomer formulations to chloramine disinfectants has only recently become clear."
While Plaintiffs' expert, John Scates, states that "any claim that the water condition was poor or contained unreasonable levels of contaminants would be without merit," Mr. Scates provides nothing but his conclusory testimony to support this assertion. Such testimony is not sufficient to rebut evidence properly before the Court.
Considering the evidence before the Court, any circumstantial evidence created merely by the valve's malfunction is rebutted by Defendants' evidence that the age of the filter and/or the chloramine levels of the water passing through the Kourims' refrigerator could have caused the failure. Thus, Plaintiffs' circumstantial evidence, if any, is insufficient to establish a manufacturing defect by a preponderance of the evidence.
C. Expert Testimony Regarding a Manufacturing Defect
Plaintiffs also attempt to establish a manufacturing defect through the testimony of their expert witness, John Scates, who is a mechanical engineer. Mr. Scates inspected and tested the valve in question, submitted two reports detailing his findings, and at trial, testified that the valve was defective due to Emerson's faulty manufacture. Mr. Scates testified that the defective nature of the valve allowed it to leak water and flood the Kourims' home.
Mr. Scates' first expert report, dated June 13, 2001 ("June 13 report") and admitted as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 11, recounts the following:
Water valves of the type used here use a spring-loaded pin to open and close the valve. A solenoid (electro-magnet) is used to retract the pin to open it, allowing water to flow to the icemaker. When the electrical power is removed, the pin is pressed back against its seat by an internal spring.
In the June 13 report, Mr. Scates determined that the valve in the Kourims' refrigerator was faulty. However, he explained that he could not determine the actual reason for the valve's failure without disassembling it, thereby destroying it. The Kourims' agreed to Mr. Scates' performing the destructive testing on the valve, which occurred on January 7, 2002.
In Mr. Scates' January 12, 2002 report ("January 12 report"), admitted into evidence as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12, he explained in detail the way in which the valve was supposed to work, and how the valve failed in the Kourims' case. During the normal course of operation, power is supplied to the solenoid, an electro-magnet, to open the valve. Once the valve is open, the solenoid retracts the pin inside the valve, allowing water to flow. When there is no power, a spring presses the pin into the "off" position, thereby cutting off the flow of water through the valve. Water moves through the valve by entering through a hole in a piece of white plastic. A piece of black rubber is installed on the end of the pin facing the piece of white plastic, and when the valve is in the "off" position, the rubber is supposed to seal off the hole in the piece of white plastic.
Mr. Scates' January 12 report stated that the rubber at the end of the pin "had become so soft and sticky that it could not retract and reseat on command Furthermore, its softness allowed it to become deformed, and the lip around the hole had punched through it and reshaped it." Mr. Scates stated that in such a condition, the rubber tip of the pin could not fully cover and seal the hole as was required for proper valve operation. Accordingly, Mr. Scates' January 12 report stated that, in his opinion, the valve was defectively designed or manufactured.
Mr. Scates' testimony at the trial of this matter reconfirmed the positions he set forth in his two expert reports. Mr. Scates testified that the rubber at the end of the pin in the valve was Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer ("EPDM") rubber, which becomes hardened during what is called the vulcanization process. Mr. Scates testified that, in his opinion, the rubber was improperly vulcanized, and thus after a period of time it reverted to its pre-vulcanization form, which is as a gum-like substance.
In Rios, the court held that an expert's opinion on whether an automobile tire suffered from a manufacturing defect was not reliable when the opinion was based only on visual and tactile testing. Discussing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), the court stated that while visual and tactile testing by an expert could be reliable in some cases, there was no evidence supporting the method undertaken by the expert in Rios. In Kumho, the Supreme Court stated that while an expert may be qualified, his opinion may not be reliable when there is an absence of evidence showing that his methods are common among industry-wide experts, and when a lack of scholarly work or testimony of others validating his methods exists. See Rios, 2004 WL 343541, *6-7 ( quoting Kumho, 526 U.S. at 156).
Like Rios and Kumho, there is no evidence here showing that Mr. Scates' visual and tactile methods of testing the water valve are reliable. On cross examination Mr. Scates did testify that, other than his opinion, there was no evidence showing that the valve was not processed according to its standard design. While an expert's opinion may be evidence of a manufacturing defect, a district court is not required to admit evidence on an issue which is connected to the data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 156. Accordingly, Mr. Scates' testimony amounts to no evidence of a manufacturing defect. See Rios, 2004 WL 343541, at *7.
Plaintiffs have failed to establish their manufacturing defect claim as a matter of law. Therefore, judgment will enter that Plaintiffs take nothing on their manufacturing defect strict liability claim.
IV. Negligent Manufacturing
In addition to seeking recovery from Defendants under a strict liability cause of action, Plaintiffs also claim that Emerson's manufacture of the valve was negligent, thus making Defendants liable to Plaintiffs for negligent manufacturing. Defendants deny this assertion.
While strict liability focuses on the condition of the product, negligence looks at the acts of the manufacturer and determines if the manufacturer exercised ordinary care in the design and production of the product. See id., 951 S.W.2d at 437 (Tex. 1997) ( quoting Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears, 911 S.W.2d 379, 384 (Tex. 1995)). Like a design defect claim, a claim for negligent manufacturing is based on the existence of a safer alternative design of the product. See Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d at 437. Without proof of a safer alternative design, a negligent manufacturing claim fails as a matter of law. See id. A negligence cause of action requires a legal duty, breach of that duty, and damages proximately resulting from that breach. See Van Horn v. Chambers, 970 S.W.2d 542, 543 (Tex. 1998).
The only time Plaintiffs mention a safer alternative design is in their original Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law before the Court. In that document, after acknowledging the need to prove a safer alternative design by a preponderance of the evidence, Plaintiffs simply state that "[t]here was a safer alternative design for the rubber seat, but Emerson failed to use the design. . . . The alternative design would have prevented or significantly reduced the risk of damaging Plaintiff's property. The alternative design for the Emerson valve was technologically feasible for Emerson."
Additionally, on cross-examination by Defendants' counsel, Mr. Scates testified that other designs were on the market, but may be patented. He also stated that he was not suggesting that an economically safer alternative design existed, and that he was only testifying as to a manufacturing defect.
Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to provide any evidence whatsoever of a safer alternative design with regards to the valve. Accordingly, their negligent manufacturing cause of action fails as a matter of law. See Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d at 437.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, each of Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants fail as a matter of law. Accordingly, judgment will enter this day that Plaintiffs take nothing in this suit against Defendants.
SO ORDERED.